

HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



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A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations



Peace Operations Training Institute®

Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions

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A Thesis

by


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The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations.

Submitted



18 November 2011

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
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12 Dec 2011

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ABSTRACT

Until recent times, the significance of understanding culture in peacekeeping missions was not seriously considered. Due to the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping missions which brings peacekeepers in close contact with local populations many challenges connected with “culture” have shown up.

Many authors agree that the relationship of the local population towards peacekeeping troops is a decisive element in determining the mission’s success or failure.

Recognizing that establishing and maintaining a positive relationship with the local population is a prerequisite to mission success, peacekeepers should be required to have a sound understanding of, and respect for, cultural differences and an appreciation of the different norms and traditions of the host state. It is critically important that peacekeepers demonstrate extraordinary carefulness, self-control, and understanding towards other cultures, so that their behavior does not have a chance of reflecting a poor image of the UN mission.

However, based on numerous reports, deficiency of cultural understanding about the host state society by peacekeepers occurs quite often. A failure to collect, analyze, understand, and use information on local population may lead to lack of regular, and systematic attention to local attitudes towards the UN mission.

This paper explores solutions for a systematic approach to cultural awareness in peacekeeping missions. For that reason, the "Human Terrain System", widely used in U.S. military to provide "cultural awareness" to planning and conducting all military operations, has been discussed in more details. This paper defines the concept of culture and its importance. It describes the stages of cultural adaption and discusses cross-cultural interaction in peacekeeping missions. More specifically it points out the need of understanding cultural differences and building cultural awareness on the part of peacekeepers.

Finally, the intention is to recommend establishment of a formalized structure in the UN DPKO and within each peacekeeping mission that would be charged with insuring "cultural awareness" on the part of the mission and the peacekeepers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to Mr. Karl Farris, for guiding me in preparing this thesis right from the conception of the topic and subsequently providing precious guidelines in developing the thesis. Without his support and encouragement it would not have been possible to complete this thesis.

I also give thanks to Brigadier Kenan Dautović, PhD, Commandant and Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Bower, Director of Studies of Peace Support Operations Training Centre - a Centre of Excellence in the PSO area (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) for giving extraordinary support to finalize this project.

I am also very grateful to Ms. Susan Terrien, Mr. George Oliver, Dr. Harvey J. Langholtz and the entire staff of the prestigious UN Peace Operations Training Institute for their assistance and valuable guidance in bringing this work to completion.

Finally, I would like to express my profound gratefulness to my family without whose encouragement this project would have been much more challenging and harder to finalize.

ACRONYMS

BCT	-	Brigade Combat Team
CIDA	-	Canadian International Development Agency
COA	-	Course of Action
COP	-	Common Operating Picture
CPE	-	Cultural Preparation of the Environment
CPTM	-	Core Pre- Deployment Training Module
DIV	-	Division
ECHO	-	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
HQ	-	Headquarters
HTS	-	Human Terrain System
HTT	-	Human Terrain Team
IMPP	-	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IO	-	Information Operations
IOC	-	Initial Operating Capability
IPB	-	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IRC	-	International Rescue Committee
JUONS	-	Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements
METL	-	Mission Essential Task List
METT-T	-	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, friendly Troops and support available, and Time
METT-TC	-	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, friendly Troops and support available, Time and Civil considerations.
MHQ	-	Multinational Headquarters
MSF	-	Doctors Without Borders
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
OEF	-	Operations Enduring Freedom
OIF	-	Operations Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN	-	Operations Plan
OSCE	-	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OXFAM	-	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PCC	-	Police-Contributing Country
PIR	-	Priority Information Requirements
SDS	-	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SMEs-Net	-	Subject Matter Experts Network
SMG	-	Senior Management Group
SOFA	-	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	-	Status of Mission Agreement
TCC	-	Troop-Contributing Country
TES	-	Training and Evaluation Service
TRADOC	-	Training and Doctrine Command
UN	-	United Nations
UN DFS	-	United Nations Department of Field Support

- UN DPKO - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
- UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- US - The United States
- US DoD - The United States Department of Defense
- USAID - The United States Agency for International Development
- USMC - The United States Marine Corps
- WHO - World Health Organization

Chapter One – Introduction

Culture is a serious and at the same time very sensitive topic. Thus, it is very important that peacekeepers understand the differences in cultures and their effects to prevent misunderstandings. However, until recent times, the significance of understanding culture in peacekeeping was not seriously considered. Due to the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping missions which brings peacekeepers in close contact with local populations many challenges connected with “culture” have shown up.¹

The environment in which the peacekeeper is going to work is complex. Today’s missions are multi-culturally composed and take place in diverse cultural contexts. In particular, it concerns the local environment, with its specific habits and cultures. Many authors agree that the relationship of the local population towards peacekeeping troops is a decisive element in determining the mission’s success or failure.²

Recognizing that establishing and maintaining a positive relationship with the local population is a prerequisite to mission success, peacekeepers should be required to have a sound understanding of, and respect for, cultural differences and an appreciation of the different norms and traditions of the host state.

It is critically important that peacekeepers demonstrate extraordinary carefulness, self-control, and understanding towards other cultures, so that their behavior does not have a chance of reflecting a poor image of the UN mission.

However, based on numerous reports,^{3,4} deficiency of cultural understanding about the host state society by peacekeepers occurs quite often. A failure to collect, analyze, understand, and use information about the local population may lead to lack of regular, and systematic attention to local attitudes towards the UN mission.

¹ Phyllis J. Mihalas (2008) “Attitudes and Behaviours of MILOBS and Peacekeepers” in H. Langholtz (eds.), *United Nations Military Observers: Methods and Techniques for Serving on a UN Observer Mission*, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 17.

² Heiberg, Marianne. *Peacekeepers and Local Population: Some Comments on UNIFIL*. In *The United Nations and Peacekeeping*. Indarjit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. (page 147-148).

³ Chopra, Jarat and Tanja Hohe. *Participatory Intervention*. *Global Governance*, 2004,10:289-305;

⁴ Myint-U, Thant and Elizabeth Sellwood. *Knowledge and Multilateral Interventions: The UN’s Experiences in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

The Concept of Culture

An extensive amount of research has been conducted related to the concept of culture. While this thesis is not an in-depth look at the concept of culture, the understanding that culture plays an increasingly important role in peacekeeping missions, requires that culture and its importance become a key factor in both planning and conduct of missions.

Culture (Latin: *cultura*, lit. "cultivation")⁵ is a term that has many different related meanings. For example, in 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of "culture".⁶

One source suggests that the word "culture" is most commonly used in three basic senses:

1. *"Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture"*
2. *An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning*
3. *The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution, organization, or group.*⁷

Slightly different aspects of the culture have been presented in the dictionary:

1. *"that which is excellent in the arts, manners, etc."*
2. *a particular form or stage of civilization, as that of a certain nation or period: e.g. Greek culture.*
3. *development or improvement of the mind by education or training.*
4. *the behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a particular social, ethnic, or age group: e.g., the youth culture; the drug culture.*⁸

⁵ Harper, Douglas (2001). Online Etymology Dictionary.

⁶ Kroeber, A. L. and C. Kluckhohn, 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.

⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org>

⁸ <http://dictionary.reference.com>

However, Georg Simmel proposed more simplified view suggesting that culture referred to "*the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course of history*".⁹

Hence, we can see that there are numbers of different definitions, concepts, and theories on culture. As shown in the few examples above, the definition of the term "culture" is apparently a matter of a wide-ranging debate. Nevertheless, our intention here is neither to enter into that debate nor to resolve this complex discussion.

In its simplest form, and for the purpose of this thesis, we will use Duffey's definition: "*Culture is a system of implicit and explicit beliefs, values and behaviours shared by the members of a community or group, through which experience is expressed and interpreted.*"¹⁰ In other words culture provides an understanding of group and individual beliefs, values and behaviour and how they are interpreted.

Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott suggest that a number of factors play a role in shaping a culture. The following factors, amongst others, will influence culture with a varying degree: "*Urbanization – measure in how far people are concentrated in urbanized city areas; Nationalism – patriotism, fealty to one's country; Migration – measure of people who move to or from a country, which brings different cultures together; Colonization – the settlement of one country in another influencing the local culture; Minority experience – a group of people in a country that do not represent the majority; they can sometimes feel dominated by the majority group; Industrialization – measure of industries integrated in society; Education – measure of schools integrated in society; Social Background – the way society is divided into social layers; Ethnic Background – a person's racial background; Religion – a person's beliefs; Gender – the interaction between men and women; the balance between the two genders and the specific society; Language – a society can have many different languages that divide the groups; Profession – what people do for a living can shape the individual culture, etc.*"¹¹

⁹ Levine, Donald (ed) 'Simmel:On individuality and social forms' Chicago University Press, 1971., page 6.

¹⁰ Duffey, T. (2000), "Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping". In T. Woodhouse and O. Ramsbotham (eds.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London: Frank Cass, page 165

¹¹ Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) "Cultural Awareness" in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute*, page 15.

Culture determines the way we operate, the style in which we communicate with others, and the way that we think about and understand events happening around us. However, we have to understand that culture is neither constant nor homogenous, and it is not merely a custom. It is actually a composite responsive process and more importantly it changes over time, as a consequence of the “changing nature” of above mentioned factors.

Foundation of Culture

Culture is built through the development of socialization. That means we learn relative values and appropriate behaviors from our community members. There are different levels of culture. Consequently, as noted by Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott, one deals with observable aspects, such as clothing, language, and food. Another level, which is not always observable, includes our shared ideas, beliefs and values. These usually become apparent when people from different social systems interact.¹²

It should also be pointed out, that individuals do not represent a single culture, but rather multiple cultures. Many cultural groups exist within the larger ones, including age, gender, class, profession, and religion. Although culture is usually used to refer to relatively large groups of people and the boundaries between cultures often correspond with ethnic and political boundaries (e.g., American, Zambian, European, Asian), there are many cultural groups that exist within the larger ones; these are referred to as *micro-cultures* (e.g., age, gender, class, military, civilian).¹³

¹² Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) “Cultural Awareness” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 15.

¹³ Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 167.

Stereotypes and Prejudices

Process of creating stereotypes starts when people start making generalizations about other people and attributing characteristics to them. If “objective” of generalizations is cultural groups then there is a big danger of creating negative stereotypes, which surely will lead to prejudice.

As outlined by Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott, “*a cycle of prejudice begins when we start judging other cultures by our own set of standards to define the world around us.*”

Prejudices are created based upon incomplete information and “sorted” by an individual based upon his/her own background and experiences. An unintentional conflict or misunderstanding may be caused by either lack of knowledge or reluctance to learn the local culture. “*The only way to break this cycle is to be aware of cultural differences and try to understand their origins*”.¹⁴

Peacekeepers have to be very careful about own expectations in order to avoid any possibilities of making stereotypes or forming prejudices against the local population.

Cultural Differences

As mentioned, the only way to stay away from a cultural narrow-mindedness is to make ourselves aware of cultural differences and try to comprehend their genesis.

For that reason we will do a short examination of different ways and levels related to cultural differences.

The Figure 1 shown below provides an interesting examination of different ways and differing levels of depth related to cultural differences and notes the five areas of considerations.

¹⁴ Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) “Cultural Awareness” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 16.




Figure 1- Manifestation of Culture at Different Levels of Depth
 Source: Hofstede, G. (1997). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind. New York: McGraw Hill, page 8.

As Hofstede pointed out, cultural differences manifest themselves in different ways and differing levels of depth. As depicted in the figure above, symbols are found in the outermost layer of a culture. **“Symbols represent the most superficial, as values represent the deepest manifestations of culture, with heroes and rituals in between”** (e.g. words, gestures, pictures, or objects) that are familiar only to those sharing a particular culture. They are variable within the time frame. They may be copied from another culture and new symbols could appear and easily be developed, while old ones disappear. **“Heroes are persons, past or present, real or fictitious, who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture.”** Heroes are used as models “how to behave” in one culture. **“Rituals are collective activities, sometimes superfluous in reaching desired objectives, but are considered as socially essential (e.g. ways of greetings, paying respect to others, religious and social ceremonies, etc.)”**. **Values** are placed in the center of a culture. **“They are broad tendencies for preferences of certain state of affairs to others (good-evil, right-wrong, natural-unnatural)”**. Sometimes values are not visible by others. Symbols, heroes, and rituals represent **“the tangible or visual aspects of the Practices of a culture”**. Therefore, we may understand the true cultural meaning of the practices only when they are discovered – **“interpreted by the insiders.”**¹⁵

¹⁵ Hofstede, G.(1997).Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind. New York: McGraw Hill, page 8. 13

As indicated, culture and cultural differences may have very strong consequences and may lead to misunderstandings and conflicts. Therefore it is required from peacekeepers to be able to manage these differences.

Cultural Awareness

As concluded, misunderstanding arising from cultural differences often leads to conflict. Indeed, many of the intractable conflicts in the post-Cold War are rooted in cultural differences. Struggles over ethnicity and religion (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, Congo, East Timor, Kosovo), involve deeply rooted beliefs and values that are often more consequential than economic or political factors.

According to Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott Cultural Awareness is built through three steps: *“Firstly, we need to fully understand our culture, how personal cultural experiences have shaped our communication styles, and why we do things a certain way. Secondly, we need to understand the specific culture we would be working with, and lastly, we need to view cultural differences not as weaknesses but as strengths that enable us to solve problems in a unique and creative manner.”*¹⁶

In an effort to better understand the process of building cultural awareness and how the above mentioned steps correlate to the level of cultural awareness, Woodhouse and Duffey provided a broader elaboration on this topic.

Naming the first step as “Awareness of Your Own Cultural Frameworks”, Woodhouse and Duffey point out that *“we all belong to a variety of cultural groups, and that the implicit and explicit beliefs, assumptions and rules embedded in those groups guide our everyday thinking and acting”*. Further, they suggested that in order to improve our

¹⁶ Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) “Cultural Awareness” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 19.

interaction with others it is important to understand “*how personal cultural experiences have shaped our conceptions of conflict and approaches to managing and resolving conflict.*” With regards to the second step “Awareness of Others’ Cultural Frameworks”, it is noted that “many of the things we take for granted may lead to ineffective communication and increase the potential for misunderstanding and conflict, particularly when we know little about the people we are interacting with”. Pragmatically speaking, it is very much unlikely that we have knowledge on all cultures in the world. Nevertheless, it is critically important that we are aware of cultural differences and that we are flexible and able to manage them. In light of looking at cultural differences not as weaknesses but as strengths that enable us to solve problems in a unique and creative manner, the final step of building cultural awareness suggested by, Woodhouse and Duffey emphasizes the importance of “*being receptive to these differences and to work with them, not against them*”. By doing so, peacekeepers will prevent possible consequences of the cultural shock and make the process of adaption more effective.¹⁷

Cultural Shock and the Stages of Adaption

From the moment of their arrival in the mission area peacekeepers may start feeling initial discomfort towards new and unfamiliar environment. Due to different climate, language, currency, road signs, some peacekeepers may become homesick of depressed and some may even become hostile towards the host nation’s population and culture. Therefore, it is required that peacekeepers are aware of an adaptation process which is necessary for their adjustment to the new culture. According to some authors, there are several stages (see Figure 2) of the adaptation to a new culture: Honeymoon, Initial confrontation, Adjustment Crisis and Recovery.¹⁸

¹⁷ Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 182-183.

¹⁸ Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) “Cultural Awareness” in H. Langholtz (eds.), Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 19.

Stage	Situation	Approaches	Reactions
Honeymoon	First contact with the culture	Observe	Excitement, curiosity, slight concern
Initial Confrontation	First intensive feeling with the culture	Solve problems in familiar ways	Surprise and confusion; mystified about others' behaviours
Adjustment Crisis	Problems intensify	Some experimentation with new behaviours	Feeling frustration, anger, confusion about own identity
Recovery	Sense of belonging to culture emerges	New strategies to help one function effectively	Now feeling that the culture is understandable, enjoying many aspects of the new culture

Figure 2 - Stages of the Adaptation to a New Culture

Source: Elias A. and M. Mc Darmott (2008) "Cultural Awareness" in H. Langholtz (eds.), Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 20.

Cultural shock is the natural response when an individual is taken from his/her own national and ethnic environment and placed in another. As observed by Harleman, the local environment is *per se* a potential dilemma if it is not seriously considered. Some people deal with the problem more effectively than others, and those who have the benefit of previous assignments will overcome the event more quickly than "first-timers". Thus, the mission environment and the local culture and habits are factors that will affect the peacekeeper.¹⁹

¹⁹ Harleman Christian (2008) "The Working Concept, Social and Cultural Environment" in H. Langholtz (eds.), An Introduction To The UN System: Orientation For Serving On a UN Field Mission, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 75-76.

Chapter Two – Cross-Cultural Interaction in Peacekeeping Missions

Horizontal Interoperability in Peacekeeping

It is the intention to focus this thesis on the host population culture and interaction between the local populace and peacekeepers, or “vertical interoperability” as labeled by some authors.²⁰

However, this is not the complete story. It is not enough to focus solely on the culture of the host population in order to prepare peacekeepers, both military and civilian, for interaction in the mission area. A multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation is composed of a wide variety “actors” each with their unique organizational structures as well as operational cultures and practices.

Major “actors” that are usually organizationally part of the peacekeeping mission include a Multi-national Military Component, an Electoral Component, a Human Rights Component, a UN Police Component, a Civil Affairs Component and others depending on the nature of the missions mandate. Organizationally within the structure of the peacekeeping mission there will also be representation from various UN Programs and Agencies (e.g., UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, etc).

There will also be external “players” working in the peacekeeping mission area in a variety of activities, but which are not part of the organizational structure of the peacekeeping mission. National Donor Country Agencies such as USAID, ECHO,

²⁰ In their article “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions”, Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael call the interaction that takes place among various kinds of international actors participating in peacekeeping ‘horizontal interoperability’, and the interactions of those people with local populations, ‘vertical interoperability’. However, the terms ‘horizontal and vertical integration’ are used in a metaphorical sense only. There is no authors’ intention to characterize either the mission or the local population as culturally ‘above’ or ‘below’, or ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the other. (Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael, Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, page 540)

CIDA, etc., are one example of such organizations. And, in most cases, there will be a wide variety of both large (International) and small non-governmental organizations (NGO's) such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF), OXFAM, IRC, etc.

The point is that no matter the size or scope of the peacekeeping mission, because of their varied nature, and the different outlooks and operational “cultures” of the many component elements, the situation is fraught with potential for misunderstanding, miscommunication, and organizational rivalry.

If there is a lack of clear understanding of all the various organizational elements by each other conflict often occurs impacting negatively on execution of the peacekeeping mission’ mandate. Therefore, along with the need for cultural understanding on the part of the peacekeepers for the foreign population/culture in which they are deployed, there are other areas as well that need cultural awareness, training and understanding.

One such area is an understanding of the different military cultures of the national military units that make up the multi-national military coalition which forms the military component for the peacekeeping mission.

Another is the military component’s need for understanding the organizational purpose, capabilities and operational cultures of the various non-military components that are part of the mission as well as those numerous organizations that are not part of the mission but are working in the mission area alongside the peacekeeping mission.

Conversely, all these non-military organizations must be familiar with the general military culture, the organization of the military component in the mission, its mandate and the tasks that have been assigned to the military component. Such “horizontal” cultural awareness and understanding is especially important for the senior leaders of the various components as they establish policies and direct the work of their organizations in working with the other components to achieve a unified mission effort.

Levels of cultural interaction in peacekeeping were examined in a study by Woodhouse and Duffey, and a broader elaboration on this topic has been provided.

According to these authors intercultural contact in peacekeeping environments occurs on a number of different levels, including between: “(1) *the national contingents that comprise a peacekeeping force; (2) the diverse personnel who work with diplomatic, humanitarian and other civilian agencies; (3) the military and civilian organizations involved in establishing and sustaining the mission; (4) the peacekeepers (military and civilian personnel) and the local population; and (5) the different cultural or ethnic groups who may be in conflict.*”²¹

Levels of cultural interaction in peacekeeping are depicted below (see Figure 3).




Figure 3 - Cultural Interaction in Peacekeeping

Source: Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 173.

Speaking about the “Civilians-Civilians” relationship presented in diagram above, the authors emphasized diversity of the “humanitarian community” in peacekeeping

²¹ Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 173.

environment. That diversity, according to authors, is twofold, different nature of the organization (e.g., its objectives, size, expertise, quality) and different cultural background of its personnel. A failure to recognize these differences may create difficulties in coordination of humanitarian activities. While describing the “Military-Military” relationship, the authors pointed out that peacekeeping forces, although serving under UN flag and wearing blue beret or a blue helmet are made up of troops from different nations and cultures. Thus, as authors noted, those forces have different “mission objectives and standards, rules of engagement, use of force, staff procedures, chains of command, etc.” Consequently, such diversity may influence not only military efficiency of the overall mission, but also perception of local populace towards the mission.²²

Thus, as part of "cultural understanding," the peacekeeping mission should make an effort to provide as much information as possible to the local population about the purposes of the peacekeeping mission, its goals and the diverse nature of its organization. This should be done through a well-structured information program that is part of a larger information campaign directed at the local population to create a positive image of the peacekeeping mission.

The authors especially emphasized importance of and challenges to the “Military-Civilian” relationship. They pointed out that there are “several very different **organizational cultures**²³ operating in contemporary peacekeeping environments: international/diplomatic (e.g., UN, OSCE), military, civilian police, NGO (international humanitarian, human rights, development and conflict resolution, and local/grassroots).” According to authors, each organization has its own understanding of the conflict situation and its own intervention policies and practices. Those differences may create

²² Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Peace Operations Training Institute, 174.

²³ According to Woodhouse and Duffey, “An *organisational culture* is the way a group is organised and how it functions, the way an organisation approaches its tasks and its relationships with other organizations.”

clashes between military and civilian agencies, or create negative stereotypes and suspicions on both sides that may further hinder cooperation. In describing the “Peacekeepers (Military/Civilian)-Locals” relationship the authors noted that “the fundamental doctrinal peacekeeping principles of consent and impartiality have been seriously challenged for the sake of humanitarian intervention in some “recent” peacekeeping missions, (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda). In order to protect those principles, authors suggested better and deeper understanding of the conflict and local population’s culture and traditions.²⁴

An interesting examination of the importance of understanding culture in peacekeeping missions, taking all levels into account, with the supposition that cultural considerations affect mission outcomes, was provided at the tenth conference of the European Research Group on Military and Society in Stockholm in June 2009.

The contributions from several authors at the conference highlighted the cultural dimensions and complexity of peacekeeping missions and underlined the consequences of disregarding cultural issues and their effects on missions.

Woodhouse presents an overview of the relationships between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict resolution with an emphasis on the way that cultural analysis might help to develop effective and sustainable peacekeeping interventions. His article comments on the conceptualization of the role of culture in conflict resolution theory, and how concepts have been used to address cultural barriers to effective peacekeeping.²⁵

Schaefer draws attention to the local level and the prerequisites for successful peacebuilding. He argues that peacebuilding without cultural sensitivity is empty, while cultural sensitivity should not be applied without cosmopolitan values. Sustainability considerations require that peacebuilding approaches are locally accepted, and that

²⁴ Woodhouse and Duffey (2008) “Culture, Conflict Resolution And Peacekeeping” in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 174.

²⁵ Ramsbotham Oliver, Woodhouse Tom and Miall Hugh, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, page 141–143.

local acceptance depends not least on the degree to which these approaches are commensurate with local understandings and cultural practices.²⁶

Tomforde's article follows the argument that German soldiers in Afghanistan find themselves in an 'intercultural dilemma'. The article discusses the tactical–operational level with regard to how much intercultural competence Bundeswehr 'peacekeepers' need and what kind of intercultural challenges they encounter in Afghanistan.²⁷

Haaland shows that a cultural transformation has taken place in Norwegian units deployed abroad – as the framework for these missions shifted from UN to NATO command in the mid-1990s. In UN missions during and shortly after the Cold War, there had been a cultural gap between the military at home and units deployed abroad, and experiences from these missions were perceived as irrelevant to national defence. After NATO became the preferred framework for Norwegian deployments, national military culture focused primarily on war-fighting skills and discipline, replacing the UN culture's focus on non-combat skills and practical problem-solving. Haaland argues that this transformation has had an impact on the Norwegian units' interaction with local cultures.²⁸

Vuga examines the question of armed forces' capability to manage cultural differences within multinational peacekeeping mission environments, taking the Slovenian contingent in Lebanon and its multinational cooperation as her case study. Complex peace missions, as opposed to traditional ones, require a multinational structure and cooperation with several non-military actors/subjects. Culture, encompassing the military organizational culture as well as the so-called 'national culture', unquestionably has a substantial impact on relationships in multinational missions.²⁹

Haddad examines how intercultural skills are used by the French military in their daily life during a peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. As an essential part of professional

²⁶ Schaefer Christoph Daniel, Local Practices and Normative Frameworks in Peacebuilding, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.4, August 2010, page 499–514

²⁷ Tomforde Maren, How Much Culture is Needed? The Intercultural Dilemma of the Bundeswehr in ISAF, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.4, August 2010, page 526–538

²⁸ Haaland Torunn Laugen, Still Homeland Defenders at Heart? Norwegian Military Culture in International Deployments, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.4, August 2010, page 539–553

²⁹ Vuga Janja, Cultural Differences in Multinational Peace Operations: A Slovenian Perspective, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.4, August 2010, page 554–565

military education and a component of military efficiency, cultural awareness is supposed to play a key role in fulfilling peacekeeping missions. The contention here is that there is a gap between the official discourse on cultural awareness and the way that the military experience their daily life and perceive multiculturalism during missions.³⁰

All of the ideas in present research can be summed-up with a statement that intercultural contact in peacekeeping environments occurs on a number of different levels and the need to promote better understanding of each other's cultural organization and function is essential to enhance coordination and co-operation in the field.

As observed by Stanley, due to cultural norms diversity, military component of the peacekeeping mission may find difficult to accept "*predominantly civilian cultural norms of the United Nations (UN) and the Human Relief Organizations*". Thus, the senior leaders must be able to understand the organizational and operational characteristics, as well as operational advantages and disadvantages of each of the peacekeeping mission components and elements."³¹

³⁰ Haddad Said, Teaching Diversity and Multicultural Competence to French Peacekeepers, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.4, August 2010, page 566–577

³¹ Stanley Chua Hon Kiat, *Psychological Dimensions of Peacekeeping: The Role of the Organization*, found on http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_2/1.htm, accessed on 10 Oct 2011.

Vertical Interoperability in Peacekeeping

For the purpose of this paper we must now examine in more detail how **deep culture**³² matters in peacekeeping missions, and how to improve interaction between peacekeepers and local population – vertical interoperability.

According to Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger, respect and partnership serve as key elements or symbols for vertical interoperability.³³ However, based on numerous reports,^{34,35} peacekeeping missions have generally failed to communicate these values in their actions. The main challenges in achieving interaction between peacekeepers and local population is to get them sharing common understandings towards the meanings for the actions undertaken by both the mission and local population. Thus, peacekeepers need to be familiar with issues of identity and memory and how those issues affect the perception of the mission. The surface cultural forms, very often called “*travelers’ advice*”, that are common to a society haven’t been seen by the authors as important as the underlying symbolic reasons for those forms and the cognitive and affective systems into which they are tied. “*Travelers’ advice*”, provides a list of “facts” regarding certain group’s ways of interaction with the world, and of “things” a person interacting with them should or should not do (e.g. what gestures to make and postures to avoid: “*Never show the sole of your foot*”, “*Don’t eat with your left hand*”. etc.).³⁶

³² Deep culture refers to the cognitive and affective structures and processes that motivate action and shape the ways in which people react to their environments. It is these aspects of culture upon which attributions of motive are based. The distinction between surface and deep cultural differences mirrors that between surface structure and grammatical structure in language, and was described in Robert A. Rubinstein, “Deep Culture” in Hybrid Peace Operations: Multidimensional Training Challenges’, Prepared for Peace?: The Use and Abuse of ‘Culture’ in Military Simulations, Training and Education, Newport, RI: Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Salve Regina University, 2004, page 6–7.

³³ Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael, Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, page 544

³⁴ Chopra, Jarat and Tanja Hohe. Participatory Intervention. Global Governance, 2004, page 289-305;

³⁵ Myint-U, Thant and Elizabeth Sellwood. Knowledge and Multilateral Interventions: The UN’s Experiences in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

³⁶ Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael, Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, page 545

As suggested by Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger communicating in a way that allows people to understand themselves as valued and respected is especially important in conflict and post-conflict situations where interaction occurs with people who experienced deprivation and trauma. Consequently, achieving vertical interoperability in peacekeeping depends on peacekeepers' skills to interact with local population. That interaction should be done by expressing genuine partnership and respect for the key symbols of their world perception. As suggested by the same authors, successful vertical interoperability requires correct interpretation of social interaction and communication, of verbal and non-verbal messages, and of symbolism and perception.³⁷

Authors recommended seven principles of action in order to clarify how peacekeepers can better understand and use culture to improve the success of peacekeeping missions.

The following paragraphs will elaborate Rubinstein's, Keller's and Scherger's views on cross-cultural interaction in peacekeeping missions.

Speaking about the first principle "*Be Aware of Meaning*" the authors suggested that success depends on peacekeepers skills to correctly interpret what is happening in situations they come across and to interact in a culturally positive style. Application of that principle requires flexibility on the side of peacekeepers in order to understand the new environment and be able to respond to the new cultural challenges. When it comes to the second principle "*Pay Attention to Symbols*" authors noted that the symbols related to political and national cultural conflicts are additional aspects of vertical interoperability in peacekeeping missions. For example, symbols may represent some political parties (e.g. flowers, birds, colours, etc.) so that even illiterate citizens can vote. "*Avoid Attributing Motive*" has been suggested as third principle of action. Assumption

³⁷ Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael, Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, page 547

that others operate with the same motives as we do is one of the most common feature of cross-cultural miscommunication. In order to work effectively peacekeepers must understand the motivations of local populations in order to correctly attribute motivations for action – and must be aware of “*how their own actions play into, promote or hinder these motivations*”. In an elaboration on the “*Conflict Management and Culture*”, as fourth principle of action, the authors pointed out that the methods of conflict management and mediation of disputes native to the mission area may differ from those ordinarily used by the peacekeepers. Consequently, local population and international actors may understand and interpret the ‘rule of law’ in diametrically opposite ways. “*Ensure Cultural Expectations Are Explicit*”, the fifth principle, has been assessed as difficult because of professional cultural differences between mission elements – the problem of horizontal interoperability discussed earlier. The authors suggested that it is crucial to have constant communication with the local population in order to make everyone aware of common expectations. “*Avoid Creating In-Group/Out-Group Formations*”, has been suggested as the sixth principle. The main idea of this principle is that members of peacekeeping missions must be aware of these distinctions and how they may influence their work. Therefore, peacekeepers are required to understand the importance of these distinctions (boundaries between groups, and how flexible and porous these boundaries can be) to vertical interoperability. Finally, the authors suggested “*Stay Apprised of Power Differences*”, as the seventh and last principle of action. Authors underlined that hierarchies always exist within a society. This can be explained as a way of power concentration within that society. Following differences may be included: “*who in a social interaction has standing and legitimacy; who has the appropriate status to negotiate and give assurances; who has the power to intervene; and who should be called upon for counsel*”. Therefore, peacekeepers must understand both the hierarchies within a society and where the power and expertise is positioned.³⁸

³⁸ Rubinstein Robert, Keller Diana and Scherger Michael, Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, page 547-551.

Ideas presented by Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger lead to a conclusion that planning for interoperability is essential if peacekeeping missions are to be successful. As suggested, the key aspect of deep culture about which to be aware is how to engage the local community so that its members feel respected and treated as equal partners in the rebuilding of their home communities, rather than perceiving themselves as demeaned and further disempowered.

Thousands of people are deployed in various peacekeeping missions around the world. In each mission, small or large, the credibility depends not only on the ability to carry out the United Nations mandate, but also on the quality of behaviour demonstrated by each individual. Both the population of the hosting community or country, as well as the international community, closely observes the conduct of the United Nations personnel, particularly in highly visible and problematic missions. Consequently, it is important that each person serving under the United Nations demonstrates extraordinary discretion, restraint, and sensitivity towards other cultures, so that their behaviour does not have a chance of reflecting a poor image of the peacekeeping mission or the UN as a whole.

By paying attention to the above presented principles, members of peacekeeping missions can enhance their abilities to work effectively with local communities and peacekeeping missions can promote the linkages among the strategic, operational and tactical levels necessary for peacekeeping missions to succeed.

Chapter Three – Systematic Approach to Cultural Awareness in Peacekeeping Missions - Human Terrain System (HTS) in Peacekeeping Missions

In conducting numerous low intensity "*Stability Operations*"³⁹ since the end of the cold-war the U.S. military has come to recognize the need for cultural awareness on the part of military units in all phases of operations. These "Stability Operations" closely resemble multi-component peacekeeping operations. The U.S. military response has been to develop a concept called the "Human Terrain System" whereby each U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is augmented by a small HTS staff composed of area linguists and cultural anthropologists who can advise the BCT commander and staff, as well as units, on the cultural aspects of the operational environment.

This chapter will look at the U.S. military HTS to see what aspects if any can be adopted by UN peacekeeping missions to insure that social and cultural aspects of the mission's area are considered in planning and conducting missions.

US Army Human Terrain System (HTS)

The creation of Human Terrain System was partly the result of an article by Dr. Montgomery McFate⁴⁰ in which she argued that the understanding of an adversary's culture is critical to waging an effective counterinsurgency operation. This article coincided with requests from units in the field, and the Army quickly recognized that

³⁹ An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Definition from JP 3-0 quoted in US FM 3-0 "Operations" June 2008, page 195).

⁴⁰ Montgomery McFate, —Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship, *Il Military Review*, March-April 2005

people, and indeed entire populations, form a cultural and sociological environment, or **human terrain**⁴¹ in which troops must effectively operate.

Thus, in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the conflicts shift from conventional warfare to *counterinsurgency*⁴², US military officials recognize the need for “cultural awareness” of the local populations. As Major General Douglas V. O’Dell, Jr noted, “We are in a different war. We are in a war that is as much a cultural struggle as it is a military struggle.”⁴³

A fundamental condition of *irregular warfare*⁴⁴ and counter-insurgency operations is that the Commander and staff can no longer limit their focus to the traditional Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, friendly Troops and support available, and Time - (METT-T). The *local population* in the area of conflict must be considered as a distinct and critical aspect of the Commander’s assessment of the situation. This was codified in US Army doctrine with modification of METT-T to METT-TC, adding “Civil considerations”. Because of this added complexity, “civil considerations” has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC. All commanders use METT-TC to start their visualization. Staff estimates may address individual elements of, and add to, the commander’s visualization.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Under this concept, “human terrain” can be defined as “the human population and society in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and characterized by sociocultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society. Human terrain information is open-source derived, unclassified, referenced (geospatially, relationally, and temporally) information. It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual.”(Kipp Jacob, Ph.D.; Lester Grau; Karl Prinslow; and Captain Don Smith, *The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century*, USNI, U.S. Naval Institute, *Military Review*, September-October 2006., page 15).

⁴² Counterinsurgency- Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Definition from JP 1-02 quoted in US FM 3-0 “Operations” June 2008, page 187).

⁴³ Human Terrain Teacher’s Guide, Watson Institute For International Studies, Brown University, 2011

⁴⁴ Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. (US FM 3-0 “Operations” June 2008, page 42).

⁴⁵ US FM 3-0 “Operations” June 2008.

In an irregular warfare environment “*Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decision-making processes of individuals and groups*” and should be evaluated according to their “*society, social structure, culture, language, power and authority, and interests.*”⁴⁶

As outlined by some authors conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like “*building a house without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure. But while waste on a building site means merely loss of time and materials, waste on the battlefield means loss of life, both civilian and military, with high potential for failure having grave geopolitical consequences to the loser.*” Also, Major General Benjamin C. Freakley (Commanding General, CJTF-76, Afghanistan, 2006) pointed out that: “*Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy.*”⁴⁷

Regardless of above mentioned potential negative consequences, the U.S. military has not always made the necessary effort to understand the foreign cultures and societies in which it intended to conduct military operations. As a result, it has not always done a good job of dealing with the cultural environment within which it eventually found itself. As noted by Mc Fate between the end of the Vietnam War and the conflict in Somalia, the US military focus was not on people but on weapons and platforms. “*The focus on people – not as something to be controlled, but as part of the environment that must be understood in order to succeed – is a new and positive development inside the US DoD.*”⁴⁸

⁴⁶ US FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency”, December 2006, page 57.

⁴⁷ Kipp Jacob, Ph.D.; Lester Grau; Karl Prinslow; and Captain Don Smith, The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century, USNI, U.S. Naval Institute, Military Review, September-October 2006., page 8-9.

⁴⁸ McFate Montgomery (Social Science Advisor) and Col. Steve Fondacaro (Program Manager) Human Terrain System, US Army TRADOC, Cultural knowledge and common sense; A response to González in this issue, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 24 No 1, February 2008, page 27.

There is broad agreement among operators and researchers that many, if not most, of the challenges being faced in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from failure early on to understand the cultures in which coalition forces were working.

According to some sources, many of the principal challenges being faced in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) stem from just such initial institutional disregard for the necessity to understand the people among whom US forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the adversaries being faced now.⁴⁹

The unclassified version of the Afghanistan JUONS⁵⁰ provided a clear example of the operational gap: *"US Forces continue to operate in Afghanistan lacking the required resident and reach-back socio-cultural expertise, understanding, and advanced automated tools to conduct in-depth collection / consolidation, visualization, and analysis of the operationally-relevant socio-cultural factors of the battle space."*⁵¹

Taking into consideration all above presented arguments, there has been a clear need for *"giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with 'human terrain' - the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating."* To help address these shortcomings in cultural knowledge and capabilities, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) started the Human Terrain System Project in 2006.⁵²

⁴⁹ Kipp Jacob, Ph.D.; Lester Grau; Karl Prinslow; and Captain Don Smith, *The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century*, USNI, U.S. Naval Institute, *Military Review*, September-October 2006., page 8.

⁵⁰ US CENTCOM JUONS: Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS) were signed by Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) and Combined Joint Task Force 82 (Afghanistan). The Afghanistan and Iraq JUONS were subsequently consolidated by CENTCOM.

⁵¹ Found on an official US Army HTS web page, <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/htsAboutBackground.aspx>, accessed on 12 Oct 2011.

⁵² Kipp Jacob, Ph.D.; Lester Grau; Karl Prinslow; and Captain Don Smith, *The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century*, USNI, U.S. Naval Institute, *Military Review*, September-October 2006., page 9.

HTS provides **social-science support** in the form of cultural, social and ethnographic information research, and social data analysis. Deployed brigade commanders can make use of this during the military decision-making process - MDMP (see Figure 4).⁵³




Figure 4 - Social Science Support to Military Operations

Source: Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 27

Human Terrain Team (HTT) is composed of five to nine people, a mix of military and US Department of Defense civilians - DoD (see Figure 5). Members of HTT are with social science and operational backgrounds and they are deployed with military units in order to provide knowledge on the local population which can be useful to Commanders and staffs in the field.⁵⁴

⁵³ Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 27

⁵⁴ Ibid, page 2

Human Terrain Teams are special staff with the task to bring capabilities existing outside of the US organic Battalion, BCT, and Division structure. They are deployed as fully trained and organized teams. HTT's are attached to USMC Regimental Combat Teams, Army Brigade Combat Teams, and Division, Corps, and Combined Joint Task Force, level HQs. Recruitment and training of each team is based on expertise required for a specific region. Following training, team is deployed to the mission area and attached to their supported unit. Team conducts research from unclassified open-source and from the field. It supports planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations by providing "operationally-relevant human terrain information".⁵⁵




Figure 5 - Human Terrain Team Composition

Source: Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 11

⁵⁵Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 2

According to Human Terrain Team Handbook, the HTT has several key tasks (see Figure 6) but the main focus is on the population in order to support commander and his staff with non-lethal options for operations. All below portrayed key tasks are designed with the primary purpose to identify and address main socio-cultural knowledge gaps of supported units. By doing so, HTT improves unit's understanding of the local populations and enhance their planning and decision-making processes. Consequently, commander and staff must understand how to most effectively employ the team within area of operations in order to get the best results from HTT.⁵⁶

Human Terrain Team Mission Essential Task List	
I. Conduct a Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE)	
	Design a Human Terrain Research Design.
	Coordinate culture research activities.
II. Integrate Human Terrain into the Unit Planning Processes	
	Develop the Human Terrain Collection Plan.
	Develop Human Terrain information requirements.
III. Provide Human Terrain Support to Current Operations	
	Identify cultural decision / adjustment points that impact the population.
	Develop recommended popular responses or mitigating strategies to gain or maintain support of the local populace.
	Maintain the Human Terrain Component of the Common Operating Picture (COP).
IV. Evaluate Human Terrain Effects	
	Friendly and enemy operations on the human terrain.
	Human terrain on friendly and enemy operations.
V. Train Support Elements on Relevant Socio-Cultural Issues	

Figure 6 - HTT METL

Source: Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 26

⁵⁶Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 24-27

The first step is to conduct a **Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE)**. This process is focused on socio-cultural information within the area of operations. It is very similar to the traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)⁵⁷ used in conventional warfare where main focus is on the threat. HTT, as part of CPE, researches the area of operations prior to and during the deployment. During the deployment stage CPE consists of “collecting atmospheric, conducting polling, surveys and interviews of the local population”. The result of CPE will very much depend on the time spent on the ground. Team creates a “Research Design” by fusing outcomes of CPE, Commander’s Priority Information Requirements (PIR) and already identified cultural knowledge gaps in the unit’s campaign plan. Main purpose of research design is to address above mentioned knowledge requirements and coordinate cultural research activities of the team, the unit staff and maneuver units. The second key task of the HTT is to **integrate Human Terrain information into the Unit Planning Processes**. Next task is to create a collection plan comprising all the information requirements that were identified during the Research Design development. This happens prior to particular operations being planned, “incorporating the CPE into the unit’s mission analysis, proposing non-lethal courses of action, identifying the second and third order effects of possible courses of action, and taking part in war-gaming from the population perspective.”⁵⁸

The third key task is **providing support to current operations**. Human Terrain Team is very valuable during execution of an operation by the unit. The team can provide the Commander and staff with “cultural decision/ adjustment points and the outcomes of possible responses”. By monitoring events and on the ground assessments, the team is enhancing the cultural aspect of the Commander’s Common Operating Picture (COP).⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. (US FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency”, December 2006, page 58.)

⁵⁸ Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 24-25

⁵⁹ Common Operating Picture is “a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness.” (Definition from JP 1-02 quoted in US FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency”, December 2006, page 250)

Very good examples of HTT providing support to current operations are “*Commander preparations for Key Leader Engagements, building relationships that facilitate meaningful engagements with local power brokers, ethnographic interviews, civil affairs missions, or humanitarian assistance missions.*”⁶⁰

The fourth key HTT task is **evaluating the human terrain effects of the area of operations**. In “full-spectrum operations”⁶¹ the HTT is continuously making an assessment on effects on the local population made by friendly forces operations, as well as threat operations. Whatever effect friendly forces try to achieve against threats, and contrary, whatever effect opposing forces try to achieve against friendly forces will certainly affect the local population. The HTT task is to assess effects on local population but also to “predict the second and third order effects of possible future operations”. In addition to that, the HTT also assesses the “Information Operations measures of effectiveness and performance”, and suggests possible adjustments. In turn, the team also assesses the effects the “human terrain” is having on friendly forces and threat operations.⁶²

Finally, the HTT supports the unit by **training all elements on relevant socio-cultural issues**. The training programme for the unit can include cultural awareness which could be similar to one conducted before deployment of the unit (i.e. Cultural do’s and don’ts), but also may include some educational aspects on the most important cultural and religious holidays, as well as some classes on local cultural power structures and tribal dynamics. This training could be quite effective for the BCT/DIV staff, but it is the most effective at battalion-level and below. Battalions and units below have the primary responsibility for the area of operations and they are in close contact with the local population. The Human Terrain Team is under full command of the unit that is attached

⁶⁰Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 2

⁶¹ The US Army operational concept is full spectrum operations: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. (US FM 3-0 “Operations” June 2008, page 47).

⁶²Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 25

to. Commander of the unit can use the team like any other unit under his command. The HTT is placed inside the Commander special staff and reports directly to him (see Figure 7). Apart from that the team leader is in role of the human terrain advisor to the commander and staff providing a distinctive advisory capability.⁶³




Figure 7 - BCT Staff Organization – Special Staff

Source: Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 28

Human Terrain Team’s task is to put the human terrain research plan together with unit intelligence collection plan/Operations Plans (OPLANs) so that the unit operationally relevant human terrain information is incorporated into unit Courses of Action (COAs). In order to improve the feasibility of the unit plan for future operations, the human terrain analysis is incorporated into the planning process” (see Figure 8).⁶⁴

⁶³Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 25

⁶⁴Ibid, page 36




Figure 8 - HTT Support to Planning/MDMP

Source: Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 38

The HTT, according to Human Terrain Team Handbook, is providing the supported unit with a more comprehensive understanding of its respective area of operations by making assessments on the following categories: *“Current Institutions”* (assessment on existing institutions including their structure, function and cultural and social influence); *“Historical Institutions”* (assessment on institutions operated in the past and population perception on those institutions); *“Spheres of Influence”* (assessment on the local power brokers and how their influence could be used to support current and future unit’s mission); *“External factors influencing the operating environment”* (assessment on non-government institutions having influence on the operating environment);

“Demographics” (assessment on main demographic factors such as literacy, employment, education, race, age, etc.); *“Social organizations”* (assessment on social structure such as composition, hierarchy, influence, etc.); *“Area”* (comprehensive assessment on designated areas); *“Infrastructure”* (assessment on main infrastructure such as rail lines, oil pipelines, sewage and water system, electrical grid and capacity, communications infrastructure, etc.); *“Religious factors”* (assessment on religious factors such as structure, organization, beliefs, doctrine, holidays, influence, etc.); *“Identities”* (assessment on socially, culturally, and religiously identity of local population within a family structure, globally, and individually); *“Cultural nuances”* (assessment on society unique features); *“Social norms, tolerances, and processes”* (assessment on how the society resolves disputes; population *“attitudes toward bureaucracy, violence, capitalism, corruption; business practices”*; etc.); *“Popular attitudes”* (assessment on *“population’s collective mentality; attitudes toward modernity, religion, foreign presence”*, etc.)⁶⁵

If one agrees the purpose of the HTS is to have socio-cultural knowledge applied to military decision- making which will result in fewer operational and tactical mishaps, then we may say that this system has achieved its purpose.

Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that such knowledge has resulted in fewer lethal operations to achieve unit objectives. In the words of one Brigade Commander, “we estimate that, as a result of the HTT, we have reduced our kinetic operations by 60-70%”.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Human Terrain Team Handbook, Human Terrain System 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, September 2008., page 41-43

⁶⁶ Col. A. Jewett et al, Human Terrain Team preliminary assessment: Executive summary, July-August 2007., quoted in Montgomery McFate (Social Science Advisor) and Col. Steve Fondacaro (Program Manager) Human Terrain System, US Army TRADOC, Cultural knowledge and common sense A response to González in this issue, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY Vol 24 No 1, February 2008, page 27.

Another evidence of HTS achievements and its importance in the mission area is given in number of Commander & Staff Testimonials as follows: *“...their ability to assess the population through engagement meetings with local officials, provincial government officials, and tribal leaders has increased ISAF’s ability to better understand the average persons’ perspective. This “grass-roots” perspective provided by HTT offers a more robust and clear picture of the needs of the entire population, which is then incorporated into ISAF’s decision-making processes to increase positive outcomes.”* - BG David C. Gillian (AUS), Deputy DCOS Intel, HQ ISAF (AUG10). *“The number one performance measure is whether I can pry them (HTTs) out of the commander’s hands when I need to reallocate them on the battlefield. I can tell you I have not been successful, not once...there is a desire to have this capability in the battlespace”.* - MG Flynn, ISAF C/J2, AUG 2010 (Source: Socio-cultural data to accomplish Department of Defense missions, Workshop Summary). *“The key for human terrain teams is to help us understand so we can decide which action to take or whether any action is even appropriate. The other enabling capabilities serve to take action based on this understanding. This knowledge provides the baseline. It is all about understanding.”* - BG Vance (CAN), Commander TF Kandahar (23JUL10). *“I asked my Brigade Commanders what was the number one thing they would have liked to have had more of, and they all said cultural knowledge.”* - LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq.⁶⁷

In the end, a Human Terrain Team enables unit Commanders and their staffs the ability to operate with specific, local population knowledge, giving them the ability to make culturally relevant operational decisions. This will enable them to increase support for the elected government and reduce support for adversaries and their operations.

⁶⁷ Found on an official US Army HTS web page, <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>, accessed on 12 Oct 2011.

Us Army Human Terrain System (HTS) – Model For Systematic Approach to Cultural Awareness in Peacekeeping Missions

The Human Terrain Team is explicitly focused towards finding “non-kinetic” effects and can be used to establish cultural, social and linguistic links between peacekeepers and the local population in order to increase operational effectiveness. By doing so, the HTTs could help preventing miscommunications and mishaps that have far too often unfortunately portrayed a poor image of many previous peacekeeping missions.

However, prior to looking at possible aspects of the U.S. military HTS that could be adopted by UN peacekeeping operations in order to insure that social and cultural aspects of the mission's area are considered in planning and conducting operations, a short elaboration on the planning and conduct of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations would be of benefit.

HTT Type Support in the Planning and Conduct of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations peacekeeping operations, according to Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of UN Peacekeeping Operations, function on three broadly defined levels: Strategic level (UN Headquarters – The Security Council, The Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS); Operational level (Multinational HQ – MHQ of a fielded mission); Tactical level (National military and formed police contingents in the field/sector, regional offices and individual projects or activities)⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, February 2008, page 14.

The planning of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations is prescribed by the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)⁶⁹. The main purpose of IMPP is to assist the United Nations system reaching “*common understanding of its strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system*”. However, since the UN has a range of possible options for its engagement (deployment of an integrated mission could be one of them), it may not always be required or reasonable to apply the IMPP. As underlined in the UN Capstone Doctrine, the main idea of the IMPP is to have “a dynamic, continuous process”, but also very flexible process which will tolerate revision of activities and objectives based upon the operational environment and the level of the mission’s understanding of its changes. United Nations peacekeeping operations, or missions, have three broad deployment phases: “*Phase I: Start-up (rapid deployment and mission start-up), Phase II: Mission implementation, Phase III: Transition (handover, withdrawal and liquidation)*”. Even though those phases are conceptually distinctive they may overlap (see Figure 9). Mission deployment cycles, in reality, will hardly have a classic “bell-shaped” curve. Based upon the situation and achievements of objectives, activity in each mission may vary in terms of its intensity and scale. According to the UN Capstone Doctrine, the term “Mission Start-Up” depicts the initial phase of peacekeeping mission establishment. During that phase, the most important task is achieve “an initial level of operating capability” of all internal mission processes, structures and services. Consequently, implementation of the mission mandate can start.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The United Nations has adopted an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) was formally endorsed through a decision of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, on 13 June 2006. A comprehensive set of implementation guidelines for the IMPP are currently under development, in coordination with field missions and Headquarters planners.

⁷⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008., page 56-63.




Figure 9 - Typical Phases of UN Peacekeeping Deployment

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 62.

The Mission Start-Up process⁷¹ comprises numerous “theoretical” stages (see Figure 10), even though these may overlap in practice. **Pre-deployment** is mainly responsibility of a Headquarters (HQ) and may include tasks such as *“the United Nations budgetary process, pre-deployment visits to Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs)/Police-Contributing Countries (PCCs) to assess readiness, the negotiation of a Status of Mission/Status of Forces Agreements (SOMA/SOFA), the mobilization of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), and the tendering of major supply and service contracts for the mission”*. This phase starts once *“the strategic assessment determines that there is a need to deploy an integrated peacekeeping mission”*.⁷²

⁷¹ General Assembly has endorsed a requirement for establishment of a traditional peacekeeping mission within 30 days and a multi-dimensional mission within 90 days of the authorization of a Security Council mandate. For missions with highly complex mandates or difficult logistics, or where peacekeepers face significant security risk, it may take several weeks or even months to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. The 90-day timeline for deploying the first elements of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is, thus, a notional target.

⁷² United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 63.




Figure 10 – The Mission Start-Up Process

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 64.

“**Rapid deployment**” includes a small team deployment with the task to establish critical mission infrastructure and administration support necessary for staff and contingents planned to arrive as start-up develops. “**Mission headquarters start-up** is the period of senior mission leadership arrival. It is also stage when command and control systems are in place and when huge numbers of support personnel start arriving in-mission to help achieve an Initial Operating Capability - IOC⁷³. At this stage, based upon requirement, liaison offices and logistics hubs are established; “**Functional**

⁷³ The term “Initial Operating Capability” (IOC) refers to the point at which a mission has attained a sufficient level of resources and capability to begin limited mandate implementation and support its operational elements in the field. In general, a mission can be said to have achieved IOC when the following steps have been completed: 1) Minimum necessary political, legal and administrative agreements are in place (e.g. mandate, SOMA/SOFA, customs, aviation, property authorizations, etc.); 2) Command and control, decision-making and mission reporting arrangements have been established, as well as coordination arrangements with other actors; 3) Initial mission plan has been approved by mission leadership and funding has been approved at UNHQ; 4) Enough essential personnel, equipment and infrastructure are in place for mission components to begin limited mandate delivery. (Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, February 2008, page 10.)

component and field office start-up” happens together with the establishment of the mission headquarters and includes the establishment of the different civilian, police and military command capacities. It also includes beginning of the start-up of sector headquarters and field offices of the mission.”⁷⁴

A mix of standing joint structures and working groups are increasingly part of new, large, multidimensional operations (see Figure 11).




Figure 11 – Adopted Management Structures

Source: Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, February 2008, page 52.

As presented above, United Nations peacekeeping operations have several standing structures that provide joint analysis and operational/logistical support to Senior Management Group (SMG) and the wider mission.

⁷⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 63-64.

Human Terrain Team could be integrated into these joint structures and, with the provision of sufficient resources and support by senior management, could act as force multiplier across the full range of capabilities and tasks of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

During the planning process at the strategic level (UN Headquarters) regional area experts, much like a Human Terrain Team could support IMPP by monitoring and reporting on any significant developments at the country level (e.g. following national elections, or a changed political, security or humanitarian situation – that may require a change in the United Nations strategic objectives, or a reconfiguration of the overall role and/or capabilities of the United Nations peacekeeping operation).

Chapter Four – Recommendations for Adding Human Terrain Support to UN Peacekeeping

HTT representatives could be included at all above mentioned levels, starting from the strategic level (DPKO) in the early stages of the planning for a peacekeeping mission. In other words by participating in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) at UN Headquarters. DPKO's Training and Evaluation Service (TES) would be tasked with providing HTS support to the IMPP and also preparing required Mission Area specific training programs for national military and formed police contingents scheduled to deploy to the mission area. This could be in the form of one additional Core Pre-Deployment Training Module (CPTM) that these units scheduled for deployment are required to be trained-in before being certified as ready for deployment by their countries.

Then, TES could also develop a training module that all individuals (civilian and military to include military observers, individual police monitors, etc.) would have to complete prior to deploying to the mission area. This could be done "on-line" using computers through distance learning.

TES of course would not have the necessary resident political/social/cultural expertise to develop these training programs for the diverse areas in which a peacekeeping mission could be deployed. They could easily contract-out development of such programs to universities or other relevant expert institutions with a short "turn-around" time. The cost for contracting these courses could be included as part of the mission budget.

Moreover, specialized Human Terrain Team could be included in pre-deployment phase, as part of pre-mission survey team sent to the area of operations.

During these initial stages, the HTT could be supported by the HTS Research Reachback Center⁷⁵, Subject Matter Experts Network (SMEs-Net) consisting of on-call, micro-regional focused academic and civilian sector experts, Open Source research, and individual team member area knowledge and experience to provide needed information and mission guidance to UN Headquarters.

As pointed out in Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of UN Peacekeeping Operations, one of the biggest challenges is to establish deployment timing for the new mission. Apart from few fixed actors and variables there are many more dependencies – *“actors and variables that are constantly shifting as planning assumptions change throughout the pre-deployment phase”*. Thus, variety of different actors, variables and potential challenges at the strategic and operational levels will have influence on the progress of the mission during mission start-up phase. Human Terrain Team could be very valuable asset for covering some of variables and therefore reducing planning uncertainty. Following aspects could be fully or partly covered by HTT: *“Political sensitivities regarding pace and nature of United Nations deployment early in peace process; Level of cooperation by host authorities and regional countries; Capacity of national infrastructure (accessibility, ports, roads, climatic conditions, financial services, etc.); Availability and/or quality of commercial suppliers for essential goods and services; Environmental considerations, including geography, seasons and weather.”*⁷⁶

HTS should be added as part of the Special Staff of a fielded peacekeeping mission (see Figure 12). It's responsibilities in the mission could include:

- HTS advices and recommendations to the mission staff with regards to preparing and conducting operations and activities.

⁷⁵ The HTS research facility is located in Virginia, US

⁷⁶ Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, February 2008., page 19-20.

- Continuously monitoring the "human climate" in the area of operations and making appropriate assessments.
 - Organizing "In mission HTS training" to all mission components as required.
 - Collecting "Lessons Learned" on HTS operations and activities in the mission
- HTT may also contribute by deploying selected members together with the advanced elements of peacekeeping forces to get the most up to date situational knowledge from the field in order to assist the peacekeeping mission leadership as they deploy into the mission area.




Figure 12 – Possible solutions for HTT integration
into Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation
(Adopted from Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers
of UN Peacekeeping Operations)

The US Army HTT, as presented and discussed in previous chapter could be easily used as a reference for the UN peacekeeping mission version, however it may be organized more specifically to match requirements of multinational peacekeeping mission. Consequently, each member of HTT will be required to have a more comprehensive knowledge of UN Peacekeeping history and philosophy, languages and cultures of the population in the mission area as well as those of the multinational force it is attached to.

The HTT will also be useful in helping the deployed peacekeeping mission to develop its Public Information Strategy prior to deployment. In order to start building popular support and acceptance of the mission it is critical to develop public information messages in advance of the main peacekeeping body.

By recognizing that the public support is vital for the success of the peacekeeping mission, the team may also be tasked to provide constant feedback on the result of those messages.

Although the arrival of peacekeepers should logically be viewed as a positive event, displaced civilians and an agitated public may not necessarily welcome the arrival of outside forces. Therefore mission staff may find themselves in a stressful and chaotic situation. During this critical phase, as pointed out in UN Capstone Doctrine *“it is essential that mission leaders and personnel adhere to the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping, and actively seek to establish the mission’s legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the parties, the host population and the international community, as a whole.”*⁷⁷

Once deployed, peacekeepers, assisted by HTT expertise, may launch an appropriate Information Operations (IO) campaign in order to establish good relationship with the local population. IO campaign must be based on the local language and culture.

⁷⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 64-65.

The HTT will be also useful in helping the “**Managing Mission Impact**” and “**Maintaining Support for the Mission**” processes. As stated in Capstone Doctrine, “*United Nations peacekeeping operations must be aware of and proactively manage their impact, both real and perceived, in the host country and community*”. UN peacekeepers must stick to national laws and regulations (unless they do not violate internationally recognized fundamental human rights standards), respect local culture, and keep up the highest standards of personal and professional conduct. It was also pointed out that the UN peacekeeping operations by default “*generate high expectations*”, they are extremely exposed and every possible mistake could be easily observed. Accordingly, peacekeepers must be ready to manage the possible negative consequences of the mission’s presence and mitigate them to the lowest possible level. Capstone doctrine recognizes that “*the perceived legitimacy of UN Peacekeeping operations depends heavily on the conduct of its personnel*”. Therefore, senior leadership must make sure that peacekeepers are fully familiar with what is expected from them with regards to standard of conduct. Peacekeepers should also be aware of the possible mission “side-effects” that may weaken the perceived legitimacy and credibility of a mission, such as social, economic and environmental impact. “*Different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs*” may cause friction and may have huge **social impact** (e.g.: *employment of women in nontraditional gender roles, mixing and socialization between genders, drinking, gambling, and other culturally inappropriate behavior*); UN peacekeeping operations have huge **impact on local economy** either by increasing the price of local housing and accommodation or influencing local production by placing unusual demands for foods and materials, etc. Last but not the least; UN peacekeeping missions have **environmental impact** (e.g. waste management or water usage).⁷⁸

All of above mentioned impact could be sources of potential friction between peacekeepers and local population. Therefore, it is required that senior leaders have Human Terrain Team available to observe and assess the situation.

⁷⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 81-82.

Finally, in assessing the missions overall impact and devising strategies to address the above outlined potential friction points, the HTT can provide an assessment and insure that the differential impacts on men and women, as well as children and vulnerable groups, are considered.

Although no peacekeeping mission can control all of the side-effects of its presence, it must undertake due diligence in managing its own impact. Where problems do arise, they should be addressed swiftly and honestly. At the same time, rumors and vexatious or erroneous accusations against the mission must be countered with vigor to maintain the good reputation of the international presence.

In the end, with a relatively small investment in terms of personnel and funding, by adopting and including the proven Human Terrain System construct, the UN could take a major step toward enhancing its ability to conduct peacekeeping operations in a manner that will gain and maintain broad public support, a core requirement for mission success.

Chapter Five – Conclusions

The history of UN peacekeeping has proven that the cooperation of the local population is essential, but at the same time, one of the most difficult aspects of achieving stability and finding peaceable solutions to conflicts. As stated in the 2008 published UN Capstone Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine “*Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors – including the national authorities and the local population – in a long-term peacebuilding effort.*”⁷⁹

Thus, an attempt to succeed without looking into “Civilian Considerations” and engaging the public in this effort will very often result in failure.

Due to the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping missions which brings peacekeepers in close contact with local populations many challenges stemming from cultural misunderstandings have been documented. The environment in which the peacekeeper will conduct operations is complex. Today’s missions are composed of multi-cultural components and elements and take place in diverse national cultural contexts. In particular, of key importance is the local environment into which the peacekeepers are deployed, with its specific habits and cultures.

Therefore, it is of great importance that peacekeepers understand the local population’s needs as well as their culture and history. Consequently, it is necessary to undertake a systematic approach to cultural awareness in peacekeeping missions in order to achieve better operational efficiency and effectiveness.

The nature and purpose of current peacekeeping missions suggest that better operational efficiency and effectiveness could be best achieved through the establishment of specialized teams, composed of civilian experts attached to deployed peacekeeping forces - “Human Terrain Teams”.

⁷⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, New York 2008, page 54

The U.S. military concept of establishing a human terrain system and fielding human terrain teams with operational units presented and discussed above could be applied very effectively to UN Peacekeeping Missions. The application of most lessons learned from successful counterinsurgency campaigns can be very useful to the conduct of successful peacekeeping missions as well. Even though these are doctrinally two different types of campaigns, the common and decisive aspects of both campaigns are “winning hearts and minds” of populations and receiving the public’s trust and support. It is the perception of the population in an area of operations that is the “Center of Gravity” for both a counterinsurgency campaign and peacekeeping mission. A lack of attention and effort to getting the support of an indigenous population can further complicate operations and even result in mission failure.

Recognizing that establishing and maintaining a positive relationship with the local population is a prerequisite to mission success, peacekeepers should be required to have a sound understanding of, and respect for, cultural differences and an appreciation of the different norms and traditions of the host state. It is critically important that peacekeepers demonstrate extraordinary carefulness, self-control, and understanding towards other cultures, so that their behavior does not have a chance of reflecting a poor image of the UN mission and endanger success of the mission.

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