

LESSONS LEARNED FROM UN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR



BY

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A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
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***Lessons Learned from UN Peace Enforcement Operations
After the Cold War***

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A Thesis

by


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CJTF	– Combined Joint Task Force
DPKO	– Department for Peacekeeping Operations
IFOR	– Implementation Forces, Bosnia and Herzegovina
GA	– General Assembly
LOAC	– Law of the Armed Conflict
MNF	- Multinational Forces
NATO	– North – Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN	– Operational Plan
OPCON	– Operational Control
PEO	- Peace Enforcement Operation
PKO	– Peace Keeping Operation
QRF	- Quick Reaction Forces
ROE	– Rules of Engagement
SCR	– Security Council Resolution
SG	– Secretary General
SOFA	– Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG	– Special Representative of the Secretary General
TACON	– Tactical Control
UNAMIR	– UN Assistance for Rwanda
UNITAF	– United Task Force, Somalia
UNHCR	– UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	– UN Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	– UN Protection Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNSC	– United Nations Security Council

ABSTRACT

Since its establishment, the UN has never experienced such degradation of international security, caused by intra – state conflicts, as during the immediate post-Cold war period. One of instruments used by the UN in order to prevent conflicts or to restore and to keep peace in disputed areas during this period was peace enforcement operations. The success of these operations was influenced by different factors. This study paper examined those factors that are considered as the most influential on the success of peace enforcement operations.

The influence of different understanding of the concept of peace enforcement operations by different nations and capabilities of the UN main bodies to manage certain peace enforcement mission is examined as an important factor in this study paper.

The importance of the size, composition and command and control of the assigned forces on the success of peace enforcement mission is analyzed and compared for two missions: UNITAF and UNPROFOR.

The mandate is considered as a very important factor for success of peace enforcement missions. The influence of the mandate on mission success is considered through analysis of the success of UNOSOM II and UNITAF missions in Somalia.

Considering that implementation of the rules of engagement could lead a mission to the failure or to its success, their influence is examined through study case of UNOSOM II and MNF mission in Haiti.

Having analyzed the influence of these factors on the success of peace enforcement operations, some conclusions and recommendations have been offered in order to conduct future peace enforcement operations more effectively.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Since its establishment the United Nations (UN) has used different instruments - concepts to prevent conflicts or to restore and to keep peace in disputed areas all over the World. Such concepts are conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding¹. Peace enforcement operations have their legal basis in Chapter VII of UN Charter, which gives authority to United Nations Security Council (SC) to undertake *coercive measures, including the use of military force*².

During the Cold War from 1945 until the late 1980s, the number of peace enforcement operations that were initiated by the SC was significantly less than after this period. One of the reasons for this was the readiness of the permanent members of SC (USA, France, China, Russia and UK) to agree on such resolutions, especially USSR and USA. During most of this period the decision making process in the UN SC was blocked by one of five permanent member states using its *veto* instrument, which marginalized the UN as an international security player.

The permanent members of the UN SC showed more cooperation in the post – Cold War period, however then the UN met new challenges. The increasing intra-state conflicts tested the UN capacity to deal with complex military operations and showed that peacekeeping operations (PKO), based on Chapter VI of UN Charter (*Peaceful settlement of disputes*)³, were not a suitable concept for such complex operational environments. PKO operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, demonstrated that PKO had to be re-tailored, as it was stated by *General Sir Michael Rose*, Commander of UNPROFOR, that “*Rather than lose faith in the whole peace process, we need to analyse the changed operational circumstances and try to determine new doctrines for the future*”⁴. In his *Agenda for Peace*, presented to Security Council in July 1992, UN Secretary General (SG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, pointed out the need

¹ *UN Capstone Doctrine*, pp. 17 – 18.

² *Ibid*, p. 18.

³ *Chapter VI, The UN Charter, (1945), San Francisco.*

⁴ Woodhouse & Ramsbotham (2000), p. 1.

for improved concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building⁵. However, his proposals were often criticised because he included the use of 'peace enforcement units' within "peacemaking"⁶, creating confusion since 'peacemaking' was understood as a diplomatic effort undertaken under Chapter VI.

The complexity of disputes during the 1990s was characterised by intra-state, low intensity conflicts. In such conflicts the mandate of UN missions would often include a rather broad spectrum of tasks, starting with humanitarian disaster prevention, refugee reintegration, conducting elections and re-building police forces and civilian administration elements. In the post Cold War period, peace enforcement operations were often seen as failures, caused by unclear mandates, mission creep, and the allocation of insufficient forces and resources.

It would be logical to ask what could be deemed as a successful peace enforcement operation? The success of a peace enforcement operation means ultimate synchronization of the purpose and the objective and a dedicated means to accomplish a mission. As Peter Paret pointed out, Clausewitz's view was that "*The means of war consist in application of force, or the threat of force. Force, too, should be suitable and proportionate to the military objective and the political purpose*"⁷. Since peace enforcement operations require a military as well as a political effort in settlement of a conflict, Clausewitz's arguments are also applicable to a peace enforcement operation. In practical way this means that success of a peace enforcement operation is determined by a clearly defined end-state, which can only be achievable with the dedicated forces and resources needed to accomplish the mandate. Forces dedicated for the mission should be structured in a way which will bring ultimate success of peace enforcement operation. Those forces should be managed by an efficient command and control system and provided with appropriate logistical support, enabling them to fulfil assigned mandate. The level of public support by the international community, troop contributing nations and local communities in a mission area, towards a certain peace enforcement mission also has an influence on the success of the mission. A common understanding of the peace enforcement operations' concept should exist between troop contributing nations and the UN in order to assist the success of the mission.

⁵ *An Agenda for Peace* at http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Paret, Peter (1986), pp. 207.

Other factors which influence success in peace enforcement operations derive from different areas such as the UN legislative framework, the level of the use of force, interoperability and doctrine. The factors which most influence the success of peace enforcement operations will be examined in following chapters.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse those factors that most influence the success of peace enforcement operations that were conducted in the period after the Cold War, and to develop recommendations for improvements in future peace enforcement operations.

1.2. Identifying the problem

The complexity of peace enforcement operations could be observed during 1990s in missions conducted in the Balkans (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNOSOM and UNITAF), Haiti (MNF) and Rwanda (UNAMIR) where UN forces were mandated to restore peace by using force for whole or part of the duration of the mission. Though UN Capstone Doctrine mentions that one of core functions of the UN multi-dimensional operation is to “*Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security...*”⁸, including use of force under Chapter VII at the tactical level (mostly for protection of civilians), it also considers peace enforcement activities an exception at the interantional and strategic level.

It is proposed to analyse those missions in post cold war where the intervention was both to protect civilians and to put pressure on warring factions to bring a conflict to an end in order to derive lessons learned and make some recommendations on what could be improved so these type of missions could be preformed successfully in the future (based on provisions of the *Report The Responsibility to Protect*)⁹. Factors which influenced the success of such missions were present in the field of direct execution of the certain mission, at the political stage involving UN and belligerent’s representatives as well as diplomatic relations between contributing nations and UN. Related to the discussion about the nature of the factors that influence the success of peacekeeping operations, Fetherston pointed out that

⁸ *UN Capstone Doctrine*, p. 23.

⁹ *The Report The Responsibility to Protect* at <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>

“.. a viable political context; consistently broad support – political, diplomatic, military and financial – for the operation; representatives in the force; skill and sensitivity in directing the force; quality of command and the military discipline of the troops...”¹⁰

are essential factors for the success. The importance of factors such as political, diplomatic, and financial support for the operation cannot be disregarded in Peace enforcement operations as well. Having in mind mentioned above, we will try to give an answer on the main question of this study paper:

The statement of the problem: What should be improved in order to perform successful UN peace enforcement operations that aim at a conflict termination under Chapter VII in the future?

1.3. Analysis of the problem

To be able to answer the problem mentioned above, it is necessary to determine and to analyze which factors influence the success of the peace enforcement operations. Analysing lessons learned in peace enforcement operations conducted in post-Cold War period it could be observed that their success was influenced by different factors such as: relationships and coordination between the UN main bodies that planned and executed those operations as well as between UN and troop contributing nation (pointing out different understanding on the legislative base and institutional framework for peace enforcement operations by different nations); the mission mandate; the rules of engagement; the size and the composition of the mission forces; the efficiency of the command and control system; the mission creep; the mission expenditure and the public and the international political support to the mission.

Based on my own experience while working for the UN (one year tour of duty in United Nation Mission in Ethiopia - Eritrea as a military observer), cooperating with UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) and analysing peace enforcement operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti as well, the elements mentioned above could be grouped in factors which are considered as the most influential for success of a peace enforcement operation. Therefore, in order to make comprehensive analysis of those elements, the following factors will be elaborated:

¹⁰ Fetherston (1994), pp. 40.

a. Fundamentals of peace enforcement operations. This factor will be examined to review the legislative base and the institutional framework for peace enforcement missions.

b. The configuration of forces. Elaborating this factor the reader will be able to understand how the size, composition and interoperability of mission forces, as well as the command and control arrangements, can influence the success of the mission.

c. The mission mandate. This factor is directly related to the purpose of a peace enforcement operation, thus it is very important to review how the mission mandate can influence the success of the mission, including the issue of 'mission creep'.

d. The rules of engagement. History has shown that application of inappropriate rules of engagement can ultimately lead to failure of a peace enforcement operation. Having in mind importance of defining suitable rules of engagement for each mission, this factor will be considered across several missions.

These factors will be analysed by applying qualitative research method. The following chapters will examine and compare how each of these factors has influenced the success of the different UN peace enforcement operations missions in order to derive some conclusions and recommendations for the future improvements,

1.4. Limitations

The influence of public opinion and international political support to the establishment of the mission will not be dealt with in this paper. This paper will also not cover the influence of the economical factor on peace enforcement operations. The paper will limit its examination to certain post – Cold War classical peace enforcement missions conducted by UN during the last decade of XX century, in which a mandate was given to enforce the peace in order to bring a conflict to its end. This is different from the current situation, where peace enforcement missions are generally mandated to regional organizations (i.e NATO in Afghanistan) and UN Peacekeeping missions restricted to act under Chapter VII only in order to protect civilians (as outlined in the latest UN PKO Doctrine).

1.5. Process

The further structure of this study paper is built up on five chapters:

a) Chapter II: This chapter will consider the legislative basis for a peace enforcement operation, its definition and the difference between PKO and peace enforcement operations. This chapter will include examination of the institutional framework of peace enforcement operation pointing out the role of the main UN bodies involved in a peace enforcement operation.

b) Chapter III: This chapter will consider how the configuration of mission forces can affect success through analysis of the UNITAF and UNPROFOR missions.

c) Chapter IV: This chapter will consider how the mandate can influence the success of missions through the comparison of UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia

d) Chapter V: This chapter will consider how the Rules of Engagement (ROE) effect the success of a peace enforcement mission through comparison of the Missions in Haiti and Somalia

e) Chapter VI: This chapter will consolidate the analysis in the previous chapters and derive recommendations for improvements in certain areas that should contribute to the success of future UN peace enforcement operations.

CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS

Throughout the history of peace enforcement operations, their concept has often been misunderstood among troop contributing nations. Analysing military doctrines, it is obvious that interpretation of peace enforcement operations concept is different from one country to another. Thus, the first part of this chapter will be discussing the legislative basis of peace enforcement operations, including the definition of peace enforcement operations, the difference between PKO and peace enforcement operations and the position of peace enforcement operations in the spectrum of peace support operations. The second part of this chapter will offer an overview of the institutional framework of peace enforcement operations, discussing the role of the main UN bodies involved in creating and executing a peace enforcement operation.

2.1. Legislative basis for peace enforcement operations

The UN Charter does not define PKO or peace enforcement operations, however their meaning by the end of XX century was derived from *An agenda for peace* as well as from *Supplement to an agenda for peace*,¹¹ given by the SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to UN sources, peace enforcement operations are considered as:

- *“Intervention authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; a coercive measure which does not require the consent of the party concerned (as opposed to peacemaking, peace-building and peace-keeping)”¹².*

- *“...Provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”¹³*

- *“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such*

¹¹ *An Agenda for Peace and Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r242.htm>

¹² *Maintenance of peace and security*, UN Bibliographic Information System at <http://lib-thesaurus.un.org/LIB/DHLUNBISThesaurus.nsf/fee3fb01c865ac5d85256cf400648b1f/0c6b1749e93939d085256aa000601b54?OpenDocument>

¹³ *UN Civil Police Handbook*, pp 5.

action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”¹⁴.

However, based on experience and lesson learned in peace enforcement missions in the first decade after the Cold War, UN came up with a consolidated definition for peace enforcement in its Capstone Doctrine, defining peace enforcement as follows:

“Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”¹⁵

It can be concluded that peace enforcement activities are based on Chapter VII of UN Charter, including coercive measures and threat or use of armed forces and it does not require consent of the parties involved. On the other hand, there are still some unclear details such as the level of the impartiality of forces and the level or extent of the force applied. Additionally, there were some missions that started as PKO missions, under Chapter VI, that later developed into peace enforcement missions, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. As a result of such ambiguities in UN definitions, different approaches to the concept of peace enforcement operations could be found in the military doctrine of different countries. As an example, this could be observed in doctrinal documents of U.S., British and the Nederland Armed Forces, (respectfully) which describe peace enforcement as follows:

- *“The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.”¹⁶*
- *“Wider Peacekeeping subsumes the following activities within relief: protection of relief workers and supply deliveries; and establishment, support, and protection of safe havens... These operations may be authorized by either a Chapter VI or a Chapter VII UN mandate.”¹⁷*
- *“Peace enforcement implies a predilection to use force and entails the identification of an enemy.”¹⁸*

¹⁴ Chapter VII, *The Charter of the UN*, (1945), San Francisco.

¹⁵ *UN Capstone Doctrine*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Cassidy, Robert M. (2004), pp. 216.

¹⁷ *Ibid* pp. 210.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

- *“Peace-enforcing operations are coercive in literal sense of the word...based on the implicit or explicit threat or actual use of force to restore peace and achieve the end state as defined in a mandate or a peace agreement.”¹⁹*

Since the threat or the use of the force is dominant factor in peace enforcement operations’ definitions mentioned above, the application of impartiality is questionable. However, the impartiality will differ from mission to mission in the way forces act to ensure application of impartiality on any party which does not comply with provisions of UN SC resolution. The level of applicable force would be determined on the case-by-case base and reflected in the mission mandate, because it directly influences the rules of engagement under which forces involved would operate.

When initiating a mission, the UN should consider making a comprehensive survey and assessment of the mission area in order to undertake suitable PKO or peace enforcement operations, and prevent the need for future changes to the mission mandate. Operational changes from PKO to peace enforcement operations or vice versa lead to phenomena known as ‘mission creep’, which could consequently endanger the success of the mission.

One of UN tools to prevent conflicts or to restore and keep peace is PKO which is defined by the UN as:

„Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”²⁰

The difference between PKO and peace enforcement operations are the consent of parties involved, impartiality and the use of force. The crucial precondition for success of PKO mission is consent of parties involved because it would not possible to impose provisions of SC’s resolution by peaceful means. This is observed by UNDPKO as *‘Peacekeeping and progress towards a just and sustainable peace rely*

¹⁹ Royal Netherlands Army (1997), *Peace Operations – Army Doctrine publication*, pp. 75.

²⁰ *UN Capstone Doctrine*, p. 18.

on the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict²¹. The level of impartiality in peace enforcement operations will always depend on the will of parties involved in a conflict to comply with certain resolution, while in case of PKO the absence of impartiality ultimately challenges the success of a mission. The importance of impartiality is stressed by UNDPKO, *'Impartiality and even-handedness should always guide the actions of a military component of a UN peacekeeping operation'*²². PKO are based on the principle of the non use of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate, while peace enforcement operations may include very violent combat actions in order to achieve desired end state. Having in mind these differences between PKO and peace enforcement operations, it is important that at every level (tactical, operational and strategic) concepts of peace enforcement and peacekeeping are properly understood and exercised. The Figure below shows relationship between different peace operation activities:




Figure 1: Linkages and gray areas within spectrum of peace and security activities²³

When discussing the difference between peace enforcement operations and peace keeping we should keep in mind provisions of UN Capstone doctrine which emphasises that:

"...Although the line between "robust" peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of

²¹ Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, UNDPKO, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/library/Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf>

²² Ibid.

²³ UN Capstone Doctrine, p. 19.

*force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.*²⁴

2.2. The institutional framework for peace enforcement operations

Two main UN bodies directly involved in creation, management and execution of peace enforcement operations are the Security Council and the Secretariat – Secretary General. This chapter will focus on the role, functions and relations between these bodies in creating and conducting a peace enforcement mission.

The Security Council is the main UN body dealing with international peace and security issues. According to Article 24 of the UN Charter

*“...Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”*²⁵

The SC consists of five permanent members with right in veto cast (USA, France, China, Russia and UK) and 10 non – permanent members that rotate every 2 years. The high level of cooperation and consensus achieved between permanent members of the SC in post Cold War period led to creation of a large and complex peace enforcement missions such as UNPROFOR or UNITAF. However, the way of functioning of the SC often was characterized by ambitious political mandates for certain peace enforcement missions that were not achievable on the ground. Additionally, in some cases there were minimal consultations between the SG and the SC, while making decision for certain peace enforcement mission. An example could be situation when U.S. administration demanded from the SC, swift transition of operations from UNITAF to UN forces in Somalia. Though the SG was against such idea, the SC passed Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993²⁶, authorizing UNOSOM II to takeover the mission from UNITAF.

The gap between the SC political objectives and reality on the ground was obvious in UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In period 1992 – 1995, the SC passed eighty

²⁴ *UN Capstone Doctrine*, p. 19.

²⁵ *Charter of the United Nations*, (1945), San Francisco.

²⁶ *UN SCR No 814* at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20814.pdf>

– five²⁷ resolutions related to UNPROFOR, enlarging its mandate several times, which consequently led to ‘mission creep’. Such resolutions became rather empty declarations, as former the Special Representative of the SG in ex Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, pointed out “*Some commanders...started acting based on their own judgement, and doing what they thought was best for their troops or for the mission, rather than what the Council instructed.*”²⁸

It is considered that a clear mission mandate is crucial precondition for the success of the peace enforcement mission. The SC should avoid undermining such important element because a blurred mandate impacts on other factors for success such as the size and composition of the forces, the resources necessary for the fulfilment of the mission and ROE. The SC should take into account the situation on the ground as well as proposals given by the SG, avoiding *ad hoc* solutions and improvisations. It is also important that the mandate is clear, precise, not giving room for misinterpretation by different mission actors.

The Secretary General (SG) is appointed by the General Assembly and he/she is considered as the chief administrative officer of the UN²⁹. The Secretariat is run by the SG and is responsible for day-to-day management of all peace operations, principally through two departments, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The SG is directly involved in initiation SC’s activities in solving international security issues³⁰. The SG appoints Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG) for each mission, who is the head of a mission and coordinates overall all political, military and humanitarian efforts on the ground.

In order to meet new peace enforcement challenges during 1990s, the Secretariat undertook significant organizational and functional steps by increasing its size and building its capabilities for strategic military planning and management. In spite of these organizational and functional changes, history has demonstrated that the Secretariat was still not structured to deal with complex peace enforcement missions, demonstrating loose command and control over peace enforcement missions and the lack of efficiency and professionalism. Such performances of the Secretariat were

²⁷ Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin, eds. (1998), pp.134.

²⁸ Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin eds. (1998), pp. 135.

²⁹ *Charter of the United Nations*,(1945), San Francisco.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

observed while conducting peace enforcement in 'Safe Areas'³¹ in Bosnia through employment of UNPROFOR Forces as well as showing the lack of overall political will and operational effectiveness by not appointing SRSG to this mission for almost two years, since the begging of the mission³². In case of UNOSOM II, the situation regarding command and control cohesion and overall efficiency of the UN leadership was even worse than in UNPROFOR. The command and control structure of this mission made by the Secretariat was the first step to the degradation of mission success. The US Quick Reaction Forces (QRF, 1100 troops)³³, were not part of UNOSOM II, operating in UNOSOM II area of operation under command of US General Thomas Montgomery who was at the same time UNOSOM II Deputy Commander (*Figure 2*). Such command and control relations at the operational level led to situations that happened on 03 October 1993 when the QRF performed US planned raids on Somali militia headquarters' without UNOSOM II involvement³⁴. Additionally, the UNOSOM II integrity was ruined by refusal of some national contingence, especially Italian one³⁵, to obey UNOSOM commander's orders, instead they relied on instructions given by national authorities.




Figure 2: The chain of command in UNOSOM II³⁶

³¹ Pugh, Michael ed. (1997), pp. 92.

³² Hillen, John (1998), pp. 161.

³³ *The US Army in Somalia 1992 – 1994*, (US Army Center of History) at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm>

³⁴ United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report at <http://www.history.army.mil/html/documents/somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf>

³⁵ MacQueen, Norrie (2002), pp. 215-216.

³⁶ Canna, Micahael (2004), *Command and Control of Multinational Operations Involving U.S. Military Force* at <http://www.acus.org/publications>

As the SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, when assessing UN failures in peace enforcement missions between 1992 and 1995, that

“...Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale.”³⁷

This statement points out several considerations. First of all, it should be determined what ‘limited scale’ peace enforcement mission is, then to consider whether the Secretariat is able to manage such military operations. Secondly, for execution of the complex peace enforcement mission, another option that could be considered is that a “the coalition of the will” or a regional security organization is authorized under take such missions.

2.3. Conclusion

Having in mind the differences in interpretation of the peace enforcement operations concept by different nations, it is necessary that the UN initiate a document which would provide an unified approach to peace enforcement operations and become incorporated in national military doctrines. Peace enforcement operations might be defined as:

“The coercive measure or operation authorized by UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which does not require the consent of the parties concerned and includes the threat or actual use of armed forces in order to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where there is a threat to the peace.”

Even with a higher level of cooperation between permanent members of the SC is achieved, the functioning of the SC could be weakened by ambitious mission-mandates, and in some cases the weak understanding between the SC and the SG. The clear mission mandate is one of the basic factors for success of the peace enforcement mission. Thus, the UN SC should take into account all relevant information provided by the SG before making a decision on the mandate for certain peace enforcement mission. The mandate should be precise and concise, avoiding possibilities to be misinterpreted by its executors. In order to avoid misunderstanding at executive level, the UN SC should determine precise tasks for each peace enforcement mission’s mandate. It is important to stress that the main PKO principles

³⁷ *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

are consent of parties involved, impartiality and the non use of force, except self-defence, which makes a very basic difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

As experience has shown, the UN Secretariat does not have capabilities to run complex peace enforcement missions. One possible solution might be that UN Secretariat adopt its organization and take into account experiences from the past in order to be able to provide strategic management of less complex and demanding peace enforcement missions, as needed. Furthermore, until the UN Secretariat is capable to manage complex peace enforcement missions, for execution of these kind of missions, the UN SC might authorize a 'the coalition of the will' or a regional security organization, led by competent and experienced military power or agency (NATO), which would be in charged for conducting military operations in the field under the SG oversight.

CHAPTER III

THE CONFIGURATION OF MISSION FORCES

There are many factors influencing the success of peace enforcement operations. This chapter will be focused on two dominating analytical factors, the size, composition and interoperability of forces and their command and control. This chapter will offer an analysis of analyzed the UN missions in Somalia (UNITAF) and in ex-Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

3.1. The configuration of UNPROFOR

a. The size, composition and interoperability of the mission forces.

UNPROFOR was one of the largest peace enforcement mission, reaching its peak at almost 39000 troops³⁸. In 1993, it was estimated that 35000 additional troops³⁹ were needed in order to protect 'Safe Areas' (created by UN, under provisions of The Geneva Convention: Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo)⁴⁰. In reality, only 7500 light equipped troops⁴¹ were authorized and deployed, operating under Chapter VII and supported by NATO air assets. The capabilities of those troops were tested in the summer of 1995, when 'Safe Areas' of Zepa and Srebrenica were captured, and where Bosnians civilians were killed in an act of genocide. Once again, it was confirmed that forces and resources on the ground have to be tailored in accordance with provisions of the mandate. Such a mandate should not be given to weak forces, leaving thousands of civilians unprotected as well as putting own troops in danger.

Even though the SC subsequently strengthened UNPROFOR's mandate, authorizing the use of 'all necessary means', in order to protect delivery of humanitarian aid, the forces on the ground often were not able to achieve this, due to inadequate armament and light equipment they had⁴². As such, the UN forces on the ground remained just Chapter VI – peacekeepers, quite often not capable of dealing with the complex military situation authorized for Chapter VII actions. An example to illustrate

³⁸ *United Nations Protection Force* at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_p.htm

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *The UN SCR No 824* (1993), <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>

⁴¹ Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin, eds. (1998), pp.182.

⁴² Sutterlin, James S., ed., (2003), pp. 64.

this could be Bangladeshi battalion, stationed in Bihac in 1994, which was so poorly equipped even not able to protect itself⁴³. One of the principal reasons that UNPROFOR failed to guarantee the security of 'Safe Areas' was that units were inadequately and poorly equipped for such peace enforcement mission. The situation was the most critical in the 'Safe Area' of Srebrenica, protected by Dutch battalion. It was observed by the Dutch battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans in his report to the Netherlands Army Headquarters, in June 1995⁴⁴ that there were some indicators that his unit could experience emergency situation due to weak supply and light equipment that the battalion possessed. But, no increase to the battalion's firepower occurred for the next three months. Although the battalion was assured of close air support by NATO air force, at a critical period from 06 until 11 September 1995, it was called off due to Dutch hostages⁴⁵, and consequently Srebrenica's genocide took place.

Future peace enforcement operations should be prepared thoroughly, applying lessons learned from previous missions. It cannot be deemed sufficient, just to give an authorization to the forces to use 'all necessary means' when they do not have the basic means for self defence. The peace enforcement forces should be adequately equipped in order to be able not only to defend themselves, but also to apply forces in accordance to the given mandate. In case of the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, it was confirmed that the SG should have paid more attention to quality of the contributing force than to multinational criteria, obtaining just quantity, which in some cases hardly provided self-defendable forces.

The level of *interoperability* of multinational forces is also very important for conducting peace enforcement operations successfully in the challenging military environment. Having in mind that UNPROFOR was composed of units from countries with different military capabilities including NATO members, ex-Warsaw Pact and Third World countries, it is hard to imagine that effective integration of such mixed forces achieved sufficient level of interoperability to stop aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The integration of NATO forces and forces from some developing nations which came to Bosnia without proper clothing, shelters and even partly armed, was extreme an management challenge. Furthermore different doctrine,

⁴³ Hillen, John (1998), pp. 158.

⁴⁴ Shmidl, Erwin A. ed. (2000), pp. 110.

⁴⁵ *Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998): Srebrenica Report at* <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>

training as well as different standards of professionalism gave additional difficulties to UNPROFOR interoperability and to make such large force to operate with sense of cohesion.

b. The command and control. As in many other peace enforcement missions, the UNPROFOR command and control structure was built up on ad hoc basis, reflecting many weaknesses when it comes to command large forces as they were in UNPROFOR. The management of such complex mission was challenged by command and control relations between the UN and supporting - NATO forces as well as the role of the SRSG and the interference of national authorities in the operational control over contingents in the mission.

The role of NATO forces, during the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to establish a no-fly zone over ex-Yugoslavian territory⁴⁶ (NATO Operation 'Deny Flight') and to provide close air support for UNPROFOR ground forces. The integration of NATO forces in the UN ad hoc chain of command was very complicated. The command and control structure was shown as unresponsive, as it happened on 12 March 1994,⁴⁷ in the case of shelling of French troops in area of Bihac by Bosnian Serbs, when it took more than three hours to the UN officials to get NATO air strikes approved. Even more serious was the case with the use of NATO air assets to defend Duchbat and 'Safe area' of Srebrenica in July 1995⁴⁸, when it took the UN authorities four days to authorise the use of NATO air strikes. The complexity of the command and control relations between UNPROFOR and NATO is illustrated in *Figure 3*.

⁴⁶ The UN SCR 816, UN SC at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

⁴⁷ Yugoslavia Events Chronology: Jan.-April, 1994 at <http://www.uta.edu/cpsees/yec-194.txt>

⁴⁸ Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin, eds. (1998), pp.182-183.




Figure 3: Command and control relations between NATO and UNPROFOR⁴⁹

The problem in connection with the UNPROFOR command and control integrity came from competition between the troop contributing nations chain of command and the UN command and control system. In peace enforcement missions, where the degree of the risk is higher to UN troops, the contingent commanders often asked their national authorities for guidance on operational tasks. This problem was pointed out by former SRSG Yasushi Akashi *“The UNPROFOR Headquarters saw a stream of ministers, ambassadors and generals pass through urging UNPROFOR leadership to act one way or another, depending on the perspective of the government that sent them.”*⁵⁰ Furthermore, as a result of disconnection between SC’s resolutions and reality on the ground, some national contingents’ commanders lost confidence in the UN top leadership to lead the mission in Bosnia, and national contingents’ commanders started to conduct operations as they deemed necessary⁵¹.

The key leader in peace enforcement missions is the SRSG, who is the link between strategic level, HQ New York, and operational level of command and control in the field. His/her task is to coordinate military, political and humanitarian activities in mission area. Thus it was serious mistake by the Secretariat that it did not appoint an

⁴⁹ Hillen, John (1998), pp. 163.

⁵⁰ Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin eds. (1998), pp. 134.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp 135.

SRSB in Bosnia until almost for two years after the mission started. Furthermore, the situation in Balkan region, especially in Bosnia had complex historical background with respect of ethnical, religious and political point of view. Therefore, was it possible that Mr. Akashi had a better understanding of the situation than somebody from the region or from Europe? The answer to this question is obvious and it points out the mistake that the Secretariat made when considering appointments of SRSB, not only in case of Bosnia but also for other missions⁵².

Having in mind the character of command and control arrangements between UNPROFOR and NATO, the attitude of some national authorities towards the UN capabilities to run UNPROFOR effectively and SRSB's abilities to understand the complexities of the situation, it was very difficult to achieve strategic coherence of this mission and to obtain UN political goals on the ground.

Therefore, for the future peace enforcement missions it is necessary to establish effective and clear command and control relations between UN and the authorized regional organization involved in a peace enforcement mission, in order to make overall command and control more effective. Since the SRSB is responsible for the overall strategic cohesion of the mission, the coordination of the service provided by regional organizations should be SRSB's responsibility. When appointing SRSB, the Secretariat should take into account complexity of the situation on the ground and to appoint person who is coming from the region with similar cultural background in order to be able to understand the situation in disputed area. Additionally, those problems, which are result of interference of troop contributing countries in the UN management of the certain mission, should be solved as soon as they occur in order to prevent negative influence on the cohesion of the UN command and control structure.

3.2. The configuration of UNITAF

a. The size, composition and interoperability of the mission forces. In December 1992⁵³, after failure of United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to establish a ceasefire and to obtain secure environment for humanitarian aid delivery,

⁵² MacQueen, Norrie (2002), pp. 210.

⁵³ UN SCR 794, (1992) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

the SC authorized Chapter VII Mission - Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States, in order to achieve such conditions.

Though, the initially planned *forces* were around 25,000 to 27,000 troops, UNITAF deployed around 30,000 troops that were built on two American-divisions, reaching total to 38,000 troops from twenty-three nations⁵⁴. In addition to a US Marine Expeditionary Force and an Army infantry division supported by combat air and offshore assets, UNITAF was comprised of battalion-brigade size units from Italy, Belgium, Canada, France and Germany as well as units from Pakistan and other developing nations⁵⁵. The size of the forces was appropriate for achieving the military objectives in this mission. Additionally, UNITAF was enabled to deploy and establish secure environment in most critical regions of Somalia. Thus, it could be stated that the size of UNITAF was the element of deterrence for Somali militia.

The composition of UNITAF was quite different than the composition of forces deployed in other UN missions during 1990s. UNITAF land forces were supported by close air support and offshore combat support assets, including U.S. aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers⁵⁶. Regarding the force composition of the other UNITAF contributing nations, it could be described as heavily armed, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Such force composition enabled UNITAF to undertake and successfully manage complex and coercive military operations, quickly establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted humanitarian aid delivery and creating conditions for further political actions in resolving the dispute.

In post-Cold War period, obtaining satisfactory level of *interoperability* in multinational environment was the great management challenge even in relatively small-size UN peace enforcement missions. However, UNITAF did not have this concern due to effective US military capacities and leadership. The other major UNITAF contributing forces were NATO members or close American allies, such as Italy, Canada, Australia and France, with similar doctrinal concepts, training and equipment⁵⁷. Other UNITAF forces which were not compatible with forces mentioned above were given separate, less military challenging, operational areas. One could argue that this mission was too short (five months) to be assessed as successful

⁵⁴ Hillen, John (1998), pp. 193.


⁵⁵ 'Somalia – UNOSOM II' at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>

⁵⁶ Hillen, John (1998), pp. 191.

⁵⁷ Somalia – UNOSOM II at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>

from the aspect of interoperability, but on the other hand it was confirmed that UNITAF was in overall successful mission which achieved its military objective.

b. The command and control. Even though, the US-led UNITAF mission was ad hoc coalition, consisting of twenty-three nations, it experienced less command and control problems than other similar peace enforcement missions in post Cold – War era. One of the reasons for such success could be the fact that the UNITAF command and control structure was based on efficient and tried US command and control system (*Figure 4*). UNITAF was under overall operational control of a US Joint Task Force, which contributed to the high level of unity of the command and the unity of effort as well. In order to give a certain level of operational autonomy and to avoid necessary competition between troop contributing countries, especially to those contingents whose doctrine, training and equipment were differed from NATO one, UNITAF area of operation was divided in nine sectors, but still under U.S. force operational control⁵⁸. The success of UNITAF command and control system could be seen as the classical example of efficiency of deploying “the coalition of the will” to conduct complex UN peace enforcement mission under the command and control umbrella of the major military power.



Source: Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, p. 27

⁵⁸ Dobbin, James et al., (2003), *America's Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq* Chapter Four, at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/MR1753.ch4.pdf>

Figure 4: Chain of command in UNITAF⁵⁹

3.3. The comparison of the force configuration - UNPROFOR vs UNITAF

The analysis of the UNPROFOR and UNITAF configuration has shown that the US - led UNITAF mission in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia were very differently tailored to operate in peace enforcement missions, although those missions were also similarly large and militarily complex. The size and composition of forces in UNITAF were adequate to achieve the given mandate. These forces were built up around strong US forces and its alliance force structure, enhancing overall cohesion of the force structure. The UNITAF composition reflected the readiness and capabilities of forces to engage in combat activities which were a deterrence for the parties in conflict, pushing them to comply with the provisions of the UN resolutions. The UNITAF in Somalia was created on NATO alliance force structure with similar doctrine, training, equipment and command and control system as well as the distribution of responsibilities for those non NATO nations, enabled UNITAF to achieve necessary level of interoperability. The UNITAF command and control structure was established in such a way that all national contingents were under operational control of US Joint Task Force. As already mentioned some non –NATO national contingents were given an operational area with certain degree of operational autonomy, but those would remain under overall US Joint Task Force operational control. Such organizational model maintained a high level of the integration and unity of the UNITAF command and control, supporting UNITAF's overall efforts to accomplish the mission successfully.

Though UNPROFOR was considered as the largest UN peace enforcement mission until 1992, it was confirmed that the size of it was not large enough to guarantee security in the 'Safe Areas' in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same goes for composition of UNPROFOR, whose mandate was strengthened several times, including authority to operate under Chapter VII in order to ensure protection of the "Safe Areas", but the composition of the ground forces remained unchanged. Lightly equipped forces, which initially joint to UNPROFOR to conduct peacekeeping mission, were not capable to carry out tasks given in the expanded mandate. The

⁵⁹ Hillen, John (1998), pp. 202.

problem of interoperability was additional burden to UNPROFOR's operations. The difference in doctrine, training, equipment and operational procedures of the thirty-seven troop contributing nation had a negative influence on its level of interoperability. The UNPROFOR command and control structure was not centralized around one major power as it was case in UNITAF. UNPROFOR's *ad hoc* command and control reflected its weak cohesion and unity of effort. In the case of UNPROFOR, it could be observed that integration of UN commanded forces and NATO forces (NATO) were not adequate, which led to a failure in execution of certain tasks. Interference by troop contributing nations in the UN mission management was also present in UNPROFOR, which consequently hampered cohesion of command and control of the mission. Additionally, SC's misunderstanding of the situation on the ground was reflected in SC's resolutions that were not realistic and achievable on the ground. Overall cohesion of command and control in UNPROFOR was additionally weakened by not appointing an SRSG for the first twenty two-months of the mission.

3.4. Conclusion

The configuration of the forces for the peace enforcement mission is based on a mandate for certain mission. One of factors which influence creation of the mandate is assessment of the security situation and the level of the risk for peace enforcement forces that they will face in the future mission area. The mandate which is not based on a thorough understanding and assessment of the situation in the future mission area leads to the configuration of the forces which size, composition or interoperability which does not reflect the reality in peace enforcement mission.

In order to achieve the mission end state, it is necessary that the SG structures forces whose size would enable the achievement of the military goals of the mission. The size of the forces by itself is not enough to achieve success in peace enforcement operations. The composition of those forces is also factor which could lead to failure or success of the mission.

The composition of forces should enable them to carry out complex combat operations in peace enforcement mission if necessary. In situations where the mission starts as peacekeeping and because of changes of security situation, later turns into a peace enforcement mission, the composition of the forces should follow

changes of the mandate for such mission. Otherwise, performing peace enforcement mission with forces composed for peacekeeping mission could lead to failure of the mission and losses of the forces as well.

The interoperability of peace enforcement forces is a factor which impacts overall cohesion and the unity of effort. The interoperability of the forces could be achieved through their organization in the mission area in such a way that forces from different nations which have similar or the same doctrine and equipment operate together. Those forces, which are considered not to be compatible with major peace enforcement forces, could have separate operational areas or less challengeable tasks and certain operational autonomy. The UN Secretariat is primarily responsible for building up forces for certain peace enforcement missions that should consider how to organize and put together forces from different nations to operate together. The level of interoperability is a decisive factor when creating peace enforcement forces, large forces which are not interoperable seem to be less successful than small forces with a high level of interoperability. Thus, for the Secretariat primary criteria when creating peace enforcement forces should be quality, not quantity of the forces.

The UN Secretariat does not have the appropriate command and control structure in order to conduct large and complex peace enforcement missions. It should be assessed how big and complex peace enforcement operations it is capable to manage. In order to avoid confusion and the failure of command and control function in complex peace enforcement missions, it is necessary to establish simple and understandable command and control structure that will support successful execution of the mission. For those missions that are assessed that the Secretariat is not capable to manage, the SC should seek for partnership with regional security organizations or initiate a 'the coalition of the will' to carry out such a mission. In peace enforcement missions where "the coalition of will" operates on behalf of the UN, command and control over military operations on the ground should remain "the coalition" responsibility under oversight of the SG, who should on the other hand, remain in charge of the political efforts in such missions.

When appointing an SRSG, the Secretariat should take into account the complexity of the situation on the ground and appoint a person who is coming from the region with

similar cultural background in order to be able to understand the situation in disputed area.

CHAPTER IV

THE MISSION MANDATE

The peace enforcement mission is based on a mandate authorized by the UN SC. Through the mandate, the UN SC gives strategic guidelines for the mission and sets conditions which should be achieved as the operational end state. The mandate does not refer to the military goals of the mission, it sets overall mission goals, including humanitarian, military and political aims. It is also considered essential that the SC understands what could be really achieved by military forces and resources available to them in the given situation. Furthermore, the mandate in its nature should be clear, specific and concise in order to prevent its misinterpretation by agencies and nations involved in the execution of a peace enforcement mission.

The analysis of the influence of the mandate on the success of peace enforcement missions in Somalia, UNITAF and UNOSOM II will be conducted in this chapter.

4.1. The mandate of UNITAF

Established by the UN SC resolution 794 on 3 December 1992, UNITAF had mandate “...to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”⁶⁰ The secure environment was the precondition for aid distribution, but at the same time it meant that UNITAF has finished its mission and created conditions to handover responsibility back to the earlier failed UN mission, UNOSOM I. Analyzing the configuration of UNITAF forces, tailored for such mandate, it could be observed that there was high probability to achieve the mission desired end-state. UNITAF was deployed with overwhelming forces, dominantly NATO Allies’ forces, supported by different combat and combat service support units. As per given mandate, UNITAF was operating under Chapter VII, imposing provisions of the Resolution on the factions concerned. UNITAF was operating in most dangerous and most unsecured areas in southern part of Somalia. Forces deployed for this mission were sufficient to respond security challenges in the mission area. Though the end of the mission was not particularly defined by the mandate, it emphasized that it should be achieved once the security situation allowed uninterrupted delivery of the humanitarian aid. The mission end state was achieved

⁶⁰ UN SCR No 794, (1992) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

within five months when security situation reached such a level, allowing distribution of the humanitarian aid through the most parts of Somalia. Even though it was not stated in the UN SC Resolution that UNITAF was supposed to disarm factions in the conflict⁶¹, the SG requested UNITAF to do so but such request was rejected by the US administration. One could argue whether the decision of the US administration was appropriate at that time, but at least such decision did not make the mission success questionable. The implications of the decision to disarm the factions made by the UN at a later stage, during UNOSOM II mandate, will be elaborated through the following analysis.

A solid mandate for the peace enforcement mission should be considered as the essential part of the mission success. The mandate should give clear strategic guidelines for execution of the mission and what should be considered as its end state. Furthermore, the mandate should be built in accordance with security situation on the ground that forces are going to face as well as on the assessment on the mission force configuration needed for successful achievement of the desired end state.

4.2. The mandate of UNOSOM II

The new mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was established by UN SC Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993⁶². Operating under Chapter VII, UNOSOM II took over operational control from UNITAF on 4 May 1993⁶³. The configuration of UNOSOM II was different from UNITAF. The authorized size of UNOSOM II was 28, 000 troops⁶⁴, but it was not achieved until five months after the authorization. The composition and geographical representation of the forces reflected that most of the force contributing countries belonged to the developing countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Morocco etc.)⁶⁵. In overall, UNOSOM II was more suitable for peacekeeping than for a peace enforcement mission, lacking armoured units as well as air combat and transportation assets. Additionally, overall operational control over the mission was under the UN Secretariat which was the first peace enforcement mission in its history that was run by the UN Secretariat. At that time the Secretariat was understaffed,

⁶¹ UN SCR No 794, (1992) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

⁶² UN SCR 814 (1993) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

⁶³ MacQueen, Norrie (2002), pp. 212.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 211.

⁶⁵ Somalia – UNOSOM II at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>

without experience and capacities to handle the peace enforcement mission on the strategic level.

Contrary to the adjustments of the configuration of the forces on the ground, which led to establishment of the weaker forces than it was UNITAF, the adjustments of the mandate for UNOSOM II also occurred, but it was wider than UNITAF's mandate. UNOSOM's mandate included: assistance in distribution of the humanitarian aid throughout all country; disarming of the factions; assistance in political and economical rehabilitation of the country; the assistance of re-establishment of Somali police; to assist in demining activities and to assist repatriation of the refugees and displaced people within Somalia⁶⁶. In this case, the UN SC authorized more tasks, which in nature were complex, for forces that were not capable to realize such mandate. It is obvious that political goals of the UN were not matched with its capabilities on the ground. This is one of cases, known as 'mission creep'⁶⁷, where means and forces available for the certain mission are not properly tailored to achieve political goals given by authorized agency, in this case, the UN SC. The effectiveness of such forces to fulfil the given mandate was confirmed on 05 June 1993⁶⁸, when Pakistani troops were sent to inspect General's Aideed militia weapon storage in Mogadishu. The militia attacked the troops. The results of the attack on UNOSOM II forces, which were not able to respond to it effectively, were 24 Pakistani troops killed.

This was the beginning of the end of UNOSOM II, next day (06 June 1993), the SC in its Resolution called for use of all means for investigation of the attack and those responsible to be arrested and punished⁶⁹. The mandate was once again broadened by SC, which meant that UNOSOM II was responsible for arresting and punishment of the responsible persons for the attack. This decision led to everyday clashes between militia and light UNOSOM II forces. The implications of such strategic management of the mission led to tragic event on 03 October 1993⁷⁰, when US troops trying to arrest General Aideed were attacked and 17 US troops were killed. Subsequently, as result of the events took place in June and October 1993, UNOSOM II was reduced in size and closed in March 1995. As an epilogue,

⁶⁶ The UN SCR 814 , (1993) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

⁶⁷ Sigel, Adam B. (2000), *Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood* at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1825.pdf

⁶⁸ Sutterlin, James S., ed., (2003), pp. 71.

⁶⁹ The UN SCR 837, (1993), at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

⁷⁰ Sutterlin, James S., ed., (2003), pp. 72.

UNOSOM II had around 150 personnel killed⁷¹ and the UN credibility once again was ruined.

In the case when certain adjustments of the peace enforcement mission have to be made, any changes which are included in mandate have to be balanced with adjustments of the force configuration on the ground. There is always great risk of 'mission creep', that might lead to the mission failure, if changes in the mission mandate are not followed by adjustments to the force size, composition or command and control structure of forces that are already in mission area.

4.3. The comparison of the mandate – UNITAF vs UNOSOM II

Though the UNITAF mission was relatively short, it could be assessed that it achieved its desired end-state: secured the environment for delivery of humanitarian aid. The given mandate was clear, specific and realistic in sense that dedicated forces for such mandate could achieve desired end-state with a high level of probability. The primary task for this peace enforcement mission was establishment of secure environment, meaning that the effort of forces was directed towards the accomplishment of the most important aspect for the mission success. The forces in this peace enforcement mission were tailored, composed and structured to overcome challenges in the complex intra-state conflict. Additionally, during UNITAF peace enforcement mission there were no changes of the mandate which could lead to the failure of the mission.

On the other side the mandate of UNOSOM II put its forces and the mission as whole to the great risk of the failure. The mandate of UNOSOM II was much broader than it was previously planned for UNITAF, but forces for such mandate were even smaller in size; lighter in composition and with less effective command and control structure than it was a case with composition of UNITAF. Comparing UNOSOM's II mandate and capabilities with UNITAF's mandate and resources, it is obvious that the success of UNOSOM II peace enforcement mission was put in question at very early stage. Such unbalanced adjustments of the mandate and forces available to gain its desired end-state led to 'mission creep', the first step of the failure of a peace enforcement mission. Additionally, the mandate was broadened by the task which put UNOSOM II forces in the role of a 'hunter' of the faction leader leading to the continuous clashes

⁷¹ MacQueen, Norrie (2002), pp. 218.

between General Aideed's militia and UNOSOM II forces. Finally, capabilities of the UN Secretariat to handle such complex peace enforcement mission certainly were one of factors which influenced the mission success.

4.4. Conclusion

The basic precondition for the success of the peace enforcement mission is a well defined and solid mandate. The mandate should be based on a comprehensive assessment of the security situation in the proposed mission area as well as on the assessment of necessary needs and resources available to achieve the operational end state. On the other hand, there must be proper understanding of the mandate by the troop contributing nations in order to provide and prepare compatible forces which will be able to carry out peace enforcement tasks. The broad mandate gives more opportunity to be misunderstood in sense of the priority execution as well as in sense whether certain task should be accomplished and what are implications on the future tasks.

The extensive mandate also has negative influence on the unity of effort. It should be understood that every adjustments of the mandate of peace enforcement mission, does not necessary means or lead to 'mission creep'. Mostly 'mission creep' occurs, when adjustments of the mandate are not well balanced or followed by adjustments of the dedicated forces on the ground. Thus, in the situation where there is a need to adjust the mandate of a peace enforcement mission it is necessary to re-tailor forces on the ground and respective ROE, if necessary as well. In cases where it is assessed that there is no sufficient forces to carry out new tasks then the mandate should be focused on the most important ones that forces are able to accomplish.

CHAPTER V

THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The Rules of Engagement (ROE) regulate the use of force, under which conditions, when and how force might be applied. Commanders are responsible for execution of the ROE. When considering ROE in peace enforcement missions

“...Restraint remains a principle of peace operations and should guide ROE development, particularly in light of collateral damage, post-conflict objectives, desired end states, and the legitimacy of the operation and authorities involved.”⁷²

Those principles developed by U.S. Army are considered to be relevant for the development of ROE since it is observed that U.S. forces ROE in previous peace enforcement missions were successful. Thus, they will be elaborated in further analysis in this study paper.

The development of ROE should take into account provisions of the ‘Law of the Armed Conflict’ (LOAC), International law as well as national law. The ROE do not restrict the right of use of force in self-defence, both individually and while protecting friendly forces as well. The ROE that are in nature broad and confusable might be misinterpreted by different nations that take part in the mission. However, the commander should be given the authority to assess the situation and apply ROE as it might be appropriate in order to protect his forces. The following analysis will include the elaboration of ROE in two peace enforcement missions: Multi National Forces (MNF) in Haiti and UNOSOM II.

5.1. The rules of engagement in MNF – Haiti

The UN SC authorized forming of the USA led Multinational Forces (MNF), by its Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994, to use all necessary means to remove military leadership and autocratic regime and to restore democratic control over Haiti⁷³, facilitating returning of the democratically elected president in 1991, the President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

⁷² *Peace Operations, FM 100 – 23*, (1994), at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-23/index.html>

⁷³ *The UN SCR 940* (1994) at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

Since the negotiations for permissive entry in Haiti, between former President Carter and Haiti's General Raoul Cedras were successful, the operation Uphold Democracy started on 19 September 1994⁷⁴. It could be observed in Appendix H to the Operational Plan (OPLAN) 2380 for this operation, that the ROE for this mission encompassed clear principles for application of the ROE including the restraint and proportionality of the use of force, the collateral damage considerations, a commander's responsibility to adjust ROE as necessary and simplicity. When analyzing the ROE for this operation the principles of restraint and proportionality of the use of the force could be observed in following "...*Deadly force may be used when no lesser degree of force will suffice...*"⁷⁵ and "*US Forces are limited to the minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish their assigned mission*"⁷⁶.

Additionally, we can see that the use of force should be applied gradually, meaning that the '*deadly force*'⁷⁷, is the last option to be applied. The minimum collateral damage considerations are pointed out as '*Targets will be engaged with observed, direct, deliberately-aimed fire*'⁷⁸, meaning that targeting should be in accordance with LOAC and collateral damage should be at the lowest possible level. Since, the operation was considered as permissive entry in Haiti, in its ROE it was stated that "*No forces have been declared hostile*"⁷⁹. Furthermore, the concept of soldier's ROE card was created in thirteen points, keeping simplicity and clarity of the content. Though the use of the force was very limited, the commander was given responsibilities '*...to use all authorized means available to defend the force*'⁸⁰. The fact that this operation was dominantly carried out by US forces (20,000 US troops out of 23,000 troops deployed in Haiti), could be one of the reasons that MNF did not experience cases of the misunderstanding of ROE during the mission.

However, subsequently the ROE were adjusted on 23 September 1994, emphasizing restrictions on the use of force while establishing the public order⁸¹. This adoption of

⁷⁴ Operation Uphold Democracy at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold_democracy.htm

⁷⁵ ROE for Operation Uphold Democracy (Appendix H) in *Law and military operations in Haiti 1994-1995: Lessons learned for judge advocate* (Charlottesville, Center for Law and Military Operations US Army) at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/OL_Haiti_Lessons_19951211.pdf

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 207.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 205.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 208

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 206

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 204

⁸¹ ROE Card of 23 September 1994 (Appendix J) in *Law and military operations in Haiti 1994-1995: Lessons learned for judge advocates* (Charlottesville, Center for Law and Military Operations US Army) at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/OL_Haiti_Lessons_19951211.pdf

ROE, as it was seen in later stage of the operation, did not hamper MNF efficiency in conducting its mission.

5.2. The rules of engagement in UNOSOM II – Somalia

Though UNOSOM II was less capable to carry out peace enforcement mission in Somalia⁸², it had the same ROE as previously UNITAF. In order to achieve secure environment for delivery of humanitarian aid, UNOSOM II had more bold and aggressive approach to disarmament of the factions than UNITAF. While UNITAF successfully dealt with disarmament issue by requesting for implementation of “four NOs”⁸³ (no crew served weapon on the street, no visible weapon, no roadblocks, no banditry), UNOSOM II started to search and confiscate militia weapons. Such an approach led to militia frustration and escalation of the security situation, especially after 04 June 1993 incident. In order to strengthen UNOSOM’s ROE, its commander, Lt. General Celvik Bir, issued ‘*Fragmentary Order 39*’, ordering ‘...organized, armed militia, technicals and other crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and can be engaged without provocation’⁸⁴.

By this order the use of force by UNOSOM was even more encouraged, undermining possibility to be used gradually. While UNITAF Forces had used to apply the force after being attacked⁸⁵, UNOSOM II Forces were authorized to do that even not being engaged by Somali militia. Furthermore, the use of force in this case was not specific regarding proportionality and what measures to be undertaken in order to minimize the collateral damage. Additionally, the use of force in such a way meant that UNOSOM started an open fight against the conflict factions, which was not leading to the mission desired end state. This was confirmed in later stages, during summer and autumn 1993, when the security situation became even worse, leading to 3rd October incident and final collapse of UNOSOM II in March 1995. Such a rigid approach to the use of force was rejected by some nations contingents’ commanders. The most evident case was with Italian contingent that openly refused to carry out UNOSOM commander’s orders⁸⁶.

⁸² See Chapter 3.2 and 4.2.

⁸³ Schmidl, Erwin A.ed. (2000), pp. 47.

⁸⁴ Boulden, Jane (1999), *The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia and Bosnia* at <http://www.queensu.ca/cir/pdf/Martello20.pdf>

⁸⁵ *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations*, U.S. Joint Warfighting Centre, (1997) <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/k516.pdf>

⁸⁶ Boulden, Jane (1999), pp.64.

5.3. The comparison of ROE – MNF vs. UNOSOM II

The MNF were authorized to use the force as the last option and at the same time taking into account its proportionality and minimum collateral damage, while on the other side UNOSOM II Forces were authorized to use the force even if not provoked by Somali militia, undermining importance of necessity and proportionality. Even though MNF experienced changes of its ROE, it did not hamper the success of that mission. UNOSOM's approach to the use of the force led to derogation of the relations with militia and raising their frustration towards the UN forces, which finally ended with daily fighting. Additionally, such aggressive and extensive use of force changed the mission final objective. UNOSOM II became engaged in daily fighting and much more focused on disarmament than providing secure environment for humanitarian aid delivery and setting conditions for conflict solution. Furthermore, the rigid approach to the use of the force weakened its internal cohesion and unity of effort which decreased its efficiency and overall integrity. Though UNOSOM II mandate was boosted by Chapter VII, its forces were not robust enough to apply forces in the way foreseen by the ROE.

5.4. Conclusion

Well-tailored ROE for a peace enforcement mission are crucial since their implementation on the ground will facilitate or hinder the success of the mission. Thus the ROE must allow balance between operational requirements, mission objectives and applicable laws, while ensuring force protection. Since peace enforcement missions are carried out by multinational forces, the application of the ROE for certain contingent could be to some extent limited by its national law. Such a situation should be avoided through the development of the ROE, its operational deployment or by compromise which would not hinder the mission unity of effort and its integrity. The ROE should take in consideration under which conditions force should be used, the measures to be taken in order to minimize collateral damage, who is authorized and under which conditions to adapt ROE in the certain situation as well as being simple enough to be understandable by the mission members. As the situation on the ground or the mandate changes it should be reflected in the ROE.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will sum up and provide an overview of the findings identified in previous chapters, as well as to give some recommendations for possible improvements in the future. The elaboration of the legislative basis for peace enforcement operations showed that there were different interpretations of the peace enforcement and peacekeeping concepts by different nations which is reflected in their national doctrinal documents. Such different theoretical approaches to these concepts lead to misunderstanding when it comes to execution of peace enforcement operations in certain missions. Regardless of the high level of cooperation between the permanent members of the SC that was achieved in Post Cold War period, it could be observed that the mandates for certain peace enforcement missions given by the SC in the first decade after the Cold War were too ambitious and the cooperation between the SC and the SG in certain cases was not appropriate.

Regarding the capabilities of the Secretariat to manage peace enforcement missions, it was confirmed through the experience of peace enforcement missions in Post-Cold period that it does not have operational capabilities to manage complex military operations in the field. The appointments of SRSGs were not timely and it was not taken into consideration that the person appointed for this function should be from the region with similar cultural background in order to better understand the nature and complexity of the certain conflict. Furthermore, the UN chain of command and control in such missions was often challenged by troop contributing nations that were interfering by sending instructions to their respective contingent's commander to conduct the mission in a way that was countering to the UN view. On the other hand, peace enforcement missions carried out and operationally controlled by one major military power, as it was case with UNITAF that could be characterized as 'the coalition of the will', had more success than those missions run by the UN Secretariat.

One of significant footprints on the success of the peace enforcement mission has been the configuration of mission forces: the size, composition, interoperability and command and control of the mission. The size of forces by itself, if not composed

properly in order to carry out complex combat operations, is not sufficient for successful accomplishment of the peace enforcement mission. The level of interoperability of forces in peace enforcement mission has a decisive role. It could be observed that large forces which are not interoperable seem to be less successful than smaller forces with high level of interoperability. If these components are not adjusted when the mission mandate is changed or if the mission started as PKO and then changed to peace enforcement operations, it could endanger the success of that mission. A well functioning and structured command and control system is one of preconditions for the successful achievement of the desired end state. In the past it was observed that the UN Secretariat did not successfully manage the command and control in complex and large peace enforcement missions which hindered the overall mission cohesion, mission success and UN integrity.

Although a clear mandate is considered as the basic precondition for the success of the peace enforcement mission, this was not the case in some missions conducted in the Post-Cold War period. Through the elaboration of case-studies it was observed that the mandate in some cases was too ambitious, not reflecting reality on the ground and often changed. Therefore, forces dedicated to conduct such missions were not capable to achieve the desired end state. Furthermore, in cases where the mandate was too broad, there was a greater likelihood of it being misinterpreted by its executors, which hampered the unity of effort and the mission integrity. Often changes of the mandate for certain peace enforcement missions, without adjustments of the force configuration and resources needed for its accomplishment, led to 'mission creep' and failure of the mission.

Since the purpose of the use of force in the peace enforcement mission is one of the fundamental differences between peace enforcement operations and PKO, the ROE is considered as a very important tool whose implementation on the ground can facilitate or hinder the success of the peace enforcement mission. Case studies that were analyzed in this study paper showed certain shortcomings in the ROE which were not reflecting the balance between operational requirements, applicable laws and mission objectives. Furthermore, it could be observed that even when the operational situation had changed on the ground, requiring the adjustments of the ROE, this often did not occur. This resulted in the use of non-proportional force, putting the success of the mission on the risk.

The UN has had the main role in preventing or restoring the peace in disputed areas in the past, but its importance in the future could be even greater if we consider the number of current and potential, mainly intra-state conflicts all over the World. This chapter will offer some recommendations for possible improvements that should be undertaken by relevant UN bodies in order to manage future peace enforcement operations successfully. Though most of recommendations could be implemented in short period of time, it is assessed that some of them might only be achieved in medium period time (5 year term).

7.1. Short – term actions

- Since the Secretariat currently does not have capabilities to provide strategic management of complex peace enforcement missions, the Secretariat should initiate and the SC decide to which extent and how large peace enforcement mission the Secretariat is capable to manage. Such an assessment should provide guidelines for development of deficient capabilities in the future.
- As far as the UN Secretariat is not capable to manage complex peace enforcement missions, for execution of these kind of missions, the UN SC might consider partnering with ‘the coalition of the will’ led by a military capable and politically willing nation or a regional security organization.
- In order to create an appropriate mandate, which is precondition to build up the suitable configuration of the mission forces that would be able to achieve desired end state, the SC should take into account all relevant information provided by the SG. The mandate should be precise and concise, avoiding the possibilities of misinterpretation by its executors.
- In cases when the mandate must be adjusted, though such cases should be avoided if possible, the Secretariat and the SC should consider necessary adjustments of forces on the ground as well as resources needed to fulfil the given mandate. In order to avoid ‘mission creep’, in cases where it is assessed that there is not sufficient forces to carry out new tasks, then the mandate

should be focused on the most important ones that the Mission should achieve.

- The Secretariat should develop certain criteria in order to assess the capabilities of contributing forces to carry out peace enforcement missions. Additionally, in order to ensure efficiency of forces, the primary criteria should be capability of forces (quality) not their quantity. The composition of the forces should enable them to carry out complex combat operations in peace enforcement mission if necessary.
- The interoperability of the forces could be improved through their organization in mission area in such a way that forces from different nations which have similar or the same doctrine and equipment operate together.
- The Secretariat should ensure that the SRSG has full authority for overall management of a mission in the field, but not interfere in the execution of the military operations. Additionally, the Secretariat should prevent troop contributing nations interfering in strategic command and control of execution of military operations in peace enforcement missions.
- The Secretariat should take into account the nature and complexity of the certain conflict in order to appoint appropriate person as SRSG.
- The Secretariat should ensure that ROEs for the peace enforcement mission reflect balance between operational requirements, mission objectives and applicable laws. Furthermore, ROE should be constantly reviewed and adjusted as situation on the ground or mandate might be changed.

7.2. Medium – term actions

- The Secretariat should develop and distribute clear guidance for a unified approach to peace enforcement operations that would become incorporated in national military doctrines.

- The UN Secretariat should adapt its organization and develop its capabilities in order to be able to provide leadership and management of the peace enforcement missions.
- The SC and the Secretariat should develop its instruments in order to shorten the decision making time and increase their efficiency.

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