

NORDIC SUPPORT TO EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE: PERCEPTIONS, PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS — AND THE WAY FORWARD



BY

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Glossary

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| ACB Programme | Africa Capacity-Building Programme |
| ACIRC | African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis |
| ACOTA | African Contingency Operations Training Assistance |
| ACRI | African Crisis Response Initiative |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| ASF | African Standby Force |
| AU | African Union |
| AUC | African Union Commission |
| BMZ | German Federal Ministry of Cooperation and Development/ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung |
| BPST | British Peace Support Team |
| CADSP | Common African Defence and Security Policy |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| DSSR | Defence and Security Sector Reform |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EACDS | Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff |
| EASBRICOM | Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Command |
| EASF | Eastern Africa Standby Force |
| EASFCOM | Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECDPM | European Centre for Development Policy Management |
| ECOBRIg | ECOWAS Brigade |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EU | European Union |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| FoE | Friend of EASF |
| FOC | Full Operational Capability |
| FOMAC | Central African Multinational Force |
| FTX | Field training exercise |
| GIZ | German Society for International Cooperation/ Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| GPOI | Global Peace Operations Initiative |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IOC | Initial Operational Capability |
| IPSTC | International Peace Support Training Centre |
| JAES | Joint Africa-EU Strategy |
| M&E | Monitoring & Evaluation |
| MLD | Military Logistics Depot |
| MoD | Ministry of Defence |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MSC | (African Union) Military Staff Committee |
| NACS | Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff |
| NARC | Northern Africa Regional Capacity |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NORDEFECO | Nordic Defence Cooperation |
| NODEFIC | Norwegian Defence International Centre |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OAU | Organization for African Unity |
| PLANELM | Planning Element |
| PSC | (African Union) Peace and Security Council |
| RDC | Rapid Deployment Capability |

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|--------|---|
| REC | Regional Economic Community |
| RECAMP | Reinforcement of African <i>Peacekeeping</i> Capacities |
| RM | Regional Mechanism |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMID | UN-AU Mission in Darfur |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNMEE | UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea |
| UNMISS | UN Mission in South Sudan |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCR | United Nations Security Council Resolution |

Chapter 1: African security

The United Nations (UN) is the main international body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. However, the UN alone is not capable of preventing and responding to emerging conflicts around the globe. The international collective security system therefore relies on regional and sub-regional bodies as well as coalitions of the willing to take on the peacekeeping burden. This role was envisioned in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter calling for regional arrangements to “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes ... before referring them to the Security Council” (United Nations 1945, p. 34). This is the principle of subsidiarity, whereby those countries and regions closest to, and most affected by, the conflict should have an interest in resolving it.

The United Nations has welcomed, and largely supported, African peacekeeping initiatives and the build-up of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The African Peace and Security Architecture is embedded within a recently established continental organization – the African Union (AU). The UN-AU partnership and cooperation on responding to conflicts and crises on the African continent is evident in the establishment of a UN liaison office to the African Union, major UN funding and capacity-building of the AU’s organs, and also co-deployments, such as the UN-AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) in Darfur, Sudan.

The UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council have also elaborated on the importance of regional and sub-regional organizations’ peacekeeping responsibilities and responses through a number of resolutions and reports, such as UN Security Council Resolutions 2033 (2012) and 2167 (2014) affirming the crucial role that regional organizations play in peacekeeping and solving security issues. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General has elaborated on the importance of regional-global security partnerships and has called for “a programme of action for capacity-building across the globe” (United Nations 2006). Regional responses to conflicts and crises have become a mainstay of international peace and security – and the need to build the capacities of these regional first responders will remain a policy priority of the UN. African regional and sub-regional security mechanisms have received a lot of attention in the last decade and a half. Why is this so? And why have we witnessed an increase in African security mechanisms and African-led peace operations?

The OAU-AU transition: Focus on African security

The failures of the UN to stem violence and resolve conflicts on the African continent in the 1990s demonstrated a need for effective homebred security mechanisms in Africa. The first continent-wide organization, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), was heavily criticized for not playing a more active role in post-independence Africa and it was often referred to as a ‘club of dictators’ (Jeng 2012, p. 129). It was evident from conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia that “the Rwandan genocide could neither be contained nor prevented by existing international law mechanisms or regional mediation processes” (Jeng 2012, p. 66). Both the UN and the OAU had failed. The OAU Charter’s principles of sovereignty, self-determination and non-interference effectively impeded OAU intervention and involvement in African crises and conflicts. In fact, it was the “institutional and normative weaknesses in confronting armed conflicts that attracted most condemnation” of the OAU (Jeng 2012, pp.129-130). This emboldened many Africans, including some African leaders, to call for a renewal of the OAU and its conflict management mechanism.

Three African state leaders took centre stage in revamping the OAU. South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki popularized the concept ‘African renaissance’. Herein lies the vision of an integrated and prosperous Africa able to do away with its dysfunctional institutions, advance development and reduce violence and conflicts (Jeng 2012, pp.154-155). Mbeki’s African “renaissance vision represented a sense of African political consciousness which shaped some of the values of the Constitutive Act of the African Union” (Jeng 2012, pp. 155-156). Another African leader that was pivotal for the reform of the OAU to a more effective African Union was Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo’s vision was based on progressive values and a modernized form of Pan-Africanism (Jeng 2012, p. 156). However, the partnership between Mbeki and Obasanjo was not sufficient to bring about the much-needed reforms of the OAU. “For that to happen, they needed the exuberance, forceful charm and idiosyncrasy of an unlikely ally, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi” (Jeng 2012, p. 159).

Ghaddafi had long been a proponent of a ‘United States of Africa’ and displayed his eagerness for institutional transformation by hosting an extraordinary summit in his hometown of Sirte, Libya, in September 1999. The summit was convened to look at ways of making the OAU more effective to enable African states to keep pace with economic and political developments in a globalized world (Jeng 2012, pp. 159-160). The outcome of this summit was a decision by African Heads of State and Governments to transform the

Organization of African Unity (OAU) into a more complex, responsive and accountable organization – the African Union (AU). The Constitutive Act, which sets out the structures of the African Union as well as its principles, was adopted at the July 2000 OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo.

In a July 2002 launch in Durban, South Africa, the highly ineffective and inept Organization of African Unity became the African Union. The AU was to become the epicenter of African economic, political and social integration. This vision is reflected in the nine organs established as part of the African Union structure: the Assembly of the Union; the Executive Council; the Pan-African parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialised Technical Committees; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the Financial Institutions (Jeng 2012, p. 170).

The AU was also given a strong mandate to maintain African peace and security. In fact, the change from a largely ineffective OAU to a more responsive and proactive AU marks a crucial turning point for African leaders' willingness to intervene in the many conflicts plaguing the continent. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union demonstrates a normative shift among African leaders and peoples by authorizing military intervention in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (OAU 2000). This does not necessarily mean that African leaders have traded the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty for the protection of civilians and human rights. What Article 4 (h) does, is provide the AU and African states with a legal framework through which they can militarily intervene.

Given that the AU Constitutive Act did not call for the establishment of a peace and security body, a separate protocol established the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU's Peace and Security Protocol entered into force in December 2003. Its Article 2 states that "the PSC is the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and therefore perceived as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa" (Jeng 2012, p. 175). The Peace and Security Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) represent the core of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). A repertoire of tools and methods has been created in order to support the Peace and Security Council fulfill its role: the African Standby Force (ASF) and the AU Military Staff

Committee (MSC), the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, and a Special Fund for Peace.




Figure 1: The conflict prevention and resolution tools of the African Union and its PSC

The African Standby Force and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

The AU's envisioned peace and security agenda has been, and will continue to be, operationalized through its diverse bodies that work to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. One of these bodies, and perhaps the most robust one, is the African Standby Force. The ASF was established in 2004. The African Standby Force "with its Military Staff Committee was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping missions in responding to emergency situations anywhere on the continent requiring rapid military responses" (International Peace Institute 2010). The 2005 *Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force* outlines the ambitious plan to develop five regional forces consisting of military, civilian and police components. These five regional standby forces, representing Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central Africa, were envisaged to have the capability to deploy in six different mission scenarios, ranging from political missions to complex peace operations (AU 2003). The African Standby Force declared Initial Operational capability (IOC) in 2010 and was scheduled to achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) by the end of 2015.

Despite the ambition to reach Full Operational Capability in 2015, two of the regions' standby forces are inoperative or barely exist but on paper (North and Central), whereas the other regions struggle to find the political will, commitment and financial resources to make it happen. Some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) -- originally intended to enhance sub-regional development and economic integration -- have expanded their mandates to include the build-up of a regional force for peacekeeping purposes. These include the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). East African states, on the other hand, have created a new regional mechanism (RM) mandated with peace and security issues and peacekeeping under the AU hat: the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF).




Figure 2: The African Union Peace and Security Architecture

At the African Union level, the ASF is supposed to comprise: an ASF headquarters with a continental Planning Element (PLANELM) that includes the three components (military, police and civilian); a continental Military Logistics Depot (MLD); a roster of 300 to 500 military observers on standby; a roster of 240 police officers on standby; and a civilian roster with experts in mission administration and the various subject areas needed for peace support operations (GIZ 2014, PPR Report, p. 13).

The regional economic communities and mechanisms' standby capabilities and capacities are to be built along similar lines. Each REC/RM is to have a permanent Planning Element (PLANELM) that includes representatives from each of the three components; a standby force with one military contingent and two or more companies of police/gendarmerie to be held on standby in the member states; a civilian roster of 290 for mission support and specialized

roles; a military logistics depot/logistics base; training Centers of Excellence that will have responsibility for specialized training; and Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) (GIZ 2014, PPR Report, p. 13).

Building up the abovementioned capacities and capabilities requires time, resources and political commitment. As of yet, no AU peacekeeping mission has relied on these structures. Instead, most AU and REC missions (such as the AU missions in Darfur, Burundi, Somalia, and Mali; the ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)-AU mission in Central African Republic) have been deployed as a result of the willingness and commitment of one or two member states on an ad hoc basis (GIZ 2014, PPR Report, p. 13).

The regional standby forces face severe shortcomings and will only attain FOC in 2015 if the international community, including African countries and Western donors, is seriously committed to large-scale and comprehensive capacity-building of African militaries and sub-regional entities.

Security cooperation: Building Africa's peacekeeping capacities

The rise of the African Union as a credible peacekeeper on the African continent in 2002 meant that African states were now more willing to commit resources to maintain peace and security. At the same time, however, the African Union and the African member states are heavily reliant on funding and military support, skills and competence from Western Europe and North America. This has given rise to multiple peacekeeping capacity-building programs across the continent, by countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and the Nordic countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have provided training and training programmes for African militaries and peacekeepers for decades. The European Union (EU), which is the single largest donor to African Union peacekeeping, highlighted security as a necessary condition for socio-economic development in its Cairo Declaration and Plan of Action of 2000. Hence, all agreements between the EU and Africa in the period 2000-2007 were to include security as one aspect of development cooperation (Haastrup 2013, p. 4). It was not until 2007 that security became “a definitive area of cooperation between the EU and Africa in the peace and security nexus of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)” (Haastrup 2013, p. 4).

The Nordic countries have since 2008 supported the build-up of Eastern Africa Standby Force. In the last decade, we have seen that Nordic military engagements in Africa have primarily focused on capacity-building of African countries' militaries and peacekeeping capacities rather than deploying boots on the ground. Small and medium states that do not have large militaries have tried to create niche capacities instead of providing their own troops. The Nordic countries, and in particular the Norwegian military, have created a niche for themselves in Defence and Security Sector Reform and military training and mentoring.

What is the rationale for Western, and Nordic, engagement with African regional and sub-regional organizations? Why should the Nordic countries support capacity-building of African peacekeepers and African security mechanisms, such as the EASF? First, capacity-building efforts and DSSR programs are not only a supplement and an alternative to a Norwegian or Nordic military deployment in the region but also enable African militaries to respond to crises and complex emergencies in their own backyard. Secondly, in the (relatively brief) history of peacekeeping from the late 1940s, the Nordic countries gained a reputation as credible peacekeepers and peace-loving nations. The Nordic countries provided about a third of all UN peacekeepers in the 1980s but Nordic contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has since then declined dramatically. One reason is that the number of operations and, hence, the number of civilian, police and military personnel, have increased manifold. The Nordic countries are not able to provide large numbers of troops. Another reason is that the Nordic countries have increasingly focused on providing military assistance through other channels, such as NATO, the EU and coalitions of the willing. Given these limitations on Nordic peacekeeping contributions, the Nordic countries' capacity-building and training of developing countries' peacekeepers serve as a force-multiplier. Thirdly, it is a matter of sharing the costs and burden of maintaining international peace and security.

Currently, the top ten troop contributing countries to UN missions are African and Asian countries and nearly half of all uniformed peacekeepers are African. Moreover, most UN peace operations and peacekeepers (78 per cent) are deployed to the African continent. African and other developing countries cannot shoulder the peacekeeping burden alone. Given that African countries provide a large number of troops to UN and African-led missions as part of maintaining international peace and security, it is a duty and an obligation – and a necessity – that Western states get involved. Given the reluctance of Western countries to provide boots on the ground in UN missions in volatile areas, Western countries

have to provide support to peacekeeping in other ways. This support has thus far consisted of capacity-building of various kinds, in-kind assistance and equipment, and funding.

Although Western support for peacekeeping in Africa is both necessary and desirable, it brings a whole host of issues into the equation. For instance, due to donor-driven (versus needs-driven) policies, we have seen an asymmetrical development of regional organizations' deployment capabilities. Powell states that the "broad differences [between the African regional organizations] are augmented by donor-driven peace and security capacity-building initiatives, which are not always well coordinated and tend to favour some regions and member states over others" (Powell 2005, p. 26). Until recently, ECOWAS was the main beneficiary of capacity-building programs and financial resources from the West, thus initially allowing West Africa to develop its standby force capability ahead of the other four regions. In addition, we see asymmetries in the build-up of the regional forces' military, police and civilian components. The civilian component has thus far been neglected compared to the military component. Lastly, donors provide assistance and capacity-building based more on their own abilities and ideas of what the regional forces need instead of meeting the actual needs and priorities of the sub-regional mechanisms. This report will delve into discussions concerning donor assistance and capacity-building in Chapters 5 and 6.

Report outline

After this initial introduction to the African Peace and Security Architecture and the rationale behind supporting African-led conflict management initiatives (Chapter 1), this report will: briefly expose the author's research methods (Chapter 2); highlight some problems and prospects of sub-regional military integration and cooperation in East Africa (Chapter 3); provide an overview over the nuts and bolts of (donor-assisted) military capacity building (Chapter 4); discuss donor support to EASF (Chapter 5); and look at current and future issues in the build-up of and capacity-building of Eastern Africa Standby Force (Chapter 6). The aim of this thesis is to draw some lessons from the ways in which, both positive and negative, the African Capacity-building programme (ACB Programme) of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) has been implemented, and look at potential issues concerning continued Nordic defence and military assistance to EASF.

Chapter 2: Methodology

This research project, originally entitled “The Build-Up of the East African Standby Force: Assessing the Norwegian Armed Forces’ Capacity-Building Efforts in Africa”, was funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The author has sought to understand and gain insight into Nordic military capacity-building of Eastern Africa Standby Force through a thorough review of relevant publications and sources, in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders and quantitative surveys.

The qualitative research method consisted of open-ended semi-structured interviews. The quantitative data collection consisted of a comprehensive questionnaire that would allow the researcher to discern differences and similarities in perceptions and opinions of donor representatives and EASFCOM staff members in how they view EASF capacity-building and donor relations. The researcher also conducted a desk study of both official and unofficial sources, ranging from internal documents to scholarly sources.

Interviews

In order to prepare for the interviews, the researcher consulted Kvale and Brinmann’s seven phases of the qualitative research interview. The aim of the qualitative research interview is to produce knowledge and insight through the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale and Brinmann 2009, p. 99). Hence, it is a tool rather than a method. Focus group discussion was another tool used. Focus group discussions often bring about new unexplored topics because the interviewer serves as a moderator that encourages the group’s members to provide their opinions and insight.

The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions and allowed the interviewees considerable flexibility in discussing the topic at hand. The researcher chose to interview some of the stakeholders deemed to have relevant knowledge and information to share. While on fact-finding in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, the researcher interviewed, among others, the NACS Coordinator, the EASF Joint Chief of Staff as the highest ranking and officer in command at the time, the GIZ representative and the Danish Defence Attaché to the African Union. Furthermore, a focus group discussion was conducted with four of the five officers in the Maritime Planning Cell. These are positions funded through the ACB Programme. Norway was, within the ACB Perspective Plan 2010-2015, primarily responsible for capacity-building of the EASF maritime component/dimension.

Some of the interviews were recorded. All of the interviews were transcribed directly during the interview process. This is not always an advantage because it can distract both the interviewer and the interviewee.

The challenges of using individual interviews as a method of information collection is that information will be based on personal opinions and experiences rather than ‘facts’ and information will be biased towards the interviewee and his/her role or work. The interviewer not only has to ask the right questions but also needs to steer the interview in order to ensure that the interviewee answers the central questions. When analyzing the transcribed interviews, the researcher will have to unmask discourse and read between the lines in order to extract hidden information.

Meetings, conversations and information exchange

In addition, the researcher has met with, discussed and exchanged ideas and information with a range of stakeholders, ranging from researchers at policy think tanks, officials at the Norwegian MoD, and various officers currently or formerly engaged with capacity-building of EASF. This include conversations and meetings with, among others, the Danish representative at the International Peacekeeping Training Centre (IPTC) in Nairobi, the former Norwegian officer at NACS, the current Norwegian officer at NACS, colleagues at Norwegian Defence International Centre, Cedric de Coning at NUPI, and Danish and Norwegian MoD officials, as well as other stakeholders and interested parties.

Questionnaire

A questionnaire is a data collection instrument. The researcher believed that using a questionnaire would be a good method for extracting information and views on the status of EASF and donor contributions and relations. A questionnaire follows standard rules with few personal decisions and changes. The questions or statements are usually pre-structured and do not allow much room for interpretation. The researcher used anonymous questionnaires in order to unearth hidden opinions and beliefs and to reveal differences and similarities in perceptions between and among donor representatives and EASF staff members.

Participation in the survey was voluntary. Answers were anonymous, except a differentiation between EASFCOM/PLANELM staff and donor representatives. The answers were supposed to reflect the respondent’s personal experience, knowledge and insight.

The questionnaire consisted of 86 questions and dealt with some of the following topics: EASF readiness, ability to deploy peace operations and Full Operational Capability; African ownership and EASF member states' support to EASF; the Nordic countries' and NACS' support to EASF; the issue of funding; and unintended consequences of military integration.

The questions in the questionnaire were randomly listed. Some questions overlapped or were formulated in different ways in order to cover the various nuances and aspects of capacity-building and donor relations. The questions were articulated as statements, to which the respondents had to indicate his/her level of agreement or disagreement with the statement. There were five answer options: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Neutral indicated that the respondent did not have an opinion or did not know the answer to the statement. Respondents could only tick one answer per statement. In this report, the word questionnaire refers to the questionnaire used, whereas the term survey refers to the aggregate data and the overall results/answers to the questionnaires.

Some of the challenges related to the use of a questionnaire include a potential lack of a common understanding of terms and concepts. In order to alleviate this problem, definitions of key terms were provided in the questionnaire and the questions were formulated in various ways in order to crosscheck answers in each questionnaire. Despite including definitions of key terms, it is possible that some respondents had limited English language skills, which might have reduced their understanding of the statements in the questionnaire. Moreover, the questionnaires were supposed to reflect officers' individual professional perceptions and opinions and the respondents were therefore requested to answer the questionnaire individually. However, a few of the respondents discussed their answers in a group setting.

Sample size is another issue when using a questionnaire to extract quantitative data.

Unfortunately, access to all potential respondents within the target groups was limited. The target groups were EASFCOM and PLANELM staff members and donor representatives. Given that the focus of this research is Nordic support to EASF, and NACS represents the Nordic donors at EASFCOM, the sample size would consist of only the four NACS representatives. In addition to the NACS representatives that were available at the time of the survey, the sample size was expanded to include other donor representatives in Nairobi and also a few in the Norwegian Armed Forces who work with or provide support to EASF. Unfortunately, some of the potential respondents declined to be part of the survey. The donor answers thus have a slight Norwegian bias.

In terms of the sample size of the target group EASFCOM and PLANELM staff, there were fewer respondents than initially planned. This is because the EASFCOM management level had to attend an unplanned extra-ordinary summit in Guinea-Bissau during the week of fact-finding in Nairobi. In order to increase the number of respondents, questionnaires were left with NACS, who handed them to staff officers who had not had the opportunity to answer the questionnaires at the time. NACS received several questionnaires that had been filled in but these were subsequently lost in the mail between Nairobi and Oslo.

Desk study

Given the lack of research, data and information on the topic, it was necessary to access internal documents on DSSR and the ACB programme from the MoD, NODEFIC and NORDEFECO, as well as EASFCOM and NACS. The researcher has also consulted an extensive amount of published and publicly available reports, articles and books on African peace and security issues, the African Union, the African Standby Force, the regional economic communities (RECs), security sector reform and military capacity-building, and on local ownership and dependency within such programs.

Chapter 3: Prospects and Problems of regional integration in East Africa

In order to identify limitations and possibilities for capacity-building of regional security arrangements in Africa, we need to look at the big picture. Some of the questions donors should ask before providing financial support and capacity-building to EASF include: What are the political, socio-economic and military factors that limit or promote sub-regional military integration? What conditions aid and abet regional military integration? In which political and military frameworks do we operate? What are the limitations to regional security cooperation and how do these limitations affect capacity-building?

First, it is important to remember that these regional bodies consist of individual nation-states with diverse, if not incompatible, political views and peace and security agendas, as well as different levels of economic development and military capability. A second obstacle to military cooperation and integration in a volatile region such as Eastern Africa is overcoming years of conflicts and crises both between and within member states in the sub-regional organization. A third challenge is the issue of overlapping memberships in sub-regional institutions and organizations. Other factors that hinder fruitful regional military integration that are worth mentioning include the prevalence of regional hegemony and rivalry between member states in the regional organization; the existence of democratic and authoritarian states (- should donors only support the democratic states within a regional mechanism?); the political willingness of member states to commit resources military personnel and equipment; and lastly, the link between the AU and its mandating powers and the regional security mechanisms.

This chapter will only briefly examine a few of the obstacles to military integration and cooperation in the Eastern Africa sub-region – in order to highlight the context in which EASF has been established. This report will therefore not provide an exhaustive account of all the conflicts and crises in the sub-region. Nor will the structures and visions of the various sub-regional organizations be addressed. It is also beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the role regional hegemony plays in the regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RM) or how rivalry plays out between states within a sub-regional organization, such as the rivalry between Kenya and Ethiopia in EASF. This report does not discuss the intricacies of supporting sub-regional organizations with authoritarian or undemocratic member states, as this is a foreign policy issue for each donor country. The author will briefly discuss the issue of member state funding for EASF in Chapter 6.



Figure 3: EASF' ten active member states

given observer status in EASF but due to the longstanding conflict with Khartoum it is uncertain whether Sudan will allow South Sudan to become a full member of EASF. In fact, there are talks of a first EASF deployment to South Sudan, as part of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

Conflicts and crises in East Africa

Certainly, Eastern Africa has its share of internal and inter-state political and military conflicts and rivalries. Some of these conflicts and crises include: the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea; a failed state in Somalia; a longstanding civil war between Sudan and Southern Sudan and, more recently, a civil war in South Sudan after its independence; the accusations that Rwanda and Uganda support rebel groups in Eastern DRC; Kenyan and Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia; and internal political tension in several of EASF' member states. In addition, there has been an increase in random and coordinated terrorist attacks by the al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. This threat might expand to other countries in East Africa as al Shabaab has threatened to launch attacks in Tanzania as retaliation for Tanzanian training of Somali soldiers.

The area called the Horn of Africa consists of the four countries Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Horn of Africa has been characterized by inter- and intra-state conflicts in almost the entire post-colonial period. Somalia, for one, has been a failed state since 1991, after the break down of formal structures and state institutions. In the last two decades,

Eastern Africa Standby Force consists of 14 very diverse member states. Ten of these are active and contributing members: Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea was expelled from EASF due to its hostility towards and conflicts with Ethiopia and Djibouti as well as for its support to the terrorist network al Shabaab. Tanzania, Madagascar and Mauritius are also members of EASF but have overlapping memberships in SADC. These three countries contribute actively within the SADC standby force. The recently independent South Sudan has been

Somalia has been also been a haven for terrorist groups and piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, Somalia's rogue status precedes this date. Already in the immediate post-independence period, Somali post-independence leaders were obsessed with unifying Somali-speakers that were scattered across neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and even Djibouti (Jeng 2012, p. 63). This quest for unification, at the cost of good neighborly relations, ended in the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali conflict. This conflict paved the way for a shattered Somalia (Jeng 2012, p. 64). The Somali civil war has seen humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s (the Black Hawk down incident in 1993 led to a speedy withdrawal of international forces) but Somalia was pretty much left to its own devices until the African Union deployed a small force to Mogadishu in 2007, under a UN Security Council mandate.


Ethiopia has been in conflict with several of its neighbors. A country with a unique history and long heritage, Ethiopians set themselves apart from the rest of Eastern Africa. Although Ethiopia has never been colonized, it has had its share of conflicts and crises. Most notable is its conflict with neighboring Eritrea. In 1998, "Ethiopia and Eritrea embarked on a futile border war in which 100,000 people died, one-third of Eritrea's population was displaced and hundreds of millions of dollars were squandered on arms". (Meredith 2005, p. 678). In 2000, following a cessation of hostilities agreement between the two parties, the UN mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to observe the temporary security zones on the border between the two countries. In 2008, UNMEE was immediately terminated after Eritrea had enforced crippling restrictions on UNMEE and had made it impossible for UN personnel to operate safely in the country.

Cumulatively, Sudan has endured the longest civil war in African history. Sudan's civil war, between Southern Sudan and the capital Khartoum in the north, began as early as 1955. The first conflict lasted until 1972, with a spell of peace (1972-1983) before the conflict erupted again. The 2005 Naivasha Peace Agreements "... paved the way for the independence referendum held in South Sudan in January 2011" but it was foolish "... to assume that the recently acquired independence of South Sudan [would] douse the flames of conflict (Jeng 2012, pp. 64-65). The border demarcation between Sudan and South Sudan is still a contentious issue, reflected in ongoing fighting in the disputed Abyei region. Furthermore, the wealth sharing agreement on the distribution of the oil resources has been tough to implement. The government in Khartoum has also had to contend with armed conflict in its Darfur-region while newly independent South Sudan erupted into a bloody civil war in December 2013. Actually, "... the extent and further risk of Sudan's social fragmentation and

its potential for continual implosion had long led Peter Woodward to label it as seemingly intractable, a kind of ‘war without end’.” (Jeng 2012, pp. 64-65). The continuing Sudanese civil war, and now also the civil war in South Sudan following the power struggle between the President and his deputy, continue “to challenge adequacies of international structures, viability of regional mechanisms and capacity of domestic institutions in advancing appropriate conflict transformation and peacebuilding initiatives” (Jeng 2012, pp. 64-65). With AU, UN and UN-AU missions on the ground in both Sudans over the past decade– and no end to the conflicts in sight – we certainly have to question whether an EASF deployment to South Sudan will make much of a difference. Furthermore, given that Sudan is a member of EASF, an EASF deployment to South Sudan would not necessarily have much credibility.

In a survey conducted by the author at EASFCOM in Nairobi in June 2014, we see that over one third of the respondents (divided into EASF staff members and partners/donor representatives) believe that conflicts between East African states limit military integration within EASF. About 30 percent of respondents disagree with this statement, and the last third remain neutral (Figure 4).

Despite the many conflicts between countries in East Africa, one may still consider support to regional integration and capacity-building a good use of resources. In fact, the added benefit of a capacity-building programme of this kind is that it ensures more responsive, responsible and disciplined militaries as part of a wider *national* DSSR process. In the end, training African militaries for peacekeeping duties elsewhere could mean that we are also training them to become better militaries at home, in particular when we focus our training on soft security issues. Moreover, support to regional military integration and cooperation will potentially help ease tensions among countries in the sub-region, thus creating conditions for long-term stability. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 on the unintended consequences of sub-regional military cooperation.




Overlapping memberships

The regional economic communities (RECs) originally formed the basis on which the regional standby forces were to operate. There are several sub-regional organizations in East Africa, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). Many Eastern African countries have overlapping memberships in these and other organizations, which “tends to dissipate collective efforts towards the common goal of the African Union and the muddy goals of integration. It also adds to the burdens of the member states, as a country belonging to two or more regional organizations not only faces multiple financial obligations, but must also cope with different meetings, policy decisions, instruments, procedures, and schedules” (Franke 2013, p. 87).

IGAD was the regional body tasked with the build-up of a regional standby brigade in Eastern Africa (EASBRIG) to be part of the African Standby Force. However, disagreements and rivalries rendered this structure less useful for the purposes of security cooperation. At a summit in 2007, the Heads of State of East African countries¹ agreed to create an Independent Coordination Secretariat along with a new politico-strategic command board, named EASBRICOM (now EASF Coordination Mechanism, or EASFCOM), located outside Nairobi (Kinzel 2008, p. 18). In essence, another sub-regional organization was created – further adding to the complexity and web of organizations in East Africa.

Indeed, the author's survey reveals that a majority of respondents believe that Eastern African states' overlapping memberships limit progression in EASF (Figure 5). It is surprising to discover that respondents believe overlapping memberships in various regional organizations limits progression and military integration within EASF more than all the intra- and interstate conflicts and crises (Figure 4 previous page). Perhaps the enormity of the task of sub-regional integration, at least within the EASF, casts doubt among the respondents.



¹ IGAD countries Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South-Sudan, Sudan and Uganda alongside the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania and Rwanda form part of the Eastern Africa security cooperation, EASF.

The fourteen member states in the Eastern Africa Standby Force will jointly have to amass 5,500 civilian and military personnel, fund and staff the brigade headquarter and logistics base in Addis Ababa and the planning and coordination elements outside Nairobi (Kinzel 2008, p. 19). The challenge of having a standby force of this size is not only the resources it will require from the member states but also common doctrine and training standards, interoperability, joint logistics capabilities, and joint intelligence and communications systems – aspects of regional security cooperation that necessitate mutual trust and transparency. Given the history of animosity in the sub-region, combined with the prevalence of political violence, quasi-authoritarian regimes, large-scale corruption and poverty, there are a number of obstacles to effective military integration. Donors will have to consider these obstacles when designing, implementing and supporting capacity-building programmes for EASF. These obstacles may not only serve as a hindrance to military integration and cooperation amongst the member states but may well impede effective capacity-building of the sub-regional security mechanism.

Chapter 4: Nuts and bolts of donor-assisted and funded capacity-building

In order to develop an awareness of the ‘rights and wrongs’ of the Nordic Defence Cooperation’s Africa Capacity-Building Programme, it is important to look at the basics – or the nuts and bolts – of donor-assisted and funded capacity-building. Before embarking on capacity-building programmes, the designers of a programme or project should understand what capacity-building means and be familiar with various types of capacity-building. Furthermore, any programme or project requires proper planning. Within the planning phase, it is crucial to develop a programme design that fits the desired outcome, or end state, of the programme or project. Furthermore, the programme design should provide for periodic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises. Another aspect to keep in mind is the difference between donor-driven and demand-driven capacity-building and the relationship between the donor and the beneficiary/recipient. Is the relationship between the donor and the beneficiary always unequal? This discussion brings us to highlight some of the core principles of donor programming: partnership, equality and local ownership. Without these principles, capacity-building initiatives will not succeed and will not be sustainable. But before looking at the specifics of capacity-building, it is useful to get a sense of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ involvement in Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) and understand the context for Norwegian (and Nordic) military capacity-building in East Africa.

DSSR and military capacity-building

Due to the Norwegian Armed Forces’ limited resources and deployment capabilities, Norway has increasingly concentrated its military efforts on Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR). More of future Norwegian military engagements will focus on capacity-building of developing countries’ militaries and peacekeeping capacities rather than deploying boots on the ground. The Norwegian military has created a niche for itself in Defence and Security Sector Reform and it is therefore both timely and necessary to assess to what extent the Norwegian Armed Forces have an impact on the peacekeeping capabilities of sub-regional security mechanisms, such as the Eastern Africa Standby Force.

The recognition of the connection between development, stability and security has led to an increased international attention on Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) as a means of not only creating more stable, disciplined and responsive armed forces but also as a way of enhancing the recipient countries’ ability to deploy to peace operations. Due to the Norwegian Armed Forces’ limited resources and deployment capabilities, Norway has increasingly

concentrated its military efforts on DSSR, such as in the West Balkans, the South Caucasus region and Ukraine but also as part of the transition process in Afghanistan and reflected in its capacity-building strategy in East Africa. Although the majority of MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces' DSSR programs have been in the Euro-Atlantic region, capacity-building support outside of Europe, such as capacity-building of the African Standby Force, is becoming more important and pertinent.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether the Nordic military capacity-building support to EASF classifies as part of DSSR, it is important to note that the NORDEFCA Africa Capacity-Building Programme does not comply with definitions of security sector reform touted by the UN, the UK or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This might be because the security community has had a tendency "to 'hijack' the implementation of the SSR agenda to serve traditional military or geo-strategic interests" (Nicolaysen 2010, p. 112). Furthermore, the security community often use the SSR concept, which is originally a civilian concept, to legitimize military capacity-building and military assistance. Hence, it is not surprising that military capacity-building under the banner of SSR does not in fact comply with original civilian SSR concept.

Notwithstanding these general criticisms, the main reasons why the author does not consider the ACB Programme as complying with the security sector reform concept is because: the recipient of the programme – EASF -- is an organization, not a nation-state's defence and security sector; the DSSR concept is developed to reform or transform the defence and security sector or system of a country, such as a country emerging from war while the ACB Programme supports the build-up of an inter-state collective security mechanism; and the principle of democratic control of the armed forces is central to all DSSR but EASF is a supranational organization comprising both democratic and less democratic member states. This list of arguments is by no means an exhaustive one, but briefly lists a few of the reasons why the ACB Programme does not comply with the standard definitions of DSSR. Based on this reasoning, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence would be wise to separate its military assistance and military capacity-building programs from the stringent requirements of DSSR programmes. The focus in the ACB Programme is on building the capacities of a new entity and not on reforming existing institutions.

What is capacity-building?

What is capacity-building then? Capacity-building is a term that is often used without a clear understanding of what it means. Capacity-building is, according to Simister and Smith, “often understood as a purposeful, external intervention to strengthen capacity over time” (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 3). Capacity-development, on the other hand, is seen as an internal capacity-building process. NORDEFECO’s ACB Programme is clearly involved in capacity-building, as it is an externally driven process that aims to facilitate and affect change within the recipient organization, EASFCOM.

When designing a capacity-building programme, there are two different perspectives to contend with: an *inside-out* or an *outside-in* perspective of capacity-building and capacity development. Within the inside-out perspective it is the organization that defines and accomplishes its goals, mission and objectives. It implies that it is the organization (and its staff members) that best knows what capacity already exists within the organization, what the capacity gaps and needs are, and what needs to be done in order to close these capacity gaps (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 4). Furthermore, every change within the organization comes from within. This is a characteristic of demand-driven capacity-building. External actors or agents only play a supporting role in indigenous demand-driven capacity development processes.

The *outside-in* perspective on capacity-building and capacity development measures capacity as the organization’s “ability to satisfy its key stakeholders” (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 4). This could include an organization’s ability to meet reporting requirements of donors, demonstrate financial and procurement standards according to the external agent’s/donor’s rules, and meet deadlines for implementation, as set out in the donor-designed programme or project document. Embedded within this perspective is the notion that an organization’s capacities must be assessed by external actors and that self-driven capacity development is not sufficient to affect change (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 4). Hence, the outside-in perspective also entails identification of an organization’s capacity needs from a donor perspective. As we will discuss in Chapter 6, the Nordic countries, through the ACB Programme, as well as other donors of EASFCOM, have identified capacity needs within EASF that were not necessarily deemed a priority by EASF itself. This type of capacity-building is supply-driven as opposed to demand-driven. It has been demonstrated time and again that donor-driven change and strategies do not create sustainable capacities.

Likewise, capacity substitution has little sustainable impact. Capacity substitution usually takes the form of advisers and consultants meant to fill the gaps. Advisers and consultants that perform functions, implement programmes and projects, and provide solutions on behalf of the recipient organization will not have a lasting effect. As soon as the adviser or consultant leaves, the knowledge leaves with him or her. However, some of the traditional approaches to technical assistance, such as training (when properly targeted), study tours, equipment support and systems advice, have proved to be useful forms of capacity building. The best form of capacity-building/capacity development, though, is when donors provide a support function, such as injecting resources at certain (critical) times, provide insights, best practice, and encouragement, stimulate effective leadership and cushion risks within the recipient organization.

There is also another way of distinguishing different approaches of capacity-building: general capacity-building versus technical capacity-building. While general capacity-building is meant to assist organizations improve their abilities to perform their core functions and achieve their mission (and ultimately, the organization's vision), "technical capacity building is often carried out in the context of a specific project or programme with which an organization is involved" (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 5). General capacity-building is often a long-term process that involves improving the whole organization's performance. Technical capacity-building, on the other hand, often gives immediate results as it is conducted to resolve an issue or meet a practical need.

Capacity-building can take many forms. One of the reasons for this is that capacity can be segmented into various areas, such as internal management and processes, relational management, the capacity and capability to perform core functions, and human resources. These areas can again be divided into detailed statements that address specific aspects of a capacity. These statements are also called indicators (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 11).




Figure 6: Three circles model



Figure 7: Organizational capacities

The three circles model (Figure 6) is one of the most common models depicting the main capabilities of an organization. This model illustrates three interlocking circles that represent the internal organization (being), external linkages (relating); and programme performance (doing) (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 14). Another model, created by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), consists of five core capabilities (Figure 7). This model forms the basis for assessing and tracking an organization’s capacities (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 14).

No matter what model the capacity-building providers choose, it is crucial to “have a clear, stated rationale for carrying out capacity building, and a clear idea of what they want to achieve, both in the medium- and long-term” (Simister and Smith 2010, p. 28). More importantly, the goals of donor-assisted capacity-building should be based on, and aligned with, the goals, needs and priorities of the recipient organization.

Improving programme design

One of the initial purposes of this research project was to assess the Nordic Defence Cooperation’s Africa Capacity-Building Programme. However, the author quickly realized that this was going to be a difficult, if not an impossible task. The ACB Programme document, the NORDEFECO’s *Africa Capacity-building Perspective Plan 2010-2015*, did not contain a clear and structured programme design and it lacked baseline studies, the use of indicators and a logical framework. Overall, the programme design made it difficult to assess the performance of the ACB Programme. In addition, the Nordic staff officers overseeing the

ACB Programme implementation at EASFCOM in Nairobi, Kenya did not relate to this document as the overarching programme design. Instead, and with time, the NACS representatives came to rely on funding bits and pieces of the EASF Strategic Plan and EASF Activity Plan. The NACS officers exercise a lot of flexibility in their approach to capacity-building of EASF. This has both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to trace progress, and monitor, evaluate and document to what extent the ACB Programme has contributed to the overarching objectives of both the ACB Programme itself and of EASF. The advantage of this flexibility is that NACS officers are able to provide funding for technical assistance and inject resources when and where EASFCOM deems it is needed the most.

What would a good programme design look like? A good programme design requires close consultation with the beneficiaries (in order to ensure local ownership from the start), good planning, and knowledge and an understanding of the context. Additionally, the capacity-building programme should be based on a baseline study and needs assessments. Once these factors are considered, the programme designers can create the capacity-building plan. This plan, usually a logical framework or another type of planning matrix, will include a budget with a project or funding cycle, a set of objectives, expected input, activities, indicators, the output from these activities, which will then contribute to the overall outcome. When using logical frameworks it is easier to monitor both progress and expenditures within a certain timeframe (see Table 1 as an example of a logical framework).

| Project Description | | Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement | Sources and means of verification | Assumptions |
|---------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Goal | What is the overall broader impact to which the action will contribute? | What are the key indicators related to the overall goal? | What are the sources of information for these indicators? | What are the external factors necessary to sustain objectives in the long term? |
| Purpose | What is the immediate development outcome at the end of the project? | Which indicators clearly show that the objective of the action has been achieved? | What are the sources of information that exist or can be collected? What are the methods required to get this information? | Which factors and conditions are necessary to achieve that objective? (external conditions) |
| Outputs | What are the specifically deliverable results envisaged to achieve the specific objectives? | What are the indicators to measure whether and to what extent the action achieves the expected results? | What are the sources of information for these indicators? | What external conditions must be met to obtain the expected results on schedule? |
| Activities | What are the key activities to be carried out and in what sequence in order to produce the expected results? | Means: | What are the sources of information about action progress? | What pre-conditions are required before the action starts? |
| | | What are the means required to implement these activities, e. g. personnel, equipment, supplies, etc. | Costs | |
| | | | What are the action costs? | |

Table 1: Example of a logical framework. Original Source: Barrato 2010

When designing a capacity-building programme, it would also be useful to include the three “P’s”: Product (shows capacities improved or achieved and includes a sense of evolution from the beginning of the project, the current state of progress and the projected progress); Performance (shows substantive programme outcomes); and Permanence (shows the sustainability of the capacity produced). Both logical frameworks and the three “P’s” are useful tools for measuring results, outcomes and performance of a capacity-building programme. Note, though, that there are various ways in which to measure results and outcomes and that some indicators say little about actual capacity built. For instance, it is easier to measure and report on the number of trained personnel rather than measure how well EASF sustains capability and maintains operational readiness, or to what extent EASF has the capacity to respond to UN and AU requests to deploy peace operations.

The donor-beneficiary relationship: unequal relationship or partnership?

The politics of both development and military assistance require one party willing and able to provide assistance and another party in need of and able to receive assistance. This relationship, between the ‘donor’² and the ‘beneficiary’ or ‘recipient’, is often conceived of as an unequal relationship or an unequal power dynamic. In fact, Mannitz claims that the “process dimension of everyday interactions between ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ is empirically underexplored” (Mannitz 2014, p. 280). The accounts that do exist are often critical and look at the imbalance of power between the donor and the recipient and how donors bypass and/ or underestimate the locals/recipients (Mannitz 2014, pp. 280-281). The result of this is that the donors “tend to act around or for ‘the locals’ rather than with them” (Mannitz 2014, p. 281). When the power relations between the donor and the recipient becomes unequal, or asymmetric (both in terms of political influence and financial and material resources), donors will often be accused of, or perceived to be, neo-colonial, paternalistic and pursuing and imposing their own interests (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, p. 136).

Given that feelings and perceptions often rule the way in which each party see their relationship to the other party, it has been useful to gather information through anonymous questionnaires. These questionnaires, in combination with targeted in-depth interviews, have provided interesting information on the donor-beneficiary relationship of the Nordic countries

² The author uses the word ‘donor’ throughout this paper but the most used terminology nowadays is ‘partner’, which alludes to an equal relationship between donors and beneficiaries.

(represented by NACS) and EAFSCOM staff members. In June 2014, the author conducted a survey at EASFCOM and EASF PLANELM that included a comprehensive questionnaire and in-depth interviews with select EASF staff and donor representatives. The survey of EASF capacities and donor relations reveals the differences and similarities in perceptions of EASF staff (as beneficiaries) vis-à-vis the perceptions of NACS and other donor representatives. This paper utilizes some of the survey results to highlight the various perceptions of these two groups in discussions on balancing the interests and intentions of the Nordic countries as donors through the ACB Programme and EASF as an institution in need of capacity-building and financial support. The initial hypothesis was that a high level of donor dependency, as is the case with Eastern Africa Standby Force, would lead to low levels of local, or African, ownership of EASF policies, plans, procedures, processes and activities. In other words, the author believed that the unequal relationship between the donor and the recipient would give the donor substantial influence over the recipient's policies, processes and plans. This has traditionally been the case. However, in the last decade there has been a call for including the principles of local ownership, partnership and equality in donor programmes. The following section will discuss the principle of local ownership at length as it provides the basis for some of the main research findings presented in Chapter 6.

Principles of donor programming: Local ownership, Partnership and Equality

When the security and development paradigms merged in the 1990s, the concept of reforming security sectors or systems in post-conflict countries became part of peacebuilding programs. It became evident that such programs would not create lasting peace and stability without the active engagement, ownership and partnership of the very people who were supposed to enjoy that peace (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014; Muelenbeek 2013). Hence, the principles of local ownership, partnership and equality became prerequisites for effective and successful post-conflict interventions of all kinds, including in security sector reform programmes (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 240). This was further entrenched in the 2005 OECD Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which stressed the importance of developing countries' ownership of their development agendas and institution-building as a prerequisite for effective aid (OECD website 2014). Development practitioners and scholars alike understood that "reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors, are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained" (Nathan 2007, p. 3). Military capacity-building, security sector reform and army reconstruction programmes, albeit often the affairs of military officers and institutions or

private security contractors, have also come to see the principle of local ownership as a prerequisite for successful implementation. This also holds true for the Nordic African Capacity-Building Programme.

Defining local ownership

What does local ownership imply? According to Nathan the principle of local ownership implies that “the reform of security policies, institutions and activities ... must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” (Nathan 2007, p. 4). Nathan further clarifies that local ownership is not about gaining local support for donor activities. Instead, it means that donors support locally initiated programmes and projects (Nathan 2007, p. 4). Donais measures local ownership as “... the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and the implementation of political processes...” (Donais 2009, p. 3). Donais’ concise definition does not take into account the fact that many processes that are inherently political are disguised by donors and development practitioners as mere technical issues. By providing ‘technical advice or assistance’, donors can more easily sideline the principle of ownership. There are several other reasons why donors fail to operationalize local ownership in SSR and military capacity-building programmes:

1. Local ownership is not easily observable and there is no agreement on how to understand or measure local ownership. It is more of a guiding principle than a programme objective. Thus, most programmes lack indicators that would help evaluate the extent to which local ownership is implemented or achieved (Mannitz 2014, p. 273; Broughton and Mourmouras 2002, p. 3 and p. 14).
2. Military capacity-building and SSR programs usually do not define who the ‘locals’ are and in what ways the ‘locals’ exercise ownership over (donor-defined, donor-assisted and donor-designed) programs (Broughton and Mourmouras 2002, p. 4; Donais 2009, pp. 11-12; Scheye and Peake 2005, pp. 238-239; Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, p. 137).
3. Local owners do not always possess the requisite skills, capacities and abilities to implement or execute capacity-building programmes and build up organizational/institutional infrastructure, or they are seen as not possessing the requisite skills (Donais 2009, p. 8; Scheye and Peake 2005, pp. 244-245 and p. 248).
4. The imposition of liberal norms in military assistance and SSR programs can be in opposition to the desires, cultural inclinations and methods used by the ‘locals’

(Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 237 and p. 246; Donais 2009, p. 12 and pp. 18-19; Mannitz 2014, p. 280).

5. Donors are themselves accountable to their governments and constituents; they are under pressure to deliver measurable results within specific project timeframes and funding cycles. This makes local ownership more difficult to achieve in practice (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 247; Donais 2009, p. 9; Mannitz 2014, pp. 274-275).
6. The principle of local ownership has, arguably, been used by many donors as a legitimizing discourse for their donor-driven policies and interventions in the security arena in developing and post-conflict countries. It is a principle flouted in policies and donor-designed documents but it is not implemented or enforced in practice (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 240 and pp. 259-260; Mannitz 2014, p. 274).

When looking at these “challenges involved in operationalizing the concept of local ownership in a more meaningful and participatory manner, why bother even trying? The short answer is that local ownership can be deferred, but cannot ultimately be avoided” (Donais 2009, p. 10). Ensuring local ownership of donor-funded programmes is not only crucial for the success of donor-funded projects and programmes but is also key to the sustainability of these programmes and capacity-building measures once donors pull out. Finding the right balance between donor-driven assistance and local ownership is thus crucial to ensure the longevity and durability of capacity-building initiatives.

Who are the local owners?

Given that most DSSR and military capacity-building programs have difficulties implementing the principle of local ownership in practice, one of the central questions to be asked is: Who are the ‘customers’ of these programs? Who are the local owners?

“Regrettably, most SSR discussions remain silent on the question ‘for whom’ SSR programs are being designed. In fact, it is difficult to find in the literature a cogent analysis of ‘for whom’ SSR is intended to be and, thus, an intellectually sound method for identifying ‘local owners’ is similarly absent” (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 239). Oftentimes there are several ‘local owners’ and many of them will have different and competing claims, ideas and interests.

In the context of the build-up of Eastern Africa Standby Force, local ownership refers to two actors or ‘owners’. On the one side, the local owners are the (ten active) member states of EASF – who exercise ownership when their governments control the design and

implementation of political processes pertaining to responses to peace and security issues in the sub-region. This is done primarily through the three policy organs of the EASF.³ The ten active EASF member states exercise ownership through funding the security mechanism, showing their willingness to deploy through EASF and by providing human and financial resources and equipment. By taking ownership of EASF, they are simultaneously granting legitimacy to EASF as a security mechanism. When member states are not willing to finance their sub-regional mechanism, we can expect their level of ownership to decline.

The other ‘local owner’ constitutes the staff members of Eastern Africa Standby Force, most of whom are located in Nairobi at the EASF Coordination Mechanism and the EASF Planning Element. EASF staff exercise ownership through the implementation of the EASF strategic plan and the EASF activity plan, as well as through internal processes and procedures and day-to-day operations.

In other words, local ownership is exercised at both political, strategic and operational levels. Moreover, donors to EASFCOM also need to understand that the ‘local owners’ are not one coherent group but rather a mix of diverging and competing interests, ideas and abilities. Donors might accept local ownership in principle but the principle itself offers “little concrete guidance in determining whose voices should be prioritized among the cacophony of local owners or in how to address situations in which the priorities of significant local actors run counter to ... fundamental international norms” (Donais 2009, p 12).

Imposition of liberal norms versus local ownership

Most development and SSR programs tout the principle of local ownership. Yet the will and the ways of ‘local owners’ might not always be consistent with the ideas and ideals of Western donors or the central tenets of SSR guidelines. Donor-assisted or donor-steered reform or build-up of security institutions generally implies that liberal norms such as democratization, neoliberal development, human rights concerns, the rule of law, gender issues, good governance, and anti-corruption measures are imposed on the beneficiary country, institution or sector. Yet there are times when liberal values of SSR programming conflict with local ownership. For instance, there are “cases ... where [local] cultural and

³ The three policy organs consist of: the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, which meets once a year at the level of Heads of State and Government; the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, which meets twice a year; and the Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS), which functions as an advisory committee to the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The EACDS also manages, directs and oversees the EASFCOM (also called the Secretariat), the EASF Planning Element (PLANELM), the Logistics Base and the Brigade Headquarters (EASFCOM website).

political practices – from deeply rooted clientelism and corruption to cultural norms around the treatment of women – run directly counter to the norms being promoted by external [actors/donors]” (Donais 2009, p. 18). In these cases, what matters more: the imposition of and concern for liberal values or the principle of local ownership? If Western donors impose liberal values and norms to the detriment of local ownership, then SSR and capacity-building programs are “suspected [to be] a vehicle of neo-colonial Western intrusion aimed at imposing particular ideas of political and societal order which carry ‘the individualistic ethos of liberal democracy’” (Mannitz 2014, p. 280).

The author does not assume that EASF member states and EASFCOM staff are uncommitted to liberal values such as respect for human rights and gender considerations, good governance and anti-corruption measures, or that local ownership is in opposition to international norms and standards. Yet, it is crucial that donors find ways in which donor and beneficiaries alike reconcile international norms with capacity-building of EASF. Donors need to uphold and maintain a normative commitment to international norms while also advocating for a meaningful degree of local ownership (Donais 2009, p. 17).

Donais looks at two schools of thought, or two ways of addressing ‘local ownership’. On the one hand, “...liberals see local ownership emerging out of a commitment by local actors to take ownership over a largely predetermined vision of peacebuilding [whereas] the communitarian vision implies a far more substantive vision of local ownership, in which peacebuilding processes ‘must be designed, managed, and implemented by local actors rather than external actors’” (Donais 2009, pp. 6-7). Although a communitarian vision of local ownership might work better within one single country’s peacebuilding process, the liberal view of ownership is more suitable to the context of building up regional organizations such as the EASF– given that such organizations do not represent any one tradition, custom, or idea of how to do things. Moreover, working from predetermined set of ideals and principles (predetermined sociopolitical and economic organizing principles) might make it easier for a security mechanism such as EASF to focus on owning its day-to-day operations (rather than be bogged down with discussions on which norms and organizing principles should inform EASF policies and procedures). Indeed, it seems that donors set the “...broad parameters of what is and is not permissible” whilst the local owners, or beneficiaries, are allowed to make decisions under “...the careful supervision of responsible outsiders...” (Donais 2009, p. 8).

Yet, the transmission and adoption of (Western) norms – as imposed in donor-designed or mandated programmes – usually requires a longer timeframe than the usual 3-5 year project cycle. Hence, the short-term project-culture of many donors makes it difficult to leave locals at the helm of capacity-building with donor funds. Donors generally want and need to control the flow of money, the implementation of project activities and achieve measurable results within the project timeframe. These factors do not combine well with de facto local ownership. Hence, the principle of local ownership becomes more of a rhetorical device to legitimize donor-driven projects.

Finding the right balance of local ownership and donor-driven assistance is hard. Too little ownership and buy-in might prove ineffective; too much ownership could also prove ineffective as it might stall or slow down capacity-building of the institution. De facto local ownership might also lead to a withdrawal of (Western) donors from their responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, in Africa and elsewhere.

Chapter 5: Donor support to military capacity-building in East Africa

Since the inauguration of the African Union in 2002 and the subsequent establishment of the ambitious African Standby Force as one of five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture, Western governments have supported and financed the build-up of African peacekeeping capacities on a grand scale. This has occurred through the armed forces of donor nations, private voluntary organizations and civilian contractors.

However, already since the 1990s, most Western militaries embraced the “train and equip” approach to military capacity-building. For instance, the U.S. Department of State claims to have trained over 250 000 African soldiers in peacekeeping skills since 1997. This has been done primarily through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). These programmes have relied heavily on civilian security contractors. The French military has trained West African peacekeepers through its RECAMP programme⁴, and the UK, Canada and Norway have all contributed with capacity-building of African peacekeepers.

After the creation of the African Union and the African Standby Force, though, Western countries embarked on a peacekeeping capacity-building spending spree in Africa. With the increase in funding for African-led peace and security initiatives, we have also seen a change in the way donors approach African institutions. Assistance is more varied, flexible and have less conditions attached to it. We also see that military assistance is driven more by the needs and demands of the African institutions rather than driven by the interests and priorities of the donors (Beise 2007).

The NORDEFECO framework

The Nordic countries have a long history of cooperation and integration at different levels and in various areas and sectors, including in the defence sector. It was not until 2009, though, that the Nordic countries established the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) framework, when the Ministers of Defence of the Nordic countries decided to combine three other cooperation frameworks into one (NORDEFECO website 2014). The idea behind political and military cooperation, and NORDEFECO, is to strengthen the Nordic countries' own defence capabilities, look at common and shared synergies within the defence sector and

⁴ The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme was later renamed EURORECAMP when the European Union took over the programme.

find ways in which to cooperate on and provide joint solutions (NORDEFECO website 2014). One such joint solution is Nordic support to the capacity-building of Eastern Africa Standby Force.

Africa Capacity Building Programme

In 2008 the Nordic Defence Ministers established a military capacity-building support package called the Africa Capacity-Building Programme (ACB Programme). What later became the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) framework detailed the support in the document *African Capacity-Building Perspective Plan for 2010-2015*. The Perspective Plan outlines in which ways the Nordic countries will support the build-up of Eastern Africa Standby Force and assist EASF achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC). The main goal of the Africa Capacity-Building programme is to strengthen the African partners' abilities to deploy to peace operations as a collective sub-regional security organization and to ensure interoperability between East African militaries. This, according to the NORDEFECO Perspective Plan 2010-2015, necessitates a modernization of the recipient armed forces, support to training and education of military personnel, reform of military training, training for deployment to peacekeeping operations, and support to establish border control and a coastal guard (NORDEFECO 2008, p. 2). The three main areas outlined in the ACB Programme wherein the Nordic militaries and NACS will contribute with capacity-building include (NORDEFECO 2008, pp. 1-2):

1. Development of a land component – with an emphasis on integrating civilian, police and military resources into an effective conflict management instrument;
2. Peace support operations training component; drawing on Nordic countries' lessons learned and experiences conducting peace operations;
3. Development of a regional maritime component, including establishing a maritime planning cell.

In addition to the above-mentioned components, the Nordic countries also consider requests for extended cooperation, such as support to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and to individual EASF member states.

The ACB Programme's Perspective Plan highlights local ownership and responsibility as core principles for Nordic defence cooperation in Eastern Africa (NORDEFECO 2008, p. 1). This is done by supporting the Eastern Africa Standby Force achieve its goals, as laid out periodically in the EASF strategic plans and EASF activity plans (NORDEFECO 2008, p 3).

The primary recipient of the ACB Programme is the Eastern African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) in Nairobi, Kenya. However, the ACB Programme also supports the EASF Planning Element in Nairobi with a maritime planning cell.

The ACB programme is comprehensive and its successful implementation would require partnerships on different levels, across many countries and several institutions and stakeholders. This raises several questions on the effectiveness of the ACB programme: How can the Nordic ACB Programme enable Eastern Africa Standby Force to deploy peace operations? Are the Nordic countries' capacity-building efforts spread too thin relative to resource input and capabilities to have a real effect?

The ACB programme is ambitious also beyond capacity-building of the EASF military component. The NORDEFECO countries recognize the importance of the “comprehensive nature of EASF as more than a military capacity. EASF will, when fully operational by 2015, also include elements from the police and a civilian component”, which will enable EASF to handle complex emergencies and security challenges from a comprehensive approach (NORDEFECO 2008, p. 4).

Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned capacity-building measures seem ambitious and “... the Nordic countries are firm in further supporting their African partners in achieving the goals of the East African Standby Force (EASF) as outlined in the Eastern African Standby Forces' Strategic Development Plan”(NORDEFECO 2008, p 3). However, it is uncertain whether Nordic support to EASF will have an effect when concentrating on so many and differing aspects of the EASF, especially given that Nordic funding through the ACB Programme hovers around only USD 2 million a year.

The Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff

In order to ensure close follow-up on the ACB programme, a permanent Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS) office was established at EASFCOM premises in October 2009 (Rasmussen 2014). NACS consists of one representative from each of the Nordic countries contributing to the ACB Programme: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.⁵ These representatives are not only there to ‘safeguard’ the Nordic Defence Departments' financial contributions to EASFCOM but are also there to provide direct advice and assistance. The

⁵ Iceland takes part in the NORDEFECO framework but does not contribute to the ACB Programme.

Nordic countries work as one entity through NACS, thus lending them more leverage vis-à-vis their African partners in EASF.

“We are the largest donor to EASF. That’s the only way we can have this kind of influence” (Rasmussen 2014). *“... NACS has become the largest financial donor to EASF and [the] width of its military advisory role is unrivalled...”* (NACS 2013, p. 18).

The role of the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff is divided into three main responsibilities: firstly, to ensure that the activities funded by the Nordic countries' Armed Forces are implemented according to plan. NACS has a broad mandate and thus also flexibility to choose which activities to fund. Secondly, NACS has an advisory role and works closely with the EASF Planning Element. Thirdly, NACS representatives are working for their national armed forces and plans emanating from their capitals. They report home, contribute to future strategies and plans and provide input to their respective ministries of defence (Rasmussen 2014). In short, NACS staff provide and oversee funding, provide advice and technical assistance and report home on the preceding two aspects of the ACB Programme.

EASF staff members do not always understand the role of Western advisers. In particular if these advisers do not instruct, help develop concepts or are not involved in the day-to-day work of the various departments. The EASFCOM Joint Chief of Staff critically noted that if the Nordic countries send an adviser or officer with every fund, there would soon be more external advisers at EASFCOM than EASF staff (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014). Western advisers should be a useful resource to EASF rather than just being present to oversee their funds. The Joint Chief of Staff asks rhetorically: *“... Do we really need all these Nordics here? Apart from financial support and being involved in a bit of planning, maybe they are just playing golf?”* (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014). The Joint Chief of Staff believes advisers should play an active role – advising and teaching – and the resources spent should result in enhanced capacities of EASF staff. After all, *“we cannot be advised forever”* (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014).

NACS has a different view of their presence at EASFCOM: the NACS coordinator believes it is necessary with presence within the institution because it is important for the Nordic countries to ensure that EASF uses financial contributions according to national regulations and the joint memoranda of understanding. The Nordic and British donors agree that EASF still lacks the finance and human resource capacity to absorb donor funds. EASF is a new organization and it takes time to develop proper procedures and accounting standards. The

Nordic donors hope to be able to provide funds directly to EASF in the future, rather than go through NACS. However, Nordic staff support and assistance will be needed for a number of years to come (Rasmussen 2014).

The role of other donors

There are several donors, or partners, that in some shape support EASF – with funding, training and expertise, technical assistance and advice, physical infrastructure or other forms of capacity-building. Apart from the Nordic countries, some of the other donors and partners include: the German Federal Ministry of Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which supports EASFCOM through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ); the British Peace Support Team (BPST); UNDP and the African Union, which receives funding from the EU.

The German development organization GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft *für* Internationale Zusammenarbeit) was the first donor to establish a presence at EASFCOM in Nairobi. GIZ has since 2008 supported the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism through its GIZ/EASFCOM project. The main goal of GIZ programmes in EASF is to “strengthen EASFCOM to reach full operational capability by 2015” (GIZ EASFCOM 2014, p. 7). The way in which the GIZ/EASFCOM project seeks to assist EASF achieve FOC is by developing the civilian component. This is done through various activities, including: training, workshops and exercises; organizational development and management such as strategic and budget planning; creating a civilian roster on standby as well as a network of civilian focal points in member states; and developing concepts, information and standards for the civilian component (GIZ EASFCOM 2014, pp. 10-11). The GIZ/EASFCOM project duration is 9 years, divided into three cycles, or phases (GIZ EASFCOM 2014, p. 9) As per June 2014, there were two GIZ representatives co-located with EASFCOM. Their budget, including costs for two expatriate staff, totaled around one million euros a year (Kirchner 2014). GIZ, which is the only donor that directly supports EASFCOM’s civilian component, reports that the EASF civilian component is more developed and ahead of the civilian components of other regional economic communities and regional mechanisms contributing to the African Standby Force framework (GIZ EASFCOM 2014, p. 12).

The British Peace Support Team for East Africa consists of a dozen or so military personnel co-located with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Westwood Park outside Nairobi. One of the activities of the BPST in East Africa is to support and provide capacity-building and training to EASF, mainly to and through IPSTC rather than directly to EASFCOM.

The Friends of EASF (FoE) is a forum of current and potential donors/partners of EASF. The donor representatives meet at an ambassadorial level. Friend of EASF serves as a forum through which the international donors/partners can engage in dialogue with the EASFCOM Director. Given that all political decisions of the EASF are taken at the EASF ministerial level and not by the EASFCOM Director, FoE has limited influence over EASF's political decisions. FoE only serves as a forum for coordination and the exchange of ideas and information and all agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between EASFCOM and donors/partners are done bilaterally (GIZ 2014, p. 43).

Chapter 6: Current and Future Issues in Nordic Capacity-Building in East Africa

In order to consider current and future issues related to Nordic capacity-building in East Africa, it is necessary to take a critical look at the relationship between the recipient organization or institution and the donor(s). Much has been said and written about the huge gaps in capacities of African sub-regional organizations and security mechanisms but not enough research has been done on the gaps in donor-assisted, donor-led and donor-designed capacity-building programmes. These gaps include the inability of donors to meet the capacity-building needs of the recipient institutions, gaps between donor policies, principles and practice, donor-driven assistance, and oftentimes a divergence of donor and beneficiaries' perceptions and understanding of what capacity-building and capacity entail.

These gaps also need to be considered alongside the numerous challenges facing (newly established) organizations and mechanisms that are willing to take on the peacekeeping burden. Perhaps one of *the* most obvious challenges of regional organizations, such as the EASF, is the lack of funding and financial means. Logistical, operational, and command and control shortcomings are also a mainstay of regional organizations' peace operations and interoperability between such diverse African militaries is hard to achieve (Berman 2004, p. 31). Furthermore, both the AU and the African regional security mechanisms lack sufficient qualified personnel for their peace operations. Thus far training has been very ad hoc. Moreover, the various training programs have not taken into account long-term African peacekeeping needs (Hirsch and Walker 2005, p 5).

Indeed, Western-led and funded peacekeeping capacity-building programmes in Africa have been criticized. That is why it is important to explore the following questions: How do we avoid a donor-driven programme and ensure African ownership? How do we deal with the high degree of financial dependency of the AU, ASF, EASF and related institutions? Are capacity-building programmes driven by the recipient countries and institutions' needs? Or is capacity-building determined by the Nordic countries' military abilities, resources and political will? How do we ensure that the Nordic countries deliver a capacity-building programme that meets the needs and capacity gaps of the EASF? To what degree do the Nordic partners respond to the needs, requests and priorities of the EASF? To what extent

does the Norwegian military abide by the main principles of the ACB programme⁶ (NORDEFECO 2008, p. 1)? Are capacity-building initiatives, such as training, sustainable? Notwithstanding these issues, donors are crucial to the development of regional security mechanisms.

Balancing African Ownership with Donor Dependency in EASF

One of the central aspects of this research project has been the dichotomy of African ownership and donor dependency. How do donors and recipients alike ensure local, or in this case African, ownership of capacity-building initiatives when the recipient is so reliant on external funding? In Chapter 4, the author discussed how and why local ownership is a key principle of donor programming and a determinant for the success and sustainability of such initiatives. The author has previously discussed the major challenges that make it difficult to apply the principle of local ownership in practice. Moreover, donors deliberately or unintentionally sideline this operating principle during all stages of program design, program implementation, management and evaluation. In this chapter, the author will discuss the inherent paradox of African ownership for sub-regional security mechanisms and indigenous peacekeeping and the high level of dependency on external funding. When taking a closer look at African ownership, in particular how African ownership of EASF policies, procedures, processes and activities have fared vis-à-vis high levels of donor dependency, it is possible to discern ways in which donors have tried to steer or influence EASF activities and priorities or circumvented the wishes and priorities of EASF by denying funding.

African ownership

Since the end of the cold war, there has been a movement calling for greater African cooperation, integration and responsibility for issues plaguing the continent. The African ‘renaissance’, first voiced by Thabo Mbeki in 1996, also inspired the continent’s countries and peoples to work together to solve their problems (Franke 2013, p. 80). The mantra of the day, ‘African solutions to Africa’s problems’, has to a greater extent led to needs-driven and beneficiary-dictated development and military assistance (Beise 2007). Despite a high degree of dependency by the African Union and African regional bodies on donor funds for physical

⁶ To reiterate, the main principles of the ACB Programme are: African ownership, responding to AU needs and priorities, and coordination and harmonization with other partners to build political stability and human security

and institutional infrastructure and the ability to deploy and sustain peace operations, we also see a relatively high degree of African ownership of the build-up of conflict management capacities within the ASF framework. Simultaneously, there has been a shift in attitudes among donors, who are more willing to provide funding for African-driven and demanded processes and initiatives (Beise 2007). Nonetheless, it is important to evaluate to which extent donors, such as the Nordic countries in Eastern Africa, align the practical implementation of their programmes with their programme goals and principles, such as the principle of local ownership.

There are structures that inhibit the application of the principle of local ownership of EASF from the perspective of both the donors and the ‘local owners’. Even though the focus of this discussion is African ownership vis-à-vis the Nordic ACB Programme, it is important to keep in mind that local ownership is also determined by the actions and engagement of the ‘locals’. In other words, the sustainability of this new regional security mechanism EASF hinges primarily on the buy-in and continued interest of the EASF member states (as opposed to the continued interest of a group of donors). Furthermore, the everyday operations and activities of EASF – and the efficacy of the organization itself—also depend upon the dedication and buy-in of EASFCOM personnel, regardless of who funds the organization.

EASF ownership of policies, plans and activities

One of the challenges of promoting and implementing local ownership is, as mentioned in Chapter 4, determining who the local owners are. The African Peace and Security Architecture consists of layers of ‘local owners’, from the level of the African Union headquarters and the Regional Economic Communities and regional mechanisms (RM) through the member states of these organizations. In addition, there are different levels of ownership: at political level, policy level, and the implementation level of the Eastern Africa Standby Force. Given that the Nordic African Capacity-Building Programme’s main beneficiaries are EASFCOM and EASF PLANELM, these EASF structures should be considered the ‘local owners’ vis-à-vis NACS. The NACS representatives have until recently, had little bearing on the overall political decisions and policies emanating from the Heads of States and Governments or Ministers of Defence of EASF member states. The previous EASF strategic plans and activity plans have been presented to donors as a smorgasbord of activities and initiatives they can fund. In the current EASF Strategic Plan 2015-2020 and the EASF Activity Plan 2015, however, donor representatives were given the opportunity to provide

input (Rasmussen 2015). Hence, it is within the activity-framework where donors have the most influence (and where local ownership is weakened). This was stated clearly by the NACS Coordinator:

It is always EASFCOM's decisions but sometimes NACS will not fund certain ideas or activities. ... They have developed the plan, we are paying for everything. We always try to see what should be prioritized. Sometimes it is not the right timing. ... We try not to tell them too much what to do but *when we disagree with something, we say no* (Rasmussen 2014).

In an interview, the EASF Joint Chief of Staff Brig.-Gen. Gituai bemoaned that donors often do not support the initiatives or activities the donors disagree with (Brig.-Gen Gituai 2014). Moreover, he experienced that activities that were approved for funding by donors received a smaller budget than the estimated cost of the approved activity. The activities and initiatives of EASFCOM, then, are limited to the degree of support from the donors. This, in turn, affects the degree of EASFCOM ownership and decision-making (Brig.-Gen Gituai 2014).



Scheye and Peake raises this dilemma of, on the one side ensuring local ownership of international security sector reform (and military capacity-building) programs and on the other side, donors denying funding for activities or projects that they find unacceptable. They stress that “there should be no supposition that because a ‘local owner’ desires and/or demands a particular form of assistance that that support is either appropriate or should be forthcoming” (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 251). In fact, many of the locally proposed initiatives involve expensive equipment, “one-off training programs’ and international travel – activities which might benefit individual staff members but not the organization or institution as a whole. Alas, initiatives that will ‘have little functional value and produce few tangible results’” (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 251).

Nonetheless, donors’ dismissal of EASFCOM funding requests demonstrates the unequal relationship between the donor and the recipient and the inherent paradox of the local ownership-dependency dichotomy: EASFCOM exercises ownership up to a point. By providing or withholding funding, donors exercise *de facto* decision-making power over the execution of EASF’ plan and activities.

Despite the fact that donors may exercise *de facto* decision-making power over EASF activities by approving or denying funding, most respondents in the author's questionnaire on EASF capacities and donor relations believe Nordic countries support African ownership and responsibility of the build-up of Eastern Africa Standby Force (Figure 8). Furthermore, there is a high degree of agreement, among both EASFCOM staff and donor representatives, that EASFCOM exercises full leadership in developing and implementing its policies to promote peace, security and stability (Figure 9). The perception among EASFCOM personnel is that EASF enjoys a high degree of ownership over its own institution, policies, procedures and plans but EASFCOM does not exercise complete ownership. Mainly, the heavy reliance on external funding poses some limitations on EASFCOM.

On the one hand, EASFCOM-driven initiatives might stall due to lack of donor-funding. On the other hand, there are several examples of activities and initiatives that seem to be donor-driven rather than requested by EASFCOM. One such example is the push for capacity-building on public information and public relations by the German development agency GIZ and the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS). Both NACS representatives and the GIZ representatives believe presswork, public relations, media outreach and developing a website should form part of the daily operations of sub-regional security mechanisms. Hence, GIZ finances a public information manager for two years, in the 'hope' that EASFCOM and EASF member states will prioritize and finance such a role in the future (Kirchner 2014). NACS recently introduced a media and promotion project. It is *NACS' ambition* that EASF will be able to produce and develop their own PR stunts, videos, and press releases. The project will also train press officers in journalism and teach high-level officers how to handle the media (Rasmussen 2014). These skills and capabilities are nice to have. However, these skills are

Views on African ownership of EASF plans and activities




not vital for deploying, conducting, sustaining and liquidating peace operations. Activities and expenditures considered peripheral to core military activity are unlikely to secure continued funding from EASF member states, as they are already struggling to provide the bare minimum for their regional standby force. As a consequence, donor-funded activities and structures that are not directly requested or supported by EASFCOM and/or EASF member states, or are seen as peripheral to core military activities, may not produce tangible or sustainable results. These activities represent *outside-in* capacity-building initiatives.

Another example of where the issue of donor interests and capabilities seem to have taken center stage vis-à-vis ownership and the necessities of EASF is the development of a maritime component. One of the central aspects of the ACB Programme is the establishment of a maritime component. Maritime security has not received a lot of attention and it not high on the list of priorities at the African Union or within the regional standby forces. The EASF Joint Chief of Staff reiterated this sentiment: “there is not much of a maritime threat in peace operations” (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014). The Nordic countries’ ambitions to establish a maritime component at EASFCOM met some resistance from EASFCOM staff, who believed a maritime component would be too large and require too many resources (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014). Hence, the plan was re-adjusted to establish a maritime planning cell. Nordic donors listened to the beneficiary – to a certain degree – but staffing and funding a maritime component is certainly another *outside-in* capacity-building initiative.

NACS has since 2009 supported the five staff positions within the maritime planning cell. The calls for a leaner standby force structure (Independent Panel of Experts 2013) and the relatively low profile of maritime security issues, will likely contribute to a downscaling of the EASF maritime planning cell when Nordic funding for the cell stops. For the sake of efficiency and streamlining, the Joint Chief of Staff does not believe it is useful to have “a lot of staff at EASFCOM doing nothing. Instead, EASFCOM will call on the capacities of member states when needed” (Brig.-Gen. Gituai 2014). During interviews with the maritime planning cell, it was revealed that most EASF members states do not consider the maritime component critical or important (EASF maritime planning cell 2014). For a few EASF member states, though, maritime security is crucial – not at least for the small island member states, the Seychelles and the Comoros, and for Somalia’s troubled coastline. This exemplifies the difficulties of implementing the principle of local ownership: given that the ‘local owners’ have various needs, interests and priorities, some initiatives and activities might be requested and ‘owned’ by some owners whereas other owners see these same activities as donor-driven.

Figure 10: EASFCOM dictates the needs of the organization to donors



The two examples of donor-driven assistance above could also provide the answer as to why nearly half of EASFCOM personnel surveyed do not believe EASFCOM dictates the needs of the organization to its donors (Figure 10). They see that some of the initiatives are more steered by donor interests and priorities than by the priorities and wishes of EASF as an organization. Donors, on the other hand, are either neutral or believe EASFCOM is at the helm vis-à-vis the donors (Figure 10).

Despite this feedback, EASFCOM staff do not necessarily view donor-driven initiatives as superfluous. In fact, most EASFCOM staff members surveyed believe the Nordic countries and other donors provide support that meets the needs of EASF and that they respond to the evolving priorities of EASF. In other words, EASF staff view donor assistance as flexible and adjusting to the changing demands of EASF. In fact, several interviewees have pointed out that NACS' advantage is its ability to manage the ACB Programme funds in a flexible manner and respond to requests according to the needs and priorities of EASFCOM.

Donors sometimes try to influence EASFCOM to implement certain activities meet the capacity needs in the organization. Furthermore, these needs might not have been identified or prioritized by EASFCOM or EASF member states. Another reason why donor representatives, in the form of advisers, often claim the driver's seat is the lack of capacities among EASF personnel. The lack of qualified staff has been pointed out by several donors and EASF staff as a hindrance for capacity-building and progress within EASFCOM. Hence, when these Western advisers are embedded within the organizational structure and experience the lack of qualified personnel, it becomes easier to engage in capacity substitution than capacity-building. This generally means that the Western advisers do the job themselves. Unfortunately, this does nothing for the long-term development of EASF as an organization, given that the knowledge of the Western adviser disappears with him or her.

To summarize, EASF's high level of dependency on donor funds for running costs and activities curtail African ownership of EASF activities and plans. In addition, we see that some activities seem to be more donor-driven than based on the wishes and priorities of EASF. Nonetheless, the perception among EASF staff and donors is that donors support African ownership – probably due to a high awareness of local ownership as a core principle

of donor programmes. Moreover, EASF staff surveyed believe that donors, overall, provide useful assistance to EASFCOM. The high level of funding dependency does not have a detrimental effect on African ownership of EASF policies, procedures, plans and activities. One of the most salient issues for EASF, though, is to reduce its reliance on external funding.

Donor dependency

One of the main challenges of creating an effective and reliable African Peace and Security Architecture is the lack of funding for AU and sub-regional peacekeeping institutions and initiatives. The funding issue was high on the agenda after the African Union deployed a peacekeeping operation (AMIS) to Darfur in western Sudan in 2004 – before operationally ready to do so. The mission was highly dependent upon donor funding, equipment and airlift from the EU and other Western governments. This hampered the successful and timely deployment of the mission and had a negative impact on mission sustainment. The author's previous research on the AU's conflict management capacities and donor relations reveals that despite increased African ownership and decision-making, the multitude of donors, donor conditionality and donor audit and reporting requirements necessitated that AU staff worked more on meeting the demands of donors rather than meeting the needs of AU peacekeepers (Beise 2007). Even today, one of the greatest challenges to AU peace operations is the inability (or unwillingness) of AU member states to fund AU missions (Independent Panel of experts 2013, p. 31). In this sense, “the mantra African solutions to Africa's problems becomes another buzz word – simply because African nations do not have the funding and the capacity” (Pedersen 2014).

In addition to a lack of political will and financial contributions from African states to fund the African Standby Force, the African Union also suffers from the lack of automatic resource mobilization mechanism for peace operations. In fact, “the AU Peace and Security Protocol merely ‘invites’ troop contributing countries to ‘bear the costs of their participation during the first three months’ and then foresees reimbursement and further coverage of costs through an AU financing mechanism within a timeframe of maximum six months” (GIZ 2014, p. 14). Hitherto, the financial burden of African Union peace operations has been shared by mainly the UN, the EU through its Africa Peace facility, and bilateral donors.

What's more, as long as the AU and the sub-regional security mechanisms are dependent upon external sources and donors to pay their peacekeeping bills, these institutions will not be able to make “independent decisions regarding the mandate, scope, size and duration” of their

operations (Independent Panel of experts 2013, pp. 31-32). The Ambassador of the African Union to the UN echoes this “...one of the greatest constraints faced by the African Union and its Regional Mechanisms is the issue of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding for their operations” (Tete 2014, p. 4).

Several solutions have been forwarded because of the AU and RECs'/regional mechanisms' dependency on external financing. One obvious solution is to encourage AU member states to increase their contributions to peacekeeping purposes, or at the very least ensure that AU and REC members pay their regular contributions so as to “allow for the recruitment and payment of key staff within their respective structures” (GIZ 2014, p. 14). Another solution is to ‘right-size’, the standby forces for just in-time delivery of peacekeeping forces or downsize, as current staff levels are unsustainable without donors funding missions (Independent Panel of experts 2013, p. 21 and p. 31; Robinson). A third option is that donors and member states alike provide un-earmarked funding through a trust fund, such as the AU Peace Fund and the Peace Fund envisaged for mission sustainment by EASF.

Despite the calls for “generating increased resources from within the Continent for the funding of the African Union-led peace efforts on a more sustainable basis”, it is important to note that it is, and will continue to be, the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and security (Tete 2014). Hence, UN member states in general and Western nations in particular, have a duty and an obligation to finance African-led peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council. The main issue hitherto has been the unpredictability of funding and donor interests and caveats, which have affected African ownership of African security intuitions and responses. In the following section, the author will take a closer look at Eastern Africa Standby Force’s dependency on donor funds and what issues this raises for the young and still evolving security mechanism.

EASF donor dependency

The regional economic communities and regional mechanisms under the African Standby Force framework are – akin to the AU -- heavily reliant on donors to build their peacekeeping capacities. Some regional bodies have existed for several years (such as SADC and ECOWAS) and incrementally built their institutions and capacities. They have deployed political missions or peace operations, and member states have, over time, increased integration and military cooperation within these regional economic communities. Moreover, over the years, these RECs have received funding and bilateral military assistance and

training through mainly British, American and French initiatives (Beise 2007). Eastern Africa Standby Force, on the other hand, is a new entity requiring a rapid build-up. This implies higher start-up costs and a higher reliance on donor funds initially, for physical infrastructure, staffing, capacity-building and, ultimately, operations.

The heavy reliance on external sources is evident in the EASF 2014 activity budget: According to the EASF Report of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of 25th April 2014, the donor group *Friends of EASF* (FoE) provided almost USD 4 million out of the nearly 5 million dollar EASF activity budget for 2014 (EASF 2014, p. 22). The AU provided around USD 900,000. The EASF member states, on the other hand, only provided a meagre 2.5 percent of the activity budget, with contributions totaling USD 117,000. This number demonstrates the level of dependency on external donors for day-to-day and extraordinary activities within EASF.



The Nordic countries alone have contributed with nearly 11 million USD in support of EASF through the ACB Programme since its inception in 2009. This amount does not include the costs of the NACS representatives (salary, housing, costs of dependents). Nor does this amount take into account the costs associated with the Nordic Mobile Education Training Teams and sending East Africans to Nordic courses (NACS 2014, p. 9). In the last three years, Nordic funding has slightly increased, hovering around 2 million USD a year. The Nordic countries, through NACS, represent the largest donor to EASF. Other donors include the German development agency GIZ, which has contributed one million euros a year since the GIZ-programme started in 2008.⁷ The British Peace Support Team also contributes with funding to the military component of EASF, alongside the Nordic countries.

Following the declaration of Full Operational Capability in December 2014, EASF has stated its readiness to deploy forces to peace operations. This requires a much larger budget than in previous years. In fact, the 2015 budget for EASF activities soared to nearly USD 19 million, up USD 14 million from the previous year. The EASF Activity Plan 2015 only lists EASF member states as sources of funding for three activities, amounting to USD 3,240,000 (EASF 2014 Annex D). If EASF member states followed through on this budget, they would have increased their contributions dramatically, both percentage wise (up to approximately 17 per

⁷ The one million euros includes staff costs of the GIZ representative (Kirchner 2014). GIZ funding is divided into two: one part from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the EASF police component and one part from the German Ministry of Development Cooperation for the EASF civilian component and management support (Kirchner 2014).

cent) and in real terms. However, the activity budget constitutes only a small portion of the total costs of running EASF and eventually also deploying EASF missions. The EASF Financial Plan 2015-2020 calls for an EASF budget of over USD 50 million and *another USD 3 billion* for the EASF Peace Fund for mission deployment and sustainment. The planned EASF donor conference for 2015 was meant to bring in new donors and solicit more funding from current donors. The price tag is overly ambitious but is it, as of yet, uncertain whether donors are willing to pay for EASF peacekeeping.

The author's survey shows that EASFCOM personnel, the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff and other donor representatives agree that the Nordic countries should continue to provide financial and personnel resources to EASF following the attainment of Full Operational Capability (Figure 11). However, there are disagreements as to the nature of the assistance. EASFCOM staff members agree that Nordic capacity-building should include the day-to-day running and administrative costs of the organization. Donor representatives, on the other hand, do not believe this is good use of their funds (Figure 12). Instead, they would rather support the planning, conduct and sustainment of an EASF peace operation. Future Nordic contributions to EASF might be to fund and support EASF deployments. This will require far more resources than the Nordic countries currently commit. Hence, the donors, or *Friends of EASF*, have started approaching new potential donors, including Australia, the Baltic States, Belgium, the EU and Turkey (NACS 2014, p. 17; Rasmussen 2014). It is likely that the need for increased funding by donors, and the potential increase in number of donors and donor interests, will affect EASF ownership of its plans, activities and operations. EASF' dependency on external donors will increase manifold. However, instead of increasing the number of donors and EASF dependency on external funding, it would be more important to see EASF become self-sustainable. In addition, unless EASF member states increase their funding and contributions to their sub-regional security mechanism, it is unlikely donors will.



As long as EASF receives a bulk of its funding for both running costs and activities – and in the future for its operations – from external donors, EASF and its member states will have to contend with the push and pulls, the interests, priorities and agendas, of the major donors. This, in turn, may reduce or negatively affect African ownership of EASF policies, plans, procedure, processes and activities.

Reaching FOC: Perception versus Reality

The end state of Nordic (and German) donor funding for EASF is the achievement of Full Operational Capability. This is also the goal of EASF and EASF member states. However, perceptions and understandings of what FOC applies and whether EASF was going to achieve FOC within the planned deadline varied between EASF staff and donors. Donors did not believe EASF would achieve FOC by the end of 2014, whereas EASFCOM staff members were more optimistic.

The perception of what constitutes FOC and whether this could be achieved by EASF within the intended timeframe warrants further scrutiny and discussion. One important aspect of balancing donor interests, priorities and funding with African needs is the perception of what constitutes success or achievement.

First, the 2003 ASF Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force consisting of five regional brigades (changed in 2010 to five regional multidimensional ‘forces’ with military, police and civilian components) in the timespan of seven years could be seen more as madness than a realistic ambition. When the initial 2010 ASF readiness deadline approached, the African Union postponed FOC until 2015. Yet Initial Operating Capability was declared that year. Despite the focus on African ownership and the surge in African solutions to Africa’s problems following the creation of the African Union, the idea of creating an African Standby Force allegedly came from British advisers (Kirchner 2014). Robinson also alludes to a Western involvement in the formulation of the ASF concept, stating that “the executive branches of Western governments seem to have significantly overestimated the speed at which African armies can create fully operational multinational headquarters and forces that can deploy far beyond their national borders” (Robinson 2014, p. 9). Had the ASF concept been an African idea, it might have been more suited to the *realpolitik* of African states and the realities of African military resources and capabilities.

Now that the ASF project is well under way, at least in three of the five regions of Africa, it seems tables have turned. Africans, more specifically EASF staff, demonstrate considerable optimism about the EASF and ASF project, whereas Western donors are more reluctant to consider the ASF project a success. This difference in attitude is reflected in the author's survey and interviews on EASF capacities and donor relations, in particular as regards achievement of Full Operational Capability and the ability of EASF to deploy peace operations.

Reaching or declaring Full Operational Capability is one of the first, and most important, milestones of the standby forces. The decision by the EASF Council of Defence Ministers to declare FOC at the end of 2014, one year ahead of the ASF FOC deadline, is by all intents and purposes a political decision and a political declaration. Given that reaching FOC constitutes one of the most important achievements and objectives of EASF, it is important to look at the perception of FOC and EASF readiness through the lens of both EASF staff and the major donors. First, it is beneficial to define or clarify what Full Operational Capability actually entails.

Defining Full Operational Capability

There is no common definition of what Full Operational Capability for the regional standby forces within the ASF framework means. The Independent Panel of Experts assessing ASF plans to achieve FOC by 2015 noted in their report the lack of a common AU verification process for the regional standby forces' FOC status and had to come up with their own working definition of what constitutes Full Operational Capability (Independent Panel of Experts 2013, p. 31). Their working definition of FOC, understood in the context of the ASF Policy Framework's six mission scenarios, was (Independent Panel of Experts 2013, pp. 16-17):

- a. *The ability of the [African Union Commission (AUC)] to mandate, plan, manage, support and liquidate a peace operation at the strategic level, and combined with;*
- b. *The ability of the AUC, or a designated REC/RM to plan, deploy, manage, support and liquidate a peace operation at the operational level, and;*
- c. *The ability of member states to generate the necessary military, police and civilian capacities, against given operational readiness criteria.*


In the context of Eastern Africa Standby Force, FOC can then be defined as EASF' ability to plan, manage, support and liquidate a peace operation with the requisite military, civilian and police capacities from EASF member states.

The end state of Nordic support through the Africa Capacity-Building Programme is to help EASF achieve FOC. The problem of measuring success – and measure whether the Nordic countries have achieved what they set out to achieve in the *African Capacity-Building Perspective Plan 2010-2015* -- is that the Nordic countries failed to offer definitions or conduct a baseline study before launching the ACB Programme in 2008. Nor does the ACB Programme provide indicators that give a clear indication or measurement of how to reach programme objectives. It is not until the 2013 Nordic Review Report that we find a set of clear objectives and indicators for Nordic support to EASF. These objectives were derived from the EASF Strategic Development Plan. Objective 3 in the EASF Strategic Development Plan relates to achieving “Full Operational Capability (FOC) of a trained military force structure including a multinational brigade headquarters on standby and maintained in member states to the required readiness levels by the end of 2015” (EASF Strategic Development Plan cited in NACS 2013, p. 10).

Interestingly, the eleven strategic objectives of EASF do not reflect the ASF Policy Framework's goals of deploying to six different mission scenarios ranging from political missions to complex multidimensional peace operations and rapid, robust deployment in cases of genocide. Neither do the indicators developed by NACS to measure fulfillment of EASF strategic objective 3 (cited above). Instead, NACS have come up with a set of indicators meant to measure EASF FOC based on the performance of EASFCOM and its member states vis-à-vis the major field training exercise (FTX) in Jinja, Uganda in 2013. Using the FTX in Jinja as a goal post, NACS concluded that indicator 1 – on demonstrated operational effectiveness at force level during FTX13 – was met, whereas indicator 2 – on whether EASF demonstrated operational effectiveness at Mission headquarter (HQ) level – was not met (NACS 2013, p. 10, Annex B). The Mission headquarter of the FTX13 in Jinja struggled to run the HQ efficiently and HQ elements did not work well together. The Nordic Review Report indicated that more training and capacity-building in this area was needed, which would in turn fulfill EASF strategic objective 3 (NACS 2013, p. 11). Although NACS developed a number of indicators meant to measure their support and technical assistance to EASF, these indicators were useful only as far as evaluating the field training exercise in Jinja and EASF capabilities during that specific FTX.

Attainment of FOC in 2014

A few months before EASF declared FOC in December 2014, donor representatives and EASFCOM personnel revealed, through the author's survey, differences and similarities in



sentiments related to the achievements of EASF to date. A majority of EASF staff surveyed believed that EASF would reach Full Operational Capability in 2014 while donors were relatively evenly spread in their views (Figure 13). However, in-depth interviews revealed that donors did not believe that EASF would reach de facto FOC.

One reason why donors and EASFCOM personnel vary in their perception of EASF operating capability is varying ideas of what mission deployment and sustainment entails. Donor representatives, most of them with experience from Western militaries, might have higher expectations to what mission deployment requires in terms of training, mission support, equipment, medical facilities and so on. African

militaries and multinational forces are thus far not comparable to NATO or EU missions. That is why some sources go as far as claiming that a “fully-operational, multifunctional ASF is simply not realistic, even probably within a 25-year timeframe” and that the international community cannot rely upon EASF and African leaders to intervene in complex emergencies (Robinson 2014, pp. 12-14). Others point out that even though EASF will not achieve FOC in 2014 – other than through a political declaration, EASF will still be able to conduct smaller scale peace operations (Rasmussen 2014; Kirchner 2014).

The independent panel of experts' writes in their report "Assessment of the African Standby Force and Plan of Action for Achieving Full Operational Capability by 2015", that they do not believe FOC for the African Standby Force as a whole will be achieved by late 2015. This is because there are too many remaining gaps, challenges and shortcomings within the ASF framework (Independent Panel of experts 2013, p. 30). Moreover, even if one or more of the RECs or regional mechanisms achieve (or declare) FOC, the AU is unable to verify FOC status against a common set of criteria, as mentioned above.

The GIZ representative also believes achieving FOC to be the “ultimate end state”. Kirchner defines FOC as when the EASF “is capable of running, planning and organizing peace

support operations in an integrated multidimensional way” (Kirchner 2014). This, Kirchner stresses, is not likely to happen in 2014, which means that “FOC 2014 is a political declaration – it will not be real FOC” (Kirchner 2014). However, declaring Full Operational Capability before operationally ready to deploy peace operations is not necessarily a bad idea. Initially Kirchner believed it was important for an organization or security mechanisms, such as EASF, to plan for FOC and build up capacities – in order to avoid making many mistakes if deploying peace operations. With time, and after having witnessed frequent staff rotations at EASFCOM and the reluctance towards really achieving FOC, Kirchner is now in favour of declaring FOC early in order to deploy to a mission. This, he says, is “because the political awareness and public interest will be higher among and within EASF member states and donors when EASF deploys operations. Deploying to a mission is more serious than just another exercise – and the learning curve is steeper” (Kirchner 2014).

The NACS Coordinator strongly agreed that EASF would not reach real FOC by the end of 2014. However, given the relative success of the FTX in Jinja in 2013 where EASF member states deployed units to Uganda without donor support, EASFCOM has proven that it is able to deploy and conduct operations (Rasmussen 2014).

| Table 2: Mission Scenarios for the African Standby Force | |
|---|--|
| Scenario 1 | Military advice to a political mission |
| Scenario 2 | AU regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission |
| Scenario 3 | Stand-alone observer mission |
| Scenario 4 | Stand-alone peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment of troops for peace enforcement |
| Scenario 5 | Complex, multidimensional peacekeeping mission |
| Scenario 6 | Military intervention in case of grave emergencies, i.e. for the prevention of genocide, when the international community fails to intervene |

(Source: African Union Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force)

Figure 14: EASF is capable of deploying a scenario 1 mission: military advice to a political mission




Figure 15: EASF is capable of deploying a scenario 2 mission: co-deployment with a UN peacekeeping operation





Figure 16: EASF is capable of deploying a scenario 3 mission: a stand-alone observer mission



The Danish Defence Attaché to the African Union in Addis Ababa stated, “everyone knows that the ASF concept as a whole will never reach FOC”. Western and Eastern Africa will reach FOC and SADC will be able to do it, but has a different view of progress. Two out of five regions (Central and Northern Africa), though, will not achieve Full Operational Capability in the near future (Pedersen 2014). According to the Defence Attaché, the Americans believe the ASF concept is dead and the focus now is on developing the *African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis* (ACIRC) concept. The ACIRC concept relies on two or three continental rapid deployment components with one lead nation. Twelve to thirteen AU member states have already committed to the ACIRC concept, which came about as a temporary fix because the ASF framework was progressing too slowly (Pedersen 2014).

The Danish Defence Attaché believes one of the reasons why EASF was pushing for FOC by the end of 2014 was because reaching FOC and subsequently deploying multinational forces through the standby arrangement would be a strong argument for keeping the regional standby forces as opposed to ACIRC. In other words, if ACIRC is seen as threatening the status and priority of the regional standby forces because of slow progression, then declaring FOC will invalidate the need for ACIRC. Perhaps another reason is the realization that we “will never reach FOC because we are always learning and always building capacities, even in our own Nordic militaries. But at some stage the regional standby forces need to declare that they are ready to deploy missions” (Pedersen 2014).

Figure 17: EASF is capable of deploying a scenario 4 mission: a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation




Figure 18: EASF is capable of deploying a complex multi-dimensional Chapter VII peace enforcement mission





Figure 19: EASF is capable of rapid deployment (within 14 days) in case of genocide



Deployment Capabilities

Survey respondents, interviews and other sources indicate that EASF is able to conduct small-scale operations but does not yet possess the capabilities, capacities or the resources to conduct complex peace operations under a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate. For an overview over the six different mission scenarios, consult table 1 above. The survey results (Figures 14-19) highlight respondents’ views on EASF deployment capabilities. FOC entails the ability and capability of conducting peace operations on the six mission scenarios described in the ASF Policy Framework.

Robinson holds that “if the existing rapid deployment capabilities are committed to Chapter VI operations, instead of more ambitious tasks, [EASF] might well be able to cope” (Robinson 2014, p. 13). This means that scenario 5 (complex peace enforcement missions with a Chapter VII mandate) and scenario 6 (rapid deployment in the case of genocide) should not form part of EASF’ operational commitments. Survey respondents generally believe that EASF can provide military advice to a political mission (Figure 14), conduct hybrid missions with the UN (Figure 15), and deploy a stand-alone observer mission (Figure 16). EASF staff and donors start to disagree on EASF capabilities to deploy bigger missions, including a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation (Figure 17), a Chapter VII multidimensional peace enforcement mission (Figure 18) and rapid deployment in case of genocide (Figure 19).

Arguably, scenario six, which requires deployment within 14 days, should be removed from EASF’ operational commitments. Since there are four levels of decision-making for authorizing ASF operations, which all require time for processing, it is doubtful whether any of the

regional standby forces will be able to deploy at such short notice. The four levels of decision-making include the highly bureaucratic UN and the AU, the REC or regional mechanism concerned and the Police and Troop Contributing Countries, some of which require Parliamentary approval before sending troops to peace operations (Independent Panel of experts 2013, p. 18). Although some of the EASFCOM personnel surveyed believe that EASF is capable of deploying in a scenario six mission within 14 days, most donors remained neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement (Figure 19).

Although many donors have expressed that it is unlikely EASF would achieve FOC by the end of 2014, it is important to note that several countries in the sub-region have vast experience deploying to UN and AU peace operations. As of August 2014, EASF member states Ethiopia and Rwanda were two of the top ten troop contributors to UN peace operations. Burundi, Kenya and Uganda have also provided significant numbers of troops to UN and African Union missions. Since the ASF Policy Framework was adopted in 2003, African countries have steadily increased their contributions to both UN and AU missions, from as little as 10,000 per annum in 2003 to more than 75,000 troops in UN and AU missions in 2013 (Independent Panel of experts 2013, p. 33). This increase in African peacekeepers demonstrates not only a political willingness to engage in conflicts on the continent but also underscores that many African nations have both the experience, capacity and capability to deploy. That is perhaps a crucial reason for why we should not discount the ASF project as a whole, or the build-up of EASF FOC more specifically.

Despite the fact that EASF has declared FOC, the future litmus test is a multinational deployment through EASF. This is where donors will play a crucial role –not only in terms of capacity-building but also in terms of financing mission deployment and sustainment and provide equipment, airlift and mission support,

Sustainability and self-financing of EASF

Given that EASF has declared FOC, future donor support should focus on two key areas: ensuring that all donor-assisted capacity-building is sustainable and help EASF come up with resource mobilization strategies to increase self-reliance.

If self-financing becomes the end state of a new phase of Nordic donor support to EASF, then the Nordic countries, in cooperation and dialogue with EASFCOM, will have to come up with

a plan that will enhance the institutional infrastructure, financial standards and accounting capacities of EASF. The lack of proper financial and accounting systems and standards have been cited as one of the reasons why donors do not want to provide funding without the financial oversight by Western advisers (Rasmussen 2014; Kirchner 2014). In fact, the EASF Strategic Plan 2015-2020 has proposed a few strategies that will “reinforce administrative and financial practices for transparency and accountability”, including “revision and implementation of EASF financial, procurement and service regulations” and “regular independent financial audits and communication of annual financial information to stakeholders” (EASF 2014, Strategic Plan 2015-2020, p. 37). Donors should consider what resources and what kind of capacity-building they can provide in order for EASF to achieve these strategic objectives in the next six years.

Funding priorities of EASF member states

Another aspect of achieving sustainability and self-financing is the role of EASF member states. Given that EASF is so reliant on external funding, we need to ask: Why are East African member states not providing their new security mechanism with the required resources? When EASF member states only contribute a miniscule amount to EASF’ activity budget, one has to question whether these states are willing to carry the financial burden of the new regional security mechanism. Some sources suggest that EASF member states do not yet have confidence in this new security mechanism:




Quite reasonably, Eastern African states may be more comfortable with more controllable means (their own national armed forces) to address conflicts immediately around their borders. Thus, resources are allotted to those more controllable means, rather than relatively untested multilateral experiments (Robinson 2014, p. 10).

The fact that EASF was initially a lesser priority within many of its member states is exemplified by the fact that most EASF member states were in payment arrears in 2009, apart from Kenya who has an interest in a strong Eastern Africa Standby Force. However, as of March 2013, Robinson reports, most EASF member states had paid their dues (Robinson 2014, p. 11). This development might reflect Eastern African states’ increased interest in EASF as a conflict management tool. In addition, EASF Ministers of Defence have in their

EASF Ministerial Council decision 34, decided that: “Member States should establish mechanisms for mobilizing additional resources to minimize dependence on donor support in order to achieve 50 % of the budget contributed by Member States to be incremented by 25 % every year (cited in NACS 2014, p. 18). Other measures to increase ownership and decrease dependency have been proposed. The Joint Chief of Staff recommends that donors continue to fund training but that the instruction is left to the Africans. He further recommends that donors cease micromanagement of their funds and instead pool their resources in “consolidated funds, which can be utilized according to EASF needs and priorities”; and that there are two funds – the EASF Peace Fund for mission deployment and sustainment and another fund for EASF running costs (Brig.-Gen Gituai 2014). Self-sufficiency and self-determination following the attainment of FOC are clearly on the EASF agenda.

Despite these recent developments towards greater self-reliance, the perceptions of EASFCOM personnel and donor representatives vary regarding the ability and willingness of EASF member states to fund EASF. The author’s survey shows that both EASFCOM staff and donor representatives believe that EASF member states are *able* to fully fund EASF and EASF operations (Figure 20). When asked whether EASF member states are *willing* to fully fund EASF and EASF operations, though, we find variations in answers between EASF staff and donors. EASFCOM personnel believe EASF member states are willing to put in the required financial resources. NACS and other donor representative, on the other hand, do not

Perceptions on EASF funding



believe EASF member states are willing to provide the necessary funding (Figure 21). Most respondents agree that EASF member states should provide EASF with more financial resources (Figure 22). In other words, status quo is not satisfactory. Whether some of the less active and less eager EASF member states will be convinced to increase their funding for EASF and make good on their pledges, remains to be seen.

Notwithstanding the important initiative by the EASF Council of Ministers of Defence and Security in February 2014 to steadily increase EASF member states' contributions to EASF, the issue of funding dependency will remain for another few years.

That is why one of the milestones in the EASF Strategic Plan 2015-2020 is to “develop sustainable resource mobilization mechanism. This guides EASF’s efforts towards sustainable financing of its activities and operations. It provides guiding principles and proposes strategies for mobilizing resources to support the implementation of EASF’s Strategic Plan and the ultimate fulfilment of its vision and mission” (EASF, 2014, Strategic Plan 2015-2020, p. 37). The three strategies that will help EASF achieve this milestone include the EASF Peace Fund; the international donor conference planned for 2015; and a review of funding mechanisms, such as consolidated funding and long-term funding agreements with donors/partners (EASF, 2014, Strategic Plan 2015-2020, p. 37). One strategy EASF has not looked into is the use of a levy on, for instance, sub-regional travel and/or international trade and monetary transactions. ECOWAS introduced the ECOWAS Community Levy in 2001. The levy is a tax on all imports to ECOWAS member states. The levy funds the activities, institutions and programmes under the ECOWAS Commission, including ECOWAS peace operations. In fact, this levy allowed ECOWAS to self-finance its mission to Guinea-Bissau (Independent Panel of Experts 2013, p. 32).

It is important that donors are not “overly ambitious on behalf of the institutions and local actors that they are meant to support. When funding, advocating for or creating structures, departments, roles, positions and responsibilities that require the local owners to take over after the funding cycle ends, might not be sustainable unless the local owners themselves find a need for them” (Scheye and Peake 2005, p. 250). It is questionable whether Nordic support for an EASF maritime planning cell is sustainable: it is likely that once external funding for maritime planning staff cease, the maritime cell will also be discontinued. This is the same with donor-initiated capacity-building on public relations within EASF.

One option for ensuring sustainable capacity-building and donor support is to introduce cost-sharing models in donor programming. This implies that donors fund only a certain percentage of the activities in question whereas EASF member states fund the rest. There are various ways of designing a cost-sharing model but one model that will ensure self-reliance over time is a model where donor funding decreased and EASF funding increases with equal amounts/percentages every year. The aim of such a model is twofold: it ensures EASF ownership of, and continued interest in the activity when EAFS will shoulder more of the costs over time. Secondly, it ensures sustainability and encourages self-reliance.



Given that it takes time – perhaps decades – to build an efficient and deployable Eastern African Standby Force, it is crucial that the Nordic countries commit to long-term capacity-building of this sub-regional security mechanism. In fact, “[t]he Nordic involvement in Africa is seen as a concrete investment with the purpose of enhancing – not only the security of Africans – but also as an investment in our own security” (NORDEFSCO 2008, p. 3). Indeed, DSSR and capacity-building of EASF are necessary investments in future security and stability. Nonetheless, these investments should pay off in measurable results.

Unintended consequences of regional integration




Achieving Full Operational Capability has been highlighted by several sources as an end state of donor funding and donor programmes. However, reaching FOC should not be seen as the end state but rather as the beginning. Reaching FOC constitutes the process that will move the regional standby forces closer to the end state: namely, deploying peace operations with the goal of preventing conflicts and keeping or establishing peace and security on the continent. What if cooperation and coordination between previously antagonistic states in order to reach FOC is indeed just as important or even more important for the prospect of preventing conflicts and providing peace and stability in the sub-region? Following World War II, Western European nations established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in order to increase cooperation and integration, in particular between Germany and France, in order to reduce the likelihood of future conflicts. After all, friends and allies do not go to war against one another. In the six and a half decades since the ECSC was established, political, social, economic and cultural integration across Europe has increased to the point that it is inconceivable that any Western European state will go to war against another.

Sub-regional cooperation in Eastern Africa serves a similar purpose: in a volatile region with interstate and intrastate conflicts and tension it is crucial to have venues for dialogue, confidence-building and mutual exchange of information and ideas. Perhaps the most important, yet unintended and unanticipated, aspect of sub-regional military cooperation in East Africa is the potential reduction in tension and animosity between countries and nationalities that have been, or still are, in conflict. There are multiple and overlapping conflicts among countries in the sub-region. The creation of a sub-regional mechanism designed to intervene in conflicts and keep the peace brings together representatives of these countries from the highest political levels, including Heads of State and Defence Ministers, to officers and soldiers on the ground, serving shoulder to shoulder in EASF peace operations. Security cooperation and military integration within the EASF provide these countries with a pressure valve and a forum to discuss their own issues. By working together to solve the peace and security challenges of their sub-region or continent, they might be able to simultaneously resolve their own differences and peace and security issues.

The NACS coordinator, Rasmussen, stressed that the Nordic countries are providing support to EASF for two main reasons: the obvious one is to help build up the standby force. However, he continues, “equally important is the process –to establish a platform where Eastern African countries can work together on joint challenges” (Rasmussen 2014). Currently there is much more communication between countries in the region than previously and representatives of these countries’ armed forces are now “working together where they a few years ago would not even shake hands” (Rasmussen 2014).



The result of cooperation and coordination within EASF is that representatives of countries who previously were at war or currently have unresolved disputes work for common goals, side by side. The exercise of building up EASF as a sub-regional security mechanism thus becomes an important sub-regional confidence-building and conflict-reduction measure that contributes to greater stability and peace in the sub-region. This sentiment is reflected in the author's survey, where almost all respondents, both EASFCOM staff and donor representatives, agree that cooperation between Eastern African states in EASF reduces conflicts in the region (Figure 23 and 24). In other words, EASF serves as a confidence-building mechanism between the armed forces of Eastern African states (Figure 25) that serves to reduce conflicts and tension between member countries (Figure 24). The fact that the build-up of a sub-regional security mechanism like EASF serves as a conflict prevention tool, indicates that donor funds are well spent, regardless of whether programme activities are implemented according to plan and/or lead to measurable results.



Although EASF serves to reduce conflicts and tension in the sub-region, there are still issues that remain. For instance, over one third of respondents believe Eastern African states are reluctant to share intelligence within EASF whereas nearly one third disagree with this statement (Figure 26). Military integration and multinational deployments through EASF will require both information and intelligence sharing. Suspicion and secrecy will hamper collaboration on peace and security in the region.

A few East African states have unilaterally intervened in conflicts in the sub-region. In particular, the sub-region's major powers,

Ethiopia and Kenya, have engaged in separate and unilateral military interventions in Somalia. Nonetheless, only a few of the respondents believe EASF member states prefer to solve security problems unilaterally (Figure 27).

Final remarks

In 2002, the African Union was created to enhance economic, political and social integration on the African continent. The AU was also tasked with preventing, reducing and resolving Africa's conflicts and crises. One of AU's tools for operationalizing its peace and security agenda is the African Standby Force, which was established in 2004. The ASF consists of five regional forces that are building up the capability and capacity to deploy to six different mission scenarios, ranging from political missions to complex peace operations.

One of these regional standby forces is the Eastern Africa Standby Force. Established in 2004 as a sub-regional security mechanism, EASF has already declared Full Operational capability, one year ahead of the ASF deadline at the end of 2015. The creation and build-up of EASF has been achieved partly through the political and resource commitments of the EASF member states. Another important contributing factor has been the support of international donors/partners, such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation's Africa Capacity-building Programme.

This report has given an account of donor support to, and the build-up of EASF by providing an initial introduction to the African peace and security architecture and the rationale behind supporting African-led conflict management initiatives in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 briefly exposed the author's research methods. In Chapter 3, some problems and prospects of sub-regional military integration and cooperation in East Africa were highlighted. Chapter 4 provided an overview over the nuts and bolts of (donor-assisted) military capacity building whereas donor support to EASF was discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 examines current and future issues in the build-up of and capacity-building of Eastern Africa Standby Force.

The aim of this thesis has been to draw some lessons from the ways in which the Nordic Defence Cooperation's ACB Programme has been implemented, and examine potential issues concerning continued Nordic defence and military assistance to EASF. Despite room for improvement and the inability of proper monitoring and evaluation of the ACB Programme, we see that the single most important aspect of supporting security and military integration and cooperation in such a volatile sub-region is the opportunity for EASF member states to build relations, enhance mutual trust and confidence, reduce tensions and solve their issues peacefully. Although this report mainly identifies perceptions, prospects and problems of

Nordic military capacity-building programmes and Nordic support to EASF, continued
Nordic support to EASF is the only way forward.

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