Security Sector Reform & Governance: Leadership Engagement

Peace Operations Training Institute®
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

PELP
PARTNERSHIP FOR
E-LEARNING ON
PEACE OPERATIONS

Security Sector Reform & Governance: Leadership Engagement

Peacekeepers from Niger serving with United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) provide security during the arrival of a United Nations delegation. 22 March 2023. UN Photo by Harandane Dicko.

BASED ON

United Nations guidance on Security Sector Reform & Governance (www.un.org/ssr/guidance/crossroads)

SERIES EDITOR

Ramona Taheri

CONTRIBUTORS

Erin Lyons • Ivan Moore • Elisabeth Rosenbaum Maurer

Peace Operations Training Institute®

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

PELP
PARTNERSHIP FOR
E-LEARNING ON
PEACE OPERATIONS

Method of Study

This self-paced module aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this module successfully:

- Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire module. Notice the section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.

- The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.

- Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.

- Study the module content and the learning objectives. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.

- Prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of the text. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

- Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.

- A note about language: This module uses English spelling according to the standards of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (United Kingdom) and the *United Nations Editorial Manual*.

» ***Access your online classroom at***
<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.

Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

- Access to all of your courses;

- A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;

- Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course supplements; and

- The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course.

Security Sector Reform & Governance: Leadership Engagement

UN Photo by Martine Perret.

Security sector reform is fundamentally a political process of establishing functioning procedures, checks and balances, transparency, and accountability in a sector often marred by opacity.

Contents »

Learning Objectives »

- Understand the basic principles underscoring a United Nations approach to SSR&G.

- Understand the importance of team and resource management for mission leadership on SSR&G.

- Identify how to provide cohesive and coherent "One United Nations" support on SSR&G.

- Reflect on the role of mission senior leadership in SSR&G.

Introduction

The Security Council has tasked the Secretary-General's Special Representatives, Special Envoys, and United Nations Resident Coordinators "to fully take into account the strategic value of security sector reform in their work, including through their good offices".[1]

Senior leaders of United Nations country teams should also develop a strengthened capacity "to absorb relevant peacebuilding functions, including any activities related to SSR following the drawdown and exit of Security Council-mandated missions".[2]

This module provides a brief, executive-level introduction to security sector reform (SSR) and governance (SSR&G) and options for action.

Why This is Important

Non-democratic forms of rule are on the rise.[3]

In fragile countries, in particular, many people feel unprotected by their own security institutions. **When soldiers or police do not serve the common good, societal trust — so necessary for sustained prosperity and well-being — remains elusive. Privileged groups, including those in uniform, may reap the benefits of favouritism and repression, while development is denied to many.**

Helping establish security services that provide genuine human security is a direct interest of the in-country presence of the United Nations: "[…] to support national actors in achieving their security, peace and development goals […] the development of effective and accountable security institutions on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect for human rights and the rule of law is essential".[4]

Some think SSR is mainly about improving the readiness of defence forces and internal security services or providing them with equipment. Not at all. It is fundamentally a political process of establishing functioning procedures, checks and balances, transparency, and accountability in a sector often marred by opacity. Nowadays, the term security sector *governance* is often added to underline that SSR includes how the sector is funded, operates, and is held to account.

A Glimpse of the Magnitude of the Issue »

In Somalia, the federal government spends well over one third of its national budget on security. As the country collects no tax revenue, the national security budget depends fully on donor funds. In the meantime, numerous informal armed groups and militias raise millions of dollars in predatory "taxes" on Somalis to pay for themselves.

SSR, driven by the government, will need to address this situation if the country is to provide human security to its citizens successfully.

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and World Bank, *Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review*, January 2017. Available from: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/644671486531571103/pdf/Somalia-Security-and-justice-sector-public-expenditure-review.pdf>.

---

1) United Nations Security Council, resolution 2553 (2020), S/RES/2553 (2020), 3 December 2020, 20(c). Available from: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2553(2020)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

2) United Nations Security Council, *Striving for Peace During the Seventy-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, September 2018, 15. Available from: <https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2017/12/18-12095-PGA-Book-Striving-For-Peace-web3-small.pdf>.

3) Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule*, February 2022. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/FIW_2022_PDF_Booklet_Digital_Final_Web.pdf>.

4) United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the* Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008, Summary. Available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/securing-peace-and-development-role-united-nations-supporting-security-sector-reform>.

Salva Kiir (right), President of the Republic of South Sudan, meets with a delegation led by Jean-Pierre Lacroix (third from right), Under-Secretary-General for the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, Smaïl Chergui (second from right), Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union), and Ismail Wais (sixth from right), Special Envoy to South Sudan for the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in Juba. The three representatives expressed their support for full implementation of the peace process in South Sudan. 17 August 2013. UN Photo by Maal Maker Thoing.

SSR&G is institution-building and good-governance promotion close to the pinnacle of national power. Given its highly political nature and its centrality to the in-country success of the United Nations, senior United Nations leaders must engage on SSR&G early, strategically, and consistently, including by facilitating dialogue on security governance arrangements.[5]

Throughout their engagement, United Nations leaders need to be aware of the **United Nations principles for SSR&G**, including:

- **Inclusive national ownership**;
- The **primacy of political solutions**;
- Ensuring a **governance-focused approach** at all stages of reform.[6]

The United Nations support must also be guided by other relevant United Nations guidance, including the Organization's *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces* (HRDDP).[7]

---

5)   United Nations Security Council, *Strengthening security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2022/280, 15 March 2022, III(23). Available from: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2022%2F280&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

6)   United Nations Security Council, *Strengthening security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2022/280, II(5).

7)   United Nations, *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces*, 2015. Available from: <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/Inter-Agency-HRDDP-Guidance-Note-2015.pdf>.

1. We aim to support societies wanting to develop effective, inclusive, and accountable security institutions which allow them to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development, and the enjoyment of human rights by all.

2. Either a national commitment or a Security Council mandate to embark on SSR is the basis of our involvement. Relevant international laws and standards guide our work.

3. SSR can only succeed if driven by political leadership. Our support will build on nationally defined goals and a functioning relationship between cooperating institutions and groups within the country.

4. SSR needs to be addressed at all stages of the conflict-peace spectrum. We promote it as a key component of prevention, peace operations, conflict resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding, and development strategies.

5. We always tailor our support to the local situation and the needs of those involved.

6. Our approach is gender-sensitive from the moment the United Nations is engaged. The Organization will address the specific needs of women, minorities, indigenous peoples, and other groups at risk of social exclusion.

7. Viable SSR needs a national strategy as its basis, including priorities, measurable indicators of success, timelines, budgeting, and partnerships.

8. The effectiveness of international support will be shaped by the integrity and accountability of those involved and by the quality and number of resources provided.

9. Consistent coordination is key at the national and international levels.

10. The United Nations considers monitoring and regularly evaluating SSR against established principles and specified benchmarks essential.

Figure 1: The Basic Principles for a United Nations Approach to Security Sector Reform and Governance

What We Have Learned

1. **Many countries now face cycles of *repeated* violence**, weak governance, and instability. Ninety per cent of recent civil wars have occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years.[8] **SSR&G cannot be ignored**. It must be addressed to avoid a relapse into conflict. When reform is not taken up, persistent unaccountable concentrations of power, enabled by available weaponry, will drive conflict and get in the way of political stability and transition.

2. **Senior leaders have to put and keep security at the top of their agendas**, as security — of the State and its peoples — is a foundation for peace, development, and human rights.

3. **Building and improving a reliable, effective security sector is a slow-moving process** but fundamental to immediate and long-term stability.

4. **Institutional legitimacy is the key to stability**. When State institutions do not adequately protect citizens and guard against corruption, the likelihood of violent conflict increases.[9]

5. **SSR&G should address the security needs of the population as a whole, including vulnerable groups**. National ownership is a must-do, not a "nice-to-have". But it refers to more than the go-ahead of government officials. What is required is gathering and analysing disaggregated information on the security needs experienced by different groups. Engagement with national authorities as well as with civil society and at the community level should be parallel first steps in any SSR&G process.

---

8) World Bank Group, *World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development — overview (English)*, 2011, 2. Available from: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/806531468161369474/world-development-report-2011-conflict-security-and-development-overview>.

9) World Bank Group, *World development report 2011*, xi.

6. **SSR&G is essential to peace processes, mediation, and political dialogue**. SSR&G has proven to gain traction as the political process advances. The use of good offices is indispensable for the design of a national SSR&G process that puts conflict drivers, distribution of power, and the financial sustainability of reforms at its centre.

7. **In settings of fragility, national institutions that are supposed to oversee security actors** — parliament, ombudsperson, inspectorate-general — **are often particularly weak**. This situation worsens when donors focus on assisting with immediate military-operational priorities, which often weakens the accountability of security actors and institutions instead of helping strengthen security sector governance.

8. **"Political will"**, defined as the "demonstrated credible intent of political actors",[10] **is a key factor** for comprehensive reform strategies. But power holders are often the greatest beneficiaries of *obstacles* to reform — favouritism, corruption, and lack of accountability. "Political will" is only a useful concept if it is unpacked.

9. Indicators of an **absence of political will** can include:

   - A lack of follow-up on commitments made;
   - A lack of political agreements on SSR&G;
   - Weak or non-existent legal, policy, and institutional frameworks;
   - An inadequate allocation of power and resources;
   - A lack of appropriate internal control mechanisms, sanctions, and enforcement.

10. On the other hand, signs of a **presence of political will** can include:

    - Inclusive national ownership of SSR&G initiatives;
    - Government support for the involvement of civil society;
    - Adequate resourcing of security sector institutions;
    - Long-term public commitment;
    - The existence of functional oversight authorities;
    - The application of sanctions.

Why Start with the Money? »

Armed forces include soldiers who are well into their seventies — simply because there is no pension system in place.

Hefty amounts of ammunition sit in costly storage facilities, while the matching weapons systems have long since been taken out of service

Security spending may vastly exceed domestic tax revenues.

A rudimentary manual payroll "system", without registration, verification, or monitoring may be in place. Generals may claim to be in charge of troops that only exist on paper, so as to pocket the "salaries" of these ghost soldiers

Former members of armed groups, now to be integrated into armed forces, may declare their rank — and a pay grade — of the most senior officers

SSR can only be successful if it starts with an understanding of the financial practices and decisions currently underpinning the sector. That understanding needs to be developed primarily in and by the government itself.

---

10) Derick W. Brinkerhoff, "Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework", P*ublic Administration and Development*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 239–252.

11. **Mission leadership has a strategic role in convincing national leaders that it is in their long-term interest to lead an accountable and transparent security sector, including financing and budgetary allocations that can be trusted by all**. When improving the functioning of any government sector, an important starting point is to understand how the money flows. In the security sector, political leaders often claim expenditure insights cannot be shared — even between government entities — for national security reasons. However, such confidentiality claims are often thin coverings for practices based on partiality and exploitation. Indeed, prudence may be needed in some budgeting details, such as intelligence. But even in those instances, there are ways to organize discrete parliamentary oversight of security expenditures. **The security sector's public expenditure reviews (PERs)** can prove invaluable.

12. **SSR&G benchmarks have been a key feature of mission exit and transition strategies** and successful country programmes.

13. **When requested by national authorities, the United Nations is in a good position to coordinate different stakeholders**, specifically to align international partners behind nationally owned reforms and to facilitate reforms that address key drivers of conflict.

14. **It is essential to mainstream human rights, gender, and youth perspectives throughout SSR&G**, including by working towards the solid participation of women in the security sector and strengthening the role of the United Nations in supporting gender-responsive SSR&G.

15. **SSR&G language should be adapted to the context** so that terminology does not cause resistance to the actual process. "Security sector development" and "security sector transformation" are, for example, sometimes terms that national counterparts prefer.

Options for Action/Recommendations

1. **Prepare, build a team, and marshal resources as soon as possible**.

   Effectively supporting SSR includes supplementing one's strengths with a team of senior political and security experts (both in-country and at United Nations Headquarters [UNHQ]) and identifying support options such as:

   • **In-briefings** on SSR&G and the country's political-security landscape, prior to deployment, from the United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit (UNSSRU), as well as United Nations country experts in-country and/or at UNHQ **=>** *Contact ssr@un.org*;

   • **Peer-to-peer exchange/opportunities and mentoring** with senior leaders with SSR experience (current and past), as well as senior police and defence experts, to discuss SSR&G practices that have (and have not) worked in similar settings **=>** *Contact ssr@un.org*;

   • **The rapidly deployable United Nations SSR&G standing capacity (SSuRGe team**, based in Brindisi) and its system of swiftly available expertise from a range of international partners **=>** *Contact ssr@un.org*;

   • **United Nations SSR&G knowledge hub and community of practice**, administered by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) **=>** *Contact ssr@un.org*;

   • **Donors and funding mechanisms** such as the Peacebuilding Fund and the Development Coordination Office (DCO) for Resident Coordinators (RCs).

2. **Understand the context.**

As stressed by the Secretary-General, "While capacity-building is important, including by providing entry points for reforms, **it is vital to understand the political and economic role of institutions from the perspective of different actors and communities**".[11] This is a critical task for senior leaders and requires a "whole-of-mission" analysis and understanding. Suggested actions:

Khassim Diagne (left), Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), meets with the leadership of a camp for internally displaced persons and peacekeepers during a visit to Tchabi. 17 June 2021. UN Photo by Michael Ali.

- **Gather and analyse information relevant to the security sector**, including gender-sensitive and youth-responsive mapping of actors (including State, non-State actors, neighbouring countries, and donors) and their needs, interests, incentives, positions, and power dynamics. This should include determining the political will for SSR&G in-country and with a country's partners. Understanding the security sector should draw on a diverse audience, including relevant national, regional, and international actors from the government and outside government.

- **Ensure sufficient resources are in place** for continuous information-gathering, assessments, reviews, and analysis (see item one above for support options).

3. **Facilitate dialogue, will, and ownership.**

To take action, national politicians need at least some imagination — some capacity to envision how things might be different. **Senior leaders can feed into political imagination by convincingly outlining the benefits of positive change**. Politicians might apply their "political will" mainly to enhance their influence and reputation. Believing that constructive SSR serves such purposes makes their engagement more likely. Senior United Nations leaders may lack influence with national leaders, politicians, power centres, and/or change champions. **But there is much that United Nations leaders can do to shape public debates and elite perceptions, and in this area, attempts are often worth making**. Still, even when personally convinced of the need for strengthened security sector governance, national politicians will assess whether the sought reforms are likely to succeed. They will weigh factors such as:

- The capacity of political/administrative instruments;
- Material resources;
- Institutional impediments;
- Opposition from interest groups.

4. **Senior United Nations leaders need to understand the underlying reasons for limited political will. They can also assist national leaders in understanding the value of strengthening security sector governance** and supporting sustainable economic development and foreign direct investment. One of the most powerful vehicles to that end is for the government to undertake a **public expenditure review** of the security sector, to professionalize forces, and to suggest budgetary savings, military-to-military cooperation, and training.

---

11) United Nations Security Council, *Strengthening security sector reform. Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2022/280, 15 March 2022, II(7).

In their dialogue with national politicians and military leaders, United Nations leaders may also engage with arguments pointing to the downsides of authoritarian rule. These include **the need to maintain control** through overwhelming force — and the lack of mechanisms to moderate it — which **is not only costly but can limit a government's ability to adjust policy in response to public frustrations.**[12] Similarly, authoritarian political control often **comes at the expense of competence.**[13] A lack of adaptability and competence in security sector governance constitute immediate risks for authoritarian regimes and are arguments for (a return to) civilian rule and oversight.

5. **Help identify what needs to be done.**

   Assist national partners in developing a national vision of what needs to be done, including through support to national dialogue processes, national security assessments, national security planning, and SSR&G needs assessments. Planning should adopt predictive and foresight-oriented methodologies, which are gender- and youth-responsive, especially considering the increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous landscape in which the United Nations operates. Resources need to be aligned early and focus on sustainability and a country's needs, not donors' priorities.

6. **Lead coherent "One United Nations" support to national priorities: bring the team to the table.**

   • **Broker United Nations/international-national agreements** on the type of support expected to support national priorities.

   • Remember that many United Nations actors can (and need to) be involved in supporting national SSR&G. It is important to **rally the United Nations team around a common vision and get it working in a team ("One United Nations")-oriented manner**:

United Nations Peace Operations and Special Political Missions (SPMs) with an SSR Mandate »

• United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

• United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

• United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

• United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

• United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

• United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

• United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

• Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY)

• United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU)

---

12) Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2023*, March 2023, 11. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf>.

13) Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2023*, March 2023, 11.

- **Formulate an overarching United Nations support strategy and plan for SSR&G support**. Supporting nationally led, all-inclusive SSR&G is a United Nations-wide job. It requires the engagement of many United Nations entities and always involves other multilateral or bilateral partners. Entry points for SSR&G may be inserted in **national development plans** or the broader sustainable development agenda. Of course, support strategies must drive impact while avoiding harm. For example, consider how to support a country in addressing the issue of militias beyond State control, particularly in cases where such militias have considerable economic power or local legitimacy.[14]

- Given the multitude of United Nations entities involved, **establish an in-country United Nations working group on SSR&G and/or create a "leadership circle"** with senior security advisers (civilian, police, and defence). Pool resources. Think strategically about the different types of expertise needed at different stages, including political analysis, budgeting, planning, human rights, gender, police, and military advisers.

7. **Lay the groundwork for SSR&G.**

- **Focus on building trust and confidence with and between relevant national actors that may create conditions conducive for SSR&G down the road**. Consider the national political landscape to build incentives for national leadership interest in embarking on an SSR&G process. Some aspects of SSR&G are particularly conducive to including communities and civil society, such as community safety and emergency response. Often, such typically "low-confrontation" issues can pave the way for more robust engagement with security actors and establish an expectation for civil society involvement in security decision-making.

Major General Michael Lollesgaard (not pictured), Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), meets with representatives of the Plateforme and of the local government during his visit in Anefis in northern Mali. 14 September 2015. UN Phoyo by Marco Dormino.

---

14)   Reflection provided by interviewed United Nations senior leader.

- **Think in terms of early confidence-building measures without losing sight of the long-term objectives of reform and governance issues**. Are there any "low-hanging fruit", upcoming symbolic anniversaries, or issues around which consensus can be built that can serve to open the door for a broader discussion around SSR&G? This could include kickstarting activities that have a short-term impact (i.e., capacity-building projects, elections, economic recovery programmes).

- **Use good offices to seek political agreements that will establish a vision of the security sector and enable technical expertise to proceed**. Maintain dialogue and promote coordination between national actors to leverage support and mainstream messaging. This includes talking to both State and non-State actors in settings where certain groups might not be talking to one another, for example, armed groups on the one hand and the national government on the other.

8. **Reflect on the role of the United Nations senior leader.**

    To ensure success, **senior leaders should reflect on their hopes, concerns, strengths, and areas for growth**. Not all senior leaders have national security and/or SSR experience and might, therefore, sometimes feel "out of their comfort zone" on SSR&G. Hesitation by senior leaders towards engaging in SSR&G might also be related to concerns that tangible progress may not be made and regarding reputational risk (both organizational and personal), the risk of unwanted consequences causing further conflict or violence, or possible conflict with other United Nations mandates or national requests. Identification of strengths and areas for growth well before deployment is critical to success. Senior leaders interviewed for this module highlighted the following qualities as conducive to successful engagement in SSR&G:

    1. **Honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, and humility**. Before taking action, seek first to understand. It is important to establish relationships of mutual respect with national interlocutors and build trust while modelling honesty and reliability. Senior leaders should also acknowledge and respect the primacy of national actors in making key SSR&G decisions.

    2. **Inclusion**. Encourage inclusive engagement and collaboration, including through coordination that can help senior leaders better navigate their respective "comfort zones" (i.e., with security and other experts)

    3. **Patience**. Take time to understand, manage expectations, and mediate conflict or disagreement between national stakeholders and national and international stakeholders, and within the United Nations family, rather than rushing into capacity-building. SSR&G is foremost a political process which requires tact, good judgment, and a combination of listening and proposal-making. While some results might be obvious immediately, SSR&G is a long-term process and therefore, other results — and deeper impact — might take time to witness.

How to Measure Progress

In order to measure the **progress made by United Nations senior leaders in SSR&G, think of** the following indicators:

1. Senior United Nations leadership should include SMART national security and SSR&G goals and success criteria.

2. Is the United Nations entity effectively implementing its **Security Council mandate** on SSR against benchmarks in Security Council resolutions?

3. Is the United Nations entity effectively delivering **national requests and priorities**, including with regard to coordination?

4. Is the United Nations entity prioritizing the **gender and women, peace, and security (WPS) agendas** to advance gender-responsive SSR?

5. SSR&G is included in the **broader political analysis** of the host State (e.g., United Nations Common Country Analysis), **peace operation strategy, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework**, and those of other relevant United Nations entities in-country.

6. SSR&G is included as a separate section in the **annual budget plans of peace operations** and other relevant United Nations entities to foster senior leadership's commitments and monitoring and evaluation.

7. United Nations senior leaders have established **working relations** with relevant senior national and, where relevant, international stakeholders in pursuit of developing consensus for a positive strategic vision of SSR&G as well as national oversight mechanisms to monitor implementation — and bring up the urgency of progress on SSR&G regularly in these meetings.

8. United Nations senior leaders integrate **SSR&G messaging into their reporting** (i.e., quarterly Secretary-General reports on United Nations missions) and **communications**.

A team of parliamentarians from the cities of Beni and Butembo visited the Kamango Territory with the facilitation of the political affairs section of the MONUSCO field office in Beni. They held discussions with MONUSCO and officials, security commanders, and the local populations of Beni, Butembo, Lubero and other nearby communities. The parliamentarians were accompanied by the Force Intervention Brigade Commander, the acting Head of Office, and other MONUSCO officials. 15 May 2020. UN Photo by Michael Ali.

Further Reading

United Nations resolutions

- Security Council resolution 2553 (2020). S/RES/2553 (2020). 3 December 2020. Available from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3893781?ln=en&v=pdf>.

United Nations policies

- United Nations. *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces.* 2015. Available from: <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/Inter-Agency-HRDDP-Guidance-Note-2015.pdf>.

Reports of the Secretary-General

- United Nations Security Council. *Strengthening security sector reform. Report of the Secretary-General*. S/2022/280. 15 March 2022. Available from: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2022%2F280&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

Other resources

- Berdal, Mats and Jake Sherman, eds. *The Political Economy of Civil War and UN Peace Operations* (2023). Routledge, 31 March 2023.

- Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About It.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008

- Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. *The Art of Leadership in the United Nations: Painting perspectives, staying true to principles*. 2022. Available from: <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/leadership-report-2022-web.pdf>.

- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World 2023.* March 2023. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf>.

- Kleinfeld, Rachel. *A Savage Order: How the World's Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security*. New York: Pantheon, 2018.

- Transparency International. *Building Political Will Topic Guide.* 31 October 2014. Available from: <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Topic_Guide-_Political_Will.pdf>.

- United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and World Bank. *Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review*. January 2017. Available from: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/644671486531571103/pdf/Somalia-Security-and-justice-sector-public-expenditure-review.pdf>.

- United Nations Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB). "United Nations System Leadership". Available from: <https://unsceb.org/united-nations-system-leadership-framework>.

- United Nations HR Portal. "UN Values and Behaviours Framework". Available from: <https://hr.un.org/page/un-values-and-behaviours-framework-0#:~:text=UN%20Values%20and%20Behaviours%20Framework%20The%20framework,comprises%3A%20Four%20values%3A%20Inclusion%2C%20Integrity%2C%20Humility%20and%20Humanity>.

- United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. *Towards Better Security Governance: Learning from the Road Travelled. An independent review of United Nations support to security sector reform in peace operations, 2014–2020.* 14 December 2021. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/220121_-_towards_better_security_governance-learning_from_the_road_travelled_final.pdf>.

- World Bank. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. 1 March 2018. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict>.

- World Bank. *World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development — overview (English).* 2011. Available from: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/806531468161369474/world-development-report-2011-conflict-security-and-development-overview>.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

DCO   Development Coordination Office

HRDDP   Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

MINUSCA   United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MINUSMA   United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MONUSCO   United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

OROLSI   Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

OSESGY   Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

PER   public expenditure review

RC   Resident Coordinator

SPM   special political mission

SSR&G   security sector reform and governance

SSuRGe   Security Sector Reform and Governance Standing Capacity

UNHQ   United Nations Headquarters

UNMISS   United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNOAU   United Nations Office to the African Union

UNOWAS   United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

UNSMIL   United Nations Support Mission in Libya

UNSOM   United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNSSRU   United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit

Instructions for the End-of-Module Examination »

Format and material

The End-of-Module Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online Classroom. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from the entire module and may also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.

» *Access the exam from your Online Classroom by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/courses/> and clicking the title of this module. Once you arrive at the module's page, click the red "Start Exam" button.*

Time limit

There is no time limit for the exam. This allows students to read and study the questions carefully and consult the text. Furthermore, if the exam cannot be completed in one sitting, students may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The "Save" button is located at the bottom of the exam, next to the "Submit my answers" button. Clicking on the "Submit my answers" button will end the exam.

Passing grade

To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade, and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. Students who fail these two attempts should re-enrol in the course and take this opportunity to study the course materials closely before attempting the exam additional times.

Continue Your POTI Training Experience »

- Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.

- If a particular category of study interests you, such as Military or Police Studies, Civilian Service, Gender Awareness, or Human Rights, consider the POST Certificate programme available in five areas of specialization. See the requirements at <www.peaceopstraining.org/specialized-training-certificates/>.

Peace Operations
Training Institute®