The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 2000–2020

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After their deployment in Bangassou, in the Mbomou prefecture in the south-east of the Central African Republic, 150 members of the Central African Armed Forces work in close collaboration with peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Joint patrols are carried out daily in the city and its peripheries to reassure and protect the population, working towards a lasting peace in the region. 1 August 2018. UN Photo #775476 by Herve Serefi.
# The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 2000–2020

## Table of Contents

Method of Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ix</td>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lesson 1  <strong>Overview: Trends and Key Themes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Section 1.1  <strong>Course Overview</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Section 1.2  <strong>Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Section 1.3  <strong>Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Lesson 2  <strong>Peacekeeping Reborn</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Section 2.1  <strong>UN Peacekeeping Reborn</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Section 2.2  <strong>UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Section 2.3  <strong>UN Peacekeeping in Kosovo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Section 2.4  <strong>UN Peacekeeping in East Timor</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Section 2.5  <strong>UN Peacekeeping in the DRC</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Section 2.6  **UN Peacekeeping and the “Global War on Terrorism”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 9.4 Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017) ................................................................. 166
Section 9.5 Action for Peacekeeping (2018) ................................................................. 167

Lesson 10 Summary and Conclusions ..................................................... 173

Introduction .......................................................................................... 174
Section 10.1 Recap of the Course ................................................................. 175
Section 10.2 The Impacts of UN Peacekeeping on Armed Conflict .............. 177
Section 10.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 .................. 180
Appendix A: List of Acronyms ................................................................. 186
Appendix B: Further Readings ................................................................. 191
About the Author: Professor Paul Williams ............................................. 192
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination ..................................... 193
Method of Study

This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:

- Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
- The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
- Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
- Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
- At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
- After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

» Access your online classroom at <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login> from virtually anywhere in the world.

- Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
- A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.

Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

- Access to all of your courses;
- A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
- Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course supplements; and
- The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course.
Overview: Trends and Key Themes

This lesson provides an overview of the course and highlights the major trends and enduring themes of peacekeeping in the twenty-first century.

In this lesson

Section 1.1 Course Overview

Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Section 1.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Lesson Objectives

• Provide a brief overview of the course structure.

• Provide an overview of the major patterns and trends in UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020.

• Summarize key enduring themes in the history of UN peacekeeping between 2000 and 2020.
Introduction

This lesson starts by giving you an overview of the rest of the course. It then summarizes some of the major trends and key enduring themes evident in the UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and mid-2020. For most of this period, the number of UN missions and peacekeepers grew steadily to reach record levels before contracting somewhat after 2016.

By agreement between Israel and Jordan, a UN-escorted convoy — carrying food, other necessities, and exchange personnel to the Israeli humanitarian and cultural institutions on Mount Scopus — leaves Mandelbaum Square every two weeks. Manifests are filed with United Nations and Jordanian authorities. Before departure, personnel of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) examine the contents of the convoy in the presence of both Jordanian and Israeli authorities. 1 May 1959. UN Photo #126537.
Section 1.1 Course Overview

This course is organized into 10 lessons. Together, they will guide you through the major developments in UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020.

Lesson 1: Overview: Trends and Key Themes provides a concise overview of the number, size, and composition of UN peacekeeping operations during this period, as well as the numbers of uniformed personnel involved. It also describes the rising numbers of police, women, and fatalities in these missions. It concludes by highlighting five enduring themes featured in the rest of the course, namely, the relationship between means and ends in peacekeeping operations; the importance of linking peacekeeping with effective political strategies for peacemaking; efforts to develop appropriate guidelines and principles for UN missions; the need for effective partnerships; and the need to improve the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers.

Lesson 2: Peacekeeping Reborn summarizes how important new peacekeeping operations were established in four war-torn territories in late 1999, namely, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These missions saw the start of a new era of growth for UN peacekeeping both in terms of the number of missions and personnel. The lesson also discusses how the “9/11” terrorist attacks on the United States intensified the so-called “Global War on Terrorism” that influenced UN peacekeeping operations in various ways.

Lesson 3: Peacekeeping in Western Africa focuses on the cluster of operations that the UN conducted in the Mano River region, namely, Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNMIL), and Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI and UNOCI), the last of which closed down in 2017. These operations responded to the civil wars in each of these countries, as well as other critical issues, including the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The lesson also summarizes developments in the UN mission in Morocco/Western Sahara, MINURSO, which remains active at the time of writing.

Lesson 4: Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa focuses on operations in what became the region with the most intensive deployments of UN peacekeepers. It discusses the main episodes and challenges that faced UN missions in the DRC (MONUC), Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), Burundi (ONUB), Sudan (UNMIS and UNISFA), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (MINURCAT), and, since 2011, South Sudan (UNMISS). Once again, these operations were mainly responses to the region’s civil wars and their legacies or spillover effects. While most of these operations ended well before 2020, ongoing missions remain in Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC.

Lesson 5: Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus provides an overview of major developments in UN peacekeeping operations in Southern Europe, South and South-East Asia, and the Caucasus. It analyses the seven UN peacekeeping operations that deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), Croatia (UNMOP), the island of Cyprus (UNFICYP), Timor-Leste (UNMISET and UNMIT), and in the contested regions of Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and Abkhazia in Georgia (UNOMIG).

Lesson 6: Peacekeeping in the Middle East discusses the six distinct UN peacekeeping operations in this region. Specifically, it provides an overview of the longest-running UN peacekeeping mission, the Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO); the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War; the UN observer mission along on the Iraq-Kuwait border
(UNIKOM); the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and the organization’s Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), which operated for a few months during 2012.

*Lesson 7: UN Stabilization Operations* begins by summarizing how the UN has approached the concept of stabilization in its peace operations. It then provides an overview of the main episodes and challenges that the four UN operations explicitly labelled as “stabilization” missions faced. The first such operation was MINUSTAH, deployed in Haiti between 2004 and 2017. The next three stabilization missions were all deployed in Africa, namely, the UN stabilization mission in the DRC (MONUSCO, 2010–present), Mali (MINUSMA, 2013–present), and CAR (MINUSCA, 2014–present).

*Lesson 8: Partnership Peacekeeping* examines the different ways in which UN peacekeepers partnered with peacekeepers from other organizations. These partnerships mainly occurred with actors and organizations from Africa and Europe, but they resulted in a range of different models of cooperation and spurred some of the key innovations in UN peacekeeping during the twenty-first century. The lesson provides case studies of two particularly important partnership operations in Sudan and Somalia: the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS), respectively.


*Lesson 10: Summary and Conclusions* briefly recaps the content of Lessons 1–9, summarizes the overall impact of UN peacekeeping operations during the twenty-first century, and revisits the five enduring themes introduced in Lesson 1.

**Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020**

Between 2000 and 2020, the UN maintained between 13 and 18 active peacekeeping operations each year (Figure 1-1). Overall, this period witnessed 35 UN-led peacekeeping operations (see Table 1-1). In addition to the UN-led missions, the same period saw 20 UN-authorized and 50 non-UN peace operations that involved military contingents.¹ Since the UN has never had a monopoly on authorizing or conducting peace operations, it has often worked alongside and with a variety of other actors engaged in peacekeeping. In the twenty-first century, many of those other actors came from Africa and Europe. As a result, any comprehensive history of UN peacekeeping must take account of these other types of peace operations. Lesson 8, therefore, examines the United Nations partnerships with these other actors in more detail. For now, it suffices to say that the UN has provided technical, logistical, and financial support to several non-UN peace operations, and its peacekeepers have engaged in sequenced, parallel, and hybrid partnerships with regional organizations in a range of theatres around the world.

Table 1-1: UN Peacekeeping Operations active 2000–June 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Years Active</th>
<th>Deployed Size (Estimated Maximum of Uniformed Peacekeepers)</th>
<th>Analysed in Lesson #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria</td>
<td>1948–present</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>India and Pakistan (Kashmir)</td>
<td>1949–present</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964–present</td>
<td>6,275</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Israel and Syria</td>
<td>1974–present</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1978–present</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991–present</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1993–2009</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>Kuwait and Iraq</td>
<td>1993–2003</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1994–2000</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995–2002</td>
<td>2,047</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996–2002</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1997–2000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
<td>4,720</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999–2002</td>
<td>10,790</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>1999–2010</td>
<td>22,016</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although 35 UN peacekeeping operations were active between 2000 and 2020, only 19 of them were established since 2000 (see Table 1-1). The busiest year in this period was 2004, when three new peacekeeping operations were established in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB), and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) (Figure 1-2). The most recently established multidimensional operation involving peacekeeping troops was MINUSCA in the Central African Republic in 2014 (MINUJUSTH, the successor mission established in 2017 as part of the drawdown of MINUSTAH in Haiti, did not involve troop contingents). In comparison, the UN closed down 22 peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020, 18 of those closing by 2012 (Figure 1-2).

In geographic terms, UN peacekeeping during the twenty-first century was notably concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 35 active UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020, 17 took place in Africa. This trend among the new UN missions established since 2000 was even more pronounced, with 13 of 18, or 72 per cent, deployed in Africa, including the five largest operations of this period: UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, MONUSCO in the DRC, and MINUSMA in Mali. The other five peacekeeping operations established after 2000 were deployed to Timor-Leste (UNMISET and UNMIT), Haiti (MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH), and Syria (UNSMIS).

In terms of the numbers of uniformed UN peacekeepers, the twenty-first century saw a generally steady increase in troops and police, along with generally consistent numbers of observers and experts. The number of uniformed UN peacekeepers reached record levels by 2010, before contracting somewhat...
since 2016 (Figure 1-3). The contraction was due to the closure of the missions in Liberia (UNMIL), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and Haiti (MINUSTAH) and ongoing transitions and reduction of missions in Darfur (UNAMID) and the DRC (MONUSCO). The lack of new operational theatres for UN peacekeepers since the deployment of MINUSCA in 2014 contributed to the contraction as well.

Not surprisingly, given all the activity, the period from 2000 to 2020 was also the most expensive in the history of UN peacekeeping since it began in 1948. In financial terms, the annual amount of UN peacekeeping expenditure grew fairly steadily from just over $2 billion in 2000 to a peak of about $8.3 billion in the 2015/2016 fiscal year, before decreasing gradually to about $6.5 billion by 2020. In comparison with the roughly 50 years between 1948 and 1999, the two decades since 2000 account for roughly three-quarters of total expenditure on UN peacekeeping. During these two decades, the UN peacekeeping base reimbursement rate was increased in several increments from $988 per peacekeeper per month in 2000 to $1,428 by 2018.\(^3\) The UN gives this monthly allowance per soldier/officer to each contributing country government that provides contingents of troops and/or police. Importantly, improved bureaucratic and procurement procedures enabled the UN to deploy its peacekeepers more cost-effectively, with the UN reducing the deployment cost per peacekeeper by 22 per cent since 2006.\(^4\)

As the number of UN peacekeepers grew between 2000 and 2020, so too did the number of countries providing them. The number of UN troop/police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) stood at 82 in March 2000, but by late 2007, it approached 120. The precise number has remained around 120 since then, reaching a peak of 128 in September 2014 (Figure 1-4). These countries were a mix of


old and new contributors, and they provided highly uneven numbers of peacekeepers. Nevertheless, the general upward trend was a clear sign that more Member States were taking their responsibilities seriously. As articulated in Articles 43 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States should make available to the Security Council those assets that are necessary to maintain international peace and security. The growing number of T/PCCs created both opportunities and challenges for the UN. On the positive side, increasing the number of T/PCCs enabled the UN to draw from a larger
pool of personnel and capabilities for its missions. It also increased the level of political support for missions because more countries had a practical stake in them and gained first-hand knowledge of the practical challenges involved. However, the larger numbers also created practical challenges, including by ensuring that all T/PCCs understood and operated according to UN standards. This, in turn, placed a considerable strain on the minimal training capacities of the UN, which often struggled to ensure that all T/PCCs consistently met the UN pre-deployment training and equipment standards.

The weight of providing UN peacekeepers has always been shared in a very uneven manner between the organization’s members, with a handful of T/PCCs providing most of the uniformed personnel of the UN. In the twenty-first century, most of the largest T/PCCs were South Asian and African States, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/European States providing relatively few peacekeepers. Let’s take as an example a relatively busy month for UN peacekeeping, August 2017. At that stage, there were 91,256 uniformed peacekeepers deployed by 124 UN Member States. Bear in mind that in order to sustain that number of personnel in the field, three times that many need to be available: While one group is deployed in the field, another batch of forces needs to be preparing and training to rotate into the mission, while the group that has just rotated out then needs time to rest and recover before they might be required to deploy again. In August 2017, the division of labour was highly uneven. The top-30 T/PCCs provided 80,059 (or 88 per cent) of the total number of uniformed UN peacekeepers, while the top-10 T/PCCs provided 58 per cent.5 Perhaps incredibly, just five countries at the top of the

5) At that stage, the top-10 T/PCCs, in rank order, were Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Nepal, Senegal, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia.
list — Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda — provided 40 per cent of the world’s supply of UN peacekeepers.

Another notable trend about who was providing UN peacekeepers concerned the rising level of contributions from neighbouring States, i.e., those States that share a border with the host country. Particularly since mid-2008, UN peacekeepers drawn from next-door neighbours and the wider neighbourhood increased significantly. Figure 1-5 depicts how one study defined next-door neighbours and “the regional neighbourhood” in the case of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. Whereas in the early 1990s, fewer than 3 per cent of all UN peacekeeping troops came from next-door neighbours, since 2008, the percentage has grown steadily to reach about 20 per cent by 2017. For the wider neighbourhood as a whole, the number of UN peacekeeping troops was rarely more than 10 per cent until January 2008. By 2017, it had grown to nearly 34 per cent. Similar trends are evident for police contributions. Figure 1-6 depicts the total percentages of uniformed UN peacekeepers drawn from next-door neighbours and the wider neighbourhood. By December 2017, seven UN missions had no troops from neighbouring countries, but four had the neighbourhood providing over half their troops: UNISFA (Abyei), MINUSMA (Mali), UNMIK (Kosovo), and MINUSCA (the CAR).

For the UN, the rise in neighbourhood contributors brought both opportunities and challenges. As summarized by Williams and Nguyen:

"In generic terms, there are several potential opportunities afforded by having neighbors as contributing countries. They should have better local knowledge of the host State...

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and its conflict dynamics, their geographic proximity should facilitate rapid deployment, and, because they stand to be impacted by spillover effects, they have a vested interest in reaching a solution to the crisis and hence should be willing to endure risky and lengthy missions. On the other hand, neighborhood contributions might also bring challenges for UN peacekeeping operations. Arguably the most important is that their geographic proximity might render them primary or secondary parties to the conflict, in which case they would be likely to push partisan, vested interests both by omission and commission that undermine the UN’s principle of impartiality.”

Towards the other end of the contribution spectrum were those UN Member States that provided relatively few peacekeepers, certainly compared to the top T/PCCs. The first notable group is the permanent five members of the Security Council, also known as the P5. Under Article 24(1) of the Charter, the Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. As veto-wielding permanent members of the Council, the P5 clearly hold privileged status. But in terms of providing uniformed peacekeepers, their contributions do not stand out as remarkable. The Council has not officially commented on whether Article 24(1) means that individual Council members have an elevated responsibility to contribute UN peacekeepers beyond those of other Member States. In the twenty-first century, P5 contributions showed considerable variation (see Figure 1-7):

- After deploying nearly 900 uniformed UN peacekeepers mainly in the Balkans from 2000–2001, US contributions had dwindled to fewer than 100, mainly experts and police deployed

Figure 1-7: P5 Uniformed UN Peacekeepers, 2000–2020


7) Williams and Nguyen, Neighborhood Dynamics, 2.
to MINUSTAH and UNMIL, by 2009. This number gradually reduced over the next decade, and by 2020, there were only 30 American-uniformed UN peacekeepers, almost all of them staff officers scattered across six different missions: five in Africa and UNTSO in the Middle East.

- In almost direct contrast, the trajectory of China’s contributions of uniformed peacekeepers increased significantly during this period. Having deployed its first UN peacekeepers in 1989 in Namibia, China’s contributions increased only very slowly, and by 2000, it still deployed fewer than 100 uniformed personnel. However, within eight years, China provided over 2,000 UN peacekeepers, mainly in missions in Africa, reaching a peak of just over 3,000 in 2015. During this period, China not only grew its traditional contributions of medical personnel and engineers but, from 2013, also deployed infantry battalions, first in Mali (MINUSMA) and then from 2015, in South Sudan (UNMISS).

- France, too, increased its UN peacekeeping contingents since the early 2000s. It started in the 2000s with about 500 uniformed personnel deployed mainly in UNOCI and UNIFIL but with smaller contributions in another eight operations. Following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, France deployed over 1,600 troops to the revamped UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. In 2008, France deployed an additional battalion of troops to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic to help deal with some of the spillover effects of the war in Darfur, Sudan. This briefly brought France’s total to over 2,500 UN peacekeepers. The decade ended with most of France’s roughly 700 uniformed peacekeepers deployed in UNIFIL.

- For the UK, it deployed roughly the same number of UN peacekeepers in 2020 as it had in 2000, with overall numbers fluctuating between 270 to 700. The UK’s most enduring commitment was the deployment of troops in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which saw a gradual reduction over these two decades. The UK’s peak contribution came in 2017 after Prime Minister David Cameron had pledged to provide more UN peacekeepers at the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping. This led to deployments of roughly 350 troops to UNMISS in South Sudan, mainly engineers and medical personnel, as well as a small detachment of about 50 personnel to UNSOS in Somalia. When the UK withdrew its contingent from UNMISS in early 2020, it handed over its level-II hospital facility to Viet Nam. Shortly thereafter, the UK pledged a 250-strong reconnaissance unit to MINUSMA in Mali, but its deployment has been delayed until probably late 2020 due to the outbreak of COVID-19.

- For most of the 2000s, Russia maintained several hundred uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping operations, with its largest contingents deployed in UNMIS, UNMIK, and MONUC. For most of the 2010s, however, Russia deployed very few troop contingents, preferring instead to deploy small numbers of experts and police to a relatively wide range of missions. By 2020, Russia deployed no troop contingents but maintained a small number of mainly experts, staff officers, and police scattered across nearly a dozen missions.

Another group of States that provided relatively few UN peacekeepers for most of the twenty-first century were those in Europe. Although they possessed many professional, capable, and well-trained personnel, many European countries prioritized deployments in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq rather than UN peacekeeping operations. Despite experiencing something of a return to UN peacekeeping in Africa after the end of the Afghanistan campaign in 2014–2015, European countries...
were only contributing about eight per cent of UN peacekeepers globally by 2020.\(^8\) Researchers have identified a number of reasons why European governments remained reluctant to provide many UN peacekeepers: mistrust of UN command and control, particularly the rules regarding military utility helicopters; the inadequacy of medical guarantees for casualty evacuation; the lack of professional peacekeeping intelligence; the lack of clarity on operational tasks and end dates; the slowness of UN processes for agreeing on deployments; the underuse of their assets and skills; the lack of proactive and inclusive planning by the UN; the difficulty of meeting the UN targets for female peacekeepers; cost considerations; and insufficient support for strategic communication to domestic audiences.\(^9\)

In terms of the composition of UN peacekeeping operations, the period from 2000 to 2020 is notable for significant increases in the number of police and women peacekeepers. First, there was a major rise in the number of police deployed as UN peacekeepers, from around 4,500 at the start of 2000 to nearly 15,000 by 2011 (Figure 1-8). These numbers were also much higher than during the 1990s, which saw only around 2,000 UN Police for most of the decade. UN Police were a mixture of individual police officers (IPOs), a small number of specialized teams, and Formed Police Units (FPUs) of usually between 120 and 140 armed officers. First deployed as UN peacekeepers in 1960 in the Congo, IPOs perform a variety of tasks, including mentoring and training national police officers, providing special expertise for investigations, and assisting local law enforcement personnel combat transnational crime. FPUs were first deployed in 1999 in Kosovo and East Timor to help field larger numbers of UN Police to carry out public order management and protect UN personnel, facilities, and civilians. By 2016, more than 70 FPUs were deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. The first all-female FPU was deployed by India in

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2007 to UNMIL in Liberia. Men were present, but only in support roles, such as cooking, driving, and vehicle maintenance. The first deployment of the newly established Standing Police Capacity occurred in 2007 to MINURCAT. Like their military counterparts, UN Police also saw a steady contraction in their numbers from 2016.

In the early 2000s, richer OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) States deployed considerable numbers of UN Police. However, by the late 2000s, the vast majority of UN Police came from poorer countries, mostly from Africa and Asia, as depicted in Table 1-2.

### Table 1-2: Top-10 UN Police contributors in the twenty-first century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
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<td>886</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>964</td>
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<td>561</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>252</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>363</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other notable trend in the composition of UN peacekeeping forces was the increasing number of women. In 1993, for example, women made up just 1 per cent of UN-uniformed peacekeepers.\(^\text{11}\) The UN called for more women peacekeepers as part of implementing its women, peace and security agenda, catalysed by the passing of Security Council resolution 1325 in October 2000. Officially, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations made several arguments about why more women peacekeepers were needed.\(^\text{12}\) These included improving operations and performance due to greater diversity and broadened skill sets; increasing better access to local populations, especially women and children; building trust and confidence with local communities; helping to prevent and reduce violence; and inspiring and creating role models.\(^\text{13}\)

Unfortunately, the UN has only made its comprehensive sex-disaggregated data for its uniformed peacekeepers available since 2005, so numbers for the period from 2000 to 2004 are unclear. The available data shows that the number of women peacekeepers grew slowly but steadily from around 1,000 in 2005 to over 5,000 by 2019 (Figure 1-9). As of June 2020, a total of nearly 4,000 women were deployed as peacekeepers in all current UN peace operations.\(^\text{14}\) By that stage, most of the largest contributors of female peacekeepers were from Africa, notably, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, and Senegal, and South Asia, specifically, Bangladesh and Nepal. It is notable that the number of women peacekeepers continued to increase from 2016, while the overall number of UN

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\(^{12}\) As part of the restructuring of the UN, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) became the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in January 2019.


peacekeepers contracted. There was a major increase in female police officers deployed after 2008, starting from almost zero to nearly 1,500 by 2011, but this figure has remained relatively stable since then. The number of female troops increased steadily to over 3,000 by 2018, but this still represented less than 5 per cent of the overall total.

One interesting innovation was the deployment of a small number of female engagement teams (FET), such as the Zambian FET in MINUSCA. These were small teams of female troops intended to help win the “hearts and minds” of the local population through their interaction with local women. To do so, they conducted patrols; organized meetings and sensitization activities with local women; engaged in medical outreach; trained women on sanitation, providing nutritional meals, and even gardening; and identified Quick Impact Projects that might benefit the local community.

Although there had been general calls for more women and some ad hoc targets developed since the late 2000s, it was not until 2018 that the UN established a Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy for the decade ahead (2018–2028). It set targets for women troops, observers, police, and justice and corrections personnel. It set the following targets for women peacekeepers by 2028: 15 per cent of UN troops; 25 per cent of military observers and staff officers; 30 per cent of IPOs; 20 per cent of FPUs; and 30 per cent of justice and corrections personnel. By 2019, women represented 4.7 per cent of UN troops, 16.7 per cent of UN military observers and staff officers, 26.8 per cent of IPOs, 10.8 per cent of FPUs, and 29 per cent of justice and corrections personnel. The main reason why these numbers were not higher was the existence of various barriers to more women participating in UN peacekeeping. In 2018, the Canadian Elsie Initiative identified six main types of barriers:


1. Equal access to opportunities;

2. Deployment criteria;

3. The working environment;

4. Family constraints;

5. Equal treatment during deployment; and

6. Career-advancement opportunities.\(^{17}\)

The last general trend discussed here concerns peacekeeper fatalities. As of April 2020, 3,925 UN peacekeepers had died while serving. Of this total, 2,277, or nearly 60 per cent, died since 1 January 2000.\(^{18}\) The UN records the cause of death for its peacekeepers as resulting from malicious act, illness, accident, or another cause. The breakdown of UN peacekeeper fatalities by cause of death are shown in Figure 1-10. Overall, 2010 proved the deadliest year, in large part because more than 100 UN peacekeepers were killed on 12 January when a massive earthquake hit Haiti. For most of the 2000–2020 period, between 100–140 UN peacekeepers died each year, translating to roughly one every three days. Of the missions established after 2000, the deadliest were UNAMID (278 fatalities), MINUSMA (209), and UNAMSIL (192), while MONUC and MONUSCO combined suffered 347 deaths. MINUSMA suffered the most fatalities from malicious acts, with over 130. Illness was another major source of peacekeeper fatalities, particularly in MONUC/MONUSCO, UNAMSIL, UNMIL, and UNAMID, which together suffered 542 such deaths.


Section 1.3  Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Before analysing the history of UN peacekeeping operations deployed between 2000 and 2020, this lesson concludes by briefly highlighting five of the most important enduring themes evident across them. These concern the relationship between the means and ends in peacekeeping operations, the importance of linking peacekeeping with effective political strategies for peacemaking, efforts to develop appropriate guidelines and principles for UN missions, the need for effective partnerships, and the need to improve the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers.

The means and ends should be in sync

With just a few exceptions, the new UN peacekeeping operations established after 2000 had very long mandates. In the late 2000s, often running to over a dozen pages, they earned the derogatory nickname “Christmas-tree mandates” as a reference to how many different tasks were attached to them. To take perhaps the most extreme example, in 2018, the UN Secretary-General told the Council that UNMISS “cannot possibly implement 209 mandated tasks”.19 Common tasks included supporting local police and military forces; ceasefire monitoring; maritime security; security monitoring, patrolling and deterrence activities; protection of humanitarian and UN personnel and facilities, including free movement of personnel and equipment; security sector reform (SSR); demilitarization and arms management; humanitarian support; human rights; women, peace, and security; children in armed conflict; the rule of law and judicial matters; political process; electoral assistance; support to State institutions; international cooperation and coordination; support to sanctions regimes; public information; civilian-military coordination; contingency planning; mission impact assessment; and (since 1999) the protection of civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition, some missions have been tasked with degrading “spoilers”, illegal non-State armed groups, and even “terrorists”.20 To implement such a wide range of tasks, peacekeeping missions require the appropriate capabilities in terms of personnel, equipment and assets, financing, and support systems. However, gaps often opened up between the capabilities provided to operations and the effects they were expected to generate in the field. Gaps between the means and ends of UN peacekeeping operations are a regular feature of the history of these missions in the twenty-first century.

Successful peacemaking is the best exit strategy

A second enduring theme derives from the fact that at the political and strategic level, peacekeeping and peacemaking are distinct activities. It is a common misperception that it is the job of peacekeeping operations to end wars. In fact, it is the belligerents in any armed conflict that must make peace. UN peacekeepers can make that more likely by engaging in confidence-building measures, but they cannot simply end wars. It is the job of peacemakers to help belligerents negotiate a political settlement. Ideally, therefore, all UN peacekeeping operations would be directly linked to an effective political peacemaking process aimed at resolving the armed conflict in question. Where no effective peacemaking strategy exists, peacekeeping operations can do little more than limit the damage, even if all the individual peacekeepers perform their mandated tasks admirably. Without peacemaking, there is no pathway


to a successful exit for peacekeeping operations. Of course, there is always the potential to end a peacekeeping operation badly, perhaps by host governments ejecting the operation or major T/PCCs withdrawing their personnel. Sadly, the history of twenty-first-century UN peacekeeping is littered with missions that struggled because of the lack of an effective strategy to resolve the conflict in question.

**Peacekeepers need appropriate guidance**

To have any hope of implementing their complicated mandates, peacekeepers required some guidance as to how best to go about it. As a social practice that has been invented and periodically reinvented since the late 1940s, UN peacekeeping has been the subject of numerous efforts to develop guidelines, principles, best practices, and doctrine. By the twenty-first century, the basic principles had cohered around the three set out in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine.\footnote{UN DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008). Available from: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the-capstone-doctrine/>} The first was the **consent of the main parties** to the conflict, including the host country government. Despite not assuming the universality of consent by all armed groups, this provided the freedom of action (political and physical) to carry out mandated tasks. The second was **impartiality**, which enabled the implementation of mandates without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality was considered crucial to retain the consent and cooperation of the main conflict parties. Impartial UN peacekeepers should not condone actions by parties that violate the mandate, but they should ensure that countering breaches should be done transparently and the rationale for such action explained through transparent and effective communication. The third was the **non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mission’s mandate**. Of course, given the frequently lengthy mandates, this was a very permissive principle that permitted proactive use of force in some circumstances. Importantly, the UN was keen to emphasize the differences between “robust peacekeeping” — where proactive force is permitted at the tactical and operational levels — and “peace enforcement” — which does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic level. The enduring theme for this course is the persistent debates over the extent to which these basic principles remain appropriate for all of the UN peacekeepers across all of its missions.
Peacekeeping relies on partnerships

The UN has never possessed a monopoly on authorizing or conducting peace operations, although the concept of “peacekeeping” is commonly associated with the United Nations. In practice, the UN has regularly worked with a variety of actors who are also engaged in some form of peace operations. In this sense, what the UN Secretary-General called “partnership peacekeeping” has a long history. But it is fair to say that during the twenty-first century, the frequency and nature of the peacekeeping partnerships of the UN intensified, particularly with organizations in Africa and Europe. As we shall see later in this course, the UN has developed various forms of partnerships with such actors, including sequenced, parallel, support, and hybrid relationships in the field. But UN peacekeeping is founded on partnerships in other senses too. At the political and strategic level, UN peacekeeping is the outcome of partnerships between the Security Council, Secretariat, and Member States. At the operational and tactical levels, UN peacekeeping is the outcome of partnerships between the relevant T/PCCs in the field, who, in turn, are often supported by a range of private contractors. And at a fundamental level, peacekeeping should be a partnership between the peacekeepers themselves and the “peacekept” — the local populations on the receiving end of UN missions. As will become evident throughout this course, UN peacekeeping stands a better chance of working effectively when these different partnerships function smoothly.

Improving accountability and performance enables success

Finally, it is important to recall that there have been a variety of unintended negative consequences when UN peacekeeping operations have deployed. Indeed, if one only read commentary about contemporary UN peacekeeping in the popular press, one would probably find much more negative coverage than positive. In particular, numerous media outlets have regularly reported on a variety of scandalous behaviour by UN peacekeepers. This has included peacekeepers engaging in violence against civilians, smuggling and trafficking of illicit goods, spreading infectious disease, and committing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Rather belatedly, the Security Council, Secretariat, and most Member States have taken more serious steps to prevent such activities, including Security Council resolutions, investigations, and making amends to some of the victims. They have done so not only because such conduct is morally wrong and often criminal but also because improving the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers increases the likelihood that missions will be effective. A regular theme of UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century is, therefore, the struggle to hold peacekeepers accountable for such misconduct and to improve their performance. Both of these objectives required the UN to develop appropriate rules and standards, some of which were met with criticism from some Member States. Part of the history you will learn in this course is, therefore, the story of developing those standards and of peacekeepers trying to live up to them, sometimes under very challenging circumstances.

End-of-Lesson Quiz »

1. Between 2000 and 2020, how many United Nations peacekeeping operations were active?  
   A. 25  
   B. 30  
   C. 35  
   D. 40

2. Since 2000, _____ percentage of newly established United Nations peacekeeping operations were deployed in Africa.  
   A. 52  
   B. 62  
   C. 72  
   D. 82

3. Between 2000 and 2020, what was the highest level of annual expenditure on United Nations peacekeeping?  
   A. $6.3 billion  
   B. $7.3 billion  
   C. $8.3 billion  
   D. $9.3 billion

4. From January to July 2009, which permanent member of the Security Council provided the most uniformed peacekeepers?  
   A. China  
   B. France  
   C. United Kingdom  
   D. Russian Federation

5. Which Member State was the top police-contributing country in December 2005, December 2010, and December 2015?  
   A. Jordan  
   B. Senegal  
   C. Bangladesh  
   D. Rwanda

6. The base reimbursement rate for UN peacekeeping troops was raised to _____ in 2018.  
   A. $1,028 per peacekeeper per month  
   B. $1,332 per peacekeeper per month  
   C. $1,410 per peacekeeper per month  
   D. $1,428 per peacekeeper per month

7. In what year did the United Nations deploy its first Formed Police Unit?  
   A. 1960  
   B. 1996  
   C. 1999  
   D. 2001

8. By 2028, the United Nations has set a target for women peacekeeping troops of _____ per cent.  
   A. 5  
   B. 10  
   C. 15  
   D. 20

9. Between 2000 and 2020, which year experienced the most United Nations peacekeeper fatalities?  
   A. 2010  
   B. 2013  
   C. 2016  
   D. 2019

10. A basic principle of United Nations peacekeeping is to require the consent of _____.  
    A. all conflict parties  
    B. no conflict parties  
    C. the host government only  
    D. the main conflict parties

Answer Key provided on the next page.
End-of-Lesson Quiz »

Answer Key »

1. C
2. C
3. C
4. B
5. A
6. D
7. C
8. C
9. A
10. D