

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA



BY
Emeka Victor Onumajuru

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations



Peace Operations Training Institute®

**UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA**

BY

**MAJ E.V. ONUMAJURU
(NIGERIAN ARMY)**

being a Research Project Submitted to

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

and

**The United Nations Institute for Training and Research
Programme of Correspondence Instruction**

for the award of

***The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support
Operations***

UNITAR-POCI

NEW YORK

APRIL 2005

CERTIFICATION

I Certify that this thesis titled “United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and Conflict Resolution in Africa” was carried out by Major EV Onumajuru under my supervision.

Ms Anja Anja Kaspersen

Thesis Adviser

UNITAR POCI – NEWYORK

May 05

Harvey Langholtz, Ph.D

Thesis Coordinator

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Many people contributed to the success of this study. It would be difficult to thank them all enough but I owe them a lot of gratitude for their effort. I am highly indebted to my Thesis Adviser Ms Anja Anja Kaspersen, for correcting my work.

My sincere appreciation also goes to my Director Maj Gen OA Azazi for his encouragement and to Lt Col ASH Sa'ad for his professional, gentle but persuasive critique and corrections. He really brought out the substance in me to bear on the project.

I plead with those whose names could not be stated here to bear with me. They should note that without their immense contribution this work could not have been possible. Finally, I give all glory, honour and praise to God for this wonderful opportunity.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my darling wife Iniobong for her immense contributions and understanding.

TABLE OF CONTENT

TITLE PAGE.....	I
APPROVAL PAGE.....	II
DEDICATION.....	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	V-VIII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	IX
GLOSSARY OF TERMS.....	X-XI
ABSTRACT.....	XII

CHAPTER ONE

<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	PAGE(S)
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY.....	1-2.
STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.....	2-3
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY.....	3-4
HYPOTHESIS.....	4
RATIONALE OF THE STUDY.....	4-5
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	5-6
METHODOLOGY.....	6
ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS.....	6-7
LIMITATIONS.....	7

CHAPTER TWO

<u>LITERATURE REVIEW</u>	PAGE(S)
CONCEPT OF CONFLICT.....	9-13
CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING.....	13-19
CONCEPT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.....	19-20
PEACEKEEPING AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM.....	20-23

CHAPTER THREE

<u>OVERVIEW OF CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA</u>	PAGE(S)
CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA.....	26-31
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA.....	31-37

CHAPTER FOUR

<u>PEACEKEEPING AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOL IN AFRICA</u>	PAGE(S)
GENERAL.....	39-40
CASE STUDY OF LIBERIA.....	40-47
CASE STUDY OF RWANDA.....	47-53

CHAPTER FIVES

APPRAISAL OF UN PEACEKEEPING MECHANISM

IN AFRICA

PAGE(S)

LOGISTICS.....	56-57
MANDATE.....	57-59
DELAY IN INTERVENTION.....	59-60
WEAK STRUCTURE OF AU MECHANISM.....	60-61
POOR ATTITUDE OF THE WEST.....	61
CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA.....	61-69

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

PAGE(S)

CONCLUSION.....	70-73
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	73-74

REFERENCE

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	75-76
-------------------	-------

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	-	African Union
COE	-	Contingent Owned Equipment
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Monitoring and Observation Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
IDP	-	Internally Displaced People
MONC	-	United Nations Mission in Congo
MRU	-	Manu River Union
NPFL	-	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
PKO	-	Peacekeeping Operations
PSO	-	Peace Support Operation
UN	-	United Nations
UNAMIR	-	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNEF	-	United Nations Emergency Force
UNMIL	-	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR	-	United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
UNTAC	-	United Nations Technical Assistance Mission in Cambodia
TCC	-	Troop Contributing Countries

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Armed Conflict. This denotes conflicts whereby parties on both sides resort to the use of force. It includes situations ranging from a military over flight, an attack on a civilian by a single soldier, or an all out war with massive casualties.

Contemporary Conflict. This refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflicts in the post coldwar world.

Conflict Management. It is used to refer to the limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict, rather than the durable elimination of the causes of conflict.

Conflict Settlement. This suggests agreement over the conflict issues, which involves compromise or concession from both sides. Neither side may be able to achieve all of their goals, but the initial disappointment may be offset by the mutuality of the compromise. Settlement is often the quickest solution to a difficult or violent situation; its effectiveness is temporary because the underlying relationships and structures that have caused the conflict are not addressed. Thus, conflicts that have reached settlements are often reopened later.

Peace Building. It is defined in An Agenda for Peace as “actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Since the publication of An Agenda for Peace the idea of peace building has progressively expanded to include a border agenda. Peace building

includes the national reconciliation process and development. It is part of the activities primarily conducted by the United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organisation. The key elements of peace building are: demilitarisation, control of small arms, institutional reforms, improved police and judicial system, electoral reforms, social & economic development.

Peace Making. It is a diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to negotiate a settlement of their dispute through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Peacemaking is central to all peace processes and in general conducted by the diplomatic community.

Peace Enforcement. This include the use of armed force to maintain international peace and security in situations where the security council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It is provided in Chapter VII of the Charter, and may be needed when all other efforts fail.

Peace Support Operations. It is the term frequently used for operations that are primarily military. It refers to those activities requiring the functions related to potential use of force and thus includes preventive actions, peacekeeping, disarmament, sanctions and embargoes, and peace enforcement.

ABSTRACT

This study sets out with 4 objectives: to examine the general causes of conflict in Africa, to examine conflict resolution mechanism in Africa with emphasis on AU, to examine the influence of peace support operations on conflict resolution in Africa and to proffer solutions.

The method used included the interview and documentary methods. The study revealed that the majority of conflict in Africa is internal. The root causes of conflicts in Africa were identified as poor economic performance, social injustice and political exclusions including aggravating factors like ethnicity and unsatisfactory nature of interstate borders inherited from colonial times. The establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was in a bid to resolve the conflicts in the region. Unfortunately, after the establishment of MCPMR and other mechanism many African conflicts remain unresolved with new ones emerging. This development portrayed a situation of ineffectiveness of the mechanism.

The study further revealed that UN PKO as a conflict resolution mechanism has not being very effective in Africa. This is considering the situation in the Mano River Union and the Great Lakes region. This is due to various shortfalls of UN mission in Africa, which include poor logistics, ill-defined mandate, delay in intervention, poor attitude of the west to conflicts in Africa and weak structure of AU MCPMR. The challenges to peacekeeping in Africa which include securing comprehensive political settlement, securing and sustaining consent and understanding the sensitivity of the people among others were identified as area that need to be addressed

In an effort to enhance UN PKO as a conflict resolution tool in Africa, the study recommends among others improved logistics for UN PKO in Africa and that UN mandate for Conflicts in Africa should be well defined and appropriate to the situation. Others include prompt intervention by the UN, encouragement and support of regional peacekeeping initiative and active engagement in peace building activities.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The prevalence of conflict has remained a major feature of post independence Africa. The hopes that accompanied Africa's Independence in the early 1960's have, so far, proved to be largely a mirage for many Africans as the region continues to be devastated by conflicts and the widespread destruction of life and property. Africa is perhaps the most devastated by internal conflicts and with catastrophic consequences. Introducing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mechanism for Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflicts to the OAU council of Ministers at Dakar, Senegal, in 1992, the then General Secretary Salim Ahmed Salim, emphasized that:

“Conflicts have cast a dark shadow over the prospects for a united, secure and prosperous Africa which we seek to create.... Conflicts have caused immense suffering to our people and, in the worst case, death. Men, women and children have been uprooted, dispossessed, deprived of their means of livelihood and thrown into exile as refugees as a result of conflicts. Conflicts have engendered hate and division among our people and undermined the prospects of the long term stability and unity of our countries and Africa as a whole. Since much energy, time and resources have been devoted to meeting the exigencies of conflict, our countries have been unable to harness the energies of our people and target them to development.¹

These conflicts have been fuelled by uncontrolled accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, begetting increased criminality, banditry, cross-border crime and emergence of the phenomenon of child soldiers. Though internal, most of these conflicts spill over into neighbouring countries causing wide spread regional insecurity and instability despite the presence of UN Peacekeepers.

Conflict remains a major security problem in Africa. Africa continues to have the greatest number of armed conflicts of any continent. In mid – 2001, latent or open hostilities affected Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea- Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, to mention but a few. Some of these conflicts have persisted despite UN PKO operations while in some cases the conflicts reopen on withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.

Given the number of conflict in sub Saharan Africa, it is not surprising that they cumulatively have claimed at least 7 – 8 million lives. Also, in 2001, more than 3.5 million of the more than 14 million refugees and asylum seekers in the world were in Africa. Of the approximately 21 Million Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the world more than 10 million are Africans⁽²⁾

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The multiplication of conflicts in Africa and the inability of PKO to resolve these conflicts remains a great challenge to African

governments and the UN. Following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has become central to the international community's response to many complex violent conflicts including those in Africa.⁽³⁾ PKO has been used to intervene in Africa's active war zones as in UNOMIL and UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNOSOM in Somalia, UNMIR in Rwanda, MUONC in Congo and post settlement peace building as was the case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique. Consequently, it has become more common for Conflict Resolution theorist to refer to peacekeeping as an important instrument of positive Conflict transformation. In the last decade, the Mano River Union (MRU) and Great Lakes Region have seen major conflicts, several millions of death and also PKO's.

This dissertation therefore seeks to bring to the lime light and analyze two basic problems with respect to Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa. The first is the inability of PKO's to adequately resolve Africa's conflicts. This has led to the re-emergence of such conflicts. Another problems is the failure of the international community to promptly fund PKO in African Continent. This is alluded to by the slow response and serious delays in deploying UNAMIR under its expanded mandate of May 1994. Finally, is the inability to tackle the root causes of African conflicts.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The objectives of the dissertation will be to find out:

- i. The general causes of conflicts in Africa;
- ii. The Conflict Resolution mechanisms in Africa;
- iii. The influence of Peace Support Operations on Conflict resolution in Africa; and
- iv. Proffer Solutions.

1.4 **HYPOTHESIS**

This research will be guided by the assumption that peacekeeping operations alone would be incapable of resolving conflicts.

1.5 **RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH**

The African continent has witnessed several PKO deployed in various conflict areas. This has however failed to achieve the desired result, thus suggesting that peacekeepers need enhanced capabilities and that more conflict resolution tools is required. Lending credence to this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed to the need for peacekeeping forces to find new capabilities for what he refers to as “positive inducements” to gain support for peacekeeping mandates amongst populations in conflict areas.⁴ It is against this background that efforts are being made by the UN and regional bodies to make peacekeepers promote lasting and durable peace and sustainable solution.

The study will therefore, examine the impact of peacekeeping operations on conflict resolution in Africa with emphasis on the

Mano River Union and the Great Lakes region, provide an informed basis to improve conflict resolution in Africa and also contribute to intellectual discourse on peacekeeping and conflict resolution in general.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The research is situated within the frame work of the systems theory. A system is a framework theoretically or conceptually defined for the analysis of phenomena in political, economic, and bio-social spheres of life. It normally consists of a set of variables in interaction among independent or dependent variables, which changes in one or more variables.

The theory is based on the concept of a whole. Anatol Rapoport defines a system as “a whole, which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts”⁵ J.W. Burtons defines the concept of a system as “relationship between units”.⁶ The system theory can therefore be defined as “a series of statements about relationship among independent and dependent variables, in which changes in one or more variables are accompanied or followed by changes in other variables or combination of variables.”⁷ The system theory holds that within the international systems, states are held together by a complex network of interactions which make them inter-dependent in facilitating their basic functions. These functions include investments, tourism, communication network, technology transfer, information flow, trade transactions, and diplomatic activities.

Every system seeks to maintain its equilibrium and therefore any disturbance tends to offset the balance. Against this background, all states in the system must cooperate to eliminate disturbances throughout the system. The conflict resolution mechanism of UN and regional organisations indicate the willingness of states to reduce disturbances. It is within this framework that UN PKO and PSO are conducted. Within the region, AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (MCPRC) also fall within this framework.

1.8 METHODS AND SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

The method used in gathering data for the study is mainly library research and discourse with some informed individuals on the subject matter. A further material was sourced through UN, OAU and ECOWAS conference proceedings on the subject matter. The UNITAR POCI course book was used extensively.

The secondary sources of data collection were obtained through scholarly works on Conflict Resolution and PKO, Journals and other documents of historical and political significance.

1.9 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

Chapter One consists of introduction to the research work. This includes the background to the problem, problem, objectives,

hypothesis, rationale of the research, theoretical framework, methods and sources of data collection and arrangement of chapters.

Chapter Two is the review of existing Literature.

Chapter Three gives an overview of causes of conflict and conflict resolutions in Africa.

Chapter Four examines PKO as conflict Resolution tool in Africa.

Chapter Five appraised UN Peacekeeping Mechanism.

Chapter Six consists of conclusion and recommendation.

1.10 **LIMITATIONS**

Limitations of this study relate to unavailability of some reference materials as well as difficulty in obtaining some information on PKO in Africa. Attempts were made to get alternative materials to offset the falls.

END NOTE

1. Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Resolving Conflict in Africa: Proposals for Action (Addis Ababa; OAU Press and Information series 1, 1992) p.3
2. Amanee, June 2001
3. Professor Tom Woodhouse and Dr Tamara Duffey 2000, P.11
Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution, A course produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations,2000, P.11
4. Annan, K. (1997), “ Peacekeeping Operations and the UN”, Conflict Resolution Monitor ,Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, pp. 25-32.
5. J W Burton: **Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules** Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.6
6. J. E Doughtey and RT Pfaltzgraft, **Contending Theories in International Relations** New York, Harper Collins publishing Inc , 1990 p.136
7. FM. Deng, S. Kimaru, Donald Rothchid and W. Zatman **Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa** , Washington DC, the Brookings Institute, 1996, P.xx

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW


2.1 OVERVIEW

This Chapter will review existing literature on the subject matter. The concepts of conflicts, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution will be discussed. Finally, this chapter will review previous works on peacekeeping as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism.

2.2 CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Conflict is a very fluid and ambiguous concept. According to the International Alert, an NGO “Conflict is a multi dimensional social process which is a common and essential feature of human existence.¹ When expressed and handled constructively, conflict can act as a catalyst for personal, social and political change and transformation. When it is expressed destructively, conflict fosters violence and damage that is familiar in wars and violent conflicts². This is as illustrated in Figure 1.

FIG 1: CONFLICT ENERGY



Source: International Alert.

Tom Woodhouse of Bradford University defines conflict as “the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups”.³ The use of such a broad definition allows for the consideration of any conflict, whether it is interpersonal or international, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. Contemporary conflict, refers to the prevailing pattern of political

and violent conflict in the post cold war world, while contemporary armed conflicts refers to those that involve the use of force ⁴.

Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human life, which Zartman sees as something that is desirable. ⁴ Stedman is of the view that; “Conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs, wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions that appear to be in a position to help them” ⁶. This definition offered by Stedman is clearly not narrowed to the African situation.

Stagner defines conflict as “a situation in which two or more human beings desire goods which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both ...each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation, and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal”. ⁷ The British Defence Doctrine however defines conflict “as a human struggle manifested as a clash of wills between two opposing leaders or leadership groups. It may also become a contest of wills between opposing populations who are suffering as a result of hostilities”⁸. The similarity of these definitions shows that conflict can be said to be a familiar and basic phenomenon of human interaction. Deng, Kimaru and Zartman defined conflict as “perceived divergence of interest” or “action seeking inconsistent goals”⁹. Coser notes that “there are occasions for conflict in every group as rivalry develops over control of resources, leadership, positions and the like.”¹⁰

Armed conflict is described as war.¹¹ It can also be a legal condition which permits 2 or more hostile groups to carry out a conflict by armed forces. Consequently, the legality attached to war differentiates it from normal fighting even if an organized one, since war involves armed conflict not just violent conflict.

These definitions from Stagner, International Alert, Woodhouse and British Defence Doctrine presented a generalized definition, which failed to bring out the reality in Africa. Coser's definition however brought out the main cause of conflict but it was not related to the African situation. This study takes the above lapses into consideration and attempts to overcome them by relating the concept of conflict to the African situation.

Stedman however offered an insight into the nature of conflict in Africa when he contended that; "Conflicts in Africa arise from problems basic to all populations: the tugs and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just"¹². Conflicts in Africa are predominantly intra-state rather than inter state. The danger however lies in the spillover effect resulting in cross border actions and refugee situations. One in 5 Africans lives in country severely disrupted by conflict. The direct annual costs of conflict in Central Africa has been estimated at US\$ 1 billion to which can be added another US\$ 500m, being the cost associated with refugees and internally displaced persons.¹³ These costs exclude

indirect costs to neighbours and the ineffective economic management of the economy of conflict-ridden countries.

Of all the above attempts to define conflict, Stedman definition best suits this study. The study therefore identifies with the definition of Stedman that quest for access to power and distribution of resources are the major causes of conflict in Africa, These conflicts have so far not being fully resolved through UN PKO.

2.3 CONCEPT OF PEACE KEEPING

The Blue Helmet defines peacekeeping as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers. Undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” ⁽¹⁴⁾ Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, yet it is often described as falling between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Peacekeeping operations have been described by Dag Hammarskjold as “Chapter 6½ initiatives”.

The principles, defined by Dag Hammarskjold and, Canadian Lester B. Pearson were:¹⁵

- Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of mission.
- Non- use of force except in self defence.

- Voluntary Contributions of contingents from small/ neutral countries to participate in the force.
- Impartiality.
- Control of peacekeeping operations by the secretary General.

The concept of peacekeeping evolved as a child of necessity. It is an adaptation of the UN provisions in Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter- the creation of an enabling environment for international peace and security.¹⁶ The provision stipulates the need for parties to a dispute to seek solution through negotiation, mediation, arbitration and a result to regional organisation or other peaceful means as the case may be. Most times, parties to disputes are not too likely to resort to negotiation because of their belligerent dispositions. Thus peace-making becomes relevant to create the conducive environment for the settlement of dispute, and where that fails forceful intervention may be embarked upon.

Peacekeeping is the application of non-enforcement military measures that are different from peace enforcement, which falls within the ambit of conflict prevention through conflict suppression and regulation by coercive measures. Peace making on the other hand involves mediation, reconciliation, rehabilitation and arbitration processes to get belligerents to meet, talk to one another, reach agreements to limit conflicts and then concentrate on the substantive issues underlying the conflict. The three related terms are aptly distinguished thus, that:

Peacekeeping is easily a holding action, a temporary measures aimed at defusing tensions and reducing the incentives for parties to pursue violent conflict. Peacemaking covers all conflict resolution and mediation techniques designed to bring hostile parties to agreement... Peace-enforcement involves measures to compel a recalcitrant party to abide by the resolution of an international body.¹⁷

Peacekeeping as a concept therefore is the interposition of a neutral international force in a conflict area to create a buffer between warring factions in a conflict. According to Onoja, peacekeeping operations “are essentially a practical mechanism developed by the UN to contain and control armed conflicts and to facilitate their resolution by peaceful means”.¹⁸ It is therefore a means to an end, and that end is conflict resolution. Boutros-Ghali, further defines peace keeping as “the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving military or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”.¹⁹ Peacekeeping in this context, is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. Hence peacekeeping as a third contingency approach to conflict management, according to Bassey is “one of the novel techniques” of “Conflict Diplomacy” which has gained wide currency in the contemporary international era.²⁰

Peacekeeping involves; the deployment of an international force which makes it a third party exercise, the existence of the consent of parties to the dispute, need for a pre-determined cease-fire agreement and rules for the non-use of force by the

peacekeepers. These points are in line with the principle of the UN concept of classical peacekeeping. The encyclopaedia of the UN throws more light thus:

Peacekeeping actions... generally falls into one of two categories depending on the seriousness of the situation. In cases where the dispute is still relatively under control, the UN may undertake observer operations involving the stationing of UN personnel in the area on a Quasi-permanent basis to supervise cease-fire and truce lines and conduct immediately investigations of any complaints of violations. If full-scale hostilities have broken out, military operations may be necessary to bring the fighting to a halt and to maintain the peace until final settlement has been reached.²¹

The need for political impartiality and non-coercive behaviour in conflict behaviour is often emphasised.

The UN has been encouraging regional arrangement to handle conflicts as enshrined in Article 52 of the UN Charter. Such regional security arrangements do not in any way challenge the right and authority of the UN. This is because the United Nations through its organs-the Security Council and General Assembly reserves the right to mediate in conflicts. Article 52 of the UN Charter for emphasis explicitly state that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies from dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and are consistent with the purpose and principle of the United Nations.²²

Urquhart advocates the need for a change in the present peace keeping technique in the world so as to be able to impose robust measures to safe guard international peace and security.²³ The stance by Urquhart on the need for robust peace keeping is very relevant to most African situations. This was exemplified in the sub-regional peace effort in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This approach seems to be embraced in the current peacekeeping efforts within the field of regionalism.

The initiative for peace keeping in Africa according to Fung derives from two points of view; internal and external.²⁴ To him, the internal source translates into the OAU's effort, while the external lies in the support of the West towards African initiative. He maintains that such support will only be meaningful and effective, if it is properly coordinated and entrenched into the OAU conflict management and resolution mechanism. Fung further argues that peacekeeping requires a well-defined focus to ensure greater political sensitivity and susceptibilities. This is because the interests of countries tend to affect the perception and attitude of contingents in conflict situation. He reiterates the need for an appropriate and well-defined legal framework for peace keeping at the regional or sub-regional levels.

Peacekeeping efforts especially in Africa do not come readily due to UN Approach, which now craves for a change. Ndiomu captures it aptly thus:

Before Un sends peacekeeping, it usually waits for an invitation from the government of the host nation in an internal crisis. Where it is an inter state crisis, a party has to raise the matter at the UN through the Secretary General. Situations today seem to have eroded the “wait-for-invitation” posture of the UN over internal crisis.²⁵

UN “sluggishness” in response to security matters in most conflict areas of the world had awakened the need for sub-regional security bodies to ensure stability. The research also agrees with Zartman’s view that; through the role of the OAU as a regional organisation in conflict resolution remains of great importance, sub-regional bodies such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Commission (ASDC) could ensure sub-regional security.²⁶

To achieve this goal, the issue of the theory of hegemonic stability of states which “assumes that the world as a system requires a dominant leader for all its subsystems to function smoothly and to be stable,”²⁷ comes to the fore. Appreciating this stand from the perspective of Africa Security, it then exposes the need for the recognition and acceptance of some countries as sub-regional leaders. These countries will be expected to play the leadership roles of shouldering security responsibility within their regions by way of propelling the wheel of security arrangements towards the overall sustenance of African peace and stability. This position was exemplified in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crisis. Nigeria served as the main pivot on which ECOMOG operations rested.

Peace-keeping efforts therefore, will often be embarked upon in stabilising peace and security in areas adjudged to be replete with conflicts. The UN has made concerted efforts towards stabilizing international peace and security but her approach has often been fraught with problems resulting in more failures than successes. The resort to the use of regional bodies in the conduct of peacekeeping operations introduced a new dimension to global peacekeeping and security management efforts.

2.4 **CONCEPT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.**

The aim of conflict Resolution is to transform actual or potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political changes. Conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the fundamental causes of conflicts and aim to produce solutions which are mutually acceptable to all parties. Conflict resolution operates at a number of levels or tracks, and encompasses a range of techniques from conciliation to mediation, negotiation, and problem solving.

Resolution of conflict implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, changing behaviours so they are no longer violent, attitudes so they are no longer hostile, and structures so they are no longer exploitative. The term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes and to the completion of the process. The process of conflict, diagnosing its nature and applying appropriate methods in order to ⁽²⁸⁾:

- Diffuse the negative emotional energy involved.
- Enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their difference;
- Resolve the differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been agreed by all the key parties, and which address the root cause of the conflict.

2.5 PEACEKEEPING AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM

Peacekeeping as presently conceived is traceable to an adaptation of the provisions embodied in chapter six of the UN Charter, mandating the organisation to create an enabling environment for global peace and security. The need for peaceful settlement of disputes, as contained in the UN Charter provisions, stresses the necessity for parties to a dispute to seek solution through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and the resort to regional agencies or any other peaceful means of their choice. Since parties to a dispute are not likely to resort to negotiation to resolve their differences, as long as their forces are engaged in active combat, peacekeeping is intended to create the necessary environment within which the dispute can be negotiated.

Peacekeeping was, thus, conceived as an inter-positional force emplaced between two or more warring factions, to ensure that

the terms and conditions of a pre-determined ceasefire agreement are not violated. Peacekeeping operations normally:

- a) Involve the deployment of military personnel from contributing states under the authority of a commander appointed by the international body, such as the UN, or OAU, responsible for the operation.
- b) Presuppose the existence of a pre-determined ceasefire agreement.
- c) Require the consent of all parties to the dispute before a peacekeeping force is deployed.
- d) Involve a clear and practical mandate.
- e) The non-use of force except, in the last resort, in self-defence.
- f) Require the continuing and strong support of the mandating authority, as well as the willingness of the troop-contributing countries to provide adequate military personnel, financial and logistical support for the operation.

Although the concept of peacekeeping, which predates the UN system itself, was subsequently developed by the organisation and used in the 1940s in the Balkans, Indonesia, South Asia and Middle East, the UN Charter does not categorically provide for peacekeeping. Rather, chapter 7 article 42 of the UN Charter provide for peace enforcement. However, due to the cold war rivalry between the super powers, these powers had vested interests in virtually all international conflicts. Under these circumstances, it was virtually impossible for the UN Security

Council members to cooperate in assembling and deploying troops for peace enforcement in international conflicts. In view of the difficulty with peace enforcement, peacekeeping was therefore adopted by the UN as a compromise mechanism for conflict resolution. However, the changed international environment in the post –cold war era, has resulted in cooperation rather than rivalry among the super powers, hence the growing tendency to return to the original concept of peace enforcement (as provided in chapter 7 article 42 of the UN Charter). The international community has, therefore, been able to enforce the decisions of the UN , and similarly , enforce basic codes of humanitarian conduct in the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, the global body has been able to punish non-compliance with agreements or decisions of its Security Council, as was the case with the UN intervention in Gulf region.

With the increasing incidents of armed conflicts which have bedevilled the post-cold war global environment, the UN finds itself bombarded by requests for the deployment of peacekeeping forces to perform wide-ranging tasks, many of which may differ radically from the basic concept of peacekeeping. Apart from this, the diminished importance of Africa in the strategic calculations, especially of the super powers in the post cold war era, has meant that African conflicts have not attracted adequate international responses, comparable with the level of attention received in other conflict areas in the worlds. In fact, regional organisations are now expected to show greater initiative to cope with the security of their areas. Thus, the UN's involvement in

international conflicts is expected to enhance or complement regional or sub-regional efforts. Here, ECOMOG's role in the Liberian crisis has provided a pointer to possible future trend in sub-regional peacekeeping initiatives.

The new concept of peacekeeping entails promoting durable and lasting peace and a sustainable solution. This concept of peacekeeping which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sees as absolutely essential for the future effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, brings peacekeeping squarely into the realm of conflict resolution.³ There is the need for peacekeepers to be engaged with the consent-promoting dimension of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, which relates to the goals of conflict resolution and post conflict peace-building.

The consent promoting techniques include negotiations and mediation, liaison and civilian affairs. Others are community information, public information and community relations.³⁰ The main objective of these activities is two fold. Firstly, to provide good secondly, to foster trust and stability in the area of conflict and positive perceptions of the role of peacekeepers and the nature of peace process.³¹

END NOTES

1. Professor Tom Woodhouse and Dr Tamara Duffey, "Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution", (New York UNITAR POCI 2000) P.21.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p 22
4. Ibid
5. Zartama NI "Conflict Reduction, Prevention Management and Resolution, in F. Deng, and W Zartman (eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1996) p 299.
6. Stedman JS, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa; A Conceptual Frame" in Deng, FM and Zartman, WI (eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC: the Brookings Institute, 1996) P.370.
7. Stanger R, Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, (Belmonti Brooks, 1967), p.16.
8. British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (London, 1996) P.24.
9. FM Deng, S Kirmaru, T Lyons, Donald Rothchild and N Zartaman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1996) P.XX
10. Rose R, Cited in W.C GÖckerharm The Global Society (New York: Geowl Hill inc, 1995) p. 119.
11. Stedman JS quoted in Nwolise OBC, ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operation in Liberia: Effects of political stability in West Africa sub Region" in Africa peace Review, Vol. NO1 (Abuja 1997) p. 39.
12. Ibid
13. Jakkie Cilliers "Regional conflict and poverty in Southern Africa, Paper presented at a Southern African Regional Poverty Network Conference held at the Human Science Research Council, Pretoria, 26 Apr 2001.
14. UN Document A/52/29/2 August 1997, p.11.
15. Rana, S, "Small Arms and Intra-state Conflicts" Conference paper 7-11 November 1994 (Geneva: UNIDIR) p.2.
16. Ibid

17. ECOWAS, Guideline on the Establishment and Functioning of National Commissions against the Proliferation of Small Arms ECOWAS Secretariat , PCASED Bamako, March 2001, p.28.
18. Oxfam “Conflict Children: The human cost of small arms in Kitgum and Kotido, Uganda, January 2001p.10.
19. Hammerskjld, Dag, UN Peacekeeping: 50 Years 1948-1998 (New York, Harvester Wheatsheat, 1992) p. 53.
20. International Institute for Strategic Survey, “Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or Peace-enforcement” in Strategic Survey, May 1992/93 (London).
21. Onoja L, Peacekeeping and International Security in a Changing World, (Jos, Mono expressions, 1996) p.2.
22. Boutros-Boutros Ghali. An Agenda for Peace (New York: UNDP), p.11.
23. Bassey, C.O, “The Peace-keeping Approach to Conflict Management a Conceptual Overview” in Vogt M.A and Ekoko AE (eds) Nigerian in International Peace-Keeping 1960-1992 (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, 1993) p.23.
24. Encyclopaedia of the UN (London: The New Coston Library Service Limited, 1971) p.46.
25. Article 52 of the UN Charter.
26. Urquhart, B Beyond the Sheriff Pose Survival (Colorado. Rienner Publishers (1990) p.196.
27. Fung, R “Security Strategies in Africa: Why Peace Keeping”, MA. Vogt, and LS Aminu (eds) Peace Keeping as A Security Strategy in Africa (Enugu: Forth Dimension Ltd, 1996), p. 65-80.
28. Ndiomu, Charles, “Principle and History of Peacekeeping” a Lecture delivered to Course 7 Participants NWC, Abuja Nigeria Feb 15 1999 p.15.
29. Zartman, W.I Op Cit p. 229.
30. Khapoya, V.B The Politics of Dicision-A Comparative African Policy Toward the Liberation Movement, (Denver, University of Colorado Press 1984). P.61.

CHAPTER THREE

OVERVIEW OF CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

3.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter will cover an overview of causes of conflict in Africa. It will also highlight conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa and will treat the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in detail.

3.2 CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

The vast majority of conflicts in the world have occurred in developing countries and the continent of Africa has had more than its fair share. One in five Africans lives in a country severely disrupted by conflicts. The direct annual costs of conflicts in Central Africa has been estimated at US\$ 1 billion, to which can be added another US\$ 500 million, being the cost associated with refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These costs exclude indirect costs to neighbours and the ineffective economic management of the economy of conflict-ridden countries.¹ Apart from undermining the promise of African democratization and development, armed conflicts contribute to political decay, facilitate state collapse, cause widespread human right violations, generate refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Conflicts also divert scarce resources away from social services,

disrupt trade, and contribute to the breakdown of family structures. The pervasiveness and persistence of conflict also have grave psychological consequences as children are traumatized or become accustomed to a culture of violence.

While Africa has had its share of inter-state wars, the majority of its conflicts are internal, and these internal conflicts appear to be increasing as elsewhere. The causes of conflict in Africa are many and they frequently recur. Contrary to popular belief, African conflicts do not primarily stem from ethnic diversity, despite the horrific level of ethnic violence and genocide as witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi.² Rather, in a pattern found around the world, conflicts are driven by poverty, underdevelopment, a lack of economic diversification, and by political systems that marginalize large parts of the population.³ These are often the real causes that lie behind social turbulence and allow the mobilization of ethnic and religious differences for political gain by political elites. The causes of conflict are also not always structural in nature. Apart from the “root causes” which are economic, social or political exclusions, there are also “aggravating factors” which do not as such directly cause violent conflict, though they are likely to contribute further to a climate conducive to violent conflict or to the escalation of an existing conflict.

Common to many African conflicts is the unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders inherited from colonial times. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU),

recognizing that to open the question of borders would foment discord and strife, maintained the permanence and sanctity of existing borders. Consequently, there was splitting up of tribes, the Kakwa between the three borders, Somalis between five and the Beja between three, all in East Africa. If some new resources like oil are found then war threatens, arms are distributed to these marginalized peoples and this promotes regional conflict.⁴ The existence of such peoples also has the effect of prolonging guerrilla conflicts, as guerrillas can easily cross into “friendly” territory and hide among their people, eg Zaire. Ethnicity is equally a major cause of African conflicts and it continues to be so. The Rwandan and Burundian conflict was ethnic motivated.

A more basic and long term cause of conflict has been the catastrophic economic performance of many African countries. This is coupled with debt burdens, poor flow of private capital, and insufficient foreign aid. As Neil Macfarlane points out, economic discomfort can boil up into conflict.⁵ In 1992, Boutros Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the UN, stated as the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppressions,⁶ while Ted Guur writes that conflict in Africa is often a fight for shares of a shrinking pie of economic resources, protecting patterns of distribution and control.

In 1992 Timour Dmitricher listed 29 major causes of potential tensions and conflicts.⁷ These Oliver Furley summarized and classified as follows:

- **Military**: inter-state aggression, annexation, intervention, or hostility, for example support for the rebels of other states, or for separatists,
- **Political/International**: ideological or political campaign, territorial claims, regional rivalries, terrorism, coercion or discrimination respecting the trade or economies of other states.
- **Political/Domestic**: power struggles, hostile groups, over population, demands for democracy, communal or ethnic violence related to economic, social, religious, cultural or ethnic issues, economic or religious disparities.
- **Persecution**: violations of human rights, mass movements of refugees, poverty or instability caused by the mismanagement or ineptitude of government.

Considering the causes of internal conflicts as witnessed in Africa today, scholarly literature on internal conflicts has identified four main clusters of factors: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors; and cultural/perceptual factors.⁸ The three main structural factors include weak state structures caused by lack of political legitimacy and ineffective political institutions capable of exercising effective control. When state structures weaken, violent conflicts often follow. Secondly when states structures are weak, individual groups within these states feel

compelled to provide for their own defense, they have to worry about whether other groups pose security threats.⁹ The third structural factor is ethnic geography. More specifically, states with ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict than others, especially when they are marginalized.

Political factors include discriminatory political institutions. Closed authoritarian systems generate resentments especially if some groups are inadequately represented. Secondly, the prospects of violence are great if groups have ambitious objectives, strong sense of identity and confrontational strategies. Thirdly, elite politics and more specifically, the tactics employed by desperate and opportunistic politicians in times of political and economic turmoil.¹⁰

Two broad economic and social factors can be identified as potential sources of internal conflict. First, economic problems can contribute to intra-state tensions. In Africa transitions from centrally planned to market-based economic system created several problems from high unemployment to rampant inflation. Second, discriminatory economic systems, whether on the basis of class or ethnicity can generate feelings of resentment and levels of frustration prone to the generation of violence.

Two cultural and perceptual factors have been identified as sources of internal conflict. First is cultural discrimination against minorities. Problems include inequitable educational opportunity and constraints on religious freedom to mention but few. The

second factor has to do with group histories and group perceptions of themselves and others. Many groups have legitimate grievances against others for crimes of one kind or another committed at some point in the past. The Rwandan genocide is a case in point.

3.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM IN AFRICA

African continent has the largest number of conflict resolution mechanism. These mechanism for various reasons have not been implemented effectively. Some of the African regional organisations that have created conflict resolution and management mechanism include ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS, EAC, IGAD, AU, COMESA and UMA.¹¹ The OAU now AU mechanism will be discussed to give a better understanding of how these mechanism functions.

3.4 AFRICAN UNION

On the formation of the OAU in 1963, the organisation realised that conflict being a natural concomitance of human (and state) interaction, must arise and therefore established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This was the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). The Commission's protocol was signed in 1964, and it came into effect in the same year, but its Bureau was not set up until 1968.¹¹ The member states of OAU however kept away from this commission partly due to the principle of non-interference in the

internal affairs of members. They thus took to ad hoc committees in managing conflict in the continent.

By 1971, the commission was liquidated without handling any serious dispute despite the numerous conflicts bedeviling the continent. Having liquidated the commission and having made no charter provision for mounting peace-keeping operations, the OAU depended on ad hoc mechanisms for conflict prevention and management. Such measures included the special (consultative) Committees, Council of Ministers, Assembly of Head of State and Government, Good offices etc.¹³ Conflict requiring peace-keeping troops were left to the UN. This explains the inability of the OAU to send a peacekeeping force to the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia (1964) Ghana and Guinea (1966) Guinea and Cote D'Ivoire (1967).

In 1993 the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) at its headquarters in Addis Ababa. The MCPMR still exist till today. It is built around the Bureau of Heads of State and Government, with a decision-making organ called the Central Organ, and a secretariat headed by the Secretary General.¹⁴ The Central Organ has 3 levels of authority – Ambassadorial, Ministerial and Heads of State and Government levels. Operationally, the MCPMR revolves around the General Secretariat, the office of the Secretary General and the Division of Conflict Management, utilising the gains of the early warning system. The mechanism is funded from the peace fund set up by the OAU to be financed

from 5% OAU regular budgetary appropriation, as well as voluntary contribution from Africa and non-African sources.¹⁵ The MCPMR was established through the June 1993 Cairo Declaration whose paragraph 22 provides that:

The Secretary General shall under the Authority of the Central Organ, and in consultation with parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiation to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.¹⁶

The Cairo Declaration further stated in relation to the MCPMR that “In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. In this respect, civilians and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited cope and duration may be mounted and deployed.¹⁷

In conforming with the UN procedure of resolving international conflicts, the Cairo declaration envisaged the role of the UN in paragraph 16 as follows:

In the event that conflict degenerates to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance where appropriate, the services of the UN be sought under the general terms of its Charter.

The MCPMR has obviously made efforts to cope with the scourge of conflict on the continent. Notwithstanding, several of these

conflicts persist with new ones emerging. This may have informed the perception by critics that the OAU mechanism has not been able to operate as effectively as envisaged. The OAU Secretary General gave credence to this argument when he stated that:

The ugly scourge of conflict continues to ravage the continent despite the ardent efforts exerted by our leaders and peoples.¹⁸

Thus the Mechanism seems not to meet the expectation of African leaders, hence, the formation of an African union with strengthened mechanism.

The AU was formed in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000 with improved objectives, principles and organs. Since order and peace are sine qua non for development and growth, it became imperative that Africa stems the continuing underdevelopment and dehumanisation that has been her lot through conflicts. Although the AU Mechanism transformed from that of the OAU, the Act establishing the Organisation departs clearly from the regime to the OA Charter in the area of collective security. Consequently, the inclusion in the various provisions of the AU Act of some key issues of economic development, gender equality, good governance, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, establishment of a common defence policy for Africa and the right of the Union to intervene in Member State is a clear indication of the desire of Africa leaders to depart

from the former approach of the OAU to a fundamentally different approach toward the maintenance of peace, security and stability.

Despite the formation of AU, Africa leaders still find it difficult to implement its conflict resolution mechanisms and strengthen its capacity to support PSOs. This is due to the following critical limitations:

- a. **Lack of Funding**: Most regional organisations are cash strapped and therefore lack the capacity in the relevant structures and capacity to support PSOs. For example while the AU appropriations 6% from the regular budget (about \$1.8m) is considered grossly inadequate for the tasks at hand, external funding, which formed a larger portion of contributions came slowly and with conditions.¹⁹ The way out is for regional organisations to have effective and realistic funding mechanisms to support their peace support roles. Continuous appeals must also be made by the organisations to donors to channel their assistance through centralized endowment or peace funds.
- b. Lack of effective coordination and harmonization between regional and sub-regional organisations' security mechanisms.
- c. Insufficient expertise in multi-dimensional command and control functions at brigade and higher levels due to lack of funding and equipment.

- d. Inadequate equipment and logistics.
- e. Inadequate staffing of appropriate branches.
- f. Lack of regional cohesion involving linguistic divide, lead nation crisis, duplication of effort as well as political will to substantially, if not fully, empower some relevant structures.
- g. Mechanism capabilities are yet to meet the standard set by the Report and recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. These raise the need for consultation between AU, ECOWAS, the UN and international community.
- h. Lack of viable structures for strategic level management of Peace Support Operations.

The inability to establish an African Standing Force (ASF) has also undermined the capability of AU to mount PSO. Thus the issue must be urgently addressed to enhanced rapid deployment of regional forces to crisis areas. On this issue, Lt-Gen Martin Luther Agwai the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff points out the following:²⁰

- a. Self sustainment of Sub-regional brigade-sized forces 60 days after the issuance of relevant mandate by the AU.

b. Multi-dimensional strategic and mission levels management capacities. The deployment of the ASF will require speed and this has implications for training and management of the stand by force structures and units. This in turn calls for the establishment of a planning component at the regional and sub-regional HQs to augment the various military HQ staff. In addition the planning component like in the UN should be supported by an On-call list of trained staff, for effective management of both the ASF and on going mission.

c. Standardisation of Doctrines SOPs and Regional Centres of Excellence. There is the critical need to harmonise the various SOPs and doctrines of member states in line with the UN to enhance the peace support capabilities of ASF and minimise the risk of confusion during ops. The existing AU generic SOPs therefore need to be reviewed along with the need to improve the AU training capability both at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

END NOTES

1. Jakkie Cilliers. "Regional Conflict and Poverty in Southern Africa", Paper presented at Southern African regional Poverty Network Conference held at the Human Sciences research Council. Pretoria, 26 April 2001.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Furley, Oliver. **Conflicts in Africa** London, Tauris Academic Book, 1995, 9.3.
5. S. Neil Macfarlane, Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention, **International Security**, 8 (4) Spring 1984, p.131
6. Boutros Boutros Ghali, **An Agenda for peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacemaking**. Report to the UN, June 1992.
7. Furley, Olive, Op.cit p. 3.
8. Brown M. E. **The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict** London: The MIT Press, 1996, p. 13.
9. Barry posen "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" in Brown, **Ethnic Conflict and International Security**" pp 1023-124.
10. Brown M.E. op cit p.13.
11. WT Gbov (Maj Gen), 'The Nigerian Army in Global Security' Lagos, Megavon Press, 2004 p.112
12. Ibid p.170
13. Ibid p.171
14. Ibid
- 15.
16. WT Gbor (Maj Gen) Op Cit p.171
17. Ibid
18. Ibid p.112
19. Ibid p.113

CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF PKO AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOL IN AFRICA

4.1 General

The study of conflict resolution has much in common with the role of peacekeeping in international conflict management.¹ At about the same time that the field of Conflict Resolution was emerging at the height of the cold war, Dag Hammarskjold and Lesser B Pearson were defining the basic principles of peacekeeping. These principles guided the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF1) created in response to the Suez Canal crisis in the Middle East in 1956. Both areas have developed a common interest in the dynamics and resolution of conflict and are underpinned by many of the same concepts and principles.² Of recent attempts have been made to merge the theory and practice of conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

Following the cold war, peacekeeping has become central to the international community response to many complex violent conflicts. It has taken different roles in prevention (UNPREDEP in Macedonia), intervention in active war zones (UNOMIL in Liberia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia, UNOSOM in Somalia), as well as post-settlement peace building (ONUSAL in El Salvador, UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUMOZ in Mozambique).³ Thus is now common for conflict resolution theorists to refer to peacekeeping as an

important instrument of positive conflicts transformation. In this sense, peacekeepers are increasingly required to use psychological and communications strategies over the use of military force. Equally, one of the striking features of recent analyses by practitioners of peacekeeping has been the frequency with which they refer to the relevance of aspect of conflict resolution. However, this can not be said to be particularly true in Africa as PKO has not effectively resolved the numerous conflicts in the region. The PKOs in Liberia and Rwanda will be used as case studies.

4.2 CASE STUDY 1: LIBERIAN CRISIS

REMOTE CAUSES

16. The remote cause of the Liberian crisis can be traced to 1808 when the slave trade was abolished and America established a colony for freed slaves in Liberia. There were initial frictions between the new settlers otherwise called America Liberians, and the natives also referred to as African Liberians. Thus, when Liberia was declared independent on July 1847, the constitution ensured that power rotated among the settlers. The resultant conflict between the settlers and the natives persisted, leading to a declaration of independence by the Grebo Chieftoms, an alliance of local chiefs.⁴ This however, was quickly quelled by an American naval expedition. Although, the African-Liberians lost the fight it was certain that stage for future struggles for equality had been set.

William Tolbert who was President Tubman's successor introduced some minor changes which were to allow the African Liberians more participation in Liberian politics. This was not to be as he later backed down under pressure. Against this background a tribal orchestrated coup was carried out on 12 April 1980 which brought Master Sergeant Doe to power. President Tollbert and a host of other politicians were killed. President Samuel Doe ruled along tribal lines and was ruthless to all opposition.

4.3 **IMMEDIATE CAUSE**

18. The regime of Samuel Doe and his accomplices turned out to be fascinating paradox in Liberians politics. When they assumed power, their fellow African-Liberians believed that their political aspirations would be adequately met. Unfortunately, because of political immaturity and lack of experience, they failed to introduce appropriate reforms with regards to tribal representation. This gave the ousted Americo Liberians the chance to maneuver their way back into the political terrain. The African-Liberians felt betrayed while the Americo-Liberians felt that power natural belonged to them. This regime therefore lost the sympathy of both camps as time went on. The only choice left was for Doe to rely on his fellow Krahn to enable him retain power. In response, various groups sprang up and political tension developed and enveloped the country. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor launched a rebellion against the junta on 24 December 1989.

4.5 OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE CRISIS

The NPFL on the one hand had the backing of Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. Libya provided training and facilities for the NPFL, through Burkina Faso which equally provided training centres. On the other hand, the support of Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Guinea for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) enabled Samuel Doe to continue to resist the dissidents.⁵ It is equally important to mention that the rest of the world, including the UN, was not interested in the crisis as it was fully committed with the events in Bosnia and the Middle East. The OAU was equally handicapped due to lack of resources while, ECOWAS member states were divided over the crisis because of their national interests and the principle of non-interference in the internal affair of member state.

4.6 PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

Fighting began in Liberia in late 1989, and by early 1990, several hundred deaths had already occurred in confrontation between government forces and rebel NPFL led by Charles Taylor. From the outset of the conflict, ECOWAS undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. These include creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990.⁶ Other ECOWAS efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Liberia include the mediation of a series of agreements which became the basis for the peace plan of November 1990, including the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)

led by Dr Amos Sawyer. On 30 Oct 91, ECOWAS brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord which outlined steps to implement the peace plan, including the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG, as well as the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

The UN supported the effort of the ECOWAS member States in Liberia. The Security Council first took up the question of Liberia on 22 January 1991, commending the efforts of ECOWAS Heads of State. On 7 May 1992, the Security Council indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia.⁷ In 1992 it imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia except for those destined for the sole use of ECOMOG.

The Security Council established UNOMIL on 22 September 1993 by resolution 866/1993, for an initial period of seven months, to work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. It was composed of military and civilian components. The Chief Military Observer commanded the military components while the civilian component included the humanitarian assistance and electoral assistance as well as the necessary political and administrative staff. The deployment plan called for mission to operate out of its headquarters in Monrovia, as well as four regional headquarters, co-located with ECOMOG's force sector

headquarters in the Eastern, Northern, and Western regions and Greater Monrovia.

The military component of UNOMIL monitored and verified compliance with the ceasefire, the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment, as well as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants.⁸ The Chief Military Observer arrived Liberia on 10 October 1993 and by mid December there were 166 UNOMIL Military Observers. By April 1994, UNOMIL had deployed its military observers in 27 team sites out of a total of 39 projected sites. The military observers were engaged in the patrolling of border crossings and other entry points, observation and verification of disarmament and demobilisation and the investigation of ceasefire violations. With the deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG, the joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee was replaced by a Violation Committee, as foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement. A total number of about 60,000 rebels were to be disarmed.⁹

In April 1994, dispute arose within the leadership of ULIMO along ethnic lines. The continued fighting within and between the parties constituted a serious obstacle to the peace process. The parties mistruth to one another also extended in some cases to ECOMOG. As a result of mistruth and hostilities between and within some factions, and despite the efforts of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the parties refused to engaged actively in the disarmament of their combatants or to give up control of territory. Three months after the start of demobilization, a total of only 3,

192 combatants had been demobilised. Insecurity in some areas of the country also impeded full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. Between July and August 1994, fighting continued within Liberia with signs of split within the NPFL hierarchy. All factions were experiencing command and control problems resulting in poor security and humanitarian situation. By Aug 94 the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance grew to an estimated 1.8 million.¹⁰ This situation led to the Akosombo Agreement of 7 September 1994 which called for an immediate cease-fire and provided more details concerning its implementation, the disengagement of forces and disarmament of combatants.

The political statement continued up to 1995 with Security Council sending a technical team to Liberia in Feb 1995. Based on the finding of the team, the Secretary General launched an inter-agency consolidated appeal for Liberia, for the six-month period January to June 1995, seeking \$65 million in extra budgetary resources required by UN agencies to continue to carry out life saving interventions in number of key emergency sectors.¹¹ The activities was to be limited to ECOMOG extended areas but was later secured to other areas. The humanitarian activities covered food and nutrition, health and medical relief, water and sanitation etc.

Due to the insecurity situation in Liberia in Feb 95, the 78 MILOBs and 7 Paramedical Staff serving with UNOMIL were deployed only in the greater Monrovia area, including Buchanan and kakata.

The mandate of UNOMIL was subsequently extended to 30 Jun 95 and later to 15 Sep 95. However, this is with a provision that unless serious and substantial progress was made towards a peaceful settlement, the mission's mandate would not be renewed. The Abuja agreement was however reached which established a ceasefire and called on the UN not to withdraw UNOMIL as it would compromise the gains made by ECOMOG.¹²

In the implementation of the Abuja Agreement UNOMIL was given a new mandate and concept of operation. UNOMIL main function was to exercise its good offices to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the transitional government, investigate allegations of reported cease fire violations, recommend measures to prevent their reoccurrence. Others include to monitor compliance with the other provisions of the agreement especially drawing and demobilisation of combatants. UNOMIL also supported humanitarian assistance as appropriate and investigated and reported violation of fundamental human rights.

The crisis of early 1996 saw the repatriation of UNOMIL forces to Dakar and Sierra-Leone with only about 5 remaining in Monrovia. UNOMIL mandate was further extended to 31 Aug 96 with its strength remaining at 25 civilian and military personnel. By end of Aug 96, UNOMIL mandate was not renewed. Estimated expenditure from the inception of UNOMIL until 31 Mar 96 amounted to \$77,981,100.¹³

With the withdrawal of UNOMIL conflict in Liberia persisted. This was despite the success of the 1997 election that brought in

former President Charles Taylor. The Charles Taylors government aggravated the root causes of the conflict which was neither settled by the UN or ECOWAS before the departure of peacekeepers. Not surprising the Liberia conflict restarted and culminate in the sacking of former President Taylor government in 2003. This paved way for another peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, which is currently in Liberia. So far, there is no sign that NNMIL will provide a lasting solution to the Liberian crisis to avoid a resurgence. The Liberian situation support the hypothesis that PKO alone would be incapable of resolving conflicts in Africa.

4.7 **CASE STUDY 2: THE RWANDAN CONFLICT**

The endemic Rwandan conflict has immediate and remote causes, which are inextricably intertwined. These causes have ethnic and historical roots, which have led to many decades of interethnic hostilities with the country.

4.8 **REMOTE CAUSES**

The upsurge of violence that accompanied the death of the Rwandan President has roots in the history of Rwanda (and Burundi) and the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi.¹³ The crisis in Rwanda reflects a history of social relations between two ethnically “mobilized” groups, with circles of victimization and reprisals for decades, kept alive in the collective memory to prompt confrontation in episodic instalments.¹⁴ A brief historical review of these hostilities shows that series of ethnic massacres

have taken place to consolidate the emergence of a class society with the Hutu who are the majority as servant and a Tutsi minority aristocracy.

By the time Rwanda obtained independence in July 1962 ethnic identity had become the main source of the political division. The Hutu in power led several ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, which resulted in persecution, massacre, mass exodus and exile of the minority Tutsi into Uganda, Tanzania and Zaria.¹⁵ Subsequently the minority Tutsi acquired increased dominance in Burundi through the military to the detriment of the majority Hutu. The Tutsi refugees and their offspring did not give up their Rwandan identity, or their right to return, to their Rwanda.¹⁶ The exclusion of the Tutsi from public life and their elimination during periods of political tension led to an uprising in September 1990, which was crushed but not without bloodshed.¹⁷ The genocide and mass displacement of Rwanda people in 1994 is the result of the invasion of the Tutsi refugees from Ugandan who have been excluded from political power for a long time.

4.9 IMMEDIATE CAUSES

Following the September 1990 uprising an estimated force of 10,000 guerillas called Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) headed by Paul Kagame a former head of Ugandan Army Intelligence, launched an invasion into Rwanda from the Uganda border.¹⁸ The RPF occupied north Rwanda and for three years conducted a guerrilla operation for the “Liberation” of the country. The event,

which triggered off the 1994 exodus of Rwandan people, was the death of the President and his Burundian counterpart in a plane crash. This gave a cause celebre to the Hutu extremist of the Presidential Guard, backed by other troops and militia (Interhamure) to hunt and kill Tutsi and moderate Hutu. This intensified the war between the RPF and the Rwandan National Army resulting in thousands killed and approximately two million went into exile in neighbouring countries.

4.10 CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES AND PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

Two weeks after the invasion of North Rwanda by the RPF in October 1990, a sub-regional summit was held for the first time in Mwanza, Tanzania on 17 October 1990.¹⁹ Several peace conferences were initiated by neighbouring countries Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Zaire. Each of these had a large number of Rwandan refugees, so they became active in promoting a cease-fire and in arranging political settlement. The outcome was a sub-regional conference of the five heads of states which drew up the declaration of Dar-es-salam of 1991 calling for a cease fire and asking for dialogue between the government and the RPF.²⁰ Both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations supported the sub-regional effort. However, the initiative to manage the Rwandan crisis was weak since Uganda was part of the conflict and the problem of Tutsi refugees who claim their right to go back home was not resolved. Series of peace conferences were held but did not stop the continuous success of the RPF.

Complimenting the effort of the neighbouring countries to resolve the crisis, the OAU played a critical role in negotiating series of agreement from N'sele (Zaire) in 1990 to Arusha in 1993. The OAU initiated a mediation process that led to the establishment of a 55 man Neutral Observer Group (NMOG) in 1991 to monitor the cease fire.²¹ This was later expanded to 120 man observer force, but this mission was not effective due to lack of logistic (vehicles, communications assets) and the strength of the force was too small to cover more than 150km demilitarized zone (DMZ).

The Arusha agreement of 1993 called for a neutral international force of the UN for the implementation of the cease fire in Rwanda, the inauguration of an enlarged transition government, military reforms, demobilization and preparation for elections.²² The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) took over the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group in October 1993. Before the UNAMIR the UN had an observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in Uganda to monitor the border of the two countries and prevent logistic support to RPF from Uganda.

The loss of 10 Belgium in UNAMIR led the Belgium government to withdraw its contingent from the mission. Consequently, the Security Council by its infamous resolution 912 of April 1994 decided to reduce UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270. Subsequent to the down seizing of UNAMIR and resultant offensive of the RPF, France decided unilaterally to intervene in the south in a

humanitarian operation called Operation TURQUOISE. The aim of the TURQUOISE was to protect Hutus from massacre by the RPF whose troops were recording swift successes across the country. Since the UN did not endorse the operation, UNAMIR refused at the beginning to cooperate with the French (in operation TURQUOISE). The OAU, the international press and the International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC) criticized the withdrawal of UN from Rwanda. In reaction the UN passed the resolution 918 of 1994 for the deployment of a Force of 5,500 to operate in Rwanda under chapter VII.

The new force would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons, help with the provision of assistance by humanitarian organisations and monitor border crossing points and the deployment of the belligerents. The force main task were to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda, to stabilise and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda, to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda, and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda. In the prevailing situation, the need for reinforcements for UNAMIR remained urgent. Two and half months after the security council expanded UNAMIR's mandate, fewer than 500 troops were on the ground apart from a number of military observers.

UNIMAR began deploying troops in the humanitarian protection zone on 10 Aug 1994, and on 21 Aug, it assumed responsibility

from operation Turquoise. The Rwandan Government sought the urgent assistance of UNAMIR in establishing a new, integrated, national police force. On 16 Aug, UNAMIR initiated a training programme with students selected by the Government as volunteers from different social and ethnic groups. UNAMIR reached its full authorised strength of 5,500 all ranks in October 1994. Despite the increase in strength, security still remained a problem, especially in the humanitarian camps. The situation in the camps led to the Kibeho tragedy.²³ The aftermaths of the Kibeho tragedy led to the deployment of Zairian Camp Security contingent to maintain security in these camps.

UNAMIR mandate was extended to 8 Dec 1995 via UNSCR 997 of 9 June 95, it also authorised the reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months and to 1,800 troops within four months. The mandate was also shifted from peacekeeping to confidence building. By 31 Oct 95 the force stood at 1,821 troops and 286 military observers. During this period, UNAMIR helped construct and renovate detention centres, assisted in the construction/repair of budgets, roads and schools and in the transportation of humanitarian assistance.

In Dec 95, the Rwandan government advised the UN that it did not agree to an extension of UNAMIR mandate beyond its expiration on 8 Dec on the basis that, as a peace-keeping mission, UNAMIR did not respond to Rwanda's priority needs. However the Government indicated that it would be receptive to a continued UN presence. However, UNAMIR mandate was

extended for a final period until 8 Mar 96 but it was also adjusted with a force level of 1,200. By 19 Apr 96, the withdrawal of UNAMIR was completed. The Rwanda Government agreed to the establishment of a UN office in Rwanda. The estimated cost of UNOMUR until 21 Dec 93 was US\$2,298,500 net. Expenses for UNAMIR and after 22 Dec 93 UNOMUR amounted to \$437,430,100 net. Cost for the administrative close down of UNAMIR were estimated at \$4,102,000 net.²⁴

Currently, the Rwandan crisis is still far from being over despite the presence of a recognised government. Like in Liberia, the root causes of the conflict was not addressed. This has led to political and social crisis in the country which is capable of developing into another conflict. The peacekeeping activities of the UN in Rwanda was not adequate backed by peace building efforts hence the current fear of Rwanda's relapse into conflict. Rwanda lacks social and economic development, and an effective police and judicial system which could help stabilize the security situation. The situation in Rwanda, like in Liberia are indications that the UN need to do much more than peacekeeping in order to resolve the conflicts in these countries.

END NOTES

1. Prof Tom Woodhouse and Dr Tamara Duffey, "Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution, New York, UNITAR POCE, 200 P.3
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.11
4. Aboagye BF. ECOMOG A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, (Accra, Sedco 1999) P.1
5. Vogt MA, and Aminu LS, (eds) Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies (Enugu: Forth Dimension Publishing Co Ltd 1996) P.403.
6. Blue Helmet P.380
7. Ibid P.383
8. Ibid P.387
9. Ibid p.389
10. The Blue Helmets, p. 387
11. Ibid p.389
12. Ibid p.392
13. Ibid p.398
14. Jimni Adisa "The Conflict of Stranger, the Impact of Rwandan Refugees on Neighbouring Countries," African Book Builders Ltd, 1996, P.13
15. YM Dickson, "Conflicts Resolution in Africa: Challenges for the 21st Century." National War College 8, Abuja, 1997, P.28
16. Jimmi Adisa Op Cit P.21
17. YM Dickson OP Cit P.28
18. Jimmi Adisa Op Cit P.11
19. Ibid P.12
20. YM Dickson, Op Cit P.46

21. Iliya, Rwanda Crisis, Lessons for Nigeria, "Lecture Delivered at NWC Course 8, Abuja, Apr 98, P.44
22. Al Olurin, "Peacekeeping as a Military Operation "Lecture Delivered at NWC, Abuja Feb 2000 P.5
23. The Blue Helmets, p.361
24. Ibid p.374

CHAPTER FIVE

APPRAISAL OF MECHANISMS

5.1 OVERVIEW

An appraisal of UN PKO in Rwanda and Liberia revealed several shortcomings. This includes among others poor logistics support and lack of proper and well defined mandate. The delay in intervention, weak structure of the AU Mechanism and the indifferent attitude of the west was also noted. This chapter will examine these shortcomings in detail. It will also cover the challenges to peacekeeping in Africa.

5.2 POOR LOGISTIC

The ineffectiveness of most peace operations has been related to poor logistic support. This was the case of UNAMIR in Rwanda, which was made up of 2548 poorly equipped troops. Consequently, it failed to achieve its mandate. To confirm that, Anyidoho observed “from the beginning of the mission, UNAMIR was beset with logistic problems almost all contingents came from developing countries. As a result the force could not prevent or halt the massacre in April 1994.¹ The UNAMIR was also weak because the UN put in place a force of 2,500 men with poor logistics support for a job that needed about 5,000 troops._

Another logistics problem encountered in Liberia and UNAMIR was the inability of African TCC which formed the bulk of peacekeepers in these countries in meeting their obligation in the provision of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), self-sustainment and other heavy logistical enablement. This is basically due to three reasons. Firstly, the UNTOE drawn for various missions are alien to the inventory of African TCC. They are manufactured by developed countries to meet their standard. Secondly, some of the self-sustainment requirements and standards, do not conform with the customs and existing practices of African countries. Furthermore, reimbursement rates are largely hinged upon developed countries standards. To ameliorate these more efforts should be made towards regular payments of UN reimbursements. The possibility of up-front payments of reimbursements to TCC to cushion the procurement of COE could be explored by the UN. Furthermore, self-sustainment standard should be determined by capability rather than by equipment.² These measures if adopted could enhance the logistics support of UN PSO.

5.3 LACK OF PROPER MANDATE

In most of the conflicts in Africa, the combatant (belligerent) hardly keep to the rule. Peacekeeping contingents often, come under attack by the combatants. Some times members of the peacekeepers watch helplessly as combatant massacre civilians. This situation is due to the lack of flexibility to change the mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement in response to

the situation on the ground. UNAMIR is a case in point as the force could not react to the killings in Rwanda in the early stages of the civil war due to inadequate mandate.

The security council is responsible for determining the mandate of a mission. In most cases, political expediency overrides military operational requirement. Although the mandate is the result of careful negotiations and compromise, it must remain acceptable to the contending parties, flexible enough to allow freedom of action by peacekeepers and also be clear and enforceable. Whenever peacekeeping mandates were unclear they would be subjected to different interpretation by various national contingents. In some cases, commanders sought for clarification and guidance from their national governments resulting in command and control problems in mission area. It is believed that, if the TCC are involved in determining the mandate, they would be more dedicated to its successful implementation.

A proper and clearer mandate could be achieved through increased consultation between TCC and the security council. The progress made in this regard through frequent briefings by PKO and information disseminated from UN situation centre is acknowledged. However, more still need to be done. Thus TCC would need to request for more involvement in the formulation and amendments of peacekeeping mandates. Furthermore, the security council should explore ways of making its deliberations on mandates or matters of operational concern to TCCs that have deployed troops in operations in question known to such

countries. Other means should also be explored to enable TCCs make inputs to Security Council deliberations on operations through the Military Staff Committee (SMC). Currently, TCCs and member states make inputs only to Secretary General, and General Assembly reports through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and C.34 reports.³

5.4 **DELAY IN INTERVENTION**

The delay in intervention by the UN has contributed to the metamorphosis of African crisis to complex conflict situations. For example after the break out of the Rwandan conflict in October 1990, it took one year before the OAU deployed the NMOG, and three years for the UN to set up the UNAMIR. In the same way when the security council adopted the resolution to deploy UNAMIR II, after the world expressed its indignation at the attitude of the UN in Rwanda, it took more than 3 months to have the first batch of troops on the ground. The delay in decision-making and implementation of the decision are mostly responsible for the escalation of violence.

It is noted that the Brahimi report observed the need for rapid deployment and capability. In line with this the UN introduced several initiatives to enhance rapid deployment and intervention. These include some improvement in its standby Arrangement System, the formation of multinational brigade sized force by member states, the development of on-call list and Strategic Development Stocks as well as programmes to assess the readiness of troops pledged to the UN prior to their deployment.⁴

However, most of these initiatives are still not developed and are not operational in the African region. Thus the UN would need to assist the AU and other regional organisations to develop these initiatives.

5.5 WEAK STRUCTURE OF AU MECHANISM.

The OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MC PMR) like its previous mechanisms have not improved the organization's capacity in handling conflicts. This in effect has a negative influence on UN intervention in Africa. Some scholars have argued that a stronger AU would easily influence and lobby the UN to intervene in African conflicts before the situation becomes complex. The apparent lack of capability to manage conflicts by the AU is due to lack of funds and other inherent weaknesses. As Dede O observed the OAU now AU mechanism was a victim of caution, compromise and conservatism that have too often become part and parcel of the decision-making process within the AU.⁵

The other weakness is that financially the AU mechanism has to rely on the UN or donor nations, because very few nations pay their contribution to the peace fund. This critically area of funding would need to be revisited by AU member states in view of the current trend of regionalisation of PKO. Furthermore, the UN would need to consider increased funding to regional organisation in order to empower regional conflict resolution mechanism which will ultimately enhance the maintenance of international security order. Thus the UN and regional organisations would need to

cooperate in the area of funding for conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.

5.6 THE POOR ATTITUDE OF THE WEST.

The shock provoked by the images of western bodies dragged on the streets of Mogadishu badly affected the perception of the western public in the involvement of their troops in peacekeeping operation in African. Consequently the west is reluctant to be involved in the continent as confirmed by former US Secretary of Defence William Cohen, who declared that no American soldier will be involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa.⁶

Other Western countries have also towed this line unofficially as they limit their involvement to PKO in Africa to provision of funds while some provided medical and logistic support. This contradicts the great western interest and presence in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the western world would have to treat the mission in Africa like those in Europe in order to achieve the desired result.

CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

5.7 SECURING COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Value based conflicts are generally less amenable to conciliation because they are based on deeply held beliefs. To resolve them conclusively, peaceful instruments of dialogue and negotiation will

be stretched to the fullest. To prevent contending parties from resulting to the use of force in seeking to conclude the conflict solely on their terms, every effort must be made to reach a comprehensive political settlement. To achieve such conclusive political settlement to disputes and conflicts is one of the main challenges to peace keeping generally and in particular to Africa.

It is essential to note that in the absence of a comprehensive settlements, any restored peace will remain fragile and susceptible to relapse into bigger conflagration. Experience from the field also confirm that a comprehensive political settlement always establishes the sound framework for peace keeping activities and gives all parties a legitimate document to guide the peace process.⁷ It provides a firm foundation and the political cohesion for action. Therefore, before deploying a peace keeping operation, particularly the multi-role type, it is imperative that a political settlement in the form of a comprehensive peace accord is reached.

5.8 SECURING AND SUSTAINING CONSENT

Peace keeping is a conflict resolution activity by which results are achieved through persuasion rather than the use of force. Every peace-keeping operation therefore, must have the consent of the contending parties. Thus, securing and sustaining consent is key to successful operations. However, because of certain peculiarities of the operational environment, this tends to be one of the greatest challenges to peace keeping. Somalia and

Yugoslavia are good examples where the loss of the consent of the conflicting parties put the peace keeping operations in jeopardy and brought disastrous consequences.

Securing the initial consent requires careful and tactical negotiations and to sustain the consent when obtained is even a more difficult undertaking. Although, the credibility of the peace keeping force in a key psychological elements of successful operation, the strength of the force must be just adequate to exercise the mandate. It must not be perceived, by the parties to the conflict, as provocative. There have been instances when certain contingents on peace keeping missions have wielded too much strength and power and thus have caused the premature termination of operations because consent was lost.⁸

Absolute impartiality in word and deed is very essential in sustaining the trust, confidence and hence consent of the contending parties. The moment the peace keeping mission is perceived to be partial and not neutral in its dealings, mutual respect will evaporate, consent will be lost and the peace keeping operations will find it difficult to implement its mandate. Finally, peace keepers must act within the legal framework of the mission as well as the domestic, national and international laws. It is also essential for peace keepers to understand that a peace keeping force is never an occupation force. Even though peace keepers enjoy certain privileges and immunities, but for the sake of promoting and up-holding the consent of all, they must respect the host nation's laws customs and traditions.

5.9 UNDERSTANDING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE PEOPLE

Recent peace keeping operations particularly in Africa have been faced with the challenges of getting the peacekeepers to understand and cope with the sensitivities of the local people. There have been instances when negligence or a lack of understanding of the cultural practice and traditions of the people has had disastrous consequences. The people of Africa are very sensitive to their culture and traditional practices. Therefore, any action by a stranger perceived to show disrespect for these practices often attract hostile reaction, which could jeopardise peacekeeping operations.

In Africa, many of the cultural and traditional practices are relevant to the resolution and management of conflicts in the continent. Generally, the chiefs, clan leaders and the family elders command great respect and are held in high esteem. The African also has the propensity to search patiently for consensus in deliberations. For these reasons chiefs, clan leaders and elders play effective roles in mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. Therefore, if peacekeepers and peacemakers understand these attributes, the African conflicts will be better managed. This is an important phenomenon which peacekeepers must understand and recognise. UNOSOM for examples ran into serious difficulties and eventually folded up because due cognisance was not given to this characteristics of the African.

5.10 RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

Another problem facing the UN today is the long time it takes the organisation to establish, mount and deploy peace keeping missions into conflict areas. Conflict situations themselves have now become more complex and fluid, and so can change rapidly from low intensity into unrestrained violence. In many cases, the slowness of the UN to react, and delays in deploying peacekeeping mission has had catastrophic consequences. Many conflict situations that could have been contained effectively if peace keeping forces were deployed earlier, often escalate into broader conflagration by the time the peacekeepers arrived. The challenge therefore, is how best the organisation can build a credible rapid deployment ability.

The causes of the delays have been identified to be both procedural and organisational. In several instances, the period between a Security Council decision to establish a peace keeping operation and the actual arrival of contingents and their equipment in the mission area has been too long. This period, until recently used to be as long as three to four months. For example, according to Gambari “it took the UN 5 months to get the Security Council approval for a mission in Rwandan.”⁹ Presently, it takes the secretariat quite some time to canvas and successfully secure from member states troop and equipment contributions for keeping operations. Sometimes also, the offers secured are not guaranteed. There have been instances when some contributing countries have reneged on their promise and

withdrawn their offers at the very last minute. Such situations have caused further deployment delays because of the extra time the secretariat usually require to look for new contributions.

5.11 CREDIBLE PUBLIC INFORMATION CAPABILITY

In some parts of the developing world today, illiteracy rate is high. Therefore, in conflict areas where the dominant population is illiterate and rumour mongering is rife, opposing factions usually exploit this situation and tend to wage campaigns of misinformation in order to perpetrate strife and violence, or to cause fear and panic among the civil population. In the conflict in Rwanda for example, the Hutu-dominated government was reported to have peddled rumours and so widely misinformed the civil communities that mass exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries ensued.

The challenge of peace keeping mission is that of building a credible public information capability so that in such circumstances peacekeeping forces could quickly neutralise any adverse effects. Peace keeping missions need to be proactive and develop effective public information systems which could regularly broadcast to the local people and inform them of what is going on.

5.12 LEGALITY FOR PEACEKEEPING/ENFORCEMENT

A major challenge to peacekeeping mission has always been the issue of legal standing for such operations. Acceptably, embarking on any peacekeeping mission must conform with the following operating conditions; invitation, political consensus, consent of parties to the conflict and impartiality or neutrality. It must be noted that most conflicts today are intra-state and so getting the belligerents to arrive at a consent is always a futile exercise. This lag often exposes the populace to wanton destruction of lives and properties. The approach to traditional peacekeeping roles may not be workable at this instance in solving conflict issues in Africa.

The cases studies on regional initiatives had revealed that most of the UN peacekeeping operations today are ushered in after peace enforcement actions as had been dictated by the prevailing conflict situations. This is a strategy that should continue to be adopted in future conflicts where belligerents are irreconcilable to accepting peaceful interventions, as spelt out in UN Articles 52 by invoking the implementation of Articles 53. These actions were played out in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. To avoid a continued spill over effect and fresh outbreak of conflicts in Africa under guise of non-interference in internal affairs, the AU as a projected solution had approved the resort to the strategy of collective security. This is presently enshrined in its Principles of Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h) in case of intra stated conflicts and Article 4 in interstates breach of peace.

5.13 COMMON THREATS

Major threats to peace and security in Africa are those posed by ethnicity, religion, political insatiability, poverty e.t.c that of often spillover to other states. Ensuring conflicts also cause the substantial movement across the borders by refugees thus posing threats to- neighbouring countries coupled with attendant humanitarians problem. The spill over effects of such crisis has often stretched the collective initiative of countries within such sub-regions. This happened in Liberia, which later replicated itself in Sierra Leone and Guinea, resulting in the full engagement of ECOMOG. To nib such crises in the bud, the UN need to effectively support crisis prevention and management mechanism like those of the OAU and ECOWAS. This is to avert common threats to peace and security.

5.16 WEAK AND/INEXPERIENCED FORCES

The problem of mobilizing a formidable and robust force by the UN for peace missions has more often than not been very evident especially in the continent of Africa. The weakness of such force from some countries has been premised on their low equipment state. Compounding this issue is the reliance on external sources of military hardware. Additionally, most sub-regional (TCC) are not exposed to peacekeeping techniques. They thus lacked the required experience in that field especially with the absence of prior joint training and common peace keeping doctrine.

It is obvious that third world countries do have large armies that are readily available to be committed to UN peacekeeping missions through regional or sub-regional bodies. However to achieve success the UN must insist that their training status be improved upon through joint training exercises for optimal performance. The experience gained by troop in ECOMOG through trial an error is worth building upon. The support of western countries to AU through such programmes like ACRI (US), RECAMP (France), ad well as the British Peace Support Training (BPTS) and other assistance from Norway, Canada and Denmark is noted. However these training initiatives need to be reviewed from time to time to ensure their effectiveness. They should focus more on imparting peacekeeping skills rather than showing military capability.¹⁰

END NOTES

1. Anyidoho, Guns Over Kigali, "A Review Article on the Rwandan Genocide" West Africa Magazine, 1998 p.747.
2. JWT Gbov (ed), "The Nigerian Army in Global Security" Lagos, Mrgavons Ltd 2004, p.111
3. Ibid
4. Ibid 106
5. Brownson N Dede, "The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Lecture Delivered at NWC 17 Feb 2000 p.15
6. William Cohn, Monitored from MBI TV on 25 Feb 2000.
7. T M Ato (Gp Capt), 'The Challenges of Peace-keeping in Africa: A case study of Somalia', Abuja National War College, 200.
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. JWT Gbor (ed), Op Cit, p.117

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 CONCLUSION

This study set out and appraised the UN traditional peacekeeping operations in Africa with the view to determine how effective they have been as a conflict resolution tool in Africa. This is based on the role played by the UN which is charged with the responsibility for the maintenance and sustenance of peace and security in the world as enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter. In this study, the causes of conflict in Africa were found to be driven by poverty, underdevelopment, lack of economic diversification and by political systems that marginalize large parts of the population. It was equally noted that while Africa has had its share of inter-state wars, the majority of its conflicts are internal, and these internal conflicts appear to be increasing as elsewhere.

The study found out that, the reaction of the international community through the aegis of the UN, AU and other multilateral bodies, to conflicts in Africa was found to be ineffective, to achieve lasting peace and stability for the continent. While the UN have been making efforts to deploy troops to Africa to contain conflict situations and nip fresh conflicts in the bud, the organisation has lacked the necessary funding required to execute this mission on time. When funding finally arrive, the

situation in question would have worsened thus making conflict resolution complex.

The reasons for the inefficient response could be attributed to several factors. These include; the overburdening of the UN, financial handicap by the UN and AU, delay of intervention, lack of proper mandate and poor logistics. Others include legality of peacekeeping/peace enforcement, use of weak and inexperienced forces and the attitude of western countries. The challenges of peacekeeping in Africa which has to be addressed to ensure success of PKO in Africa were also noted. These include securing comprehensive political settlement, securing and sustaining consent, and understanding the sensitivity of the people. Others are rapid deployment capability, legality for peacekeeping/peace enforcement and use of weak and inexperienced forces. The apparent loss of interest in Africa by the super powers as Africa has lost her strategic importance since the end of the cold war can not be ignore. The shift is now to Central and Eastern Europe by the developed western countries.

The increased crisis in the African continent has led to calls for a greater African involvement in conduct and management of PKO in Africa. This is necessitated by the poor performance of the UN in resolving conflicts in Africa and the African security environment in general. This line is already towed by Mrs Joy Ogwu Director General, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs who affirmed that this can be done through the cooperation of African states relying on their own regional and continental

institutions to respond creatively to the challenges of peacekeeping. African countries can not achieve much with the financial assistance of donor countries and the logistics support of the UN. In this light therefore, the UN will have to be more committed to supporting conflict resolution in Africa while African countries need to play effective role by supporting the UN in various ways. These would include provision of well trained peacekeepers, stop in the provision of bases across borders for warlords and dissidents, and provision of strong structure at the Au and sub regional organisations.

The UN could also consider “sub-contracting” PKO in Africa to regional organisation, like ECOWAS who have good record of PSO. These will also entails the provision of the wherewithal by the UN for such missions.

6.2 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are proffered:

- a. Improved logistics for UN missions in Africa.
- b. The UN mandate for conflicts in Africa should be well defined and appropriate to the type of situation.

- c. UN Intervention in crisis in Africa should be prompt and the legality of peacekeeping/peace enforcement must be established.
- d. The attitude of western countries to crisis in Africa need to be re-examined.
- e. The UN should not only encourage and support regional peacekeeping initiatives but also allocated sufficient funds for implementation of the “sub-contracting” of roles, so as to ensure effectiveness at sub-regional crisis management.
- f. The UN should be actively engaged in peace building in Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Adisa, Jinmi, "The Politics of Regional Military Cooperation: The Case of ECOMOG" in Vogt, M.A The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping (Lagos, Gabumo Publishing Co, Ltd, 1992) p. 206

Ogwu, UJ. "Multinational Peacekeeping in Africa: Issues and Problems" a Lecture delivered to Course 10 Participants NWC, Abuja Nigeria, Apr 23, 2002. p 11.

Onoja L, Peacekeeping and International Security in a Changing World, (Jos, Momo expressions, 1996) p. 2

Bassey, C. O, "The Peace-keeping Approach to Conflict Management a Conceptual Overview" in Vogt M.A and Ekoko AE (eds) Nigeria in International Peace-keeping 1960-1992 (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos 1993). P 23 _

Aboagye BF, ECOMOG A Sub Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia (Accra: Sedco 1999).

Akabogu C, 'The Liberia Crisis: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping', Ed Vogt MA (Lagos: Gabuno Publishing Co. Ltd: 1992).

Bernykum A, (ed) Regionalism and the United Nations (Ocean Publication 1979).

Vogt MA, and Aminu LS, (eds) Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies (Enugu: Forth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd 1996)

Weller M, (ed) Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement The Liberian Crisis (Cambridge: University Press, 1994)

Zartman WI, and Deng FM, (eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1991).

Ramesh T, 'Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution in the South Pacific'(kuala Lumpur: ISIN 1998)

JOURNALS

African Journal on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Vol,1 No 1 January-April, 1997.

African Peace Review Journal for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution Vol 1 No 1, Abuja, 1987.

Africa Analysis, No. 378,10 August 2001.

Africa Analysis, No. 376,13 July 2001,

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (London 1996).]

Constitutive Act of the Africa Union 11 Jul 2000.

OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure, 21 Jul 1964.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

OKONKWO FO "Organisation of Africa Unity/Africa Union Mechanism for Conflict Management: An Evaluation", Abuja, National War College, 2002.

Ato TM, "The Challenges of Peace-keeping in Africa: A Case study of Somalia," Abuja, National War College, 2000._