A Comparative Study of Two Peacekeeping Training Programs: The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA)

BY

Daniel Karis

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

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

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by

Daniel G. Karis, LTC, USA (ret.)

African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program

presented in partial completion of the requirements of

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

Submitted: _____ _23 July 2009_
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Submitted to

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Australian Defence Force

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Abstract

This thesis is a comparative study of two peace support operations (PSO) training programs sponsored by the United States (U.S.) Department of State (DoS). They are the African Crisis Response Initiative and the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program. The purpose of each program is to provide troops from African partner nations with PSO training so that they can be employed on PSO missions in support of United Nations (UN), regional, or sub-regional organization (such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), etc.) mandates. The thesis reviews some of the challenges faced by contemporary Africa, a description of both the ACRI and the ACOTA programs, an analysis of each program, and an evaluative assessment.

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In Memoriam

"Absent Comrades and Friends"

Joseph Molofsky, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
The ACOTA Program Office, 2007-2008

Siddon Davis Banda, Captain, Malawian Army
ACRI trained U.N Observer, killed in the line of duty in 2002 in Ituri, Democratic
Republic of Congo

A Comparative Study of Two Peacekeeping Training Programs:
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I. Introduction

This thesis is a comparative study of two PSO training programs sponsored by the U.S. DoS Africa Bureau. The two programs are the former African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the current African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA). The purpose statement of each program is to provide troops from African partner nations with training in military skills and with non-lethal equipment so as to enhance their capacity to conduct PSOs as representatives from troop contributing countries.

To set the stage for the examination of the ACRI and ACOTA programs, the thesis will briefly review the challenges faced by Africa, including nation-building and the transition to democratic forms of government. This will be followed by considering U.S. national interests in Africa and summarizing U.S. involvement in some of the complex challenges presented by Africa, specifically the crises in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi, the attacks on the U.S. Embassy's in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the aftermath of 9/11. The paper then examines the U.S. effort to address concerns in Africa, including the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), ACRI, and ACOTA. The paper concludes with an analysis, assessing the ACRI and ACOTA programs, the partnerships, their accomplishments in terms of peacekeeping operations (PKO) deployments, and a comparative assessment of ACRI and ACOTA.

II. Africa's Contemporary Challenges

The ACRI and ACOTA programs are an effort by the U.S. Government to assist contemporary African nations to address some of the countless difficulties they are faced with. Among these difficulties are (1) building nations out of the boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the former colonial powers, (2) reconciling the cultural heritage of the many, smaller, historical, kinship-based entities that made up the continent, (3) the drive toward modernity, and (4) the transition to their own form of democratic representation (Khapoya, xiii). Each of these factors influences the problems and struggles in Africa.

At the outset, however, we must recognize that Africa is a diverse place and there are no simple solutions to the problems that plague the continent. This diversity is highlighted in countries such as Nigeria, which has nearly 250 different social groups, each with their own language; by Tanzania with more than 100 ethnicities; and by Kenya with over 40 different groups. If language is a crucial identifier of culture, and if there are over 800 languages in Africa, than it follows that Africans have over 800 distinctive cultures. Living in such vastly different local circumstances, Africans naturally develop different customs, lifestyles, and perspectives. Building consensus to solve continent level issues in this diverse environment requires great effort, politically and militarily. Not surprisingly, in this Babel, even the official language of most African states defaulted to that of its former colonizer as emerging countries were politically unable to decide which of their indigenous languages should serve nationally (Khapoya, 4-27). Developing solutions to African problems and endeavoring to build nations, given these considerations, are inherently daunting tasks.

II. a. Nation Building

Nation-building is the conscious and purposive attempt to bring different peoples together to think, act, and live as if they were one people belonging to one large ethno-cultural community. Nation-building seeks to enhance the ability of a group, or community of people, to share a common culture, language, history, and territory along national lines. Relations within a nation are characterized by an ethos of cohesion, solidarity, fellowship, mutual recognition, sympathy, and understanding (Gyekye, 79-85). Fundamentally, nation-building is creating an ethno-cultural community of people who have a sense of belonging.

II. b. Cultural Heritage

The process of African nation-building is influenced by a number of factors, including tribalism, cultural reconciliation, modernity, and the transition to democracy. On the strength side, tribalism can foster a sense of belonging and kinship, and encourage mutual obligations and reciprocity. It is in tune with the historical roots of Africa's communal nature, with the tribe playing a significant role in both the socialization and the acculturation of its members, ensuring that the old ways are not forgotten and providing an anchor with the cultural heritage of the past. Counter-balancing these positive factors are tribalism's weaknesses. By definition, tribalism is partisan, it fosters ethnic competition, resists modernity and national integration, promotes inter-ethnic fragmentation, and it is generally at odds with the central authority. It can establish conflict constituencies, undermine economic development with nepotism and favoritism, and it may pit the more tribally oriented rural Africans in conflict with their more nationally oriented urban brethren (Guralnik, 1517 & Khapoya, 13-14).

Kinship based tribes are extra-national, extending beyond the artificial, nation-state boundaries established by the former colonial powers (Khapoya, 14). During the Conference of Berlin, 1884-1885, the European powers carved up the political boundaries of Africa in a manner that best suited their needs (Ellis, xvi). Africa was exploited on a massive scale during colonialism in terms of resource depletion, labor subservience, unfair taxation, lack of industrialization, hindrance of inter-African trade, and the introduction of fragile, cash-crop economies (Khapoya, 144). The colonizers exploited African resources, and discounted African culture and ethnicity (Gyeke, 86). Virtually every boundary decided at the Conference of Berlin splintered large cultural and ethnic groups between countries. The Maasai were divided between Kenya and Tanzania; the Hausa scattered over West Africa; the Somali were separated in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia; and the Ewe divided between Togo and Ghana, just to name a few. Forcibly splitting large ethnic groups into many different states and placing groups with a history of mutual hostility towards one another into a single state—such as in Chad and the Sudan—has contributed to the current specter of irredentism, civil war, and the squandering of scarce resources (Khapoya, 187). In some countries, in the Horn of Africa and Central Africa, ethnic and tribal-based conflicts, aggravated by an illogical political

geography of fragmented ethnic groups, finds warlord political leaders and their conflict constituencies confusing the ability to destroy with the ability to govern (Menkhaus, 16).

The successful leaders of African independence movements, faced with the task of building nation-states out of the remnants of colonial police states, accepted the former colonial boundaries and, joining together in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union, or AU), agreed to respect the arbitrary territorial status quo (Ramsay, 8). One of the more daunting problems thus confronting Africa is how to create and build national identities within states that are politically, ethnically, and culturally diverse. Ethnic nationalism, ethnic heterogeneity, and tribalism bedevil attempts at national political integration (Gyekye, 82-84).

Given these conditions, the first generation of African leaders' suspended constitutions, created "rubber stamp" parliaments, stifled the free press, banned opposition parties, dismantled the independent judiciaries, and jailed political opponents (Gordon, 131). They tended toward single-party regimes that were an outgrowth of the centralizing nature of colonial rule (Olukoshi, 174). One-party rule was enforced to prevent people from forming parties based on "tribal" interests rather than national issues (Khapoya, 191). These independence leaders believed that a strong central government was essential to national unity and economic development. They concentrated political power by eliminating the opposition and by expanding the bureaucracy and the security (military/police) forces (Gordon, 67).

After independence, the idealism that characterized the various nationalist movements, with their promise of popular self-determination, gave way in most states to cynical authoritarian regimes (Ramsay, 6-7). The decolonized state was merely an aberration of the colonial state. In league with African elites, Western multinational corporations pursued economic growth and profit, regardless of the impact on Africa and its environment (Gordon, 4). Colonial capitalists and post-colonial multinational corporations drained Africa's resources and left the people marginalized, even destitute (Khapoya, 195). During the colonial period, little attempt was made to integrate or unify the people (Gordon, 65). The nineteenth century partition of Africa, reinforced at the time of independence, placed little importance on the cultural homogeneity of human groups in constituting the territories that were to become independent African nation-states (Ellis, 24). The arbitrary colonial boundaries brought on

inter-ethnic fragmentation and meaningful political participation was subdued. Political discourse, so vital in any system and even more so in an evolving one was not cultivated. In this environment, is it realistic to expect tribal groups that have been played one-against-the-other for so long to suddenly know how to forge nation states (Khapoya, 128)?

II. c. Modernity

Fortunately, after thirty years of predominantly authoritarian rule, the winds of political change and modernity swept through Africa. The 1990s brought a democratic awakening, given the loss of credibility of Marxist and Leninist ideologies that legitimated many African autocracies, the growth and motivation of African and international human rights movements, the rising expectations bolstered by the will to act, and the impact of democratic revolutions elsewhere in the world. Africans, motivated against stifling political repression, deteriorating economies, and encouraged by democratic revolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, demanded multiparty political systems, expanded civil liberties, free elections, and responsible public officials (Gordon, 53). In 1989, 35 nations were single-party states, but by 1994 there were none, and two countries, Swaziland and Uganda, were even experimenting with no-party systems. Benin, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, The Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, and Zambia quietly witnessed the decisive rejection of ruling parties in multiparty elections which led to greater power-sharing between old regimes and their formerly suppressed oppositions (Ramsay, 7).

II. d. Transitioning to Democracy

The prospect for the development of modern democracy in contemporary Africa is encouraging. Democracy compels governments to be more open to public scrutiny, makes it easier to expose and curb incompetence and corruption, strengthens and professionalizes the bureaucracy (and the military), and is better able to carry out economic reform (Gordon, 86). Institutionalization of the rule of law gives emphasis to the basic rights of individuals and improves the balance between the state and society (Ellis, 114). To survive the test of time, democracy must come from within. It must be from the grass roots up as it is up to Africans to

fashion political structures whose ultimate aim is the attainment of democratic goals, values, and practices, even if the structures themselves are different from those of other democracies (Ellis, 18 & Gyekye, 140).

It is by no means a foregone conclusion that multi-party politics and liberal economics will help to create more widespread prosperity, or narrow the gap of inequality, which separates elites and the larger population (Ellis, 265). African discontent with political oppression, foreign intervention, and economic disasters is understandable. Throughout its history, sub-Saharan Africa has had to deal with numerous problems. It has had to cope with rapid population growth, declining per capita income, weak agricultural growth, unemployment, the marginalization of women, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), the debt crisis, environmental degradation, structural adjustments, thin markets, primary commodity dependence, vulnerability to external shocks, rudimentary institutions, skill shortages, and capital shortages—all of which pose serious challenges for African democracies (Ellis, 97 & Gordon, 105).

While the colonial administrations were dismantled in the 1960s, the ties to the former colonial powers remained. Undiversified, cash crop economies leave African countries at the mercy of their former colonial masters and the whims of the international market. The unequal and exploitative power relationship in the international capitalist system is a dominant force. In both dependency theory and center-periphery models of development, the wealthy, developed countries (the "center") prevent poor countries (the "periphery") from developing (Khapoya, 95-99). The optimism of national unity for some peripheral countries is replaced with discord. Countries such as Burundi, Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the Republic of the Congo experienced internal and external strife that impacted the international community and signaled a need for a strategic response (Ramsay, 5).

III. U.S. Interests in Africa

The current situation in Africa, specifically concerning these peripheral countries, has a strategic impact on the international community, as witnessed by the debates in the chambers of the UN, and a call for action to respond to some of these crises. As a member of the UN Security Council, the U.S. could not shy away from its obligation to acknowledge these situations and seek remedies. However, from the perspective of U.S. strategic interests, what is difficult about Africa is the lack of a framework for organizing U.S. relations and interests on a continent whose size, diversity, and complexity defy a single approach (Booker, 200).

III. a. U.S. National Strategic Interests

U.S. national strategic interests, and therefore U.S. strategic decisions, are influenced by domestic political concerns and the ensuing controversy which tends to inhibit a U.S. strategic response unless a vital national interest is at stake. Simply stated, U.S. national interests include (1) Sovereignty, (2) Security, (3) Stability, (4) Solvency, and (5) Status. Sovereignty is the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and institutions and people secure. Security seeks stable regional balances, secure from hegemonic dominance and free from threats of aggression, coercion, subversion, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Stability refers to a stable world order that fosters political freedom, human rights, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and diplomatic solutions to regional problems. Solvency is a healthy, growing U.S. economy that ensures prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad, with access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space. Status involves healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations (Nolan, 2009).

III. b. U.S. Interests in Africa

In Africa, the U.S. national strategic interests translates into support for long-term development by investing in human capital, in infrastructure, in institution building and in better governance, building critical capacities that support human rights and political stability,

effective socioeconomic policies and entrepreneurship, and that capitalize on Africa's natural resources to diversify their economies, strengthen food security and self-sufficiency, and mobilize the efficient allocation of domestic and external financial resources (Gordon, 124-131). Politically, the U.S. encourages a free press, constitutional government, opposition parties, independent judiciaries and legislatures, and demand that African political leaders conform to the same ethical and moral standards to which other countries are held (Gordon, 131 & Gyekye, 193). On the security side, the U.S. provides training and equipment (ACRI and ACOTA) to select African militaries to support regional peacekeeping efforts and other conflict resolution roles and back UN PSOs (Booker, 200).

The UN's role in the post-Cold War era has become the subject of debate. One of the concerns revolves around an emerging Western consensus that downplays the previously held international legal norm of sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs of member states vice the interests of human rights and humanitarian intervention (Gordon, 155). Supporting this emerging consensus, African governments that used to condemn foreign intervention in Africa as motivated by neocolonialism and neo-imperialism are now more insistent in demanding a greater U.S. and UN involvement in controlling conflict. Both the U.S. and UN are reluctant to be cast in the role of imposing order in Africa (Ottaway, 207). However, it is in the interests of the U.S., within its legal means, to prevent the creation of radicalized political leaders and the formation of broad based, segregated, militant, nationalist, and radically-fundamentalist organizations (Gordon, 63).

Currently, there is a large, moderate Muslim population in Africa that favors harmony with the U.S. and the West (Brondum 2003). However, there is a threat of extremist elements expanding through Algeria and the Sudan and a propensity for these extremists to utilize unstable countries with large Muslim populations for safe havens, so it is important to the West to maintain stability in Africa and to retain the support of the moderate Muslim population. The U.S. National Security Strategy confirms this importance by stating that in Africa, both promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and poverty. Disease, war, and poverty threaten human dignity and they are a strategic threat to U.S. core values (Bush, 10 & Evers, 9).

U.S. core values and African values should operate in a complimentary manner. Too often advisors to African governments exacerbate a particular situation by assuming that traditional African ways are inferior and Western methods are invariably superior (Ramsay, 131). The U.S. cannot, and ought not, impose solutions on African nations. The U.S. approach must be patient, composed, and consistent with U.S. national interests and values while recognizing that an African approach will be consistent with African interests and values. While U.S. leverage on the continent has limits, it can capitalize on a measure of trust that exists in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the U.S. does not have the baggage of being a former colonial power. The challenge for the U.S. is to use this trust, and its diplomatic, informational, economic, and political strength, to wisely assist African leaders to address the issues facing Africa. By taking a moderate approach, by assisting Africans in solving African problems, the U.S. will earn their respect and cooperation, while failure to do so will earn their enmity. Imposing U.S. will, militarily or politically, or ignoring the problems faced by Africa solves nothing.

Admittedly, the Western world is interested in the concept of stability for Africa but usually not enough to warrant the commitment of its own military forces. In 1993, the operation in Somalia taught Americans that there are no effortless ways to handle conflicts on the continent. As a consequence of the tragedy in Somalia, the Western world, in 1994, was unwilling to commit the resources necessary and stood by as hundreds of thousands were massacred in Rwanda. As a result, numerous governments in Africa and the Western world reached the conclusion that in order to create stability in Africa, the continent must develop its own organic ability to establish peace and security and it must learn to fend for itself (Evers, 3).

IV. U.S. Involvement in Africa.

The dominant strategic concern of the U.S. from the end of World War II until the demise of communism was not Africa, but rather it was the Cold War. The U.S. and the Soviet Union sought a balance of power in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact nations would be held at bay by a strategy of mutually assured destruction should one bloc or the other initiate open warfare. Open warfare did exist during this timeframe, but it was largely conducted by surrogates or in a clandestine manner. Africa's involvement amounted to siding with one bloc or the other and in being a lesser battleground for the two ideologies represented by East and West. With the demise of the Cold War and the end of the Warsaw Pact the problems of conflict in Africa were largely ignored by the Western powers. The discord in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi highlight the complications and the mess involved when the U.S. imposes its military will on the situation, or just ignores the problem entirely.

IV. a. Somalia

The U.S. effort in Somalia is best known for the decisive battle of Mogadishu portrayed in the book and movie *Black Hawk Down* (Bowden, 2001 & Gordon, J.A., 8). In December 1992, the U.S. and allied forces entered Somalia to stop the imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it succeeded, the political situation bogged the U.S. and its allies down in a poorly organized UN nation-building operation. Instead of the anticipated gratitude, U.S. forces received increasing hostility as they became more deeply entangled in the process of trying to establish stability. U.S. efforts to bring the clans and the various political entities together were stifled as each political actor maneuvered for power. In the end, the Somali people were the main victims of the leadership struggle and the U.S. and the UN capitulated to events and withdrew. American military power had established the conditions for peace, but there was no peace to keep (CMH Pub 70-81-1, 26). American interest in military operations in Africa waned after Mogadishu and President Clinton ordered a review of U.S. national security policy in regards to PKO. The result was Presidential Decision Directive 25 which established guidelines and criteria concerning U.S. involvement in UN activities--including preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. The

criteria promoted a more cautious approach in considering U.S. participation in PSOs and inferred that the U.S. was basically not interested in an expanded role in African peacekeeping (Herbst, 308-323 & Pollard, 5-6). The result was U.S. disenchantment for military involvement on the continent and a consequent isolationist approach, instead of involvement, in Rwanda and Burundi.

IV. b. Rwanda

In 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda attempted to exterminate the country's Tutsi minority. In a hundred days, using hand held weapons, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and citizens murdered an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus in the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. As the terror unfolded, the U.S. Administration showed virtually no interest in stopping the genocide. Some have explained the U.S. failure to respond to the genocide by claiming the U.S. did not know what was happening, that it knew but didn't care, or that regardless of what it knew there was nothing useful to be done (Power, 2001).

Samantha Power, based on a three-year investigation, provides a clear picture that the U.S. government knew about the genocide early enough to save lives, but passed up countless opportunities to intervene. In her article, "Bystanders to Genocide" Power claims that the U.S. did much more than just fail to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers already in Rwanda, it blocked the subsequent authorization of UN reinforcements, it refused to use its technology to jam the radio broadcasts that were so crucial in coordinating the genocide, and it refused to use the term "genocide" for fear of being obliged to act. Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. policy objective which, President Clinton, later apparently regretted (Power, 2001).

In his March 1998 visit to Rwanda, Clinton issued the "Clinton apology." In a speech at Kigali Airport, he stated "We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the U.S. and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred" in Rwanda.(Power ,2001). Regardless of perspective, Rwanda is an egregious example of the abdication of the moral high ground on the part of the U.S. and the

West and the shame of Rwanda and Burundi lingers in the memories of many in Africa to this date.

IV. c. Burundi

In 1993, the Hutu Party, Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and its presidential candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, won the election that formed the first Hutu government in Burundi. President Ndadaye was assassinated on 21 October 1993 and turmoil ensued. The Hutu leadership, through FRODEBU, responded violently and tens of thousands of Burundians were killed (Academic dictionaries and encyclopedias, 2009).

In 1995-1996, the subsequent mass exodus of Hutu refugees during ethnic fighting in eastern Zaire became a crisis. Lacking effective civilian leadership the army, largely controlled by radical Tutsis, sought to violently re-appropriate the political control they had lost in 1993. They were opposed by rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) based in Zaire and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) based in Tanzania. Extremist local media fanned the flames and approximately 10,000 people were killed during 1995. Bujumbura continued as a Tutsi stronghold and the turmoil also continued. By 1996 some 400,000 were displaced in the country and a further 350,000 were refugees in Zaire and Tanzania. In July 1996 Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, led a successful coup attempt, suspended the national parliament and banned political parties. The new government then introduced a counter-insurgency strategy of regroupement – forcing civilians into camps where they could be controlled by the army. Fifty UN member states were approached to explore their willingness to contribute troops to a possible PKO but only Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania responded positively and the initiative did not progress (Steering Committee, Annex IV-3). The U.S. failure and guilt from not reacting to the situation in 1994 in Rwanda was resurfacing in Burundi in 1996 and confronting the U.S. Administration with yet another predicament.

IV. d. The Attack on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

On 7 August 1998, in the aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi, terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring over 4,000. Investigators identified Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as the principal suspects in the attacks. In response, the Clinton Administration sent missile attacks on targets in the Sudan and Afghanistan (GlobalSecurity.org; 20 Jun 09). Given these events, the U.S. was strengthened in its belief that a strategy of engagement in Africa was the prudent course to take; otherwise it would suffer continued adverse consequences.

IV. e. The Al Qaeda Attack on the U.S. World Trade Center in New York City

The events concerning the Al Qaeda attack on the U.S. World Trade Center are common knowledge and do not need to be further elucidated here. However, the significance of the event is the impact that it had on the psyche of the American people and the sense that U.S. failure to be proactive was a contributing factor. This provided the Bush Administration with greater freedom of action to respond to perceived threats to U.S. interests.

IV. f. The African Crisis Response Force

Arguably, the U.S. mishandled its peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, but it equally mishandled the crises in Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994 by failing to act. By 1996 the crisis in Burundi served as a catalyst for the U.S to become more actively engaged in Africa. Given the tragedies of Rwanda and Burundi, African leaders and the international community sought ways for African nations to address these problems without requiring intervention by the West (Pollard, 10-12). In response, the U.S. offered assistance by suggesting the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an African military force that would be trained and equipped with U.S. help and available for deployment to trouble spots on the continent. This seemed a way for the U.S. to help prevent a repeat of a Rwanda or Somalia type of catastrophe without placing U.S. troops on the ground. Given the nature of such contingencies and Africa's interest in handling its own problems, ACRF seemed logical (Handy, 2003). Unfortunately, it was not well received by most African nations.

When U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, went to Africa in October 1996 to present the idea of the ACRF, many of the details were still incomplete (Biermann, 130-31). Additionally, African leaders were troubled that the U.S. failed to consult them, and the unsolicited offer of a U.S.-trained standing military force likely created an anxiety about the prospect of American "imperialism" reminiscent of European colonialism. Finally, many African leaders felt that ACRF did not appropriately recognize the burgeoning influence of regional organizations in Africa such as the OAU, ECOWAS and the SADC (Henk 1997-98, 102 & Handy, 2003).

Committed to its peace efforts in Africa, the U.S. formed an interagency working group (IWG) in early 1997 led by Ambassador Marshall McCallie. The IWG focused on their long-term capacity building of African peacekeeping forces and crafted a relationship with the UN (Biermann, 132-33). As a result, the ACRF evolved into ACRI, a plan that aimed to enhance the peacekeeping capability of military forces from a number of African nations, which would retain operational control over their units (Lolatte, 1999, 8). By mid-1997, seven African countries signed up for the ACRI program and eight battalions were to be trained (Handy, 2003; actually there were nine ACRI partners).

V. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Program.

V. a. Background on ACRI

The U.S. Secretary of State proposed a standing "African Crisis Response Force" in 1996 when Burundi was on the brink of an ethnic civil war, but as we have seen, support by African leaders was lacking (Humphries, May 2004). In May 1997, the U.S., Britain, and France identified the need to coordinate peacekeeping training efforts and work together under the auspices of the UN and OAU. This "P3 initiative" recognized that each country has separate peacekeeping programs (the British have the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, the French have RECAMP, while the U.S. was initiating ACRI) with various African countries and that there were advantages to be gained from complementing and coordinating these efforts (Nunn 1998, 2 & Pollard, 16). Additionally, nongovernmental and private organizations were invited to participate in the training, thus providing trainers and trainees an increased opportunity to interact and understand what these agencies do in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (White House, April 1998).

ACRI was a Clinton Administration initiative, run by the U.S. DoS with U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) participation in the ACRI IWG (Humphries, May 2004). ACRI provided the U.S. with a coordinated program to promote regional stability by training African militaries to effectively respond to African peacekeeping contingencies with organic forces (Pollard, 14). Unlike the ACRF's focus on a standing force, ACRI focused on training African forces using a common peacekeeping doctrine and supplying them with common communications equipment that would allow the units to work more effectively together (Rice 1999, 145 & Pollard, 15). The DoS was careful to coordinate with the OAU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) regarding training curriculum and peacekeeping doctrine to ensure that ACRI trained units would be able to deploy and easily integrate into internationally sponsored PKOs (Nunn 1998, 2).

As the lead agency, the DoS established the IWG to work the political aspects of ACRI issues. The DoS set the priorities, scheduled the training, and assessed and evaluated countries for participation in the program (McCracken, 8). The DoS criteria for countries with professional military units wishing to participate in ACRI training were:

(1)   Acceptance of democratic civilian authority.

(2) Respect for human rights.

(3) Participation in prior PKOs or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities.

(4) And, a relatively high level of basic military proficiency (Pollard, 58).

The initial coordinator of the ACRI IWG in Washington, D.C., and the force behind the funding for the initial five-year program, was former U.S. Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie. In "The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): America's Engagement for Peace in Africa" Ambassador McCallie states that ACRI's objective was to assist in developing rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from stable democratic countries that could work together to maintain peace on the continent. The U.S. intention was not to create a standing force in Africa or to withdraw, but rather to remain engaged and work with the respective African states to promote peace and stability, economic growth, and democracy (McCallie, 1998, 2 & Pollard, 45-46).

V. b. Description of the ACRI Program

ACRI was a set program of instruction that sought to raise the "basic" peacekeeping skills of the participating units. The concept was to provide a battalion with an initial basic training experience then to follow-up with sustainment training over the period of several years. There was little flexibility in the way the program was presented and after the first training event it was evident that the level of training within battalions varied and the program had to be adjusted accordingly. One problem was that some units were composite forces and had a varied return rate for follow-up training. The training was also supposed to develop trained trainers so that the units would have an organic training capability, however, there was no method to develop effective trainers within the ACRI program and the concept failed to work (Evers, 49-50).

The three year phased training period was supplemented with an equipment package of non-lethal items. Training was conducted by teams consisting of U.S. military personnel (primarily U.S. Special Forces or U.S. Marine training teams) and civilian contractors. The two private companies involved in the ACRI effort were Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) located in Alexandria, Virginia and Logicon (now Northrop Grumman),

located in Leavenworth, Kansas. MPRI is a firm filled with retired military personnel from various branches of service. Their involvement centered on staff training and leadership tasks. "The use of MPRI in its role was pursued not because MPRI possesses a unique capability, but because it has available staff people whereas the U.S. military does not" (Brower, 30). Logicon was a small company with numerous retired military members, mainly former instructors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the Battle Command Training Program, or both. Its role was to conduct computer assisted exercises using the Janus simulation to assist in the training of African partner country battalion and brigade staffs (Brower, 95).

The DoS, through bilateral talks, negotiated agreements with a number of African countries that were willing to participate in ACRI. According to Mark Malan there was an "African renaissance," in which an increasing determination was exhibited on the part of African leadership to find "African solutions for African problems" (Malan, 1998, 1 & Pollard, 38). Having the proper training and equipment to be able to conduct operations effectively would improve African military capabilities, enhance their ability to accomplish missions, and enhance their repute and thus their attractiveness for mandating organizations to utilize them on PSO missions (Evers, 9). But there were also the added benefits of receiving needed equipment and training, as well as the funding associated with keeping their respective militaries employed on PSO missions. In addition to these aspects, ACRI did such things as provide optometry examinations and immunizations for the participants (Patterson 2003). Combining a range firing with a vision check and issuing corrective eyeglasses has a significant impact on force protection and reducing collateral damage should soldiers need to employ their weapons on a hostile target (Evers, 34). Likewise, the ammunition provided to practice marksmanship was invaluable and one of the best parts of the program was the provision of equipment, from individual uniforms to communications equipment, which is vital when dealing with militaries that have difficulty funding equipment from their own resources (Evers, 51).

The program was also designed to conduct battalion and brigade headquarters staff training. Poor command and control was a recurring problem on PSO missions. African militaries are designed on the Soviet or European model and they do not utilize their noncommissioned officers in the same the same way that the U.S. does and this difference and

other doctrinal issues hampered the effectiveness of the training. Likewise, there was a restriction against conducting lethal training on the fear of arming an unstable government's military and perpetuating further instability. However, there is rarely a situation in African PSO that is strictly a peacekeeping mission as most environments are non-permissive at some point (Evers, 49-50).

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the training, strengths and weaknesses of the program must be identified. As A. Evers points out in her thesis, *An Assessment of the U.S. Peacekeeping Training in West Africa: Is it on the road to stability?* the ACRI program had no effective measures of success or methods for evaluating the actual performance of the trained forces in the mission area and there were no methods to otherwise track the performance of ACRI trained personnel and units. Absent these measures, the means did not exist by which to identify training shortfalls and to subsequently provide a more tailored and effective training program of instruction (POI) (Evers, 53-54). The ACRI training concept was firmly established and the POIs taught were broken into the major components of Initial Training (IT) and Follow-on Training (FT) for battalions consisting of FT-1 through FT-5 and Brigade Initial Training (BIT) and Brigade Follow-on Training (BFT) consisting of BIT-0 through BFT-2 as follows:

FT-1: Battalion: 2 weeks classroom, 1 week CPX, and 1 week CAX.

FT-2: Battalion: a limited field training exercise in which the battalion employed a company sized unit using the operations order from FT-1.

FT-3 Battalion: 1 week classroom, 1 week CPX, and 1 week CAX, including introduction to civil-military operations, media relations, etc.

FT-4 Battalion: field training exercise.

FT-5 Battalion: 1 week classroom, 1 week CPX, and 1 week CAX, including a senior leader's seminar and review of material. This maybe a multinational exercise in which the battalion works for a brigade undergoing a BFT.

BIT-0 Brigade: 4 weeks field training, 2 weeks classroom training, 1 week CPX, and 1 week CAX.

BFT-1 Brigade: 1 week classroom, 1 week CPX, and 1 week CAX. The first BFT-1 conducted for a Senegalese brigade in July 2001 was a multinational exercise and included a Malawi battalion which was undergoing its FT-5.

BFT-2: Brigade training – training beyond BFT-1 never occurred (Humphries, 2001, 7-8)

The POI for the Initial Training is broken into five distinctive portions (Brower, 96). The five phases, in order, are as follows.

(1)   Receive, Equip, and In-process. During this phase ACRI equipment and uniforms were issued to the battalion, troops were in-processed, and they were given their eye exam and provided glasses, if needed (McCracken, 1998, p. 10).

(2)   Common Tasks. This phase includes basic marksmanship, basic medical skills, and human rights training and other training that is applicable to the individual soldier (Brower, 97).

(3)   Multi-echelon Training. This phase takes up to 30 days to complete and focuses on individual, platoon, and company tasks for the infantry companies, functional area training for the combat support and combat service support elements, civil affairs and psychological operations training, leadership training, and military staff training. During this phase, U.S. trainers were to focus their efforts on "train-the-trainer" techniques so that host nation officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would then be able to train their own soldiers. This was to allow for a better student-to-instructor ratio and it was supposed to leave a legacy capability as host nation officers and NCOs would be capable of teaching the ACRI tasks on their own (McCracken, 11-12 & Brower, 98).

(4)   Collective Training. During this phase, the various elements that have received instruction separately begin to train together (Brower, 99).

(5)   Battalion Training. During this phase, the battalion received a mission which represented the culminating event of the training. The host nation was involved in the creation of the scenario and included the participation of local villagers role-playing displaced persons and creating a realistic training environment. During the final FTX the battalion was evaluated based on the training received in the POI (Brower, 99).

Follow-On Training. Once the initial training was completed, sustainment training must take place if the battalions are to maintain their level of proficiency. Follow-on training provided that training over the course of several years (See Figure 1). The five training iterations, as indicated, sought to accomplish this.

Brigade Training. Under ACRI brigade training focused on the headquarters as a command and control element because there were no complete African brigade sized elements available for PSO deployment. Thus, only the brigade headquarters was trained occasionally with ACRI trained battalions to serve as subordinate maneuver elements. The focus of the ACRI program was on training battalion sized units. The purpose behind brigade training was to train a brigade-level staff, combat support, and combat service support personnel so that they are capable of supporting the efforts of a multi-national brigade-sized force in both peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations (HUMRO) (3rd SFG, 1999, slide 3).

The training provided in the Brigade Training Plan POI was two phased:

(1)   Phase I Training. The primary focus during this phase was on staff functions and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and it included subjects on combat support, combat service support, special staff, and civil-military operation. The aim was to improve the ability of the staff to effectively and efficiently perform its command and control role over subordinate attached battalions. The training was followed by a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and the Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) providing the brigade headquarters the opportunity to practice and assess itself on its performance (Brower, 101).

(2)   Phase II Training. In this phase, the unit was broken down into their functional areas and provided with additional staff specific functional training. To test and evaluate the training, Situational Training Exercises (STX) were provided for each staff section. The training concluded with a PKO/HUMRO scenario that mirrors the scenario that was used during the CPX/CAX conducted during Phase I.

V. c. The ACRI Mission

The mission of the ACRI program was to enhance existing capabilities of selected African militaries to enable their greater and more effective participation in either limited HUMRO or PKO (Evers, 33).

ACRI was to identify, organize, equip, train, deploy, and advise capable African forces to conduct operations such as limited HUMRO/PKO which would provide a more secure environment for either refugees or internally displaced people that would facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence (Brower, 4).

V. d. ACRI Objectives

ACRI's immediate objective was to increase the number of capable states in Africa that were able to effectively address the PKO/HUMRO challenges and build stability and peace within their borders and their sub-regions (Clinton 1999, 45 & Pollard, 66-67). According to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, the ACRI goal was to complete the initial training cycle and achieve a threshold of 10,000 trained troops comprising ten to twelve battalions and several specialized companies from African nations, and then shift to sustaining readiness exercises and command post exercises (Pollard, 18-19).

For the ACRI IWG there were four objectives:

(1)   Approximately twelve thousand African troops/peacekeepers trained to the standards of the ACRI program and with the capability of providing self-sustaining training (train-the-trainer);

(2)   At least three African brigade headquarters staffs will have acquired multi-national command and control skills;

(3)   Establishment of a functioning relationship between ACRI trained brigade staffs and the security structures of African principle sub-regional organizations; and

(4)   A demonstrated willingness of ACRI partners to participate in peacekeeping or complex humanitarian emergencies in sub-regional areas (Pollard, 22).

As envisioned by Ambassador Marshall McCallie ACRI's objectives were to:

(1)   Train and equip African companies and battalions to established and accepted international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief doctrine and procedures.

(2)   Train at the battalion level, focusing on communications interoperability using standardized equipment.

(3)   Increased cooperation with and participation by non-governmental and private organizations (NGOs and PVOs) in ACRI training and exercises.

(4)   Increase interoperability with international, regional and sub-regional organizations.

(5)   Train to standards as promulgated by the UN under Chapter VI mandates.

(6)   Provide continued post-training and command post exercises focusing on train-the-trainer skills, the development of civil/military operations in humanitarian emergencies, logistics, and battalion and brigade leadership.

(7)   Increase the number of African countries (stable and democratic) participating in ACRI (implied) (Pollard, 78-79).

In summary, ACRI was a bilateral training initiative designed to work with African states to create highly effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units that could operate in a multinational PSO environment in the event of a traditional PKO mission or humanitarian crisis. The ACRI program began with the basic military skills and evolved through battalion and brigade level peacekeeping exercises.

VI. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program

VI. a. Background on ACOTA

The last year of the ACRI program was U.S. Fiscal Year 2002. The Bush Administration changed the name of the program from ACRI to ACOTA and pursued a stronger more versatile approach to the training. The management of the program shifted from the IWG, with U.S. DoD participation, to a U.S. DoS only operation under the management of the ACOTA Program Office (APO). The ACOTA program placed much greater emphasis on training-the-trainer, on assisting higher-level staffs to improve their overall training methodology, and on emplacing simulation centers to support ongoing PSO training in countries that can sustain the effort. This was an endeavor to enhance the various partner nations' ability to continue training on their own with minimal U.S. support (Humphries, May 2004). The aim was to increase the inherent capability of the partner nations to train its own forces with U.S. trainers moving to the background in a mentor and assist role.

The transformation began in December 2001 and the new initiative placed more emphasis on peace enforcement, as well as peacekeeping skills, including weapons training, convoy escort, logistics, protection of internally displaced persons, negotiations, field medical skills, individual health, field communications skills, command and control, and robust force protection. Training was tailored for each country to cover shortfalls and enhance the ability of the force being trained to conduct peace enforcement operations if required (Evers, 51).

ACOTA is a more military-oriented training initiative entailing simulated combat operations and containing force protection elements (Klare & Volman, 230). This shift occurred, despite the fact that U.S. military personnel were largely committed elsewhere. The U.S. strategy of engagement in Africa became pursued more ardently at the same time American military commitments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq caused the operational tempo of the American military in other areas to increase, thus the burden of responsibility for ACOTA training largely fell on Northrop Grumman and MPRI.

As was true for ACRI, the determination by a partner nation to deploy ACOTA-trained troops remains a sovereign national decision. An ACOTA partner's participation in a PSO could be in response to a request and under a mandate from the UN, the African Union (AU),

or a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS, the East African Community (EAC), Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM), or SADC. To date, the APO has negotiated training agreements with 24 countries, including Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. The DoS seeks to broaden the list of participating countries through agreements on a bilateral basis. The APO has also sponsored training and assistance for major sub-regional organizations, including the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG).

The conditions for participation as an ACOTA partner remain relatively unchanged from the conditions set by the ACRI program:

(1)   Serving under elected civilian government with transparent decision-making.

(2)   Absent human rights abuse record with vetting required as directed by U.S. Congressional legislation—"Leahy vetting."

(3)   An expressed interest in deploying peacekeepers.

(4)   The potential capacity to deploy PSO contingents.

(5)   An agreement to end-use, reuse, and security assurances for U.S defense goods and services provided (Devlin, 2005).

VI. b. Description of the ACOTA Program

The ACOTA program is one of the U.S. Government's flagship programs in Africa. ACOTA is the DoS peacekeeping assistance program designed to enhance the peace support and humanitarian relief capacity of ACOTA partner African countries. The ACOTA approach emphasizes training in common doctrine and the issuance of equipment packages to participants in multinational African PSOs, while also assisting the partner military to create a training element that can sustain the PSO skills necessary for deployment to peace missions (Devlin, 2005).

ACOTA's focus is sub-Saharan, training peacekeeping forces in western, southern and eastern Africa and although ACOTA is not prohibited from working with the Maghreb

(northern) countries, thus far it has not done so. Unlike ACRI, which consisted of a packaged program provided to the partner nation over a period of time, the ACOTA program provides a menu of courses from which the partner nation, in negotiation with the APO, can select based on the training level of its forces, its needs, and the anticipated requirements of its PSO deployment. The training program that ACOTA has developed and offers includes the following courses:

(1)   Strategic Training Conference (STC) (1 week)

(2)   Training Planning Management Development (TPMD) Course (1-2 weeks)

(3)   Effective Methods of Instruction (EMI) Course (1-2 weeks)

(4)   Battalion Command and Staff Operational Skills (CSOS) Course (includes the Military Decision Making Process) (2 weeks)

(5)   Brigade CSOS Course (2 weeks)

(6)   Force Headquarters CSOS Course (2 weeks)

(7)   Command Post Exercise (1 week)

(8)   Computer Assisted Exercise (1 week)

(9)   Multi-National Exercises (MNX) (1 week)

(10)   Multi-National Command Post Exercise (MNCPX) (3 days)

(11)   Map Exercise (MAPEX) (1 week)

(12)   Soldier Skills Training (SST)(field training) (3 weeks)

(13)   Mechanized Training (M113 or Casspir Armored Personnel Carrier) Course (2 week)

(14)   Engineer Training Course (2 week)

(15)   Environmental Awareness Course (1 day)

(16)   Riverine Operations Course (2 ½ days)

(17)   Noncommissioned Officers Training Course (2 week)

(18)   Company Grade Officers (CGO) Training Course (2 week)

(19)   New Equipment Training (NET) Course (1 week)

(20)   Basic First Aid Course (2 week)

(21)   Field Medical Training Course (2 week)

(22) Basic Trauma Life Support (BTLS) Course (1 week)

(23) Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Course (2 weeks)

(24) Pre-Deployment Level II Hospital Advanced Trauma Management Course (1 week)

(25) Paramedic Upgrade Course (PUC) (Pending accreditation by the University of South Africa) (8 weeks)

(26) Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS) Course (Accredited by the American College of Surgeons) (2 weeks)

(27) Combat Casualty Care Course (C4) (3 weeks)

(28) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Course (1 week)

(29) Peace Support Operations in a Built-up Area (in development) (3 days)

(30) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Course (3 weeks)

(31) Pre-Deployment Operations Course (4 weeks)

(32) Logistics Training Course (3 days)

(33) Information Preparation of the Area of Operations Course (3 days)

(34) Military Operations Course (3 days)

(35) Civil Military Operations (CMO) Course (3 days)

The ACOTA program has a much greater training depth than the ACRI program. But like ACRI, ACOTA is based on an international standard and it has a UNDPKO-approved POI for its core programs of instruction – TPMD, EMI, CSOS, CPX, CAX, and SST (as of July 2009 the APO is in the process of compiling the POIs for resubmission to the UNDPKO for their review and approval). Each of the courses can be modularized and the segments adjusted to meet the needs of the partner nation. Likewise, each of these POIs also provide for awareness training in the following subject areas:

(1) Human rights.

(2) Gender respect/elimination of sexual exploitation.

(3) Child protection.

(4) Trafficking in persons.

(5) Protection of civilians and innocents.

(6)   Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organization (IOs) coordination.

(7)   HIV (Human immunodeficiency virus) / AIDS prevention.

(8)   Refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) management.

(9)   Rules of Engagement (ROE).

(10)   Introduction to UN operations.

In addition to the courses offered, the scenarios for the CPX and CAX have also changed. Under ACRI the scenarios were fictional, involving the imaginary countries of Bekaleen, Annistar, Camponia, Borkou, etc. and the terrain used for the exercises where these fictional countries were located were not even on the African continent, but rather they were actually Haiti and Puerto Rico. The rational for this ACRI decision was supportive of the OAU's Principles under Article III, 1-3 which addressed the sovereign equality of all Member States; non-interference in the internal affairs of States; and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence (OAU Charter, 1963). The leadership of the ACRI program did not want an OAU member state to read in the paper that a neighboring state was receiving U.S. PSO training that involved activities within its internal borders.

This changed as UN operations over the course of time evolved from Chapter VI PKO to something less than full-blown Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the hybrid Chapter VI + ½ mission. The scenarios that evolved during the course of the ACOTA program shifted from fictional scenarios to actual, on ground UN missions:

(1)   UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC which stands for Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo).

(2)   <u>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</u> (UNAMID).

(3)   UN Mission in the Ivory Coast (UNOCI).

(4)   UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

(5)   UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

(6)   United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (ACOTA provided training in 2008, at the request of the Ghanaian Government, for a Ghanaian Battalion that was

actually deploying in support of the UNIFIL. Similarly, ACOTA provides training for a Tanzanian military police company which also deployed in to support of UNIFIL).

Unlike ACRI, which was training battalions for an undetermined future PKO/HUMRO deployment, ACOTA found itself conducting just-in-time training for units that were already designated to deploy into a specific mission area. The ACOTA program thus shifted its orientation and provided these units with training that was oriented on the actual mission areas to which they were going to deploy.

Thus, ACOTA represents a fundamental shift from the ACRI program's PKO orientation. ACOTA provides partner nation units with an even greater capacity to allow them to conduct not only PKO missions, but peace enforcement missions as well. Furthermore, under ACRI a partner country basically had to accept or reject a fixed program of instruction, while under ACOTA, the partner country can request that the program be tailored to its particular needs (Humphries, 2004). The ACOTA approach emphasizes common doctrine and equipment for participants in multinational African PSOs, while also assisting the partner military to create a train-the-trainer element that can sustain the skills necessary for deployment to peace missions after the U.S. ACOTA instructors depart.

ACOTA training placed much greater emphasis on "train-the-trainer" activities. The process involved TPMD, CSOS, CPX, and SST and it would be achieved over the course of the training of three battalions. The host nation trainers would be integrated into the training of the first battalion iteration as students and members of the battalion staff. During the second battalion training iteration the host nation ACOTA trainers would go through the EMI course at the beginning of the training and then rehearse and conduct fifty percent of the ACOTA training for the second battalion while the U.S. ACOTA instructors would train the other fifty percent of the curriculum. During the final battalion training iteration, the host nation ACOTA trainers would rehearse and train 100% of the ACOTA POI while the U.S. ACOTA instructors would be in a mentor and assist role, supervising the rehearsals and monitoring the actual instruction. From this point on, the host nation ACOTA trainers had the capacity and were expected to teach these courses to future battalions with U.S. ACOTA instructors consigned to a mentor and assist role, when invited to do so by the host nation.

The full range of PSO tasks were covered by the ACOTA training program. Respect for human rights, gender respect, and the protection of life, property, and the environment are fundamental concepts emphasized throughout the training POIs. The ACOTA program also features training for the partner military on how to respond (force protection) to an escalating threat situation. Upon partner nation request, ACOTA provides training in combat aspects of the more dangerous peace enforcement situations. ACOTA's POI also integrates non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations into the actual training and encourages association with other African peacekeeping contingents. Finally, ACOTA provides an in-depth HIV/AIDS awareness module during each training event (Humphries, 2005).

A unique aspect of ACOTA training is the integration of a Multi-National Force Headquarters or Brigade Staff using computer-assisted simulations in order to stress command and staff elements by replicating a PSO mission. Simulation exercises help prepare battalions, brigades, and force headquarters staff to conduct effective PSO/HUMRO. These exercises improve skills that are important to multinational operations and are consistent with UN best practices. This method of training also specifically focuses on communications procedures, equipment, and interoperability to enable multinational units to more effectively work together. ACOTA encourages the training support of the European Union (EU), French, British, Belgian and other allied peacekeeping training efforts and welcomes their participation and support (Humphries, 2005).

VI. c. ACOTA Mission

ACOTA's mission is to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of ACOTA partner nations in Africa:

(1) Train individual peacekeepers, squads, platoons, companies and battalions in the field.

(2) Train, mentor and exercise battalion commanders and battalion staffs.

(3) Train, mentor and exercise PSO brigade commanders and their staffs.

(4) Train, mentor and exercise PSO force commanders and their staffs.

(5) Train and equip PSO trainers and trainees (Devlin, 2005).

VI. d. ACOTA Objectives

The ACOTA objectives are to:

(1)   Train and equip African military units and headquarters for PSO.

(2)   Build a sustainable peacekeeping capacity (train-the-trainer).

(3)   Enhance PSO command and control.

(4)   Promote commonality and interoperability.

(5)   Enhance international, regional, and sub-regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa (Shanahan, M. & Francis, D., 3).

Supporting these overall training objectives are course specific training objectives and tasks. Typical ACOTA training objectives trained for during the CSOS course are as follows:

(1)   Exercise Command and Control Procedures.

(2)   Exercise Communication Procedures and Equipment.

(3)   Exercise Logistics Operating Procedure.

(4)   Exercise Medical and Medical Evacuation Procedures.

(5)   Force Protection.

(6)   Protection of NGO/PVO/IO in sector.

(7)   Aid to Civil Authority.

(8)   Negotiations.

(9)   OPORD writing.

(10)   Utilize appropriate reporting procedures.

(11)   Exercise positive control over subordinate units.

(12)   Delegation of command authority.

Typical ACOTA Command and Staff Training Objectives training tasks include:

(1)   Exercise Command and Control Procedures

- OPORD writing.
- Utilize appropriate reporting procedures.
- Exercise positive control over subordinate units.
- Delegation of command authority.

(2)   Exercise Communication Procedures and Equipment

- Employ voice radio procedures.

- Publish C2 guidance.
- Communicate using organic communications equipment.
- Conduct secure communications.

(3)   Exercise Logistics Operating Procedure

- Plan for use of either pull or push delivery.
- Plan for host nation support (HNS).
- Establish maintenance collection point and procedures.

(4)   Exercise Medical Evacuation Procedures

- Ground evacuation procedures.
- Air evacuation procedures.
- Planning for evacuation for both civilian and military.
- Reception and triage of casualties.

(5)   Force Protection

- React to threat level.
- Guard vital installations.
- Protection from disease.
- Water supply.
- Protection from environmental threats.

(6)   Protection of NGO/PVO/IO in zone

- Provide convoy escort upon request.
- Plan for coordination of effort with NGOs.
- Plan patrol routes that protect NGO fixed facilities.

These ACOTA training objectives and training tasks for the CSOS course are consistent with the types of missions and tasks that the unit will be confronted with in a PSO mission area. The unit will then execute these tasks while conducting the SST field exercise portion of their training.

VII. An Analysis, Assessing the ACRI AND ACOTA Programs

After the introduction of this thesis in part I, part II documented some of the countless difficulties facing Africa, including (1) building nations out of the boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the former colonial powers, (2) reconciling the cultural heritage of the many, smaller, historical, kinship-based entities that made up the continent, (3) the drive toward modernity, and (4) the transition to their own form of democratic representation (Khapoya, xiii). Each of these difficulties confronts Africa and Africans with challenges. While neither the ACRI nor the ACOTA programs are panaceas for these difficulties, they each assisted African nations with capacity building to address two challenges of great concern – peace support operations and humanitarian relief operations—both in the general context of addressing African security matters and capacity.

Part III examined the U.S. strategic interests in Africa, namely sovereignty, security, stability, solvency, and status. U.S. national interests in Africa translates into support for long-term development by investing in human capital, in infrastructure, in institution building and in better governance, by building critical capacities that support human rights and political stability, by effective socioeconomic policies that capitalize on Africa's natural resources and diversifies their economies, strengthen food security and self-sufficiency, and mobilizes the efficient allocation of domestic and external financial resources (Gordon, 124-131). On the security side, the U.S., through ACRI in the past and ACOTA now, provides training and equipment to select African militaries to support regional peacekeeping efforts and other conflict resolution roles and back UN PSOs and HUMROs (Booker, 200).

Part IV addressed U.S. involvement in Africa since World War II based on its strategic concerns, first the Cold War and then U.S. missteps concerning the discord in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. U.S. political decision makers were further influenced by the destruction of the U.S. State Department facilities in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center. In response to these events, the U.S. endeavored to establish an African response force—the ACRF—but this effort met with resistance on the part of Africa's senior leadership. A number of African countries did embrace a subsequent U.S. proposal, the ACRI program and its ensuing ACOTA program, as a method

to enhance the ability of Africa to solve its own problems. Parts V and VI described the different approaches of each of these programs in regards to capacity building.

ACOTA, and the predecessor program ACRI, have actively trained African forces from 1998 until today. This assessment will consider ACRI and ACOTA partnerships, ACRI and ACOTA accomplishments in terms of peacekeeping deployments, and then a comparative assessment of the two programs.

VII. a. ACRI Partnerships

After a lukewarm reception by most African countries the ACRI program established partnerships with nine African countries: (1) Benin, (2) the Ivory Coast, (3) Ethiopia, (4) Ghana, (5) Kenya, (6) Malawi, (7) Mali, (8) Senegal, and (9) Uganda. Kenya actually came into ACRI somewhat later than the rest and the Kenya ACRI Model (KAM) was implemented in 2000 based on their desire to achieve the training needs of their unique circumstances. The partnership with the Ivory Coast was put on hold after its coup in 1999.

VII. b. ACOTA Partnerships

ACOTA inherited six of the nine ACRI partner countries, losing the Ivory Coast after conflict broke out in that country. Building on the good works of the ACRI program, ACOTA expanded to 24 partner nations as follows: (1) Benin, (2) Botswana, (3) Burkina Faso, (4) Burundi, (5) Cameroon, (6) Ethiopia, (7) Gabon, (8) Ghana, (9) Kenya, (10) Malawi, (12) Mali, (12) Mauritania, (13) Mozambique, (14) Namibia, (15) Niger, (16) Nigeria, (17) Rwanda, (18) Senegal, (19) Sierra Leone, (20) South Africa, (21) Tanzania, (22) Togo, (23) Uganda, and (24) Zambia. The DoS seeks to broaden the list of participating countries through bilateral agreements. The APO has also sponsored training and assistance for major sub-regional organizations, including the ESF and the EASBRIG. Two partnerships were put on hold: Mauritania, concerning possible Section 508, Foreign Assistance Act type issues and Niger, as a matter of policy.

VII. c. ACRI Accomplishments - Peacekeeping Deployments by ACRI Partners

By the time the ACRI program was closed down in 2002 the U.S. had completed its objective of training twelve battalions and supporting its partner countries in preparing peacekeepers for deployment (Evers, 13). ACRI deployments included:

(1)   Ghana: Sierra Leone (1999) Liberia (2003) MONUC (2002) Ivory Coast (2003).

(2)   Senegal: Central African Republic (1997) Sierra Leone (2001) the Congo (2003) the Ivory Coast (2003) Liberia (2003) .

(3)   Benin: Guinea-Bissau (1999) Liberia (2003) the Ivory Coast (2003).

(4)   Kenya: Sierra Leone (2002) Ethiopia-Eritrea (2002).

(5)   Malawi: Mozambique Floods (2000) MONUC (MilObs) (2001-03).

(6)   Mali: Sierra Leone (1998) Liberia (2003) (Devlin, 2005).

VII. d. ACOTA Accomplishments - Peacekeeping Deployments by ACOTA Partners

ACOTA was not only a change in approach in the way that PSO training was offered to partner nations, it was also an expansion of the program. In its six years of existence it has trained over 80,000 troops and the number of partner nations increased from nine to 24. The number of deployments are that these nations have participated in is a research project unto itself. Suffice it to say that ACOTA partner nations have sent their peacekeepers under UN, OAU, AU and ECOWAS mandates to Burundi (OMIB and ONUB), the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the Congo (MONUC), the Ivory Coast (UNOCI), the Darfur (UNAMID), Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (ECOWAS and UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Somalia (AMISOM), the Sudan (UNMIS), and humanitarian relief efforts in Mozambique (Humphries, 2005).

VII. e. A Comparative Assessment of ACRI and ACOTA

As a comparative study, the purpose of this thesis is to assess two DoS sponsored PSO training programs, ACRI and ACOTA. This assessment will address the following areas:

(1)   Partnership countries.

(2) Program accomplishments.

(3) Capacity building versus capacity utilization.

(4) Chapter VI versus Chapter VII.

(5) African partner nations support.

(6) U.S. Congressional support

(7) Support of the UN and regional organizations.

(8) Support of donor nations.

(9) The ACRI curriculum versus the ACOTA curricula.

Partnership countries. An examination of ACRI and ACOTA partnership countries reveals nine partners for ACRI and 24 partner countries for ACOTA. On the face of it, this would argue that ACOTA, with over three times as many partners as ACRI, is a more favored program by the African countries, but would this be a fair assessment? ACRI, as the precursor program, laid the ground work for the success now being experienced by the ACOTA program. ACRI's immediate objective was to increase the number of capable states in Africa that were able to effectively address the PKO/HUMRO challenges and build stability and peace within their borders and their sub-regions (Clinton 1999, 45 & Pollard, 66-67). No long-term presence on the ground was desired or established. ACRI went in, built capacity for peacekeeping, increased interoperability, and made available post-training events and exercises if desired by the partner nations. The reputation of the program was enhanced by the favorable comments of the participants and senior African military leaders. It is a natural consequence that over time other African countries (stable and democratic) would pursue the opportunity to participate in ACRI and subsequently ACOTA. This is exactly what happened and the program expanded.

Program accomplishments. Among the DoS criteria for countries to participate in ACRI training are either participation in prior PKOs or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities. An examination of the program accomplishments of ACRI and ACOTA in terms of participation in PSOs reveals that partner nations were, and still are, troop contributing countries to UN, regional, and sub-regional peacekeeping missions. ACRI partner nations have provided troops to resolve crises in the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. As for

the much expanded ACOTA program, suffice it to say that every PSO mission in sub-Saharan Africa has ACOTA trained personnel present and contributing to its resolution.

Capacity building versus capacity utilization. Related to program accomplishments, is the alignment of capacity building with capacity utilization. Sovereignty dictates that whether or not a partner nation provides forces, how many forces they provide, and the caveats involved in supplying those forces for a PSO is ultimately an autonomous national decision. Arguably, if a PSO does not affect the strategic national interests of the partner nation, then perhaps they may decide not to participate in the peacekeeping effort. Even though countries participate in the ACRI and ACOTA programs, receive the training and accept the equipment, there is no requirement that they participate in PSOs (Brower, 6). This fact could bring on comment as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the programs. If the partner nation does not provide peacekeepers after completing the bilaterally agreed upon training, then the IWG for ACRI and now the APO for ACOTA must evaluate the situation and make a determination as to how it will best expend its limited resources to achieve the greatest benefit. As one would expect, troop contributing countries have continued to receive follow-on training and support. Mark Malan states that the greatest flaw in bilateral attempts to develop an African capacity to respond to crises is the failure to match capacity building with capacity utilization. While not denying that the training initiatives contribute to potential peacekeeping capacity, he points out that the training is geared to individual infantry battalions as opposed to a dedicated multinational force. During ACRI, the establishment of such a standing force was beyond African capabilities (Malan, 1998, 11 & Pollard, 41). But now the African Union seeks to stand-up the "African Standby Force" by 2010 and ACOTA has since been involved in the training efforts of the ESF and the EASBRIG.

Chapter VI versus Chapter VII. Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations take their name from the respective chapters in the UN Charter. These terms do not precisely define the nature of the PSO mission that a particular peacekeeping force will face. Doctrinally, UN missions include a spectrum of activities from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, to peacebuilding. The environment peacekeepers will find themselves in range from relatively benign peacekeeping missions where all parties have agreed to and are adhering to the terms of the ceasefire agreement (such as the current

UNMIL) to a peace enforcement mission where the parties remain openly hostile and there is no peace to keep (UNAMID is presently an example).

It is understandable that most troop contributing countries would rather deploy their forces to the more benign peacekeeping missions which were the focus of the Chapter VI type training that ACRI presented. But the nature of the crises in Africa is slanting more towards Chapter VII peace enforcement type mandates. Under Chapter VII, the opposing belligerents have not necessarily consented to the peacekeeping intervention, the use of force on the part of the UN sponsored troops is reasonably expected and there may not even be any peace to keep.

However, the U.S. agreed to accept the advice of the UN military experts and concentrate initial ACRI training on Chapter VI peacekeeping measures (McCallie 1998, 4). By definition, peacekeeping implies that both sides in a conflict agree to have peacekeepers present in their sovereign territory and accept their presence as internationally accepted mediators to the conflict in a non-combat role. However, recognizing the slant toward hostile PSO environments, LCDR Andrea Pollard, in her 2000 U.S. Command and General Staff College thesis proposed that:

> …consideration should be made regarding a long-term training focus on standards and doctrine outlined under Chapter VII mandates vice Chapter VI mandates. Arguably, it may be more beneficial to train peacekeeping troops under peace enforcement doctrine and standards, prepared for possible military enforcement of peace, then training for traditional peacekeeping operations with potentially unprepared troops faced with an escalation in conflict" (Pollard, 88-89).

This is exactly what occurred as ACRI evolved overtime into ACOTA. Again, it can be argued that ACRI set the stage for the ACOTA program to progress to the level and intensity of training that it has achieved today.

African partner nation support. The support of ACRI and ACOTA by African partner nations continues to be positive. In 1999, in response to a survey conducted in reference to the level of host nation militaries' satisfaction with the ACRI program, the participating countries all claimed that they were very satisfied with the program (Kwiatkowski 2000, 73). In the 2009 ECOWAS Logistics Field Training Exercise after action report, Mike Devlin reported that one of the ECOWAS Chiefs of the Defense Staff stated, "The ACOTA is the program that best

meets African needs. It provides excellent training for officers and soldiers and it furnishes materiel necessary to train for and to carry out peacekeeping missions."

In "The U.S. and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond" Dan Henk and Steven Metz argue that the success or failure of ACRI depends upon the ability of African leaders to maintain positive political and economic trends, to have a desire for the African security environment to evolve into one of peace and security, and to take ownership of ACRI (Henk & Metz, 36-37). Henk and Metz thought ACRI alone was inadequate to deal with Africa's security needs and they recommended training police forces, coordinating official programs with private institutions, expanding the program to include humanitarian assistance, developing a pan-African staff college and regional training centers, and conducting combined exercises (Henk & Metz, 32-36).

What is remarkable is that most of what the authors suggested 12 years ago has come true (Evers, 14). National gendarmeries (police forces) have participated in the training and have even become ACOTA trained-trainers, private institutions such as the ICRC and various national Red Cross organizations, as well as the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP, an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress) have participated in staff training. Donor nations have supported the establishment of peacekeeping centers of excellence such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), at the Karen campus in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Ecole Maintien de la Paix Alione Bondin Beye, Bamako, Mali.

U.S. Congressional support. Enough Congressional support initially existed to create the ACRI program. However, the continued support of Congress is critical to the existence of the ACOTA program because that is where the funding originates. In his testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa, Dr. Steven Metz discussed the potential diplomatic repercussions and erosion of American influence in Africa if the U.S., having started the ACRI, (Brower, 110) then decreases or eliminates support for the program (Brower, 110-111).

In July 2001, Representative Ed Royce, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, announced that the ACRI program was a success, that it promoted professionalism and democracy, and that he supported the fact that ACRI training needed to be long-term (Evers, 15). The ACOTA program received similar praise from the U.S. Senate.

Senator Russ Feingold and then Senator (now U.S. Vice President) Joseph R. Biden in comments addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stating that they have been strong supporters of both the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the follow-on ACOTA, and have worked for several years to enact explicit authorizing language for these programs. A review of the U.S. Congressional budget is the best demonstration of how Congress views the success of these programs and the financial support has increased every year since the inception of the program.

   Support of the UN, regional, and sub-regional organizations. The fact that the UN would support a program such as ACRI should come as no surprise. The UN favors efforts that will lead to conflict resolution and regional stability and it also favors regional and sub-regional organizations solving problems within their own regions without the direct involvement of the UN. This is in keeping with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the reality of the UN system. The UN has limited funds for operations such as peacekeeping, UN peacekeepers are over-deployed, and there is sometimes great difficulty involved in creating the necessary consensus to act in the wake of a crisis. In light of these difficulties and in view of the efforts of both the IWG and the APO to coordinate with the UNDPKO, the UN has been a supporter of both programs. The ACRI POI was provided to the UNDPKO for review and approval prior to implementation (Brower, 107) and as of July 2009 the APO is in the process of again compiling the POIs for resubmission to the UNDPKO for their review.

   Just as the UN has displayed support for these programs, several of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations have been supportive as well (Brower, 113). The AU, ECOWAS, the EAC, and EASBRICOM have supported ACRI and ACOTA efforts and the ESF and the EASBRICOM's EASBRIG have participated in ACOTA training.

   Support of donor nations. While the ACRI program may not have earned the support of the European Community as a whole, it has gained favor with several key players, specifically the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The support of these three nations is significant, because they all have long-standing ties to many African countries. Both France and Great Britain reviewed their commitments to Africa and the results were that both countries closely cooperated with U.S. efforts in Africa (Rice, 1997, p. 21-22).

The ACRI curriculum versus the ACOTA curricula. The ACRI curriculum provided initial training for a battalion or brigade headquarters and then follow-on training for the same unit over a three year time-frame, normally at six-month intervals. Military training is perishable and for a force to retain its capability to respond to a crisis, periodic refresher training is necessary. The ACRI training program satisfied this requirement. Unlike ACRI, ACOTA is more likely to provide training to a peace support brigade headquarters, battalion, or company just prior to its deployment on a PSO mission. This is the ideal situation as it is just-in-time training that will be fresh in the minds of the participants as they deploy into their mission area. It also satisfies Mark Malan's concerns about capacity building versus capacity utilization as units receiving ACOTA generally deploy following the receipt of the training. This maximizes the immediate return on the training investment. In addition, a strength of the ACOTA program is the menu of courses from which a partner nation can select the type of training that best meets its needs and requirements in preparation for its deployment (in addition to the core courses that were UN DPKO approved).

Summary. In summary, the number of partner countries has more than tripled under the ACOTA program in comparison to ACRI and while ACRI trained units made significant contributions to the PSO effort in Africa, ACOTA trained personnel are currently involved in every PSO in sub-Saharan Africa. Capacity building versus capacity utilization is a concern but the ACOTA program's just-in-time training approach has lessened the importance of this issue. ACRI focused on PKO while the more robust ACOTA program includes peace enforcement type training in its program. This is more a result of the evolving nature of each training program than it is an error of omission or commission, with the increased intensity of the ACOTA program providing greater capability to its trained units. Both programs have received African partner nation support, U.S. Congressional support, the support of the UN, regional, and sub-regional organizations, and the support of donor nations. Finally, the ACRI curriculum and the ACOTA curricula met the needs of the African partner countries and training situations that they were faced with at the time.

VIII. A Final Note

In retrospect, the ACRI program was a success and it achieved its several goals. It trained peacekeepers for missions across Africa, it helped to show that the U.S. is engaged in the process of assisting African partner nations to take steps to solve some of the crisis situations that confront them on the continent, and it set the stage for the follow-on, more robust ACOTA program.

The ACOTA program is successful in regards to providing multinational PSO training for African partner nations. The program provides extensive command and staff training and a field training experience for African peacekeepers at the company, battalion, brigade, and multinational force headquarters level. A key aspect the ACOTA program is that the training and equipment provided is tailored to meet the needs of the partner nations and the train-the-trainer concept has left of legacy that will endure long after the U.S. ACOTA trainers move on.

In regards to this research project, it was narrow in scope to an analytic comparison of the two programs—ACRI and ACOTA. In regards to recommendations for future research, there are a number of areas that might be beneficial in adding to the body of knowledge on this subject matter. Topics that might be considered are the strengths and weaknesses of the ACRI program and the ACOTA program, the perception of the recipients of the training and how well the training meets their needs as peacekeepers, and what the return on investment is in regards to those ACRI and ACOTA partner countries which received the training. Additional research can also be completed on why some ACRI and ACOTA countries took part in the program and yet chose not to become troop contributing countries and what the perception of PSO Force Commanders are concerning the quality of ACRI and ACOTA trained units to accomplish their PSO mission.

IX. List of Abbreviations

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
APO	ACOTA Program Office
BIT	Brigade initial training
BFT	Brigade follow-on training
BTLS	Basic Trauma Life Support Course
C^2	Command and control
C^4	Combat Casualty Care Course
CA	Civil affairs
CARE	Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe
CAX	Computer assisted exercise
CGO	Company Grade Officers Training Course
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLS	Combat Lifesaver Course
CMO	Civil-military operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
CPX	Command post exercise
CS	Combat support
CSOS	Common Staff Operational Skills Course
CSS	Combat service support
DC	Dislocated civilian
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoS	U.S. Department of State
DP	Displaced person
DPRE	Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees
DWB/MSF	Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières
EAC	East African Community

EASBRICOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMI	Effective Methods of Instruction Course
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
FT	Follow-on training
FTX	Field-training exercise
FWF	Former warring factions
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HAO	Humanitarian assistance organization
HN	Host nation
HNS	Host nation support
HUMRO	Humanitarian relief operations
IDP	Internally displaced person
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labor Organization
IO	International organization
IT	Initial training
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JMC	Joint Military Commission
KAM	Kenya ACRI Model
MAPEX	Map exercise
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MilObs	Military observers
MNCPX	Multi-national command post exercise
MNX	Multi-national exercise
MONUC	UN Mission in the Congo (actually Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo
MP	Military police

NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NET	New Equipment Training Course
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
O/T	Observer/trainer
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
P3	Permanent 3 countries (includes the U.S., France, and Great Britain)
PHTLS	Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support
PKO	Peacekeeping operations
POI	Program of instruction
PSO	Peace support operations
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations Course
PUC	Paramedic Upgrade Course
PVO	Private voluntary organization
RECAMP	Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities)
ROE	Rules of engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration Course
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SST	Soldier Skills Training
STC	Strategic Training Conference
STX	Situational Training Exercises
TE	Training exercise
TPMD	Training Planning Management and Development Course
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDFS	UN Department of Field Support

UNDP	UN Development Program
UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCHR	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF	UN International Children's Fund
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	UN Mission in the Ivory Coast
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIP	United Institute for Peace
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
ZOS	Zone of separation

X. Glossary of Terms

Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance. Established in 2002, ACOTA is the successor program to ACRI. This program was designed to allow for more tailored training which focuses on the participating country's desired set of learning objectives utilizing the train-the-trainer concept (Evers, 5).

African Crisis Response Initiative. President Clinton's training initiative intended to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and effectively to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent; controlled and funded by the ACRI Interagency Working Group; based on common doctrine and equipment, with emphasis on interoperable communications equipment enabling multinational units to work together more effectively" (Evers, 5)

ACOTA Program Office. The DoS office that is responsible for the ACOTA program.

Chapter VI, UN Charter. Refers to authorized PKOs that are limited in scope. Chapter 6 operations should be permissive; parties to the conflict all agree to the insertion of peacekeepers; the peacekeepers expect to operate in a benign, non-hostile environment in which they neither threaten nor are threatened by the former warring factions. Peacekeepers in a Chapter VI operation largely monitor disengagement, such as in the Chapter VI mission in Cyprus, or the presence of long-term observers in Kashmir.

Chapter VI + ½. While there is no "Chapter VI + ½" under the UN charter, this term was in vogue during the late 1980s through the 1990s to describe PKOs different from the traditional, permissive type previously seen, but short of a Korean War scenario. This type of operation has come to be known as peace enforcement, and is now referred to as Chapter VII operations.

Chapter VII, UN Charter. Refers to operations authorized and limited in scope by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The first Chapter VII operations were conducted to eliminate a threat to the sovereignty of a member nation by the aggressive attack of another. The Korean War is arguably an example of this type of operation. During the late 1990s, Chapter VII began to be used to describe peace enforcement operations such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.

Command Post Exercise. In the ACOTA environment, the ramp-up exercise which takes place after a period of classroom instruction and before the CAX or MAPEX.

Commander's discussion. The after action review conducted to review the lessons learned during the course of a CPX/CAX for the benefit of the trainers, training unit commander, the staff, and the participants.

Common Staff Operational Skills training. Classroom training for trainers and the battalion command and staff. Typically, it consists of two days of common staff skills, three days of focused staff training on personnel, intelligence/information, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and for brigades and higher, PSYOPS.

Conflict Prevention Pool. Britain's peacekeeping assistance program in Africa, similar to ACRI. Like its American counterpart, the CPP depends on an interagency working group

within the British government. Britain has semi-permanent training teams in several Anglophone sub-Saharan countries and has made major contributions to ending the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Dislocated civilians. A generic term that refers to refugees and internally displaced persons.

Displaced persons. A generic term for refugees and internally displaced persons.

Former warring factions. The armed groups that fought for dominance in the country. Also referred to as the "parties", as in the parties to the Accord that agreed to peace and the insertion of the peacekeeping force.

Humanitarian Assistance Organizations. An umbrella term. These organizations can be categorized as follows:

(1)   UN organizations such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, etc.

(2)   International organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of the Red Cross, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, etc.

(3)   Multinational governmental organizations such as European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office, Organization of African Unity, Southern African Development Community, etc.

(4)   Bilateral governmental organizations such as U.S. Agency for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency, or the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, etc.

(5)   Faith-based organizations such as World Vision, United Jewish Appeal, Islamic World Relief, etc.

(6)   Multinational non-governmental organizations such as CARE, Save-the-Children, OXFAM, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders, the African Medical & Research Foundation, etc.

Internally displaced persons. Personnel displaced within their own country, not to be confused with refugees.

Interagency Working Group. The U.S. DoS and U.S. DoD organization in charge of the previous ACRI program.

Janus. The computer simulation program currently in use by Northrop Grumman for the ACOTA program.

Military Decision Making Process. This portion of classroom training that covers the development of an operations plan or operations order from mission receipt to orders production and dissemination.

Non-governmental organizations. The term NGOs is frequently used to refer to all humanitarian organizations, although it is not technically correct to refer to international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross as an NGO.

Private Voluntary Organizations. A term for a category of humanitarian assistance organizations.

Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix. The French peacekeeping assistance initiative in Africa commonly referred to as "RECAMP." It is similar to the U.S. ACOTA program and includes multinational seminars both in France and Africa as well as multinational command post and field exercises.

Refugees. Displaced persons situated outside their own national territory. Not to be confused with internally displaced persons, as refugees have a specific status under the Geneva Conventions.

Status of Forces Agreement. A legal document agreed upon at the diplomatic-political level between two nations, or between a nation and a multinational organization, which defines the legal status and jurisdiction over military personnel in forces deployed into the nation.

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XII.   Author's Curriculum Vitae

Summary	**Daniel G. Karis** – Lead Instructor and Senior Military Analyst ♦ Significant experience in military training, exercises, planning and operations. ♦ Skilled in computer-assisted training. ♦ 30+ years U.S. Army service (Infantry, Aviation, Military Police). ♦ Extensive experience in adult education/instruction.
Education	• A.B.D., Adult and Continuing Education, Kansas State University. • Certificate, United Nations Staff Officers Course. • M.A., International Relations, Salve Regina University. • Diploma, U.S. Army War College. • M.S., Adult and Continuing Education, Kansas State University. • M.M.A.S, Military Operations, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. • M.M.A.S., Military History, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. • M.S., Business Administration, Boston University. • Certificate, Advanced Investigations, CID Detective Training School, New Scotland Yard, Hendon, London, England. • B.S., Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Experience	▪ Ten years experience as a lead analyst and instructor for the ACOTA/ACRI program; planning and executing peacekeeping operations training in various African countries; and mentoring African military staff officers. ▪ Five years experience as exercise planner/trainer for Battle Command Training Program planning, conducting and evaluating training for military personnel with computer-assisted command post exercises. ▪ One year as military researcher/intelligence analyst in information operations for the Land Information Warfare Activity. ▪ Served as Director/Deputy Director – Department of Joint /Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. ▪ Chief, Theater Operations – U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. ▪ Chief, Plans and Exercises – Combined Field Army, Republic of Korea. ▪ Commander – Nuremberg Field Office, U.S. Army CID Command. ▪ Commander – Local Parole Company, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. ▪ Chief Investigations – U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. ▪ Criminal Investigator - U.S. Army CID Command, U.S.A. and Europe. ▪ Aero-Rifle Platoon Leader – 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. ▪ Commander - Project MASSTERS Test Company, Fort Hood, Texas. ▪ Mobile Advisory Team Leader - Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam. ▪ Executive Officer - 80th Company, 8th Infantry Battalion (NCOC), Fort Benning, Georgia.