

AN ANALYSIS OF HAMMARSKJÖLD'S THEORY OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY



BY
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A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations



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A Thesis

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An Analysis of Hammarskjöld's Theory of Preventive Diplomacy

Introduction

For almost fifty years, the containment of international conflict has been the major focus of the United Nations. The history books teach that military interventions and economic rewards often do more harm than good, proving it is easier to prevent conflict before it begins than to intervene in conflict once it has escalated to violence (Lindaman & Ward, 2004). Thus, in the effort to stop the suffering of millions of innocent people and put an end to the senseless violence that accompanies armed conflict, the expression "preventive diplomacy" finds purpose.

Conventional preventive diplomacy in its most simplest form centered on the idea of nations and governments dealing with each other on an administrative level aided by diplomats who specialized in political negotiation. From the Greek Revolution (1821-1832) to the Belgian Revolution (1830-1838) to the Armenian unrest in the Ottoman Empire (1878-1914), a reactive type of preventive diplomacy was employed to manage the violent conflict that arose during those periods. This type of preventive diplomacy was also referred to as ancient preventive diplomacy and collective preventive diplomacy (Steiner, 2004).

A more contemporary understanding of preventive diplomacy places social detection and early intervention of violent conflict at the vanguard of international politics. This places preventive diplomacy on par with crisis management and political negotiation (Cahill, 2004). Transformed by the Information Age and the advent of technology on the labor and economic markets, the new preventive diplomacy depends upon multidisciplinary resources for success. While conventional

preventive diplomacy was performed solely by heads of state, the new preventive diplomacy has come to be recognized as requiring an integrated effort by of multiple organizations and individuals around the globe (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Cahill, 2004).

The new preventive diplomacy resembles conventional diplomatic practice and uses a related repertoire of policy tools, including official negotiations, conflict mediation, intelligence gathering, and confidence-building measures. The new preventive diplomacy is celebrated for its emphasis on systematic early warning and early response. The professional literature includes numerous reports describing the strengths and limitations of tools such as early warning, sanctions, incentives, mediation, and power sharing as applied in conflict situations. Indeed, the strategy to focus on exchanges and collaboration among countries to reduce potential threats grew from Cold War policies that were intended to turn adversaries into partners for economic development and peace.

Preventive defense uses strategies of exchanges, technical collaboration, and joint military exercises to bring together military blocks from different countries together to work on problems of common concern. This challenges the skills of the men who act in the position of diplomat. In the past, the government officials who practiced reactive preventive diplomacy depended mainly on conflict negotiation skills. The new preventive diplomacy with its proactive perspective calls an expanded repertoire of skills, of which negotiation and mediation are just one part. Today's diplomats are required to maintain extensive information databases and social networking skills in order to deal effectively with the rapidly changing complexity of conflict management and international affairs.

This paper discusses preventive diplomacy as articulated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali and based on the work of Dag Hammarskjöld. Unlike many discussions of preventive diplomacy, this analysis includes examples of both successful peacekeeping missions and missed opportunities, in the belief that both are needed to gain a balanced understanding of the concept. This paper emphasizes process, not simply outcomes, in the ways in which preventive tools are and can be used to achieve peacekeeping goals.

New Preventive Diplomacy

Advocates for Growth

Dag Hammarskjöld

The concept of conflict prevention grew along with the establishment of the United Nations as evidenced by the fact that the founding treaty of the UN (Charter of the United Nations, 1945) specifies how to prevent conflict between nations. Diplomats, particularly the United Nations Secretary-General, set the international standard for modeling preventive diplomacy. Hammarskjöld, the second United Nations Secretary-General who served from 1953-1961, developed this concept during his career and became known as the dove of preventive diplomacy (Mall, 1969). It was in his 1960 Security Council report on South Africa that Hammarskjöld introduced the actual phrase *preventive diplomacy* for the first time.

The first positive action Hammarskjöld undertook on behalf of the UN was to intervene in the tension between China and United States. Hammarskjöld used his brand of peaceful negotiation to dissuade the government of China in 1954 to release 15 hostage American airmen who had been taken hostage during the

Korean War. The United States submitted to the general assembly a duty to resolve the situation of hostages between the US and the China and afterwards passed a resolution by which Hammarskjöld was able to conduct negotiations with Chinese authorities toward the liberation of the American hostages (Emery, 1966; Miller, 1961). Hammarskjöld inherited the challenge of working with the Congo's problems during a visit in January 1960 before the independence of the country.

Hammarskjöld was prepared for the issues the new government of Congo would face. He was aware from a previous visit that the Belgian government was unwilling to give autonomy to the Congo people and (Brausch, 1961; United Nations, 1985) used his power in the UN to find alternative solutions for the Congolese problem.

The outcome of the two-day long discussion that ensued was the vote on Resolution 143 (1960), which invited the Belgian troops to immediately retreat from Congo and also provided technical assistance to the then-current government.

Hammarskjöld took the destiny of the young republic of Congo in his hand and assembled troops comprised of a mix of men from Africa, Asia, Sweden, and Ireland to preserve order in Congo. He carefully defined the role of the UN troops as an impermanent force that would serve only until the local forces would be able to intervene by their own means (Dayal, 1976). By not taking sides in the conflict and by keeping his word that the preventive deployment of UN troops was only a temporary strategy, despite the extreme violence and human suffering that occurred, Hammarskjöld established the principles of preventive diplomacy as successful in conflict management and set a model for other struggling states to seek outside help.

Hammar skjöld worked diligently to end the tension in South Africa and the Congo. He networked extensively to meet people and make an impression on high-profile leaders who may influence the nations to find peace. In addition to national and international issues, constitutional crises arose in Congo when the heads of state faced dismissal from office and violent conflict erupted even further.

Administrative groups took over through *coup d'états* and political assassinations and massive human rights violations took place. With peacekeeping agreements and cease-fires, however, the use of preventive diplomacy and the UN presence contributed to stopping Katanga from seceding. Hammar skjöld knew the UN directive assigned to him by the Security Council would be extremely challenging, declaring outright that it might be very dangerous.

En route to a political meeting in Africa, Hammar skjöld died in a plane crash on September 17, 1961 (Hughes, 2001). Rumors circulated that the crash was an act of terrorism, and the lone survivor thought he heard an explosion just before the plane went down, but no official determination was ever made. Hammar skjöld set the benchmark for the resolution of internal and external conflict in both interstate and intra-state conflicts. He was a visionary ahead of his time whose philosophy of conflict resolution by preventive diplomacy set him apart as the father of modern day peacekeeping.

Part of Hammar skjöld's success as a diplomat and of his preventive diplomacy theory as well was that he offered a blend of Eastern-Western spirituality in his philosophical and psychological approach to both life and conflict resolution (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1990). Hammar skjöld's work contained elements of both

Eastern mysticism and Western science, which points to the multidisciplinary nature of preventive diplomacy theory (Hammarskjöld, 1966). Following humanistic theorists Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, Hammarskjöld employed principles of educational psychology in his preventive diplomacy regarding the voluntary nature of change, respect for others' self-worth, the open-mindedness of diversity, and the need for self-control over abusive speech and actions. Maslow, the founder of humanistic psychology, was deeply influenced by behavioral science and religion, while Rogers developed the concept of person-centered therapy and the basic core conditions necessary to facilitate meaningful relationships. These men drew upon similar characteristics of Taoist Buddhism to negotiate relationships and environments where the self-directive nature of man and man's inherent ability to learn prevailed.

Hammarskjöld regarded the UN as a mechanism that empowered nation-states and governments to implement anticipatory action, or preventive diplomacy, before crises could escalate into full-blown conflicts (Settel, 1966). The first UN peacekeeping force was deployed during Hammarskjöld's term and from this, preventive diplomacy was used to define the actions taken to prevent regional conflicts from becoming wars. Hammarskjöld's new preventive diplomacy became one of the central tools used by the United Nations in international conflict resolution. The concept of preventive diplomacy began to take shape after his death, but was buried by the Cold War until Boutros-Ghali and Annan brought it out into the open forty years later (Urquhart, 1972).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

At the end of the Cold War, Boutros-Ghali, the sixth United Nations Secretary-General (1992-1996) and the first candidate elected from Africa, further developed Hammarskjöld's concept of preventive diplomacy. During his term in office Boutros-Ghali submitted several influential reports to the UN that served as guidelines for peacekeeping operations. In his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali gave particular attention to preventive diplomacy as a peaceful means of conflict prevention by foresight. The most exhaustive definition of preventive diplomacy used today comes from Boutros-Ghali: *Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur* (1992).

Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992) affirmed Hammarskjöld's theory that the best application of diplomacy was to prevent tension before it escalated into conflict. In *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali stated that persons and agencies other than the Secretary-General of the United Nations may perform preventive diplomacy and that confidence-building measures were vital to managing conflict. *An Agenda for Peace* contains a section specifically on preventive diplomacy as *action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur* (Chapter III, para.20). With release of this document Boutros-Ghali invited discussion on economic and social developments that might threaten international peace and emphasized the responsibility that other organizations had in early warning. He

called for swift defensive action via preventive deployment of UN forces in providing a buffer between opposing parties.

In *Agenda for Development* (1994), Boutros-Ghali described the concept of preventive development to advance global consensus on the importance of economic and social development and as the best way to achieve lasting peace. This work also identified several components necessary for successful implementation: 1) confidence building, 2) early warnings based on information gathering and sharing, and 3) preventive deployment and the use of demilitarized zones. In the 1995 *A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali emphasized both quantitative and qualitative changes in international affairs with the end of Communism.

An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) was first proposed in response to a call by members of the United Nations Security Council at the end of the Cold War to discuss how the UN may be more effective. Shortly after releasing this document, the UN faced problems in Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia, which prompted the creation of the 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. The *Supplement* discussed the changing nature of current conflict, e.g., ethnic violence and violence within States rather than between States, and strengthened the meaning of preventive diplomacy as a concept tightly intertwined with peacemaking in that both concepts involved taking action to bring antagonistic parties to agreement through nonviolent means.

Kofi Annan

Kofi Annan, the seventh United Nations Secretary-General who served from 1997-2006 and the second candidate elected from Africa, built upon his predecessor's definition of preventive diplomacy. In his 1999 *Annual Report on the Work of the Organization*, Annan emphasized the rising global challenges of preventing conflict and natural disaster. Annan stressed the importance of shifting from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention was essential for reducing the burden of wars and disasters. He stated that preventive diplomacy was a central component of preventive action (Sato, 2003). The particularly devastating conflicts in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur challenged the use of preventive diplomacy and prompted the phrase *preventive action* to be added to future peace discourse, which illustrated the multiple components involved in peacekeeping, i.e., preventive disarmament, preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance, preventive development, etc. (Annan 2002a; United Nations, 1999).

Following in the footsteps of Boutros-Ghali, Annan repeatedly emphasized the importance of conflict prevention, including the elimination of the root causes of conflict and the need for a global integrated approach. In *Preventing War and Disaster: A Growing Global Challenge* (1999), Annan stated that "the United Nations has long argued that prevention is better than cure; that we must address the root causes, not merely their symptoms" and that "[o]ur aspiration has yet to be matched by effective action" (para. 1). Annan's 2000 Millenium Report similarly relayed strong sentiments about long-term conflict prevention as had Boutros-Ghali's earlier *Agenda for Peace* (1992), reflecting the ongoing effort to shape the future of the United Nations.

In his 2003 *Address to the General Assembly*, Annan announced the appointment of a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The purpose of the reform panel was to conduct an in-depth study on global threats and challenges to International peace and security. Among the reform changes recommended by the High Level Panel's 2005 report, *A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility* was the creation of a new intergovernmental body known as the Peacebuilding Commission.

The concept of the Peacebuilding Commission gained further support with *In Larger Freedom* (2005), in which Annan noted a "gaping hole" in UN efforts to assist Member States in the transition from the immediate post-conflict phase to long-term reconstruction and sustainable development. The Peacebuilding Commission, one of Annan's greatest legacies before leaving the office of Secretary-General, was approved by the largest gathering of world leaders in history.

Relation to Peacekeeping

Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping go hand-in-hand to support peace operations. *Peace operations* is the general expression that encompasses preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, as well as peace-building, peace-making, and peace-enforcement efforts conducted in support of United Nations' objectives to establish and maintain peace. In fact, the UN was not created to perform peacekeeping operations. The term peacekeeping is not even mentioned in the UN Charter. The UN was formed to prevent wars and, in essence, conduct preventive diplomacy.

Technically speaking, the UN peace operations involve bringing in UN forces after conflicting parties agree to the terms of a peace, with the objective being to maintain the agreed-upon peace. The current understanding of the stages of conflict and the best ways to manage the aftermath of violent conflict have evolved since Dag Hammarskjöld initially developed and implemented the use of military forces in a non-hostile manner, e.g., peacekeeping. From the first use of peacekeeping forces in 1948 through several conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, the UN was able to effectively organize and use peacekeeping. It was for this reason that the UN was awarded the Nobel peace Prize in 1998.

The rising number of peacekeeping operations in recent years had justifiably increased the importance of post-conflict peace building. In *Agenda for Peace* (1992), Boutros-Ghali defined post-conflict peace building as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." With *In Larger Freedom* (2005), Annan also supported the importance of integrated peace building with his proposal for the Peacebuilding Commission.

As armed conflicts became more complicated over the years, the definition of peacekeeping was stretched by the assignment of peace-building operations to United Nations and then also to civilian and local organizations. Peacekeeping can be thought of as the second phase of the peace process, distinct from the more complex long-term peace building. According to the United States military's Joint Doctrine (2003), peacekeeping involves military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate

implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peace building, peace-making, and peace-enforcement are all interrelated and indispensable to peace support operations (Druckman, 1997; Harleman, 2003). In practice peace-building has been packaged together with operations of demobilization, control of light weapons, progress of the criminal justice and law enforcement system, scrutiny of human rights, and reorganization of elections as well as social and economic development (Jeong, 2005; Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000). Peace-building can also be described as the post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (DOD, 2003). However, in the spirit of reform and ongoing evaluation, the United States military has updated its definition to include components of security, humanitarian assistance, development, and governance.

International peace-making complements the UN's peacekeeping and peace building functions. In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), Boutros-Ghali expanded on the principles of peace building and then defined its essential goal as "the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace" (para. 49). His interpretation of peace-making, however, involved the diplomatic community assembling parties to discuss the core issues of their dispute. This definition states that it is the disposition of the diplomatic community to intervene by peaceful means during times of conflict according to the UN Charter, Section VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes (1945). The United States military's version of peace-making described it as the process of

diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other form of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it (DOD, 2003).

Peace enforcement is also different from peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali recognized that at times parties to a conflict might not abide by a peace agreement and would require the presence of a neutral military force to maintain the peace. According to United States military definition, peace enforcement involves the use of armed force to separate parties in a conflict and to create a cease-fire that does not exist (DOD, 2003). Consequently, Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace outlined peace-enforcement as the middle-ground in conflict management, which would ideally only be performed by an outside party recognized as neutral and only to maintain an existing peace.

Peacekeeping uses non-coercive tactics to work toward peace. Peace enforcement involves the use of armed force by active military who sacrifice neutrality to enforce a cease fire that may or may not be desired by the parties in conflict. For the most part, peacekeepers are generally welcomed by countries in crisis. Peace enforcers, on the other hand, face issues of state sovereignty and require an International mandate to work toward the same resolution of conflict. History has proven that peacekeeping may be a valuable tool in preventing the escalation of a conflict; however, peace enforcement is not a widely favored method of preventing the spread of conflict. Peace enforcement, or Chapter VII operations, are widely used by the UN Security Council, yet not all countries agree to the use of their military forces in an enforcement operation.

Limitations of Preventive Diplomacy

Rhetorical Differences

Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992 signified the beginning of the advance in peacekeeping and peace enforcement issues and a long series of discussions that reverberated loudly throughout the International community. As stated in the *Agenda* and many other documents by Boutros-Ghali, preventive diplomacy consists of measures aimed at preventing disputes and quarrels between parties. Boutros-Ghali emphasized preventive diplomacy as a peaceful means of conflict prevention by foresight, where preventive was understood to mean active, rather than reactive diplomacy. All organizational definitions converge when it comes to the goals conflict resolution and management, but there is often disagreement on the terminology and the interpretation of principles used to establish and maintain peace.

Early texts described issues of confidence-building measures, security and disarmament without specific reference to preventive diplomacy, e.g., the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris, the 1992 Helsinki Document, and other CSCE documents. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was the landmark accord that assigned human rights the status of a fundamental principle in International relations. This accord resulted in the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (since renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to monitor and encourage compliance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act was the code

of Cold War management and, while it served as the precursor to change in International relations, it did not include preventive diplomacy in its text.

The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe was established in response to the end of the Cold War. It set forth guidelines for realization of a free democratic International community based on the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act. The Charter offered little concrete functions for crisis or conflict management and no operational capacities other than observation of military activities. It did, however, evidence the underlying theory of preventive diplomacy in the statements *human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law and their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government* (1990, pg. 3). However, preventive diplomacy was not specifically mentioned.

The 1992 Helsinki Document did not include preventive diplomacy in its text, but did include preventive measures together with early warning within the context of crisis and conflict (III/1-62). The guiding principles of preventive diplomacy as presented by the UN were present, but specific references to preventive deployment, preventive measures, political crisis management, and resolution of conflict were omitted from the Helsinki text.

The three means of preventive diplomacy as understood by UN definition include early warning by the observation and collection of factual timely information on emerging crises, a term with which most organizational texts are in agreement. The second means includes confidence building measures, which are interpreted differently from those described in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent

CSCE documents, such as the 1990 Paris Charter (Ghebali, 1998). The third means of preventive deployment is a source of much debate and not promoted in any documents but the UN *Agenda for Peace*.

Even Boutros-Ghali's revolutionary *Agenda for Peace* (1992) contains some ambiguity in its wording. The document approaches the term *prevention* from the perspective of defusing *potential* conflicts as well as from Hammarskjöld's approach of stopping *nascent* conflicts as early as possible, neither of which two perspectives support the basic meaning of prevention, which involves *anticipation*. In Boutros-Ghali's definition of preventive diplomacy, e.g., "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur" (1992, pg. 13), the latter clause contradicts the former, confusing the meanings between prevention and containment.

Another limitation to the growth of preventive diplomacy in international relations involves disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion of *use of armed force* in both principle and definition. Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace* specifically described the preventive deployment of military forces as a preventive strategy. Other documents precisely excluded the phrase *use of armed forces* and placed the meaning of preventive diplomacy in an explicitly non-coercive context (Thompson and Gutlove, 1994). The texts of the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Documents, for example, described methods of peacekeeping based on nonpartisanship and the neutrality doctrine based on the thought that armed mediation was contrary to the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The Sovereignty Norm

Since the creation of the nation state in the 1600s, the basic principle of international relations has been the sovereignty of that state. There is much controversy in its application. The UN Charter sanctifies the sovereign State *as the fundamental entity of the international community* and explicitly states (Article 2 (7)) that *the UN shall not interfere with the domestic affairs of member nations*.

Opponents to preventive diplomacy voiced concerns about what they consider to be ethical violations of principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the respect of sovereignty. Many nations in conflict in the undeveloped South fought preventive actions, claiming non-intervention and the use of armed force without consent violated their government's control and authority over their own territories.

While the UN Charter supports non-interference in domestic affairs, it also provides an exception to the rule. The principle of noninterference does not apply to peace-enforcement measures taken under Section VII where there is a clause allowing forced interference by the UN where the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs is not applicable. For example, UN sanctions were imposed on South Africa because apartheid was regarded as a threat to peace and the use of force would stop encroachment by bordering countries. Intervention in Somalia was based on a similar interpretation.

Most of the warring nation-states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are fairly isolated from modern society and largely unfamiliar with Western norms based on liberal democracy and private enterprise. In the midst of the revolutions and bloodshed and violence, these nations automatically rejected UN intervention. Over

time, however, as more of these nations decolonized and gained their independence, they joined the UN and changed their point of view on democratic principles and human rights. With the interpretation of sovereignty that had been set in stone during the Cold War slowly crumbling, but not yet eradicated as evidenced by the issues in China, Taiwan, and Tibet or Iran and Saudi Arabia, the fruits of Hammarskjöld's humanistic perspective took root in his advocacy for preventive diplomacy.

It is important to note that any application of the sovereignty norm reflects a process, rather than a static state. Sovereignty has no inherent meaning by itself, but is an inter-subjective process involving the rules of the international community and the nation-states. A change in one affects the other. As the concept of preventive diplomacy evolved, it accompanied a shift in the direction of individualism. This trend shifted attention away from the privileges of national sovereignty and toward human rights and the victims of war. The values of humanitarianism and self-determination emphasized by Hammarskjöld during his term in the UN are slowly displacing the norm of state sovereignty in response to the changing needs of society. These changes are supported by the existence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.

Hammarskjöld's support of preventive diplomacy anticipated the possibility of intra-state conflict in Africa. However, while the UN Charter provides guidelines for managing conflict between nations, it has not specifically addressed the civil or internal nature of today's more ethnic conflicts. Boutros-Ghali's 1992 agenda referenced the changing context of modern times and acknowledged the importance

of sovereignty and integrity of the State as crucial to international progress, yet also stated that the concept of absolute and exclusive sovereignty was outdated and unrealistic.

Given that the confidence building measures and early warning components of preventive diplomacy identified in the agenda assumed wars between nations and not intra-state conflicts, the development of preventive diplomacy takes on added importance.

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Bush administration's declaration of war on terrorism, the unilateral and military nature of the US response faced great scrutiny by the international community. The Bush administration determined to reconstruct the norm of sovereignty, particularly as it pertained to state sponsors of terrorism. The US reaction to the events of 9/11 was to declare that nation-states who supported terrorists forfeited the sovereign right to internal autonomy over their own territories in that they had not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty.

Since 2001 the United States Government has been attempting to convince the International community to change its understanding of the sovereignty norm regarding the right to non-intervention, as evidenced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to that time, there was some effort to mold international position on rogue states, but the point was not argued that these nation-states had forfeited sovereignty. An emphasis toward the promotion of sovereignty rather than the protection of sovereignty may be beneficial in this regard.

Post September 11 attacks, the Bush administration declared North Korea, Iraq, and Iran to be rogue states. The popular definition of a rogue state was a Third World state that possessed weapons of mass destruction, sponsored terrorism, and did not abide by International norms of civilized behavior. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush took that definition one step further when he proclaimed, *States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.* Critics of the United States rogue doctrine claim inconsistency and lack of justifiability in its application. For example, for example, Iraq was labeled a rogue state for its invasion of Kuwait, but Indonesia was not despite its invasion of East Timor. On the constructive side, however, public identification as an Axis member has benefitted disarmament negotiations.

The transition in sovereignty can only be understood in relation to the parallel shift in human rights and humanitarianism. During the entire Cold War period, the expectations of UN peace operations stayed the same. The maintenance of international peace and security and the protection of sovereignty were the main UN objectives. After the Cold War and the massive violations of human rights and gross humanitarian disasters, support for the protection and development of human rights found its way into the political talks of governments in both the Global South and the Global North. In response, the UN added the principles of defense of dignity and the basic right to life to its future discourses on conflict resolution.

With ethnic intra-state conflict occurring more than interstate conflict, peacekeeping objectives have become less defined and the principles of state sovereignty and human rights frequently are invoked. In intra-state conflicts the

emphasis on external threats (e.g., superpowers, foreign powers) and external concerns (e.g., political independence, territorial integrity) have been replaced with less identifiable internal threats (e.g., poverty, disease, environmental degradation) and needs (e.g., education, employment, training). The shift in meaning and content of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping objectives accompanied the newer focus on *internal* state sovereignty. This internal sovereignty is concerned with nations in conflict developing concepts of free and fair elections, national reconciliation, repatriation, civil peace, and sustainable development.

Neutrality Principle

The United Nations, the highest political authority and role model for world order, protects the humanitarian inviolability of relief agencies during armed conflict. The UN guarantees that relief personnel, property, and efforts will not come under attack. However, the sanctity of humanitarian aid provided or authorized by the UN depends upon neutrality and impartiality for success. The application of the neutrality principle in humanitarian interventions and conflict prevention requires constant scrutiny and assessment and is only as valid as people's understanding of the concept.

During Hammarskjöld's term, parties in conflict were quick to ensure UN neutrality, which was accomplished through the requirement of consent. The UN was not allowed to take sides or pass judgments and could not intervene without the express consent of all parties. Impartiality and neutrality carried the same meaning then. In reality today they mean two different things. Neutrality focuses on warring parties, while impartiality focuses on the victims as individuals. Neutrality is the

assurance that humanitarian agencies will not support military forces on either side of a conflict. Impartiality means that aid is rendered to the civilian population of each state without discrimination and based only on need.

Humanitarian aid often accompanies peace-enforcement efforts. Intervention in Somalia was the first instance of massive military intervention by UN members without invitation from the host-state that provided the link between humanitarian aid and use of force to restore peace. The challenge was that to promote internal sovereignty, the UN had to ignore external sovereignty and intervene in domestic matters of state regardless of the public debate that grew from concerns over neutrality and impartiality.

Despite the expectations that the UN remain neutral and impartial, there is a political nature to humanitarian relief. Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report questioned the coordination between humanitarian relief agencies and peacekeeping objectives and called for assurances of neutrality and impartiality, consequently recognizing the difference between the two terms. The neutrality once practiced by the Red Cross and other relief agencies may inadvertently benefit the aggressors and terrorists more than it helps the victims of war. There are unintended consequences of humanitarian aid. For example, people in crisis can become dependent on foreign assistance and grow cynical regarding the motives for its provision. These fears and insecurities can challenge the ethics of neutrality and impartiality.

Elements of Preventive Diplomacy

Boutros-Ghali (1992 & 1995) furthered Hammarskjöld's model of preventive diplomacy by outlining three elements central to managing armed conflict: 1) early

warning, 2) confidence building measures, and 3) preventive deployment. *Early warning* involves the observation and collection of factual evidence and intelligence on emerging and developing crises. *Confidence-building measures* are actions taken to show good faith in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict between peoples. *Preventive deployment* involves the use of military force in areas of crisis or emerging conflict at the request of the parties involved.

Early Warning

To quote Ben Franklin, *an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure*. History has shown that the economic and social burdens of armed conflicts are far-reaching and non-discriminating. Everyone suffers, not just the direct victims of war. A review of the literature revealed a variety of preventive tools and strategies that could be used to stop the massive destruction and human suffering associated with crises and conflicts. These works unanimously agreed that achieving early warning was the most important step in managing conflict.

Preventive action to stop crises from erupting into violent conflicts depends on knowing where and why conflicts might occur. Accurate assessments and credible early warnings of potential conflicts may lead to effective management. Early warning requires several types of information: the conflict history, status of the opposing parties, and information on ethnic cultures and their particular grievances. It requires cooperation on the part of the intelligence community and a consistent advocacy in order to be effective. The information collected is then analyzed to provide a model for risk assessment and decision-making.

What constitutes early warning is different for each entity. What is important are the mechanisms to monitor international crises and make use of the early warning information before crises become violent conflicts. It is also important to be able to differentiate between the early warning signals of interstate versus modern day ethnic conflict. The literature described different analytical methods and models for explaining and predicting conflict. The identifiable internal threats (e.g., poverty, disease, famine, environmental degradation) and needs (e.g., education, employment, training) create a tremendous number of variables that compete for attention, yet must be considered in order for outcomes to have any predictive validity.

For example, with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s there was sufficient early warning information available to have implemented preventive action (Adelman, 1999; Adelman and Suhrke, 1996; Guilmette, 1995; Gurr and Harff, 1996), but aid did not arrive in time to prevent bloodshed. According to an investigative panel that researched the Rwanda incident, the burden of the blame for the massacre is to be placed on the United Nations Security Council, the United States, France and Belgium for their combined failure to prevent or adequately intervene in the conflict. Former Secretary-General Annan publicly accepted institutional and personal blame for the genocide, which was initially ignored by world powers, stating that *the International community is guilty of sins of omission* (2004).

An effective early warning system is dependent upon the cooperation of multiple personnel in multiple organizations, e.g., universities, national governments, regional

organizations, and offices in the United Nations, to collect the data for possible preventive action. Humanitarian relief agencies and NGOs are particularly valuable for collecting information needed for early warning. The individual employees provide aid through their agencies at the grass-roots level and may obtain crucial information about possible conflicts at the beginning stages. The neutrality and impartiality given to humanitarian relief agencies adds to the credibility and validity of the information gathered by these personnel, which may ultimately speed up the political decision to intervene.

In essence, early warning and early response mechanisms are part of the peace building process. Peace building revolves around social, political, and economic post-conflict actions intended to strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict. The early warning components need to be incorporated into the peace building design along with operations of demobilization, control of light weapons, reform of the judicial system, scrutiny of human rights, and government reorganization (Jeong, 2005). The application of the principles of early warning by Member States would contribute to the States' capacity to cope with refugees, relieve starvation, treat disease, and educate their people for sustainable development.

Confidence-Building

Confidence-building measures are preventive techniques designed to decrease tensions and lessen the chance that a violent conflict might erupt due to a misunderstanding, mistake, or mis-interpretation of an action or communication. These preventive activities and strategies are intended to lower uncertainty, reduce

anxiety, eliminate misperceptions, and increase confidence in both the overall peace operation and a nation-state's ability to successfully achieve and maintain peace objectives. When all parties have confidence and trust in the other's intentions and abilities, healthy relationships can be forged and maintained.

Confidence-building measures are activities designed to prevent conflicts by engendering good will and changing perceptions. For example, the systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centers, arrangements for the reciprocal exchange of information, and the monitoring of regional arms agreements are activities designed to build trust between states.

A review of the confidence building measures literature, in particular the United States military, United Nations, and CSCE archives, identified several types of confidence building measures that have been practiced by many countries for many years. One measure involves troop movements and exercises, such as one nation or country notifying another of aircraft operations and flights near sensitive and border areas. Another invites the exchange of information about military budgets, equipment, manpower, or policies. Information may be exchanged directly or through a third party. Another confidence building measure involves personnel, such as inviting observers to maneuvers or exercises, hosting university exchange students, or placing permanent liaison at major locations. Still other strategies may involve creating a central data registry, developing training procedures for military techniques, and determining the appropriateness of different types of weapons. Non-

military confidence measures are also coming into vogue, including search and rescue missions, disaster relief, and hurricane tracking.

Preventive Deployment

Political will is central to effective preventive deployment. Even when early warning is achieved, international commitment and political will are necessary in order to send troops preventively into a conflict zone. The spirit of preventive diplomacy lies in the art of prediction, with the objective of prevention being to stop problems from becoming crises and stop crises from becoming conflicts before the situations get extreme. The idea is to use the early warning information to act early. However, sometimes the lack of urgency in the early non-crisis stages imparts less importance to an impending crisis and makes it harder for peacekeepers to ready the political and military support necessary for taking early action.

Almost fifty years ago, Hammarskjöld anticipated both the strengths of and need for preventive deployment. He understood preventive diplomacy as the passive use of military force sent into danger zones or contested territories to prevent the spread of violent conflict. Today, the UN Security Council is usually the agency responsible for deploying third party troops preventively, as a deterrent - before a conflict erupts into violence. Preventive deployment can be a difficult action to sell to political sponsors because it is expensive, involves uncertain outcomes, and above all involves risk. It is controversial, and many people are not able to grasp the potential price of inaction.

Successful preventive deployment forestalls the escalation of an emerging conflict. The presence of third party troops on the ground comforts local populations

and prevents local human rights abuses. Preventive deployment is different from traditional peacekeeping, which basically supported or enforced a political agreement that had already been reached. Preventive deployment may occur without a peace settlement. The first and only preventive deployment mission in the history of the UN took place in Macedonia in 1993, and that occurred with the consent of the Macedonian government. The main participants are volunteers of front-line military units who come from troop-contributing countries. The military ranks include both infantry and specialized personnel, such as hospital, movement control, or engineering units.

In addition to the lack of political will inhibiting its use, preventive deployment is also costly. For this reason, it is imperative to have First World military forces with heavy back-up support, extensive logistics, modern monitoring and surveillance technologies and, in some cases, offensive capabilities. Preventive deployment, though, is normally considered only for situations of emerging threat, such as a crisis in its pre-violent conflict phase. Preventive deployment can also be used to reinforce cease-fire violations and keep violent conflict from becoming worse in situations that are not completely resolved. In these cases troops can be deployed to keep the peace or the mandate for preventive forces already on the ground can be extended.

While peacekeeping involves the deployment of International military forces with the consent of both conflicting parties, preventive deployment involves unilateral consent and acceptance by only one party to the conflict, typically the victim of aggression or violence. Preventive deployment can achieve results in inter-state, intra-state, factional or community-based conflicts and has the potential to get to the

root causes of a conflict, such as local violence, tension between opposing parties, border incursions, drug dealing, and arms smuggling.

The lack of political will that inhibits the growth of preventive deployment strategies exists in all institutions to a certain extent. It is much more notable in the superpowers. Like all institutions, the UN has weaknesses, but incurs great blame for its inaction, when the lack of political will actually resides with its member states. There have been instances where there were identifiable points when international entities may have implemented preventive intervention, but did not, which resulted in mass violence and these situations are studied by researchers extensively. On the other hand, there have been some ethnic conflicts that did not result in senseless death and destruction and where preventive diplomacy played a key role in preserving the peace.

Hammar skjöld Influence

On the United Nations

Days after his arrival in office in 1952, Hammar skjöld effectuated important changes in the directory of the UN organization. He placed great emphasis on the role that the secretary must play at the top of the United Nations hierarchy.

Hammar skjöld felt the organization must serve as tool of negotiation to resolve conflict instead of merely being a physical location for discussions (Cordier & Foote, 1965). With these changes Hammar skjöld implicated conflict resolution on the United Nations Charter in such a way that empowered the office of the Secretary-General to engage directly with heads of states, first, as a means of conflict

negotiation, and then in discussion, second, when conflicts arose. Hammarskjöld lived up to his title as the *dove of preventive diplomacy* (Mall, 1969).

After acceptance of his new post within the secretariat, Hammarskjöld established new structures that expanded the Secretary-General ability to make decisions in emergencies without first consulting the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. Under the administration of the secretariat, Hammarskjöld carried increasing responsibilities, which allowed him to interact frequently with matters requiring global diplomacy. One particularly notable accomplishment was the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that intervened during the Suez Canal Crisis. Hammarskjöld successfully avoided escalation of conflicts around the world through different approaches with countries in crisis. This can be evidenced through his negotiations with China and the United States for hostages, in the crisis of the Suez Canal, and in Israel as well as in the Congo. The cross-cultural nature of the diplomatic strategies used were just part of his growing theory on preventive diplomacy.

On African Crises

At the creation of the United Nations in 1945, most of Africa was under colonization by foreign countries. In the beginning, only two independent countries out of fifty possible represented African interests at the General Assembly of the United Nations. The two countries in question, Liberia and Ethiopia, were independent long before talk of creating the UN charter began (Hoopes, 1922). Only two other African countries, Ghana and Guinea, promoted African issues at the UN. With the serial decolonization and independence of other African nations, many new

nations became eligible for membership in the UN. Nation-states who had once accused the UN of violations of the sovereignty norm and of the neutrality principle during violent struggles, became eager to ally themselves with countries who prized international peace and security.

In the 1960s, many sub-Saharan countries obtained independent sovereignty from foreign powers, such as France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain. Under Hammarskjöld's reign, newly independent African countries were invited and welcomed to participate in UN membership. While UN membership had been off limits to these countries in the past, their independence became a tool for easy access to an international system of justice, commerce, and governance. General Assembly debates that had previously focused only on issues pertinent to Western civilization forced the hegemony of white patriarchal privilege to vote on issues of importance to the Global South (O'Sullivan, 2003).

In light of the increase in African countries adhering to UN Charters, Hammarskjöld took a personal interest in the quality-of-life issues surrounding education, healthcare, and sustainable development in Africa. During his time office, he personally toured 21 African countries (United Nations, 1959; 1960) to observe, network, and develop relationships. In keeping with his humanistic belief in the self-directive capacity of mankind, Hammarskjöld supported the auto-determination of the African peoples to move beyond their limitations (King & Hobbins, 2003). Hammarskjöld's dedication and intense involvement in negotiating the African conflicts is proof positive of his belief in the capability and stability of the nations of

Africa to create independent countries with democratic governments and viable economies.

Hammar-skjöld's authority as Secretary-General for the UN was bounded by the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France. A lack of support on his proposals in assembly rendered him less able to perform conflict negotiation duties out in the field. During the Cold War, the US and Russia disagreed on many issues and the competition between the superpowers left a sort of vacuum or holes in world leadership. These holes in leadership served as a diversion of sorts for the African uprisings and coincidentally helped Hammar-skjöld as he practiced preventive diplomacy with the situation in Congo.

In 1960 Congo became independent from Belgium rule under which it had been colonized since 1908. At the dawn of sovereignty, Katanga (a province in Congo) attempted unsuccessfully to detach from the governing rule on June 29, 1960 (Boulden, 1962). Soon after autonomy of Congo on July 11, 1960, Katanga proclaimed independence for its territory (Gerard-Libois, 1966). After the new head of state of the new Republic of Katanga took office, however, insurrections continued to take place in the region causing senseless death and destruction. Engaging in the preventive deployment of troops, the Belgian army intervened to protect its people who lived in the area after the independence. This preventive action, however, was seen as an attempt to interfere in political matters of state and as a violation of Congo's sovereignty (Cordier and Foote, 1965; Okumu, 1963).

Katanga had become the major resource of the new Congolese economy. From a strategic standpoint, Lumumba's secession of this region could have been fatal for the Congolese economy. The new leader of the Katanga nation did not practice neutrality or impartiality in his leadership and favored the companies that mined natural resources of the country. As a result, Tshombe benefited by total support and protection from Belgium. Eventually Tshombe's assumption of naturalizing the mines was met with severe disapproval in a relationship that was not stable previously. The divergence between the two leaders led the country into conflict that continued unabated even after achieving independence (Cordier & Foote, 1965).

During Hammarskjöld's first term he strongly pushed for the creation of an international professional and technical civil service within the UN for new nations that lacked competent government officials. He had considered the possibility of the need for years of heavy UN involvement in the political affairs of Congo and developed an agreement that identified a long-term UN presence in Africa. Under the agreement, the UN would supply the Congo's government with experts in ten fields from finance to public health. Under the rubric of forward-thinking and preventive action, the guilt over the conflicts was able to be lessened and destruction was transformed into something more healthy.

Hammarskjöld had anticipated the needs of these nation-states who were in the process of decolonization. He predicted they would need help and preventively orchestrated hundreds of UN and World Health Organization technicians to work in the Congo and provide early warning. Through preventive diplomacy, which allowed

him to anticipate the future with intent to prevent more violence, Hammarskjöld's goals for Africa involved more than just shifting troops from one hot-spot in the Congo to the next. He created a peace agenda and worked to protect it, from one carefully chosen objective to the next.

Faced with ongoing criticism and accusations about violations of the norm of sovereignty, Hammarskjöld held his position. He repeatedly stated that the peacekeeping mission in Katanga was only to replace Belgian troops with UN troops. He promised African leaders that when the Belgians were gone, if Katanga still wanted to secede, the UN troops would not interfere. This meant that if Lumumba and his military army fought to possess Katanga again, that the UN forces under its orders from the Security Council would be obligated to not interfere. During this period, Hammarskjöld retained a position of neutrality and impartiality and did not side with any parties in conflict.

By the time Hammarskjöld became the second Secretary-General of the UN, many theorists, philosophers, and scholars had helped shaped his vision for African peace, which prompted the new beginning for African nations and peoples. Hammarskjöld's desire to revitalize was present in the text of his speech to the University of Somalia where he said, "You create, and I know you will create, the African personality as part of the picture of mankind today" (Hammarskjöld, 1966, pg. 109).

The Legacy of Preventive Diplomacy

Without doubt, the most important legacy offered by preventive diplomacy is the higher quality of life and assurance of international peace and security. Pre-UN

peace operations, neither of these factors was available to citizens other than of the world superpowers.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

Modeling Hammarskjöld's method of preventive diplomacy, more organizations have come to depend upon conflict negotiation to resolve their differences. These organizations have contributed to what has become known as Track 3 diplomacy. Track 3 diplomacy refers to a people-to-people type of diplomacy, as opposed to government-to-government or government-to-politician negotiations. Track 3 diplomacy is undertaken by both individuals and private groups from international non-government organizations. These representatives promote specific causes, universal ideals and norms, and social change. Track 3 diplomacy typically involves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and advocating for people who are marginalized from political power centers and require outside assistance effect positive change (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000).

The NGO groups in Europe and the United States involved with peace talks include: International Alert, The Conflict Management Group, Search for Common Ground, International Crisis Group, The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, and The Carter Center's International Negotiation Network. Negotiators affiliated with such organizations are trained in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution skills and committed to be an intermediary for parties wishing to resolve differences by peaceful means (Carnegie Commission, 1997; Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000).

The Carter Center Organization has worked toward promoting democracy to ensure the greater well being of the poor and disadvantaged by arranging conflict

mediation. The organization has been involved with monitoring elections where competing parties in the election could not find common grounds for negotiations. Most notably, the Carter Center monitored elections in Nicaragua and Korea and was present during the government elections of several African countries (Taulbee & Creekmore, 2003).

International Alert has assisted African countries to preserve peace and economic stability. Countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia, and the Republic Democratic of Congo have been the main zones of turbulence on the African continent. Through intensive monitoring, research, and discussion, International Alert has enumerated the patterns of Africa conflict problems and offered solutions that may help Africa to counter instability. Democratization of the people on any continent has always been a prerequisite to the prevention or intervention of armed conflict with the promotion of human rights, the liberty of the press, and the freedom of the judicial system (Marnika, 1995).

On Peacekeepers

The value of peacekeepers in resolving international disputes is undeniable. According to the 2005 *Human Security Report* published by the University of British Columbia, the number of armed conflicts worldwide has dropped 40% since 1992. The results of this comprehensive three-year study revealed evidence of declines in armed conflicts, genocides, human rights abuse, military coups, and international crises. The Report emphasized the importance of the UN in promoting International conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace building activities in driving the reduction in wars.

Since the United Nations' creation in 1945, the number of peacekeeping missions has continued to grow in direct proportion with the demands placed on peace operations around the globe. As of 2007, the UN deployed approximately 140,000 UN and non-UN troops on international peacekeeping missions (Global Peace Operations, 2007). UN peacekeeping missions following a mandate depend upon a combination of unarmed military observers and armed troops from around the world that together are known as the *peacekeeping force*. These contingents vary in skills and capabilities, policies and procedures, as well as in knowledge of peacekeeping and humanitarian issues from state to state. The UN military corps, referred to as *the Blue Helmets*, is tasked with providing security for specific Security Council mandates. They also provide protection for observers, monitors, and relief agency personnel providing assistance (United Nations 1985; 2000). Blue Helmets provide a highly-publicized UN presence in war-torn countries, yet are often criticized for perceived violations of neutrality and impartiality.

Without the benefit of UN protection in the field, humanitarian assistance would be abused, local governments corrupted, and terrorist factions born. Boutros-Ghali's 1997 note to the General Assembly raised arguments about an integrated approach to disarmament and withdrawal of humanitarian aid to lessen the pressures on peacekeepers and relief workers. UN Members help in this regard. Because Member States retain national command over their own volunteers, they scrutinize the details of a mission and ongoing conditions in a conflict to ensure their troops' safety.

A peacekeeping force follows the same chain-of-command as a regular military force. Peacekeepers on mission are commanded by a force commander, who remains an active duty member of his/her parent armed forces while also being a paid employee of the UN. Civilian police officers work alongside UN military forces during a mission. They serve as advisors for the military corps and collect information for early warning, while ensuring the protection of human rights of the innocents during conflict (Ford, 2004).

Civilian peacekeeper assignments are multiple and varied. These volunteers work at the grass-roots level in the field and are dependent for protection on the UN forces and for reaching peace objectives on the soundness of the mandate. Different from Military Observers in the field, civilian peacekeepers also observe and monitor crisis conditions. They contribute their findings to the early warning process of military troops and observers and help by managing supplies, health care, courier services, food services, and personnel administration, among other tasks. Civilian peacekeepers are vital in organizing and supervising elections, reporting human rights violations, helping new leaders with democracy, and working with the surviving victims of war (United Nations, 2003).

Conclusion

Preventive diplomacy is a conceptual and analytical framework, which flourished in the search for an alternative security paradigm with the end of the Cold War and then evolved to deal with current International issues. Preventive diplomacy is a proactive rather than reactive policy designed to realize International peace and security. Preventive diplomacy resembles traditional diplomatic practice and uses a

similar repertoire of conflict management and policy tools. Its toolbox includes official and Track 3 negotiations, conflict mediation, humanitarian assistance for sustainable development, and early warning, confidence building, and preventive deployment measures.

Preventive diplomacy is possible, complicated, and necessary. The realistic question is not whether or not to get involved, but when and how. As challenging as the implementation of preventive diplomacy can be, the onset of mass death and destruction transforms the nature of violent conflict in ways that make organizational cooperation and swift resolution essential at any cost. It is highly unlikely that violent conflict will ever be eliminated from society, but preventive diplomacy decreases the chances that it will continue to grow.

Documented evidence proves it is easier to prevent violent conflict before it begins than to intervene once crisis has escalated to war. The history books repeatedly show that the price of inaction can be lethal and that no amount of finger-pointing and blame can assuage the guilt that accompanies senseless human suffering. Lessons learned from an analysis of Hammarskjold's principles of preventive diplomacy are these: (1) Individuals, communities, and countries should have a disaster preparedness plan and cooperate toward the common goal of International peace; (2) Missed opportunities are learning opportunities for studying factors that contributed to past failures of preventive diplomacy; and (3) Following the words of Former Secretary-General Annan in his Memorial Conference for Rwanda, *The silence that has greeted genocide in the past must be replaced by a global clamour...* (2004), the International community needs to maintain a continuing

discourse to be objective about preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace building goals.

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