MEDIA’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING

BY
Michael Aho

Media’s Role in Peacebuilding

A Thesis

by

Mr. Michael C. Aho

George Mason University

presented in partial completion of the requirements of


Submitted: ___________________________ Date: ______________
Signature of Student

Forwarded Recommending Approval:
_________________________ Date: ______________
Signature of Thesis Adviser

Approved: __________________________ Date: ______________
Signature of Thesis Coordinator
ABSTRACT

In many policy studies and academic papers, the ‘CNN Effect’ is synonymous with the media. However, little research is focused on the media’s effect on the various elements of peace operations themselves. In analyzing the media’s role in peace operations, this paper will differentiate between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and will examine existing theory and the need for new theory. It will offer suggestions for the future of peacebuilding/media relations. Lessons learned will form a firm foundation for the paper. A bibliography for future study on this topic will be included.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. History of Media/History of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Media</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Peacekeeping v. Peacebuilding</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Examining the ‘CNN Effect’</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Comparing the principles of media and peace operations</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media in Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Campaigns/Operations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Theory</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Methodology/Case Studies</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Analysis/Lessons Learned</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Suggestions for Change</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Conclusion and Future</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of References</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intervention Types and Accompanying Media Considerations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Stages of Conflict and Media Impacts</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Media Initiatives, Strategies and Indicators</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Peace Radio Questions</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

1. Dynamics of Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Relationship........................................14
1. Introduction

This paper will address the question, “Does the media’s involvement in a peace operation have a significant role relative to that operation? And if so, what are the theories that could support such a premise?” In addressing this question, the lack of academic research in this area of peacekeeping operations will be discussed, as well as the differences between media’s coverage of war and peace operations. Finally, current opinion and options for media’s role in peacebuilding will be presented.

Many pieces of research have been presented relative to media effect, media’s role in violence and other related areas but there is little research in the area of media’s role in peace operations (Wolfsfeld et al 2001, 8 and 46). A common view of media’s role is that exemplified in a statement by William Randolph Hearst in the 19th century: “You furnish the pictures, I’ll furnish the war” (Wolfsfeld 2004, 41).

This paper will focus on the current research (little as it may be) in this area of study. Gadi Wolfsfeld, a United States Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Fellow, presented four areas that address the current studies relative to media: media’s role in foreign policy and diplomacy, media’s mobilization problems, disarmament and international cooperation and images of the enemy (2001). Identifying the variables associated with media’s role in peace operations and framing those variables relative to

---

1 While a publisher, Hearst commented to stir American anger against Spain. Allegedly, a tired reporter told Hearst, “There will be no war.” and asked to return home.

2 Wolfsfeld identified various studies in each of these areas and noted that while there were a varying degree of research intensities in these areas, little research stands alone as solid theory in 2001, *The news media and peace processes: The middle east and northern Ireland*, United States Institute of Peace.
current accepted norms is crucial for one to understand the communication concepts present in this notion.

As a preface, the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) in Vancouver, British Columbia, has been instrumental in developing the first operational framework for media’s involvement in peace. Through various roundtable discussions and conferences on media’s role, IMPACS has identified various categories in which the media can be grouped – with the understanding that “There exists a tension between our view of good media as *being* objective and our knowledge that good media *has* an objective” (Aster et al 1999).

Also, military researchers, while acknowledging a new “information age,” have commented at length on the changing presence of communication tools and media elements and how these effect the military, resulting in a change of thought and practice oftentimes (Alberts and Papp 2001).

To begin this analysis of media’s role in peace operations, one can find an excellent research premise in the comments offered by Howard: “The news media is also capable of causing considerable damage when no-one is intentionally wielding it at all…But its culture of professional and financial instincts can drive the media to practices which obsess with violence and influence opinion in socially destabilizing ways” (2002). In addition, definitions should be understood before reading further. “The media” refers to “several mediums or channels used in an organized fashion to communicate information to groups of people, as a service to the public” (Ibid.). The three main tenants
of journalism are: accuracy, impartiality and responsibility in the public interest (Ibid. and Strobel 1997).
History of Media / History of Peacekeeping

History of Media

Since the overall history of media covers an extensive time frame and could be the subject of a thesis itself, for the purpose of this paper the history of media as it relates to the timeframe of peacekeeping operations will be discussed. At the end of the 1950s, the most pervasive form of mass media was television, as nearly 90% of American homes had television sets (Sterling and Kittross 1999). In 1969/1970 the United Nations division “COMNET” (Network of Documentation Centres on Communication Research and Policy) was founded “for the support of research activities in the field of communication by publishing a mass communication thesaurus…Between 1969 and 1981, UNESCO was a principal actor in a rising international communication debate…” (Volkmer 1999).

The strong correlation between public opinion and media is best demonstrated by coverage of the Vietnam War. This statement is founded in the MacBride Report of 1981, referring to the war as one of “the most recent examples of the press’s ability to unearth facts, to forge opinion and to encourage the people to act.” The media often employs the idea of “objective journalism” and journalists often coin the term “neutral observer” (Williams 1993).

As it relates to governments and conflict, “governments use broadcasting to help build or reinforce value consensus among key support groups, as well as to promote cooperation from integral state institutions in service of policy goals” (Zaffiro 2002, ix).
Interestingly, the policies associated with media outlets often focus on the interrelations created by opposition, power across political bodies, and conflict (Ibid.).

In summary of a history of the media, the current media with which the world is presented on a minute-by-minute basis is full of mixed messages and multiple meanings and thus, “the classical enlightenment task of understanding, explaining, interpreting and evaluating is difficult to accomplish” (Eldridge 1993).

**History of Peacekeeping**

This brief section is not an attempt to summarize peacekeeping as a field or area of study – rather, it is aimed at presenting basic information related to peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Security Council must give authorization for United Nations peacekeeping operations, while the General Assembly can fulfill this role in some instances. Regardless of the approving-body, the UN Secretary-General is responsible for overseeing the daily operation-related activities. Further, peacekeeping missions are based on consent and can be set up only with the consent of the main parties concerned. This principle of consent also applied to the troop-contributing countries, which voluntarily supply the required military personnel. The two other major principles of peacekeeping are impartiality and the non-use of force (Liu 1999).

Expansion Period, 1988-1993 (Jett 1999).³ It is during the Expansion that media’s role in peace operations begins to be documented. As Dennis Jett, a former United States Foreign Service Officer, noted, “To meet this growing imperative for action (created by the media), peacekeeping more frequently became the something’, as it provided the middle option between doing nothing and unilateral military intervention” (Ibid., 29).

“Throughout the present decade (1988-1998), most battlefields have been internal to individual states; very few conflicts have resulted from interstate warfare, the more traditional concern of statecraft” (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg 1998). Unfortunately, “Nothing contained in the present Charter (the Charter of the United Nations) shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (United Nations 2001). Thus, as noted by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The evolution in thinking about sovereignty has been one of the major factors behind the profound changes in United Nations peace operations since the late 1980s. Another, of course, was the end of the Cold War” (1998). These changes applied to both the methodology of peace operations and the technical/logistical applications of these operations.

Since older UN peacekeeping operations differed from the “traditional type,” there are a variety of courses, programs and training centers that exist to inform potential peacekeepers of their role in such operations (Lee 1995).

3. Peacekeeping v. Peacebuilding

Extensive research has been conducted related to the semantics of “peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding,” as differing definitions and views circulate throughout the military, academia and international organizations. For the purposes of this paper, two comparisons will suffice to differentiate the terms: those definitions offered by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and those offered by scholars at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Further, if one desires for a larger categorical breakdown of operation components, other sources offer commentary on that front (Diehl 1993 and Jett 1999).

UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping and peacebuilding as follows:

- peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well; “peacebuilding: action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (1995 and Jett 1999, 14)

William H. Lewis, an American military scholar at the National Defense University (US), defined the terms as follows: “peacekeeping: traditionally involving military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted Rules of Engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated. Examples of this type include Cyprus and the Golan Heights;” “peacebuilding: rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to
create conditions conducive to peace, such as in Cambodia and Somalia” (Lewis 1994 and Jett 1999, 15).

The fields of peacekeeping and international relations have yet to identify consistent definitions of “peacekeeping” or “peacebuilding.” Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester (2001) admit that peacebuilding has been perhaps the most confusing and often misstated term in the field.

Some definitions are so general as to include virtually all forms of international assistance to societies that have experiences or are at risk of armed conflict; some are more precise but show greater interest in clarifying international mandates than conditions for peace in a target country; others are more willing to ask tough questions about the comparative value of international efforts vis-à-vis one another and in contrast with domestic initiatives. (Ibid., 5)

Cousens, Kumar, and Wemester (2001) present an excellent cross section of definitions that note the presence of two axes on which the possibilities of peacebuilding could be placed: deductive and inductive (Ibid., 5). Peacebuilding in the deductive sense – that which the content is “deduced from the existing capacities and mandates of international agencies and organizations” – involves linking the activities of these organizations (Ibid., 5-7). Research into the deductive element of peacebuilding has also been conducted by Ginifer (1996), Kühne (1996), and the Fafo Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (1999).

The inductive approach noted above defines those situations “where the content of peacebuilding is determined by the particular matrix of needs and capacities in individual cases” (Cousens, Kumar, and Wemester 2001, 5). Long-standing root causes can be identified using the inductive approach and determining the problem before
devising a solution that allows for an inductive, “more nuanced assessment of what a particular society most needs in order to solidify a fragile peace, without assuming that all war-torn countries will benefit equally from the standard menus of international assistance” (Ibid., 9).

Weaknesses exist in both the inductive and deductive approaches. The policymakers in the international arena do not answer such causal questions in an appropriate manner. Robinson (1997) exemplifies this shortfall: “human rights imperatives can and should be injected into every aspect of the Organization’s work (since it is important)...to understand that today’s human rights violations are the causes of tomorrow’s conflicts” (6). The weakness in the deductive approach is its inability to respond to operational questions about “when and under what conditions those tools (international peacebuilding tools) can responsibly and effectively be deployed” (Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester 2001, 8).

Some researchers and military commanders view peacebuilding as a contributor to the effectiveness of field-level peacekeepers (Doyle and Sambanis 1999, 4 quoting Sanderson 1995). Doyle and Sambanis (1999) offer a unique perspective on peacekeeping-peacebuilding relationships - the figure is reproduced here with the peacemaking components removed and a few other elements removed (Ibid., 13):
Figure 1 - Dynamics of the Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Relationship

Doyle and Sambanis (1999) also refer to two “serious traps” that peacekeeping can create for peacebuilding initiatives. They note, “the first is a trap of peacekeeping success – where a successful reduction of violence makes the status quo bearable, discouraging negotiation” (14). In regard to the first “trap,” Doyle and Sambanis clarify by discussing that a successful peacekeeping initiative may reduce “the potential for a mutually hurting stalemate” (Ibid.). The second trap is more dangerous and “is a negative peacekeeping
trap: persistently poor peacekeeping can allow a gradual deterioration of the underlying political and military conditions, institutionalizing a conflict and create possible zone of agreement in negotiations. To overcome (this), time…and technical expertise must be devoted” (Ibid.).

Finally, with regard to Figure 1 above, a strategy that demonstrates the importance of variables – specifically those that are “context-specific” – including “the history of past attempts at peacekeeping” must be employed (Doyle and Sambanis 1999, 15).
4. Examining the ‘CNN Effect’

An analysis of the media’s role in peace operations would not be complete without a look at the ‘CNN Effect’ first. The Harvard University Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics and Public Policy has been instrumental in examining media effects. Steven Livingston, a leading CNN Effect researcher and associate professor of communication and international affairs at The George Washington University, along with his colleagues at Harvard, identified three conceptual variations surrounding the CNN Effect: the notion that media serves as an agenda-setting agency, that the media serves as an impediment in some cases and that the media facilitates a more accelerated public policy process (1997).4

The CNN Effect by definition is the theory that acknowledges the effects ‘real time’ reporting has (Harmon 1999). Many policy leaders agree that “these temporary emotional responses (present after media coverage on humanitarian affairs and the like) may conflict with the more considered judgment of foreign policy officials, forcing them to take action that will soon have to be reversed or modified” (Strobel 1996, 357).

Warren Strobel, a leading researcher on media’s role in peace operations, argues that the CNN Effect, insofar as a “loss of policy control on the part of the government officials supposedly charged with making that policy,” does not exist (Livingston and

---

4 Livingston was a Fellow at the Shorenstein Center in the Spring of 1996 and conducted his research during that endeavor.
Strobel (1997) notes that there are a variety of definitions to describe the effects of a CNN-like entity (Begleiter 1995 and Neuman 1996b).

Johanna Neuman, a “CNN curve” scholar, had the following impression of the CNN Effect: “…policymakers have no choice but to redirect their attention to the crisis at hand or risk unpopularity, whether or not such revision is merited by policy considerations” (1996b).

Such a phenomenon is further evidenced by the sentiments of a former United States Department of State official:

We have yet to understand how profoundly the impact of CNN has changed things. The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department has had time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we’ve had time to think. This is now the way we determine foreign policy—it’s driven more by the daily events reported on TV than it used to be. (Pearce 1995)

In an excellent example of negative CNN Effect, the SRSG in Angola, Margaret Anstee, commented related to UNAVEM II’s failure, found in Dennis Jett’s book (1999). SRSG and Chief of Mission Anstee did not use the media to draw international attention to Angola. Jett notes that, “…she does not describe any effort to use the international media to call attention to the impending disaster she foresaw.” Jett goes on to say “While Angola was not featured on CNN, presumably some in the media would

---

5 A comment by former diplomat George Kennan.
6 As defined by Secretary Ridgway, ‘CNN’s ability to prompt popular demands for action by displaying images of starvation or other tragedy, only to reverse this sentiment when Americans are killed trying to help.’ (in Strobel)
7 On 6 February 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutro-Ghali, via S/23556, enlarged UNAVEM II’s mission to include observation of elections (this was solidified by the Security Council on 24 March 1992 by resolution 747).
have been interested in the fact that the $118 million annual budget for UNAVEM II was supporting a failing mission” (1999 and Anstee 1993).

In an effort to better understand intervention types and how the type of operation correlates to the level of media involvement and effect, Livingston devised the following table, of which only a portion is shown here:

Table 1 - Intervention Types and Accompanying Media Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Policy goals &amp; objectives</th>
<th>Likely media interest</th>
<th>Government policy</th>
<th>Likely media effects</th>
<th>Public opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace Making</td>
<td>3rd party imposition of political solution</td>
<td>High interest initially-level of stability determines rest</td>
<td>Volatile conditions; danger in reporting; access with risk</td>
<td>Attentive public scrutiny; latent public opinion</td>
<td>Latency concerns policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Bolster an accepted political solution by presence of 3rd party</td>
<td>Moderate interest unless accord is destabilized</td>
<td>Generally unrestricted access to theater</td>
<td>Emotion impediment most likely</td>
<td>Attentive-latency might concern policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed humanitarian ops</td>
<td>Forceful, apolitical aid policy</td>
<td>Low/moderate interest unless violence ensues</td>
<td>Volatile conditions; reporting risky</td>
<td>Impediment; attentive public scrutiny</td>
<td>Again, latency a concern to policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensual humanitarian ops</td>
<td>Agreed humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Initial operation met by moderate to low interest</td>
<td>Unrestricted, even encouraged by media</td>
<td>Media effect unlikely</td>
<td>Attentive scrutiny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note One – Table from Livingston 1997.

The table shown above provides an interesting examination of four “intervention types” related to peace operations and notes the five areas of considerations by the media for each. Although peacebuilding is not one of the intervention types, the table demonstrates
that the media has specific interests and motives in terms of covering peace operations. Of particular interest, similar to Ferguson’s study (2000), is the sixth column that discusses public opinion. While this thesis is not an in-depth look at public opinion related to media, the notion that public opinion plays an increasingly important role in what the media chooses to cover should be noted with particular interest.

It is important to note that this chart represents the views of academic researchers working in concert with journalists, public policy researchers and others in the academic realm. It is not meant to be exhaustive of beliefs.
5. Comparing principles of media and peace operations

Wolsfeld, et al (2001) identified five key differences between peace operations principles and media principles (the guiding doctrines of both). It is important to mention that this list is informational in nature and depicts only one representation of key differences. They are:

1. Inherent tension
2. Peace requires patience while media requires urgency
3. Peace develops with a calm environment while media prefer threats/violence
4. Peacebuilding is complex and news media deal with simplicity
5. Progress towards peace requires minimal understanding of the other side – news media routinely reinforce hostility towards the other side

Relative to the inherent tension that exists between peace operations and the media, a look at objectivity and intention would assist in analyzing this dynamic. Martin Bell, a correspondent for BBC, was particularly bothered following the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Rwanda in 1994-5. He reasoned that the West “stood idly by because the media reported the slaughter with all the objectivity of reporting on a football match” (Ayers and Bell [n.d.]). Many conflict resolution scholars and researchers proclaimed against Bell’s view of the media’s role and various new “guidelines” and “codes of ethics” have been devised for journalists (Botes 1996).

It has long been noted, as noted by Gamson and Stuart (1992) and Ryan (1991), that news media operate within a set of cultural and professionally congruent bases that help “define the construction of news.” That being said, there is also a key difference
between governments and media: “Governmental bodies and agencies operate in a political culture of secrecy, withholding almost all information of vital interest to the public” (Buric 2000). While many differences exist structurally between the media and the structure and nature of a peace operation, the study of media effect is not limited by those differences.

One of the common elements of peace operations and media is the recognition of local assets. As noted by Andrade (2002): “…carefully observing local attitudes could help determine what is needed and what changes may be required…it is (also) important to find suitable local partners who can be engaged through share objectives” (10). Clearly, peace operations embody the same principles noted here.

One of the significant limits to media is the lack of neutrality that is inherent. Melone, Terzis and Beleli (2002) argue that professional objectivity must not override the obligation of a reporter to realize that he or she can drastically affect perceptions by the audience to a given situation (2). Further, they argue that, “Simply by being there and reporting on a conflict, the media alter the communication environment and are thus inherently involved in the conflict and non-neutral” (Ibid., 3).

Another key aspect of the media that is similar to that of peace operations is that “media are sensitive towards the task of promoting tolerant and diverse viewpoints (and) can be both informative as well as entertaining and have a large potential audience” (Botes 1996). While peace operations do not entertain, those responsible for such operations do take into account the diverse viewpoints present in such a situation.

Ethical considerations
An interesting component of both media practices and peace operations doctrines are the ethical guidelines that are always present in both fields. For example, the following ten “commandments” (Retief 2002) comprise an abbreviated code of ethics for media:

“Preamble: The media shall be free because the public has a right to be informed.

You shall therefore:

1. Be accurate both in text and context (and correct mistakes promptly).
2. Be truthful, only using deceptive methods in matters of public importance if there is no other way of uncovering the facts.
3. Be fair, presenting all relevant facts in a balanced way.
4. Be duly impartial in reporting the news and when commenting on it.
5. Protect confidential sources, unless it is of overriding public interest to do otherwise.
6. Be free from obligation to any interest group.
7. Respect the privacy of individuals, unless it is overridden by a legitimate public interest.
8. Not intrude into private grief and distress, unless such intrusion is overridden by a legitimate public interest.
9. Refrain from any kind of stereotyping.
10. Be socially responsible in referring to matters of indecency, obscenity, violence, brutality, blasphemy, and sex.”

Ethical considerations in peace operations takes on a different format than those associated with members of the media. The Code of Conduct of the Blue Helmets written by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit in 1998, recognizes three key tenants:

- The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace. In this context the United Nations Charter requires that all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct.
• We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards. We, as peacekeepers, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result, we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organization.

• We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high and our actions, behavior, and speech will be closely monitored. (Hårleman 2001)

Wallace Warfield of George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (2002) suggests that those involved in peacebuilding are challenged with a conflict within a conflict in that there is the conflict situation in which peacebuilding will be involved but also the ethical dilemma in which the peacebuilder might also be involved (215). Warfield summarizes his argument by proposing that ethical dilemmas in a peacebuilding situation are quite similar to those found in interpersonal conflict situations (Ibid.). Finally, Warfield offers four stages for peacebuilders to resolve ethical dilemmas: in stage one, the peacebuilder should pause and process the dilemma internally before moving forward; stage two is a reflection stage in which the peacebuilder compares the situation with his or her own set of ethics; stage three involves a sharing process that engages others in the dilemma; and stage four, a stage to determine options and select a solution, is burdened with the element of choice for it is in this stage that the peacebuilder asks “how strongly you hold the personal value at stake, how sharply it
diverges from the value held by the general profession, and your knowledge of what
other have done in similar situations” (Ibid., 218-221).

Media in Africa

Principles of media in Africa are often discussed under a separate cover from the
principles of media in the rest of the world. In fact, governmental constraints, economic
instability, poor management of media business, technological deficiencies, and unstable
political situations are those principles noted by Onadipe and Lord (1998) as being
different in the principles. Further,

…with a capacity to reach large or influential segments of a given
population in the shortest possible time, and to provide factual
information, analysis and opinion, the mass media helps shape popular
perceptions of the nature of a society. In terms of basic human rights, the
mass media can transform the ideas of freedom of opinion and expression
into a concrete reality, by being able to openly communicate information
and ideas and by acting as a ‘watchdog’ on public institutions and
leaders…The principle roles of the media are to expose shortcomings of
the government, educate the public, popularize peace initiatives and
promote dialogue. (Ibid., par. 3)

Onadipe and Lord (1998) cite one key question that journalists in Africa should ask
themselves: Whether or not it is desirable to be totally impartial in general or in particular
situations? (par. 6).

Participants in a 1998 conference on African media and conflict included
journalists from 11 countries in Africa. Compiled by Onadipe and Lord (1998), four
categories embody the opinions of the conference participants as they relate to journalism
in a conflict situation:
1. Providing information that will enable people to make better decisions about how to respond to conflict. This could include early warnings, sensitizing the public on conflict issues, investigating, understanding and interpreting the causes of conflicts. A good example of this was provided by a timely editorial in the Ghanaian Mirror (government newspaper).

2. Educating people about conflict resolution processes and options by encouraging debate on the issues, providing space for conflicting parties and even conflict resolution experts to present their views, or even offering alternative solutions for the resolution of the conflict. Useful analysis can help educate the government, public and conflicting parties.

3. Providing a channel through which different parties can be heard and can communicate with each other. This means the media must be adequately informed about the background and dynamics of the conflict to effectively identify the main players and their interests and be capable of accurately communicating different positions.

4. Protecting parties and the public against abuse: for instance, reporting events as they happen in an accurate, non-partisan manner, exposing human rights violations, showing the consequences of conflict. Respecting the confidentiality of sources is vital, especially during conflict. (par. 121-124)

**Information Campaigns/Operations**

Information campaigns/operations are primarily a military endeavor, but there are similarities with other topics in this thesis. The military, as noted in Avruch, Narel and Siegel (2000), includes activities such as psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, public affairs, how information is given to decision makers, and also how information relates to a mission’s success (5-6). Often, information campaigns assist in “winning over” the population to the side of the military and also contribute to the message(s) of the particular military campaign (Wentz 2002, 507).

Wentz (2002) also identifies the new style of thinking towards media by the military:
Peace operations can be just as complex as combat and the media coverage involves more than simply reporting on the military operation. This means that in addition to being familiar with the military, the media also needs to have a working knowledge of the humanitarian, political, economic, cultural, social, legal, and even criminal justice issues of the country in which the peace operation is being conducted. Furthermore, today’s journalists and broadcasters often have communications capabilities that are superior to those of most other actors on the peace operations landscape, including in some case even the military. (527)

In many military operations, PSYOP teams or civil affairs personnel contribute to peace as it relates to media’s role. For example, the formation of Radio Milles Collines in Rwanda, in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, and United States involvement in Haiti (Strobel 1997, 117-118). It should be noted, though, that Radio Milles Collines operated prior to the Rwandan genocide and was virulent in nature.
6. Theory

Noting the constant set of changing theory in this field, this thesis examines the past underlying theory employed at the onset of writing and attempts to cohesively examine the fresh theory offered at the time of writing.

As Wolfsfeld notes in his recent book, little theory exists in determining media’s role in peace processes and peace operations. He points out that “another reason for the gap (in theory) might be the fact that most communication scholars are located in the United States. The US has certainly experienced a good deal of political violence and war, but it has not been engaged in a major peace process since the end of Vietnam” (2004, 9). He also brings light to four major types of influence offered by the media:

First, they can play a major role in defining the political atmosphere in which the process takes place. Second, the media can have an important influence on the nature of the debate about a peace process. Third, they can have an impact on antagonists’ strategy and behavior. Fourth, they can raise and lower the public standing and legitimacy of antagonists involved in the process and their positions. (Ibid., 11)

In his theory chapter, Wolfsfeld makes six definitive arguments that sum up his theory quite well as noted below verbatim:

1. Due to a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values, the media often play a destructive role in attempts at making peace.
2. The greater the level of elite consensus in support of a peace process, the more likely the news media will play a positive role in that process.
3. The greater the number and severity of crises associated with a peace process, the more likely the news media are to play a negative role in the process.
4. The influence of the news media on a peace process is best seen in terms of a cycle in which changes in the political environment lead to changes in media performance that often lead to further changes in the political environment.
5. The more sensationalist the media environment the more likely the news media are to play a destructive role in a peace process.
6. The greater the extent of shared media, the more likely it is that the news media will play a constructive role in a peace process. (2004, 15-42)

Three years ago, Wolfsfeld et al delineated four main variables that exist in peace operations that have direct effects on the media (2001): elite consensus, number and intensity of crises, shared media and sensationalism. While a thorough analysis could be provided on each of these variables, for the purpose of this paper only elite consensus and sensationalism will be discussed.

Examples of the elite consensus dynamic are depicted in the Vietnam War and as the 1990s Gulf War. There are two principles based in this idea: the lower the level of controversy among elites, the more likely ‘Pro-Peace’ frames will dominate media and the greater the level of elite consensus, the more supportive the role of the media (Hallin 1986 and Wolfsfeld 1997a). Wolfsfeld also notes that the greater the level of disunity among leaders over the process, the more likely media will worsen the given situation. The converse is also true – higher levels of elite support yield more positive journalism (Ibid.).

In his recent re-examination of previous theory, Wolfsfeld furthers the understanding of “elite consensus.” However, in order to understand the more in-depth approach to the theory, an examination of “media frames” is necessary. “Media frames are perhaps best thought of as organizing themes that journalists use to place events into a
package that is culturally resonant and professionally valuable” (2004, 27). A complementary explanation of these frames is offered by Gamson and Modigliani (1987): “the central organizing idea of storyline that provides meaning” (Wolfsfeld 2004, 27).

Further, Wolfsfeld believes that a pervasive type of elite consensus, when present because of a political issue, “tends to dominate media discourse and few questions are raised about its validity” (2004, 28). “Distinguishing between political and media variables reduces the chance that researchers are merely measuring different aspects of the same construct” (Ibid., 30).

In terms of sensationalism, the principle is founded in the idea that news media have a “vested interest in conflict” (Wolfsfeld et al 2001 and Ito 1990). Media give opposing sides in a conflict the ability to have two-way communications and often, this is antithetical to the premise of the operation (Strobel 1997). For example, “Images of Patriot missiles intercepting Scuds in the night skies of Tel Aviv helped dissuade the Israeli government from attacking Iraq and fracturing the Gulf War coalition” (Stech 1994). It is an established norm that media images present a more dramatic-than-normal image of conflict and humanitarian matters (Newston 1976). While much of the research, as noted above, focuses on war more than it does on peace operations, many of the media principles are transferable to peace operations (Siegel [n.d.]).

While Golfsfeld offers excellent insights into theory as it relates to media and peace, his research excludes all work of Ross Howard at the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) in Vancouver, British Columbia. Howard is referenced throughout this thesis and many of his research methods are both field- and mission-
oriented. One of the most exclusive areas of research to Howard is that of conflict sensitive journalism and the power of the media in conflict situations.

“Professional journalists do not set out to reduce conflict. They seek to present accurate and impartial news. But it is often through good reporting that conflict is reduced” (Howard 2003a, 8). On that note, Howard presents eleven “unconscious roles” of journalism: “channeling communication, educating, confidence-building, correcting misperceptions, making them human, identifying underlying interests, emotional outlet, framing the conflict, face-saving/consensus-building, solution-building and encouraging a balance of power” (Ibid., 8-9).

The following table presents three stages of conflict and addresses the impact on the media of each. For the purpose of this thesis, the latter section – post-conflict – is of particular note because it provides specific elements of the media’s role in a peacebuilding effort. For example, during the “transitional government” phase of a post-conflict peace operation there is a “risk of re-emergence of conflict-era partisanship, biased reporting and media used to inflame/distort issues” (Howard et al 2003). This knowledge about the media’s role is quite important to a peacebuilding force in such a situation.

Table 2 - Stages of conflict and media impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning signs</th>
<th>Examples of impacts on media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising political tension, intensified central authority.</td>
<td>Increased media monopoly, censorship of journalism, suppression of external media sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic instability.</td>
<td>Decline in economic and editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warning signs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples of impacts on media</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>independence due to advertising drop, cost increases. Poor remuneration of journalists causing widespread bribery. Decline of professional standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing economic or political disparity between identity groups.</td>
<td>Polarization of media, aligned with identity interests; reporting reflects exclusivity rather than inclusiveness. Stereotyping of others. Decline of diverse commentary. Harassment of non-conforming journalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender stereotyping intensifies.</td>
<td>Women displaced from media prominence and coverage and from media staff positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in civil society, rights infringements.</td>
<td>Absence of rights abuse reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance of pro-peace/conflict prevention activists.</td>
<td>Alternative, underground media take form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing peace dialogue, negotiations.</td>
<td>Sensationalized coverage, focus on violence. Absence of consensus-seeking reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse/distrust of electoral system.</td>
<td>Decline in coverage and analysis of politics. Emergence of partisanship disguised as newsgathering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of monopoly control of media outlets.</td>
<td>State/monopolist imposition of complaint media managers, journalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused attack-journalism on opponents and moderates, signaling emergence of hate speech.</td>
<td>Facile manipulation of popular sentiments. Propaganda disguised as news emerges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overt conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warning signs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples of impacts on media</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial, disavowal of international covenants.</td>
<td>Independent reporting termed unpatriotic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure destruction: material shortages, food, water, fuel, health care, electricity, batteries.</td>
<td>Loss of equipment, supplies; blocked travel, access to sources. Inability to report, distribute, broadcast. Inability of audience to receive media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted media destruction.</td>
<td>Facilities damaged, intimidation, staff shortages, unpaid staff succumb to bribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of peace dialogue or negotiations.</td>
<td>Obsessive media focus on violence. Warmentality analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Post conflict**

| **Victory/defeat, or presence of peacekeepers.** | Possible proliferation and diversity of media outlets. Underground opposition media emerges. |
| **Initial demobilization of combatants.** | Rise in media-consuming audiences. |
| **Reduction in violence. Possible rise in crime.** | Recrimination against formerly ‘opposing’ media through criminal acts. Crime and political violence reported without distinction. |
| **Resume peace dialogue/negotiations.** | Introduction of socially pro-active media. Media focus on initiatives for potential reconciliation. |
| **Steps toward resumption/assumption of electoral system.** | Resumption of political reporting. Increase in regional-local media and local-issue reporting. |
| **Transitional government.** | Risk of re-emergence of conflict-era partisanship, biased reporting and media used to inflame/distort issues. |
| **Easing of censorship, relaxed control of** | Return of media associations, focus on |
### Warning signs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning signs</th>
<th>Examples of impacts on media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>media.</td>
<td>professionalism, conduct. Risk of rampant competitive media outlets becoming political interests’ surrogates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resumption of educational system.</td>
<td>Foreign and local initiatives in training aimed at restoring media professionalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding civil society.</td>
<td>Gradual resumption of human rights monitoring, investigative reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender distinctions reduced.</td>
<td>Female journalists accorded prominence. Women’s new or traditional roles championed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding technical infrastructure.</td>
<td>Extended reach of media outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resumption of trade economy.</td>
<td>Resumption of journalistic economic literacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note Two - Table found in Howard et al 2003. Printed verbatim.*

Table 2 above should certainly be a key component of any media or peace operations handbook, as it effectively discusses what the media motives are related to various stages of a conflict and peace operation.

Ross Howard, a member of the IMPACS team, presented five categories to enable media to be placed on a continuum (2001): Stage One embodies conventional journalism, as most Westerners know it. The style involves objective or neutral journalism – often reporting unbiased information. In addition, the journalist takes no responsibility for reactions of the consumers of that information. Howard feels that the potential for peacebuilding in this scenario “lies in promoting the basics of journalism skills and ethics, through training, and in fostering the democratic institutions.”
Stage Two adds an element of journalistic responsibility to the reporter’s standards. Western and/or cultural generalizations must be avoided and “recklessness such as exposing interviewees to persecution” is frowned upon. Howard notes, however, that for peacebuilders, “the opportunity lies in sensitizing journalists and advancing the infrastructure of a free media, including independent diverse sources and modern technology.”

Complicity replaces neutrality in Stage Three. The journalist carries an enormous amount of responsibility for the reporting. At this stage, according to Howard, maximizing peacebuilding via positive stories is essential. Howard argues that advocacy can still be objective during this process. He notes an optimistic role for peacebuilders in this Stage, as they “can help journalists fulfill the role of reconciliation – by training in conflict resolution – rather than ripping a society apart.”

Stage Four shifts its gear to focus on “competitive, commercial or political advantage-seeking, and into constructive media for the express purposes of peacebuilding.” Most of the time, this Stage is exemplified through program-based opportunities (using televisions, radios, the Internet, etc.) and practical information being relayed to citizens. Howard notes the success of the United Nations in using this programming technique in its peacemaking interventions.

Finally, Stage Five is a blanketing campaign that uses any means possible to distribute a carefully crafted message to address peaceful conflict resolution. Howard says, “It includes cartoon programming aimed at former child soldiers in Angola and Sierra Leone, multilingual advice for refugees from Rwanda, and a soap opera for hostile
neighborhoods in Kosovo. It is programming with an intended outcome in mind, to foster society.” Howard notes that Stage Five uses creativity and is an effective opportunity for any peacebuilder.⁹

The following table represents Howard’s (2001) five types of media initiatives and discusses the strategy and indicators employed for each typology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media initiative Type</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Basic training in standard ABC skills of newsgathering: accuracy, balance and context.</td>
<td>Extent of violations of privacy rights or libel laws if existent. Number of professional journalist associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for professional journalist associations, conduct codes. Partnership support for indigenous training facilities. Seminars, forums for local journalists on professionalism.</td>
<td>Presence of codes of professionalism, number of training institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for independent media protection and regulation within legislation, regulations.</td>
<td>Presence of free speech and free media legislation. Number of journalists imprisoned, harassed, intimidated, de-accredited, censored. Extent of content piracy and plagiarism. Extent of access to government information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encouragement of diverse, independent media outlets.</td>
<td>Presence of independent reporting. Number of independent media outlets, number of privately owned outlets, number of alternative media outlets, number of media licenses granted, refused. Percentage of indigenous versus foreign advertisers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹ Quotes in this section are attributable to (Howard 2001) and unquoted material has been summarized by the author.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Provision of technical support and equipment, especially for essential facilities/new technology.</th>
<th>Quality and reliability of production and distribution and reach of diverse media. Number of internet connections, service providers, printing presses, transmitters.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appraisal of membership of the media.</td>
<td>Percentage of female and minority journalists, in management, in training courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media monitoring.</td>
<td>Content analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>As in Type One stage plus advanced journalism training, in investigations, economic reporting, information access, election coverage, gender and ethnic neutrality.</td>
<td>As in Type One stage plus number of specialist journalists, commentators and analysts. Number of daily news reports on politics, military issues, legal proceedings, human rights, gender. Content analysis: extent of demonizing, stereotyping, sensationalizing, violations of privacy rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide rationale, models for media-supportive environment: legislation, courts, regulatory bodies.</td>
<td>Media and public support for independent media enshrinement and regulation within legislation, regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversity within individual outlets’ staff. Evidence of differing editorial viewpoint, commentary, audience feedback.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for autonomous/commercial operations.</td>
<td>Number of financially autonomous outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for wider distribution of local/regional news. Funding for relayed international broadcasters.</td>
<td>Media monitoring for credibility, balance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Conflict resolution sensitizing and training.</td>
<td>Content analysis of conflict reporting: focus on violence versus reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Support for enhanced investigative reporting.</td>
<td>Percentage of conflict reports, lurid crime reports, versus reports of humanitarian information, peaceful resolutions, positive models and interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>Seminars, forums for international media on indigenous situation. Seminars, forums for local media on media coverage and conflict. Fund/encourage international media coverage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creating of humanitarian needs-based media outlets. Meet needs of affected populations such as: emergency relief, relocation facilities, health advisories, warnings about landmines. Define relationship to peacekeeping force. Establish temporary media productions and distribution facilities. Counter hate ratio. Recruit local staff, local suppliers to build economic engagement. Seminars, forums for local journalists on professionalism.</td>
<td>Audience ratings. Qualitative studies feedback. Responsiveness of media outlets to public requests for programming, information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>Provide programming speaking directly to conflict issues, presenting new or alternative sources of information, issues and factors behind the conflict, shared effects of conflict, presentation of opposing views, discussion of stereotypes, promotion of tolerance, reconciliation, democratization.</td>
<td>Audience ratings, reactions. Outcome assessment of issues or actions focused on. Surveys identifying individual and group perception of others. Percentage change in multi-faction or multi-ethnic community dialogues, organizations, activities, in target group or across society. Percentage changes in audience attitudes and in comprehension of message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Integration of local partners into programming.  
Extent of local partnership in decision-making and content programming. Ethnic and factional balance in staff and content.

Development of local markets, local capacity for programming.  
Extent of collaboration with government institutions, agencies, civil society and nongovernmental organizations.

Develop diversified channels of communication appropriate to local environment.  
Number of outlets and channels conveying conflict resolution messages.

Note Three – Table created by the author using Howard 2001, 12-13.

As in Table 2, Table 3 offers a unique perspective related to media’s influence and role in a peace operation. Types Four and Five are the most germane to peacebuilding operations because they focus on how the media can help bridge the gap between peacekeepers and the public. Humanitarian operations play an important role in these typologies because the media is most concerned with audience ratings and attempt to respond “to public requests for programming (and) information” (Howard 2001, 13).

Howard devised the typology table prior to collaborating with his IMPACS team in British Columbia. In 2002, that team devised a “typology of media interventions.” Their structure in identifying these types of involvement is broken into five typologies – now given specific ‘names’:

1. Rudimentary journalism training
2. Responsible journalism development
3. Transitional journalism development
4. Media-based intervention
5. Intended outcome programming

In their research, the IMPACS team has noted that these five typologies, while are able to overlap, exist primarily to establish a consistent language that can act as a base for
future research endeavors. The *rudimentary journalism training* intervention is focused on conflict-obsessed, unskilled and highly partisan media. Most often, this type of media was previously (or still is) under government regulation or control and this bias is evident in the coverage associated with this medium (Howard 2002, 11).

The *responsible journalism development* intervention typology, specialist-type reporting often occurs and impartiality begins to play a significant role in determining what to cover. The primary focus of this intervention type is “to create a media that serves society as a conflict resolution process and upholds democratic governance” (Howard 2002, 10).

‘Conscious examination’ of media’s role in the peace process and a focus on reconciliation are the primary aspects of *transitional journalism development*. This type of intervention is commonly referred to as “peace journalism.” *Media-based intervention* exists only for a narrow purpose and extremely specific viewing/listening/reading audience. Often, media-based interventions are funded and spearheaded by NGOs and other peacekeeping organizational structures and thus, tend to work against negative messages and provide important information to receivers of the messages (Howard 2002, 11).

The *intended outcome programming* is a highly unconventional type of journalism and is extremely difficult to carry out and is most often used to foster peace. The main goals of this type of intervention are promoting reconciliation, establishing a transformation of attitudes doctrine and de-intensifying conflicts (Howard 2002, 11).
As discussed above there are commonly accepted norms relative to media’s effect on a variety of situations and peoples. However, it is crucial to identify the specific communication and psychological theories that allow for a statement such as “The media do influence peace operations.”

The beginning of media-related effects research focused on what was termed the “powerful, direct effects model.” In this model, media acted like a hypodermic needle – injecting people with information and was able to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. First appearing in the 1930’s, this model quickly gave way to the “limited effects model” in 1940 (Peterson and Thurstone 1933). A great deal of psychology contributed to the premise of the limited effects model, recognizing a substantial element of variance that determined an individual’s effect by media (Cantril 1940).

The mid and late 1940s contributed yet another model to the study of media effects: the “limited and indirect effects model.” Appropriately named, this theory supported the research efforts of the previous two theories and yielded little difference in premise. The primary difference lies in the variable of demographic data as a factor in the formation of public opinion (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). The next model would be the dominating force in media effects studies for a span of 50 years. The “limited and ‘direct-ed’ effects model” gave an enormous amount of credit to media viewers in that it said these audiences were active and involved in the process (Herzog 1940; Katz, Gurevitch, and Haas 1973; and Robinson and Levy 1996). The communication theory used as a basis for statements in this paper is the “powerful and

10 Howard notes that information can be provided to assist with election & voting practices, refugee
cumulative effects model.” This model relies on a cumulative process because the doctrine’s belief is that media effect takes time to develop. The basis for this theory are the ideas that media play a role in agenda setting, accelerating news and decisions and that media can sometimes be impeding (Lowery and DeFleur 1983; Pearce and Cronen 1980; Ferguson 2000).

The role of media also presents a cultural dimension of white European North America domination of the media related studies. Ignatieff (1998, 292) calls for a change in process, as he believes bias and partiality are inevitable in such a white-dominated media system.

Most of the research on media effect has dealt with an outlet that is mainly present in only developed society: television (Hagos 2001, 20). Hagos (1993) noted that, “the reality in Africa today is that oral communication still remains the primary means of social interaction” (2). Onadipe and Lord (1998) indicate that media and conflict go hand-in-hand (par. 79).

Similarities between media and “conflict resolvers” (those involved in trying to mediate or arbitrate a dispute) are quite obvious according to Botes (1996). First, they both provide protagonists with a representative voice; second, open, perceptive thinking is essential in both journalism and conflict resolution; and third, both professions involve confidentiality and impartiality (Botes 1996).
An example of peacebuilding and media interactions is that of “peace radio.” The case studies employed in this thesis offer insights into such efforts. Peace radio promotes peacebuilding in the following ways:

- Reaches out to illiterate populations to disseminate information, generate public dialogue and debate, advocate for specific issues, provide civic education and mobilize public support for particular actions or events.
- Conducts needs assessments of rural communities.
- Educates individuals about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict.
- Publicizes border harmonization meetings in rural areas.
- Airs live strategic meetings between elders and other political leaders.
- Informs communities about the plight of other conflict-ridden areas, including the adverse effects and destruction that arise from conflicts.
- Propagates early warning information and current cease-fire status information. (Beyna et al 24)
7. Methodology/Case Studies

The methodology employed in this thesis is one of a qualitative nature and takes the form of the case study method. This methodology is used because this selection is grounded in the idea that “the research methods you choose say something about your views on what qualifies as valuable knowledge and your perspective on the nature of reality” (Glesne 1992, 4). In examining the media’s role in various peacebuilding case studies, employing a research paradigm that adequately addresses multiple, socially-constructed qualities is important. In this type of study, the researcher becomes the main research instrument – in the case of this research, that occurs vis-à-vis a comprehensive literature review as found above and through a case study analysis. Further, the case study approach allows for the “how” and “why” questions to be sufficiently addressed (Yin 1989, 17).

This thesis relies on the lessons learned from three case studies: Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Burundi. In examining peacebuilding efforts in these three countries, the positive and negative aspects/results will be addressed, as both offer insight into future media roles. The table in the following chapter will be presented to compare the three relevant case studies and encompass the background, development, conditions, and internal/external influences (AITELC [n.d.]).

It is important to note that the case study strategy is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, (one that’s) boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and (one in which) multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1981). In the following subchapters, each
case study will be individually discussed by noting the components and background of the case and by presenting the lessons learned from that case. The aforementioned table will also include a synthesis of all three studies. The final discussion will include the reliability and validity of the research. The case study method is employed in this study because the author was unable to interview people directly involved with the case studies, rather, read what they said in second-hand interviews.

**Sierra Leone**

Over 500,000 people have left Sierra Leone and over two million have been internally displaced from Sierra Leone since the war began in 1991 (Powell 2002, par. 3). “While there is no single cause of the war in Sierra Leone, the conflict can be attributed in party to the leadership of Foday Sankoh, the man who eventually became the leader of the country’s largest rebel group, the Revolutionary United Forces” (Ibid., par. 5). The National People’s Revolutionary Council, formed in 1993, was created by disaffected army officers and was responsible for a coup against the government (Ibid.).

“By 1994, any political motivation for fighting had been largely forgotten as rebel leaders recognized the personal gain that could be theirs by robbing civilians and exploiting the country’s lucrative diamond mines” (Bones 2001, 57). In 1996, 1997 and 1998, various attempts were made to restore peace in Sierra Leone including by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). After the killing of 6,000 civilians and 2,000 children being abducted in 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was created and by early 2002, the war had finally ended (Ibid., 59 and Powell 2002, par. 6-10).
The focus of this case study is the formation of Search for Common Ground’s “Talking Drum Studio” in Sierra Leone. Dr. Amr Abdalla, who is a member of the committee for this thesis, prepared a report on the program and his findings are invaluable relative to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Talking Drum Studio – Sierra Leone (TDS-SL) began in April 2000. At first, the organization had five radio programs on eleven radio stations. Abdalla notes that “…all of them had the same goal: to encourage peace and reconciliation” (2002, 1).

Abdalla’s research offers first-hand accounts of Sierra Leoneans and the turmoil they endured during the war:

*I lost my property, but there are thousands who can’t get jobs, are denied justice, etc. They are being traumatized all over again now. As a blanket statement, I can say that all Sierra Leoneans were traumatized by events of the war.*

*Everyone in the country has known that peace is the only way. We have seen signs that people are ready to forgive one another. We travel at night. We smile to each other. Even the police and the army talk to people nicely. We organize dances and people don’t fight like they used to. People are farming without worries. Schools are going on. Vehicles are moving throughout the country, everywhere they didn’t used to go. The secret societies are initiating in all the areas. This shows that peace has come, because you wouldn’t do those kinds of things if you thought guns would fire. And, people have starting taking order from the local chiefs.* (2002, 6-7)

The evaluation of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone notes that the ongoing greed and politics in the country are key factors that hindered peacebuilding (Abdalla 2002, 12).

TDS-SL goals and objectives were consistent with other peacebuilding efforts. In short, the primary goals would allow for a peaceful dialogue and allow for the providing of information in an accurate fashion (Abdalla 2002, 18). Abdalla and his team also
report a few weaknesses of TDS-SL. Examples of ways to improve included working with traditional leaders, focusing on HIV/AIDS, broadcasting in local languages and establishing local offices (Ibid., 27).

Abdalla’s evaluation of TDS-SL surveyed 400 Sierra Leoneans and had eight emphases: to determine TDS-SL popularity, to identify the radio stations with the highest listenership, to measure the time of day most respondents listened to the radio, to determine perceptions related to TDS-SL initiatives (peacemaking, etc.), to find out what expectations were held for peace initiatives in the country, to evaluate program effectiveness, to track change in audience attitude over time, and finally to identify weak and strong components of TDS-SL programming (2002, 30).

TDS-SL programming covered a variety of topics shown in the following chart from Abdalla (2002, 45).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Frequency of response in survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement and rehabilitation</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribalism</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survey asks an important question: “Do the programs deal with issues of concern?” The results found in Abdalla (2002, 57) are important in addressing what programming should be created, modified or continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of coverage by TDS-SL</th>
<th>1) Yes</th>
<th>2) No</th>
<th>If yes, how do you rate the programs’ efficiency?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Yes</td>
<td>% very effective</td>
<td>% somewhat effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Governance and leadership</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Tribalism</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Trauma from the war</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Education and schools</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Children</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Poverty</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Health</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Refugees, Resettlement and Reconstruction</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Sub-regional conflict</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Women’s issues</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Elections</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Corruption</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abdalla (2002) did not find significant differences between these groups in comparing various demographics such as gender, age and education level (58-60).

Another very interesting component of the Abdalla survey was the question “Would you be prepared to pay Le1000 a month to support a radio station in your community that talks about events and issues in your community?” (2002, 64). 87% of respondents answered “yes,” while only 6.3% answered “no” (Ibid., 65).

In TDS-SL’s realm were four individual peacebuilding initiatives: the Golden Kids Program, Mile 91 activities, Troway di Gun and one to organize youth against election violence. There were six parameters in the initiative to involve youth in elections to affect positive change:
1. Receiving training on election monitoring from the National Democratic Institute.
2. Doing voter education in their communities.
3. Serving as volunteer domestic election monitors in their communities.
4. Organizing against the use of violence around elections.
5. Spearheading a voter registration campaign.
6. Reporting on problems youths face regarding registration and elections so that information can be used in TDS(SL) programs. (Abdalla 2002, 88)

In the end of the program, TDS-SL worked with the National Electoral Commission and youths that participated to tape a program to be distributed via cassette tape; Abdalla notes that this was an example of how synergy and flexibility can occur at TDS-SL (91).

*Troway di Gun* is a program produced by TDS-SL and combatants/ex-combatants and the primary theme of the program is the literal translation of *Troway di Gun*: “Throw Away the Gun” (Abdalla 2002, 84). Another goal of the program is the successful representation of ex-combatants disarming and having peaceful lives. Abdalla suggests that ex-combatants, in discussing whether people are receiving what they need and what programs to assist with skill-building exists, are functioning like a “watchdog on NCDDR (The National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration)” (Ibid., 85). Overall, the program was successful in forcing combatants to think about disarming and at the end, a sense of pride by the show’s host was paramount (Ibid., 87).

Mile 91 is a geographically significant position in Sierra Leone because it is the gateway to any position South or East of Sierra Leone. In studying Mile 91, Abdalla (2002) discovered key groups that contributed to peacebuilding activities of TDS-SL over time. The key groups are Organization for Peace, Reconciliation and Development;
Radio Mankeneh; and the Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace program (80-81). The Mile 91 experience has no identifiable, direct correlation between TDS-SL and peace in Mile 91. However, “people said that the radio station stopped the rumors and made it easier for people to stay in Mile 91, it gave people a sense that developments were happening in their community, and eventually a confidence in peace” (Ibid., 84).

Finally, the Golden Kids Program has had tremendous success in Sierra Leone and most children have indicated that they listen to the program. Abdalla uses Swanky, a former child combatant, as the subject of the case study to show the successes of the Golden Kids Program (2002, 76). Swanky noted during one of his interviews with Abdalla’s team that, “(TDS) takes care of me by giving me the opportunity to go to school, takes care of all necessary expenditures include(ing) health, clothes, every thing that I need. To me, education is very important, because in Sierra Leone, if you don’t go to school you cannot do any thing. TDS has changed my life completely” (Ibid., 77).

**Burundi**

“Studio Ijambo” was established in Burundi in 1995 to assist in curbing the negative effects of mid-1990s hate radio in the African Great Lakes region (Hagos 2001). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded program had two purposes: first, to enhance peacebuilding efforts in Burundi and second, to assist in resolving conflict while strengthening local capacity. Until Studio Ijambo’s formation, “the Burundian press not only reflected the deep ethnic division but also actively
promoted it (and its members tried to) rival each other over calls to kill, or in packing and advancing their mutually macabre ideologies (generating) mutual terror and distrust based on historical fears” (Hagos 2001, ii quoting Rich 1997, 63).

Zachary (2000) points out that broadcasting of local radio programs in sub-Saharan Africa is critical and that “radio is a very effective means of getting issues discussed, while couching them in a way the people can relate to” (quoting Lunn). Burundi’s Studio Ijambo radio program also followed precedent in Africa, which, according to Ould-Abdallah (2000) meant: “due to lack of education and resources, the impact of the written press is largely confined to the urban elite able to read and buy newspapers. The radio, however, reached out to the masses, and at times of conflict has a remarkable ability to inflame or quiet the situation” (150).

The 2001 Management Systems International analysis of peacebuilding in Burundi focuses on five areas of peacebuilding:

1. inter-group relations
2. social and political mobilization
3. political elite negotiations
4. public institutions and processes
5. mass or elite conflict behavior

These five areas contribute to Hagos’s assessment of Studio Ijambo: “All in all, there is substantial evidence that the journalistic, dramatic and cultural components of Studio Ijambo’s programs have had positive effect in all of the five areas…” (2001, ii). Further, Hagos notes that Studio Ijambo had a lasting impact in Burundi because it transformed the methods in which media gathered news and trained journalists (Ibid.).
A brief history of the conflict in Burundi is essential to better understand the media’s role in peacebuilding there. Former UN Special Envoy to Burundi Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah offered the following brief chronological history of the Burundi conflict:

1993 – June 1: Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu and the leader of Frodebu, is elected president (of Burundi) with 65 percent of the vote, defeating Buyoya, who wins 35 percent. June 29: Frodebu wins 65 seats in the 81-member National Assembly. October 21: President Ndadaye is assassinated, prompting interethnic violence that targets Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Repression by the army sends 800,000 Hutus into exile; 350,000 people, mostly Tutsis, are internally displaced. Deaths in October and November are estimated to total between 50,000 and 100,000. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah is appointed as the UN secretary-general’s special representative to Burundi.

1994 – January: Cyprien Ntaryamira, former minister of agriculture, is elected president by the National Assembly. He is sworn in on February 5. Anatole Kanyenkiko is appointed prime minister. April 6: Ntaryamira is killed over Kigali airport in an airplane carrying him and the president of Rwanda. April-July: Genocide in Rwanda kills more than 800,000, mostly Tutsis. Two million Hutus, mostly members of the army and militia and their relatives, go into exile fearful of the advancing forces of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. July 14: The Rwandan Patriotic Front enters Kigali and takes power from the Hutu regime. September 10: A Convention of Government, based on the principle of power sharing, is adopted by Burundi’s political parties and endorsed by the National Assembly. October 1: Sylvestre Ntibantunganya of Frodebu is elected president by the National Assembly.

1995 – March 2: Antoine Nduwayo is designated prime minister, replacing Kanyenkiko. April: Violence in Burundi greets the first anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan genocide. July 16-17: UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visits Burundi. August: Ambassador Jesus Maria from Cape Verde is appointed by the UN secretary-general as special envoy for the Great Lakes region; the new envoy visits Burundi.

1996 – March: Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, is appointed as UN facilitator for Burundi and given the mission of bringing peace to the country. (2001, xxi-xxv)

In August 2000, after two years, peace negotiations finally came to a close in Burundi.
As mentioned above, Studio Ijambo was created to counter hate radio on the airwaves that was based not only in Burundi but also in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Various media actors in the Great Lakes region should be identified. They consisted of two newspapers, *The Crossroads* (Tutsi) and *The Witness* (Hutu); Radio Rutomoramgingo (anti-Tutsi in DRC); Radio Candid (anti-Tutsi); Radio Television Libre de Mille Collins (Hutu); and *Kangura*, a pro-Hutu newspaper (Hagos 2001, 6-7).

Bryan Rich and other Search for Common Ground staff were sent to Burundi in 1994 to assist in building a radio studio program. Before the 1995 formation of Studio Ijambo, Rich and a team of five Hutu and Tutsi reporters created three goals that, according to them, would result in achievement of the radio program:

- To position on the studio as a neutral and independent voice and to be inclusive of all sides. The premise of the project was that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse.

- To build a wide audience of ordinary people, both perpetrators and victims of violence. Right from the start, the team decided to let the people tell their own stories, instead of the reporters interpreting the information, so that the people’s eyewitness accounts would define the conflict and its consequences on everyday life and would propose solutions.

- To create, encourage, and reinforce the confidence and credibility of local journalists. For that, it was necessary to have a team composed of Hutus and Tutsis working together and respecting the basic rules of journalism as well as showing the common ground they shared. (Hagos 2001, 8 quoting Rich 1997, 63, and Sinduhiji 1998, 9)

From 1995-1997, Studio Ijambo produced 2,500 feature programs while assisting local journalists in changing their journalistic techniques to be fair in their coverage (Rich 2000, par. 19). In producing these programs, Studio Ijambo worked with Umwizero, a commercial state radio station. Hagos (2001) admits that the number of listeners is
difficult to determine, with some estimates at 12 million people. The programs are broadcast in French and in Kirundi, the national language. When Kirundi is utilized, listener frequency increases significantly (11).

In its analysis of Studio Ijambo in Burundi, The Management Systems International study led by Asgede Hagos (2001) offered five policy implications that are replicable to other radio peacebuilding programs:

1. Innovation – The Ijambo experience is that for a peace radio to be effective it must use innovative approaches in programming, training and general practices of journalism to draw and sustain an audience large enough to influence public opinion.

2. Independence – Independence of government control is a necessary precondition for a mass media intervention to be effective in peacebuilding.

3. Conflicting values – Some of the key journalistic values and principles, such as openness and objectivity, by which a peace radio should be guided to be credible and effective, may be unacceptable in societies that value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else. The Ijambo experience is that such culturally-based challenges must be overcome or at least minimized early through rigorous training and innovative investigative approaches so that local correspondents can function in the two worlds a media intervention puts them – one new, the other old.

4. Sustainability – Studio Ijambo is supporting its journalists in their plans to set up their own independent radio with the same aims as Studio Ijambo…Apart from adding a fresh new independent voice to the airwaves in Burundi, this will enable the Studio to broadcast its programs without having to depend so much on media organizations, such as the state radio, which doesn’t necessarily share their aims and objectives of Studio Ijambo.

5. Networking – Studio Ijambo should explore the possibility of working with regional actors in the media sector not only to expand its audience but also to protect itself from any attempt to silence by any single country. (18-19 and quoting Rolt 2001)

Melone, Terzis and Beleli (2002) present the Studio Ijambo experience in Burundi as an example of what works in creating media peacebuilding capacities and needs
initiatives. They note, “CG (Common Ground) started building coalitions striving for a win-win situation: the national radio was interested in good programming obtained without additional costs and from a source that would not turn into a competitor…CG not only provided broadcasting material but also built a production studio” (7). Aside from the media peacebuilding work by Studio Ijambo, trust-building processes were aided by media: “(CG) convinced some representatives of the different groups to come together on a radio show, creating a round table with three or four politicians on air” (Ibid., 11).

Moreover, the following five achievements, as noted at the Colombian Our Media conference, highlight the positive elements created by radio in Burundi:

- In a recent survey, an estimated 87% of Burundians listen to the radio, and 82% of those surveyed believe that Common Ground’s programs in Burundi greatly help reconciliation.
- Coverage of conflicts in different levels: family, community, national, regional.
- Able to highlight positive stories of conflict handling – where people have found a degree of common ground.
- Production of programs that will draw people into the process of dealing with conflict. Programs that will facilitate dialogue and joint problem solving and help disperse rumor, misperception and fear.
- Brought conflicting parties together in the studio. In the studio parties built relationships and exchanged views and information. (par. 71)

The negative assessments offered for Burundi radio peacebuilding initiatives are few, but should be discussed. Search for Common Ground (CG) discovered that it was completely excluding the youth portion of the population. Specifically, young boys were being missed in Studio Ijambo’s initiatives. Thus, CG redesigned their programming to be more “kid oriented” with music and content that was youth-specific (Melone, Terzis and Beleli 2002, 12).
In summarizing the Burundian Studio Ijambo experience, the five areas of peacebuilding mentioned at that start of this case study (inter-group relations, social and political mobilization, political elite negotiations, public institutions and processes, and mass or elite conflict behavior) were all aided to positive ends in radio programming. The case study also offers a unique confirmation of media effect research and it presents “pro-social effect content…and (this) grew out of the recognition that the same principles underlying the learning of antisocial activities ought to apply to more positive behavior” (Wimmer and Dominick 2000, 375-376).

**Bosnia**

Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself at war in 1992 and in April 1992, was fully recognized as an independent state by members of Europe (Cousens and Kumar 2001, 118). “During the next three and a half years, Bosnian government forces fought to preserve an independent, unitary state that would enjoy the same border of the former Bosnian republic and ostensibly offer the same rights to its Serb and Croat citizens that they had enjoyed (previously)” (Ibid.). The same notion was offered by Silber and Little 1995, 209).

Half of the 4.4 million people who called Bosnia home before 1992 were either refugees or internally displaced. Approximately 279,000 people died, most of the economic infrastructure was gone and 50% of the housing was destroyed or otherwise damaged (Cousens and Kumar 2001, 119; also Hrelja 1996; World Bank 1996a/b).
The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia, was mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which has been the basis of neutral UN peacekeeping for four decades...The New York Times, Newsday, CNN, ABC, National Public Radio (NPR), and other major news-gathering organizations, in varying degrees over time, reported a quite different war. Their reports characterized the Bosnian conflict as a one-sided and deliberately brutal war of aggression by the Bosnian Serbs against the Muslim-led Bosnian government in Sarajevo. (Strobel 1997, 99)

As Strobel noted above, the media in Bosnia played a key role in portraying the situation in that country. Strobel (1997) and Cohen (1963) focus on the problem of objectivity in Bosnia: “Within the journalistic community, the war in Bosnia opened deep fissures over the most sensitive of issues for a reporter – objectivity...Virtually all the journalists...involved in covering Bosnia acknowledged that the savagery of the fighting there and the outside world’s competing views of the conflict” (Strobel 1997, 103).

After the Dayton Accords of 1995, the international community focused much of its attention to improve the media sector in Bosnia. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Media Assistance Program, a program installed in 1995 by the Office of the High Commissioner, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, had the single goal of creating a media that was in a plural form to assist in distributing information for the elections in 1996 (van Geelan 2002, 56). Van Geelan evaluates the initiative as follows:

The massive and hurried intervention created an artificial media market almost totally dependent on foreign donors, with minimal responsibility to the Bosnian public. The already existing state-run networks continued with their partisan and sometimes even hate-mongering (in the case of Republica Serpska TV SRT) messages and were much more popular then the independent broadcasters supported by the international community. Initial lack of emphasis on programming and journalistic skills meant that
programming from these smaller local stations was generally poor and no challenge to the big state broadcasters. It was recently calculated that the per capita distribution of media outlets in Bosnia is twice that of Great Britain. In Bosnia, there are currently about 300 broadcasters, for a population of only 4 million people. (56-57)

The creation of an Independent Media Commission by the Office of the High Representative was a significant turning point for media following the Dayton Accords.

As noted above, a restructuring of the media was necessary and thus, the new Commission would have three divisions: one to handle all-media complaints, a second to act as a sub-commission to create and adhere to licensing standards, and a third division that would be a tribunal to serve in a judicial role (Price 2000, 13).

From a different perspective, David Rieff writes:

Surely one more picture, or one more story, or one more correspondent’s “stand-up” taped in front of a shelled building would bring people around, would force them to stop shrugging their shoulders or blaming the victims…In truth, the international peace corps has sympathized with Sarajevo to a degree that is altogether out of character for this group of professional skeptics. In a world where the diplomats and politicians who could have done something to save Bosnia have seemed determined to watch as it is destroyed…journalists found that they believed in “Western values” even as the Western political elite continued to betray them. (1994, 188-119)

Further, Strobel (1997) points out a distinction between “objectivity” and “neutrality” and specifically relates this difference in Bosnia. He writes:

Any news reporting of Bosnia that ascribes equal guilt to all sides is quite simply incorrect…Objectivity in this sense does not mean a kind of even-handedness, giving one paragraph to the atrocities of one side, one paragraph to the atrocities of the other side, one paragraph to atrocities of the third side…There is, I think, a tendency in media to balance competing political forces or competing political pressures. (104 quoting Gjelten 1995)
As it relates to formulation of policy with regard to peacebuilding in Bosnia, Strobel (1997) believes that the media played a key role on the public, politicians and leaders throughout the world (218-219).

One of the few positive media programs offered in peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia was that of “War Child.” This organization, supported by the music industry and established by the Pavarotti Music Center, has focused on children in Bosnia (Howard 2002a, 18). Essentially, although little information is cited in the literature about this program, the international humanitarian organization uses music “therapy to establish communication between former child combatants and enemies in Bosnia. The organization has also used modern technology to establish links and interactivity between Western children and those in conflict-affected countries” (Ibid.).

According to Melone, Terzis, and Beleli (2002) the relation between Search for Common Ground and media in Bosnia, evidenced through the call-in radio show called “Resolutions Radio,” was a disaster. The conclusion: most people in Bosnia had access to and would have preferred television (Ibid., 12).

Howard (2003b) points out that

It is increasingly clear that journalism development in the absence of a media-supportive infrastructure cannot function very well or likely very long. Media development initiatives must take account of a larger approach to a state’s democratization. A media-supportive infrastructure includes a system of legislation, courts and tribunals that complement, defend and discipline a reliable news media. Without this, there is no access-to-information legislation to enable a well-informed journalism, no courts to protect journalists from intimidation and to address media malfeasance such as libel and slander, and no independent regulators to fairly allocate publishing and broadcasting rights. It requires a multi-sectoral approach to enable the media to contribute to a society’s resolution of its conflict. (11)
Further failure is noted by an employee of *Lifeline Media* – an organization based in Geneva that uses radio to help manage conflict worldwide. Loretta Hieber notes:

In Bosnia…research has shown that media projects designed to help restructure society have instead largely failed. According to Gordon Adam of the Radio Partnership and Kirk Wolcott of the Carter Center, messages the international community wanted to put across to Bosnians through media intervention – such as the benefits of non-ethnic democracy, the safe return of refugees and the extradition of war criminals – were all highly contentious and essentially undeliverable in a society which still has many scores to settle, and would be doing so if there were not 35,000 foreign troops in the way. This analysis underlies a fundamental truth in broadcasting in conflict zones. If the audience feels the message is imposed upon them from the outside, it is highly unlikely they will be receptive to it. (1998, 20)

**Implications**

In summary, important conclusions can be drawn from the case studies presented. As in the Management Systems International (2001) study these case studies provide key questions that summarize lessons learned (88-89):

**Table 4 – Peace Radio Questions**

| Key questions to ask regarding the adopting, design and implementation of peace radio |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Regarding the nature of the conflict: | Which conflict situations are most easily influenced? | The level of fighting and polarization that exists may be a serious constraint. Since radio fed the fire in Rwanda, it seems clear that it might be used to douse it in Burundi where similar conditions existed and continue to exist. But it is not clear whether radio was able to affect the level of violent conflict in Burundi. Similarly, in Bosnia, the multi-ethnic nature of the conflict makes programming very challenging. |
| Regarding the basic design of the initiative: | Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation? | Whether radio can actually reach almost all of the affected populations in conflict prevention is critical. In a setting where all groups are not receiving the programming because of geography or transmission coverage constraints, impact would be reduced. The power of the messages and information reaching almost all the population, rather than a limited number of groups would seem necessary to contain conflict |
and promote peace. In Burundi, establishing an independent channel of communication for unreachted audiences was an important factor. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated Nelson Mandela’s speech about the negotiation framework into Kirundi so that a large audience would know about it. State channels broadcast this information mostly in French, which reaches only 15% of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regarding the implementation of the initiative (activity):</th>
<th>How well is it implemented?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting up a network with outside funds and programs rather than using local sources leads to the perception of the initiative as foreign based and less valid over time (i.e. Radio FERN in Bosnia).</td>
<td>Without very strict ethnic diversity in programming, the message is weakened. Teams of journalists that represent all groups have been successful in building public trust in the message. In those settings, people appear to look for representation in the discussion first before they tune in to the messages or even the reporting. People want to see their group represented in the face or the sound of the journalists. But trying to provide this consistently can be difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using journalists from the region or country is critical to obtaining useful information. Outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting. International media attempts are less well received locally.</td>
<td>High standards of journalism in fact finding and reporting are critical. The impact of the Studio’s professionalism underlines the work that needs to go into providing balanced reporting. This starts with the choice of who covers the story and is not totally reliant on editing after the facts are obtained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating the ethics of journalism is the work of the journalists themselves, not those they work for. Journalists should be asking themselves: Have we done good reporting? What do we know and how do we know it? Who are the sources and what is their stake? Have we verified the information? Can we conclude the truth or are we just looking at a collection of facts? Will the story have impact? What kind?</td>
<td>Knowledge of local media practice and audience listening habits determines program success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many cited the professionalism and relaxed tone of the broadcasts as a more effective way to reach broader audiences. Innovation is required to sustain audiences over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Focusing on quality of programming instead of quantity helps build audiences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regarding the immediate context:</th>
<th><em>Is it placed in fertile ground?</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtaining access to transmission sources is needed. Achieving this without compromising content can be tricky in certain political settings. In some geographic settings, access to regional media outlets can be an alternative to constrictive national situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The issue of who transmits can confuse the listener. Some who listened to the programs broadcast on state stations were not totally aware that the program originated privately.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Analysis/lessons learned

While theory and ideas have been discussed above, it is also important to note several “what’s next” ideas from a variety of sources. First it is essential to acknowledge that the media forces public policy makers into making decisions faster and with less time (Shea 2002). Second, it is essential to understand that the construction of peace is directly correlated to the state of the political environment. This element also encompasses the idea that “leaders who are unable to mobilize a broad political consensus for their policies will have little success in promoting these policies to the media” (Wolfsfeld 2001, 42). Thirdly, researchers have examined the fact that media’s portrayal of a leader (for example, France’s Jacques Chirac) can influence the public opinion of certain audiences – the media has full control over the image of the leader (LaBalme 2001).

Further, the media should adopt a holistic approach, in that media development initiatives “must take account of a larger approach to a state’s democratization” (Krug and Price 2002). A full acknowledgment about the lack of knowledge relative to media effect should also be examined (Howard 2003b, 12). Wolfsfeld (2001, 43) also indicates that it is essential for public policy makers to develop a long-range strategy that not only serves specific political and diplomatic needs, but the needs of the media (offering somewhat of a preventative formula). Strobel also notes, “A media and public affairs plan needs to be in place well before a mission begins and should be integrated into the overall operational plan (it should not be a second- or third-tier priority)” (1997, 229).
All of the ideas in present research can be summed-up with a statement General Colin Powell offered to students at the National Defense University: “Once you’ve got all the forces moving and everything’s being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to the television, because you can win the battle but lose the war if you don’t handle the story right” (Woodward 1991, 178).

With General Powell’s comment in mind, some researchers have offered solutions to the media’s negative effect on peace operations outcomes. From a journalistic perspective, Warren Strobel has said, “In the field, military commanders and their subordinates should be as open as possible with the news media. Part of the media contingent covering a peace operation will already have been in the region for months (or even years) and will have a detailed understanding of the situation and alternative sources of information” (1997, 226-7). Golfsfeld (2001, 44), from a researcher perspective, has indicated that structural changes must occur in the news media itself: “Such changes might include creating special sections in newspapers and program in the broadcast media dedicated to peace issues. Such sections and programs would force reporters to search for materials that would be consistent with the values of peace journalism.”

Also, Howard discusses good journalism and what it should and should not entail (2003a, 13). He says it should not be corrupt, malicious, derivative and/or defamatory (Ibid.). In employing this type of conflict sensitive journalism, members of the media should report both sides of a story, avoid relying on leaders to summarize the conflict dynamic, try to find commonalities between opposing sides or leaders, should avoid words that would spark hate speech or negative reaction, should avoid merging fact and
opinion and should not be afraid to bring ideas for peace to the leaders involved in the process – rather than wait for the process to occur and then offer input (Ibid., 16).
10. Suggestions for change

Various opinions about the media’s role will continue to exist regardless of the suggestions for change offered by a journalist or a researcher. The IMPACS team in Vancouver notes that the media in a peace operation should do the following (Aster et al, 1):

- Provide accurate information
- Provide an alternative view
- Provide a voice for the voiceless
- Entertain
- Advocate peace
- Translate highly political or technical information into common language
- Act as a watchdog
- Contribute to the building of a culture of peace
- Serve as a communication mechanism

Further research must be conducted relative to the impact of commercialization on the media. Howard (2003b, 6) noted that, “beyond the influence of media culture and political environment on the reporting of conflict, there is a growing impact of commercialism on the media.” No studies as of yet have been conducted on this specific area of effect.

Strobel (1997, 227) has also proposed that government officials be more open with their information on the homefront and the option to change a mission’s goals and outcome should be always-open. No matter the source, a common sentiment for change of the media is placed on public leaders and policy makers – not only the media element of the equation.
Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester (2001) synthesize their argument that peacebuilding efforts must be approached in a broad sense and reinforce that argument by noting that “peacebuilding efforts have to go much farther to identify accurately and responsively the unique relationships, mechanisms, processes, institutions, or authorities that hold the greatest promise for ongoing conflict resolution over public issues in a particular country, which may not always look like those in Western states” (16).

Howard (2003a) also points out that “Few journalists have any training in the theory of conflict. Having the skills to analyze conflict will enable a reporter to be a more effective professional journalist” (back cover). If journalists were to take Howard’s comment to heart, many would look at conflict with a different lens and perhaps even a different “media frame.

Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester (2001) propose five policy changes related to peacebuilding:

(First,) War-torn societies need highly context-sensitive approaches to political stabilization, reform and reconstruction, and international efforts that are informed enough to adapt themselves to changing circumstances in real time. Second, the international community has to develop a greater ability to integrate its various resources – military, civilian, diplomatic, political, economic, humanitarian – with one another functionally and over time…Third, if the ultimate objective of peacebuilding is political, international assistance must be particularly alert to continuing political challenges even after a major settlement has been reached…Fourth, peacebuilding will always encounter multiple challenges…Finally, perhaps the greatest challenge for the international community in trying to assist war-torn societies is to be ruthlessly modest about its ambitions. (14-15)

In constructing a media project for a peacebuilding situation, the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management in Germany, with Melone, Terzis
and Beleli (2002), indicate three ‘steps’ that must be included: pre-project assessment, project design and implementation, and post-project assessment and evaluation (5-11). In each ‘step’ the Center and authors offer suggestions for content and step-by-step methods for determining what programs and projects best suit a particular media project. A summary of the three steps leaves the media builder with a sense of what to do and what not to do and how to address each group involved.
11. Conclusion and future

As indicated at the onset of this paper, one is hard-pressed to find verbatim sourcing of the idea that media has a direct effect on peace operations. However, with the aforementioned proposals, acknowledgements and opinions, one can summarize that the media does indeed have some type of effect on peace operations. The exact effect the media has is not yet known but researchers in this area hope for the support and involvement of media, military and peace operations parties – to develop a better understanding of the matter at hand. Even more obvious through the research conducted in this paper is the realization that the international community lacks a consensus definition for peacebuilding.

Since little research has been done specific to this paper’s topic, this author takes Wolfsfeld’s conclusion to heart: “It is to be hoped that a growing awareness of the central role the medial play in other political processes will lead to an increased focus on the role they play in attempts to bring peace” (2001, 45). Also, “…They (policy makers) need a sophisticated understanding, not simplistic descriptions, of the complex role of the news media in a democratic society” (Strobel 1997, 234).

Other important elements of media’s role in peacebuilding include the need for financial support of independent media, developing infrastructure for media, building relationships with local governments and organizations at all levels, and the need for particular training that is specific to a peace operation setting (Andrade 2002, 18).
Howard (2002b) proposes three essentials for responsible media coverage of elections and does so in the context of other peacebuilding regulations: “well-established rules for the conduct of the media and the election commissions, a process of arbitration and enforcement of regulations governing the media; and sufficient technology in place” (4). The summary of findings in Howard’s study highlights the common feelings that full-scale media regulation is unlikely, that many people in a country are often illiterate and thus, do not have effects created by the media outlets, and that regulations concerning the media must be made within the context of the locality and operation (Ibid.).

It should also be noted that “certain forms of international assistance and the timing of their delivery can also frustrate peacebuilding” (Cousens, Kumar, and Wemester 2001, 14 and Paris 1997). Thus, careful consideration should be given to media’s role in any peace operation and certainly those operations considered “peacebuilding.”

In 2002, the Global Peace Initiative of Women Religious and Spiritual Leaders met in Geneva, Switzerland and focused on how women could play a greater role in building peace through negotiations and through the media. At their meeting, the women in attendance shared stories of the Rwandan genocide and also about their basket-making business. Business leaders in attendance worked with the Rwandan widows to market their basket business with media and public relations techniques. While this was not an overt or overly-complex peacebuilding program, it reinforces the findings in this thesis that peacebuilding takes many forms and can easily be assisted with media (Merriam and Glauber 2004, 26-27).
At the onset of this paper, the question “Does the media’s involvement in a peace operation have a significant role relative to that operation? And if so, what are the theories that could support such a premise?” was posed. While this thesis does not exhaust all possible answers and approaches to these questions. It does attempt to demonstrate that media play an important and ever-changing role in not only the international arena but also in peace operations and specifically in peacebuilding efforts. Further research is needed, as noted above, and ongoing dialogue will continue benefiting the field on this front.
Extended Bibliography


McLaughlin, Greg, and David Miller. 1996. The media politics of the Irish peace process.


Prag, Thomas, and Gordon Adam. *The media's role in peace-building: Asset or liability?*
Paper presented at the Our Media 3 Conference.


CURRICULUM VITAE

Michael C. Aho was born on September 18, 1980, in Charleston, South Carolina, and is an American citizen. He graduated from Floyd E. Kellam High School, Virginia Beach, Virginia, in 1998. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Communication (Public Relations) from East Carolina University in 2002. He was employed as a copyright assistant at George Mason University and as an administrative aide for the Fairfax County, Virginia Board of Supervisors for the two years in which he worked on his graduate program and received his Master of Science in New Professional Studies-Peace Operations from George Mason University in 2004.