# THE CHALLENGES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

BY
Solomon Agada

Peace Operations Training Institute®

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BY

COMMANDER SO AGADA

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# CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this work was carried out by Solomon Onyilo Agada under my supervision.

Thesis Advisor

## Commodore Darius F. Onimole, rtd

FSS,MSS,DSS,fellowofwarCollege(fwc),psc(+),

M.Sc Political Science(StrategicStudies)-University of Ibadan.

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# <u>ABBREVIATIONS</u>

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| AHQ | - | Army Headquarters |
| AU | - | African Union |
| AMISOM | - | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| CAR | - | Central African Republic |
| CNN | - | Cable News Network |
| BBC | - | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| BINUB | - | United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi |
| Brig Gen | - | Brigadier General |
| CoG | - | Centre of Gravity |
| Col | - | Colonel |
| DP | - | Decisive Point |
| DPKO | - | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DRC | - | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ECOMOG | - | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS | - | Economic Community of West African States |
| ED | - | Editor |
| EU | - | European Union |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FC | - | Force Commander |
| GA | - | General Assembly |
| ICG | - | International Crisis Group |
| IDPs | - | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IGAD | - | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ISS | - | Institute of Security Studies |
| Lt Col | - | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Maj Gen | - | Major General |
| MILOBs | - | Military Observers |
| MINURCA | - | United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic. |
| MINURSO | - | United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. |
| MINUSTAH | - | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. |
| MONUC | - | United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo |
| NA | - | Nigerian Army |
| NGOs | - | Non Governmental Organisations |
| NIIA | - | Nigeria Institute of International Affairs |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| OAU | - | Organization of African Unity |
| OIOS | - | Office of Internal Oversight Services |
| ONUB | - | United Nations Mission in Burundi |
| ONUC | - | United Nations Operation in Congo |
| ONUMOZ | - | United Nations Operation in Mozambique |
| PKO | - | Peace-Keeping Operation |
| PM | - | Prime Minister |
| PSO | - | Peace Support Operations |
| RTD | - | Retired |
| SADC | - | Southern African Development Community |
| SAIIA | - | South Africa Institute of International Affairs |
| SALW | - | Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| SC | - | Security Council |
| SG | - | Secretary General |
| SLOC | - | Sea Lanes Of Communication |
| SOFA | - | Status Of Forces Agreement |
| SRSG | - | Special Representative of the |

|          |   |                                                         |
|----------|---|---------------------------------------------------------|
|          |   | Secretary General                                       |
| TCC      | - | Troop Contributing Countries                            |
| TFG      | - | Transitional Federal Government                         |
| UK       | - | United Kingdom                                          |
| UN       | - | United Nations                                          |
| UNAMA    | - | United Nations Mission in Afganistan                    |
| UNAMIR   | - | United Nations Mission in Rwanda                        |
| UNAMIS   | - | United Nations Mission in Sudan                         |
| UNASOG   | - | United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group              |
| UNAMSIL  | - | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone                  |
| UNAVEM   | - | United Nations Angolan Verification Mission             |
| UNDOF    | - | United Nations Disengagement Observer Force             |
| UNEF     | - | United Nations Emergency Force                          |
| UNIFIL   | - | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon                 |
| UNITARPOCI | - | United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instructions. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| UNMEE | - | United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea |
| UNFICYP | - | United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus |
| UNMIK | - | United Nations Mission in Iraq-Kuwait |
| UNMIL | - | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNMIS | - | United Nations Mission in the Sudan |
| UNMIT | - | United Nations Intergrated Mission in Timor- Leste. |
| UNMOGIP | - | United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. |
| UNOCI | - | United Nations Mission in Corte D' Ivoire |
| UNOMIG | - | United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia. |
| UNOMIL | - | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia |
| UNOMSIL | - | United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNOSOM | - | United Nations Operation in Somalia. |
| UNSC | - | United Nations Security Council |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| UNSCR | - | United Nations Security Council Resolution |
| UNTAG | - | United Nations Transition Assistance Group |
| UNTSO | - | United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation |
| USA | - | United States of America |
| USC | - | United Somalia Council |
| USIP | - | United States Institute for Peace |
| USSR | - | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The desire to carry out this study emanated from the realization that within the 62 years of existence of the UN, it has established about 61 PKOs, with Africa accounting for the highest number of these missions.   Unfortunately, only few of these PKOs have been successfully handled or resulted in lasting peace.

This study first examines the history, theory and concept of conflict, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, and then made use of the Somalia crisis to generalise the demanding task of UN PKO in Africa.   The main focus was to identify the likely impediment and critical areas to this phenomenon as well as proffer strategies to making humanitarian interventions and/or PKOs more effective, especially in Africa.

The study established that the paucity of some deliberate or careful steps that need to be taken to consolidate and sustain peace generally may be the greatest challenges to PKO in Africa. These include the need for robust and timely operational mandate, and where or when

desirable, effective enforcement of arms embargo. Others include rapid deployment capability, commitment and co-operation of the belligerents and understanding the sensitivity of would-be recipients, amongst other essential details.

Also, within its first sixty years of existence, it is observed that there had been only two clear-cut cases of what had originally been proclaimed as the UN's most important function: its capacity to marshal military power against aggression - the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, and the response of the UN to it under Chapter VII of the Charter - authorizing a full military action under the UN Flag and under US command against the North Korean attack. During this time the erstwhile USSR had boycotted all UN meetings in protest against the People's Republic of China being excluded from China's seat in the United Nations. This allowed US President Harry Truman a free hand at the Security Council. The second was in 1990 with the Cold War restrictions over, the Security Council unanimously and immediately authorized again,

under US command, a coalition to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait.

The operations in Korea and Iraq achieved their objectives - the former with great military sacrifice - mainly due to very clear and timely mandate, with far enough and readily available needed military resources. On the other hand, the United State's intervention in Somalia in 1992-93 was partly successful due to what can be classified as erroneous strategy of statecraft. The US had started with coercive diplomacy - or forceful persuasion - through a threat to react with overwhelming military force should the Somali warlords (who had been using starvation of civilians as a means of waging war), opposed the US humanitarian relief intervention to bring food to over 2 million starving population. Once that phase of intervention proved successful, then the United Nations, through the backing of Clinton's administration, undertook a much more broader mandate - the reconstruction of the Somali Government, along with a dangerous and precarious attempt at disarming of the warlords' militias - but with a force far smaller than

the one used to stop the starvation. Consequently our study attempted some suggestions to these dilemmas and proffered remedies in order to improve the capacity to manage future UN PKOs in Africa, with derivable recommendations that the USA and other major developed powers should be urgently encouraged and motivated to deploy troops for PKOs in Africa, despite the unfortunate disaster of 1993 in Somalia. And that the United Nations should henceforth seek to ensure effective implementation of arms embargo it imposes on warring parties. Finally, that the UN in conjunction with TCC should ensure proper training of all peacekeepers in the art of conflict management, logistics planning and other field operational techniques before their deployment to mission areas.

# CHAPTER ONE

# 1.00 INTRODUCTION

## 1.01 Background

As it is well known, the UN was formed after the Second World War primarily, among other reasons to maintain international peace and security.[1] The founders of the UN had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in PKOs thus, PKO was not mentioned in the original UN Charter. However, a former UNSG, Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as "Chapter VI and half".[2] This is because it falls between provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII which enables enforcement actions by the UNSC. Implementation of these Chapters relies largely on the consensus of the SC's permanent members namely China, France, USSR now Russia Federation, the UK and the USA.[3]

Until the end of the Cold War, the increasing disagreement between the then 2 super powers made this collective security system unworkable, this led to the conception of PKOs. Under the collective security system, when dispute arises between 2 governments, the parties concerned are obligated to seek a solution by peaceful means. This is under Chapter VI of the UN Charter mainly by, negotiation, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, peaceful settlement or resort to regional agencies.

If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict, then Chapter VII of the UN Charter comes into play.[4]  This constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System.  It provides that in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression the SC may take enforcement measures to restore international peace in such situations. These measures are essentially, arms embargoes, complete or partial economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, and in the last resort the use of force.

UNEF, the first actual UN peacekeeping operations was formed in 1956 during the Suez Canal Crisis[5]. It provided the model for classical peacekeeping which requires the consent of the protagonists, impartiality on the part of UN forces and resort to use of arms only in self defence. The immediate objective of this classical form of peacekeeping was to facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreement.[6]Besides UN peacekeeping in Africa, AU, ECOWAS and SADC have also contributed significantly to peacekeeping efforts in the continent. Table 1 shows the list of past and present UN PKOs in Africa.

## 1.02 TABLE 1. PAST AND PRESENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

| Serial | Mission | Duration |
|--------|---------|----------|
| **(a)** | **(b)** | **(c)** |
| 1. | ONUC | Jul 60 - Jun 64 |
| 2. | UNEF I | Nov 56 - Jan 67 |
| 3. | UNEF II | Oct 73 - Jul 79 |
| 4. | UNAVEM 1 | Jan 89 - May 91 |
| 5. | UNOSOM 1 | Apr 92 - Sep 93 |
| 6. | UNASOG | May 94 –Jun 94 |
| 7. | UNOMUR | Jun 93 - Sep 94 |
| 8. | UNOMIL | Sep 93 – Sep 94 |
| 9. | ONUMOZ | Dec 92 - Dec 94 |
| 10. | UNAVEM II | May 91 – Feb 95 |
| 11. | UNOSOM II | Mar 93 - Mar 95 |
| 12. | UNAMIR | Oct 93 - Mar 96 |
| 13. | UNAVEM III | Feb 95 – Jul 97 |
| 14. | MONUA | Jun 97- Feb 99 |
| 15. | UNOMSIL | Jul 88 – Oct 99 |
| 16. | MINURCA | Apr 98- Feb 00 |
| 17. | MONUC | Nov 99 – Till date |
| 18. | MINURSO | Apr 91 – Till date |
| 19. | UNAMSIL | Oct 99- Dec 05 |
| 20. | ONUB | Jun 04- Dec 06 |
| 21. | UNMEE | Jul 00- Till date |
| 22. | MINUCI | May 03-Apr 04 |
| 22. | UNMIL | Sep 03- Till date |
| 23. | UNOCI | Aug 04- Till date |
| 24. | UNMIS | Mar 05- Till date |
| 25. | BINUB | Dec 06- Till date |

**Source**: http://www.un.org

## 1.03  Statement of the Research Problem

The UN has played a vital role in mediating peace agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce the level of conflict in several regions especially in Africa. However, some of those accords failed to take hold then, such as in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.[7] Additionally, the current situations in Cote D' Ivoire, Darfur-Sudan, DRC and Somalia unfortunately have not changed too positively. This has resulted in severe IDPs and refugee problems further compounding the security situation in and around such conflict areas.

It is estimated that roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within 5 years due to some challenges.[8] This drives home the point that, to prevent conflict, peace agreements must be implemented in a sustained manner. Most of these conflicts are known to be contagious and thus have spill-over effects to other nations while new ones are also unfolding, such as in CAR, Chad and Guinea. All these complex crises cry out for UN intervention. Meanwhile, there was already the problem of the World

Body having taken on too many missions in recent times; for example, within 1988 to 1994 alone, the number of blue-helmeted troops had increased from 9,570 to 73,393 and an exponential soaring in the peace operations budget from $230 million to $3.6 billion.[9] It is in view of the foregoing that this study seeks to address the challenges of PKOs in Africa after the end of the Cold War with particular emphasis on Somalia.

Moreover, until very recently, it is well known that there has been a systematic neglect of Africa security matters by the trio of France, UK and USA since after the Cold War.[10] This makes it necessary for Africans to properly understand the ongoing global reforms to ensure lasting solution to their conflicts. Kofi Annan the immediate past UNSG reiterated this position by advising member states of the UN to seek alternative remedies of handling conflicts in their various regions.[11] Mr Tony Blair as British PM, also declared same position while commenting on the situation in Zimbabwe for African leaders to act.[12]

Since conflicts are intrinsically bound to occur, Africans must begin to address issues that will enable them manage conflicts in the continent effectively in concert with the UN. This study will therefore seek to answer the following pertinent questions:

Why has conflict situations in Africa increased after the Cold War?

What is the common nature and underlying causes of these conflicts?

What are the challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa and how can these challenges be tackled?

**1.04 Objective of the Study.** The purpose of the study is to examine the challenges of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa. However, the specific objectives of the study are:

To identify the challenges confronting UN peacekeeping in Africa using UN PKO in Somalia in 1991 as a case study.

To design strategies towards effective UN peacekeeping in Africa.

**1.05 Significance of the Study.** Following the end of the Cold War, there were renewed calls for the UN to become the agency for achieving world peace, as several dozen military conflicts continue to rage around the globe. With this, there has been an increased need for peacekeeping in Africa due to increased conflict situations in the continent.[13] With the seemingly lax attitude of some major players in the UN towards African security,[14] the continent's security issues needs to be addressed adequately by Africans in conjunction with the UN.

This study therefore, is expected to benefit researchers, analysts, and policy makers in formulating a framework to overcome the challenges of UN PKO in Africa for successful future peacekeeping. Furthermore it is hoped that its findings could stimulate further research in the field of UN PKOs. The study would also contribute to existing body of knowledge in the field of peacekeeping.

**1.06 Research Design.** The study considered that UN PKOs in Africa is plagued by some challenges. It also considered that even though UN PKOs started in Africa about 50 years ago, it is still not as successful as it should have been. Consequently, the research was designed as a case study using the conflict situation in Somalia to bring out the general challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa. The background and UN interventions in the conflict shall be highlighted to bring forth the challenges accordingly. Furthermore, the research sought to proffer strategies to overcome the challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa to ensure successful PKO leading to sustainable peace in Africa.

**1.07 Instruments for Data Collection.** The instruments used for data collection were books, magazines, journals, newspapers and the internet. Other instruments used were, the electronic media, published and unpublished materials from libraries. Personal interviews and discussion with resource persons were also used.

**1.08 Validity/Reliability of Instruments.** In order to ensure the validity of the instruments used for data collection, they were subjected to scrutiny. This was to eliminate any trace of bias or prejudice. Furthermore, various information obtained were crosschecked with independent sources for fair assessment and authenticity.

Where traces of bias or prejudice were found such data were discarded. In the case of oral interviews, conscious efforts were made to distinguish facts from personal opinions. This necessitated in-depth analysis.

**1.09 Method of Data Analysis.** Information obtained were analysed qualitatively to arrive at the synthesis presented. However, in some instances, historical, descriptive and comparative approaches were adopted. Data obtained from interviews and discussions with resource persons were analyzed in a descriptive form.

**1.10 Scope of Study.**  The study examines the civil war and UN PKO in Somalia. This is because of its peculiar characteristics, its strategic position in the horn of Africa and its uniqueness in many respects.  For the first time, the UN maintained a peace mission in a country without a government; this was not without consequences. For instance due to lack of understanding of the concept of the second generation peacekeeping, the mission was faced with severe political and operational difficulties.

The study will also draw examples from UN PKOs in Africa within the pre and post Cold War era and considers strategies that could be used to improve future UN peacekeeping in Africa. It is assumed that the UN will continue to employ peacekeeping as a means of conflict resolution generally, especially in Africa.

**1.11 Limitations.**  A major limitation of this research work is the dearth of relevant and contemporary literature on the specific research subject. The researcher would have loved to visit and interview the FCs of the PKOs of the country used as case study and some current UN PKOs in Africa but

for the financial wherewithal. This, to the researcher is also a limitation.

These limitations are not likely to affect the objective of the research work in any significant way. This is because interviews and consultations were held with some serving senior officers in PKO Departments of the Nigeria Armed Services Headquarters. Additionally, since the research shall be adding to body of knowledge, the efforts made so far would definitely ginger further interest of more research in this area.

## 1.12 Definition of Terms

Woodhouse gave the definition of conflict as:

> *A situation that arise when individuals or groups identify a goal they want to secure in order to satisfy material interests, needs or values and these perceptions lead to actions that come up against the interests, needs and values of others.*[15]

On the other hand the Hugh Mial et al define conflict as:

> an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arises as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints.[16]

The similarity of these definitions shows clearly the nature of conflict which could be at the levels of inter-states or intra-state. It also means that conflicts would always be part of human nature. It should however he noted that because conflict is dynamic it tends to be chaotic and uncontrollable. Where the conflict involves the use of arms it is described as war.[17] In this work therefore, war and conflict will be used interchangeably to mean all types of conflict which require mediation.

Mr Kofi Annan former UNSG explains peacekeeping thus:

> A United Nations' presence in the field ...., with the consent of the parties, in order to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements

> *relating to the control of conflicts.... And their resolution or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.*[18]

George Maritell, defines UN peacekeeping as:

> *Operations in which personnel owing allegiance to the UN are engaged in military or para-military duties and are carrying weapons for their own defence in pursuit of duties designated by the UN as necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace.*[19]

FT Liu defined PKOs as "essentially a practical mechanism used by the UN to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means."[20] Some other scholars have insisted that the term UN peacekeeping cannot include UN observers. There is therefore, no single accepted definition of the term peacekeeping. The above definitions and others may be permissible in order to achieve their peculiar purposes/goals.

In this study however, peacekeeping refers to a mechanism for conflict resolution covering a wide range of activities to include use of observers, troop's deployment, disarmament, humanitarian and supply of relief materials,

refugee resettlement and elections. It is thus, conceived as an interpositional force placed between two or more contending and warring factions with opportunity to resolve the conflict either through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation and sometimes arbitration.

Manoeuvrist Approach to Warfare, although developed in the context of high intensity operations, its characteristics and requirements also have applicability across the whole spectrum of military activity including PSOs. This makes it imperative to define the concept and some of its key terms relevant to this study; these are End State, CoG and DPs.

Manoeuvrist Approach to Warfare is the application of strength against identified weakness through the combined application of manoeuvre (mobility and effect in PSO) and tempo throughout the adversary's depth and the use of surprise.[21]

End State is defined as 'state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or

to resolve the conflict on favourable or satisfactory term', or state of affairs which meets given objectives.[22] This would mean lasting peace in PSO.

CoG is defined as that characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies), from which a nation, an alliance, or a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.[23] At both strategic and operational levels of warfare, if a COG is correctly identified, influenced and if necessary attacked and eliminated it will lead either to the adversary's inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peaceful negotiations.

DPs are series of co-coordinated actions required to neutralize a CoG by exploitation of its critical vulnerabilities. It may not necessarily be a battle; it may be the elimination or denial of a capability or an achievement.[24]

## Notes and References

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21. UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations-Joint Warfare Publication 0-10, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition dated January 2002, P. 3-8.

22. Ibid. P. 3-9.

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24. Id.

# CHAPTER TWO

## 2.00  LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of peacekeeping and related issues needs to start with the proper understanding of the history, legality, and conceptual understanding of conflict and peacekeeping itself.   In this chapter therefore, the study shall highlight some theories of conflict resolution and then examine the concept of peacekeeping and its' approaches.

**2.01 Concept of Conflict.**   Conflicts are experienced at most levels of human activity and are complex processes which have certain elements.   One way of conceptualizing the relationship between these elements is a Conflict Triangle at Figure 1, with structures, attitudes and behaviours at the points. Galtung first proposed this model for understanding conflict.[1]

## 2.01 FIGURE 1.  CONFLICT TRIANGLE

```
                    STRUCTURE




                     CONFLICT



ATTITUDES                              BEHAVIOUR
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Source: Woodhouse T Prof, et al (eds). <u>Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution</u>. (New York: UNITARPOCI, 2000) p.22.

He was of the opinion that structures refer to political mechanisms, processes and institutions that influence the satisfaction of security, welfare, recognition and identity needs. Attitudes include the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These may be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts, parties tend to develop increasingly negative stereotypes of opposing parties and increasingly positive self-group identity.

Attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Galtung sees behaviours as actions undertaken by one party in conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that party abandon or change its goals. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks.[2]

Conflict is a dynamic process in which structures, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing one another. A conflict emerges as parties' interests come into disagreement or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. The parties then begin to develop hostile attitudes and conflicting behaviours. The conflict formation starts to grow and develops, thus the conflict may widen, deepen and spread. This complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic, inter-dependent changes that involve de-escalation of conflict behaviour, change in attitudes and transformation of relationships or structures. [3]

There are 2 sides to conflict; the positive and negative sides. The positive view of conflict persists in most of the

Third World where wars served as instrument of transition from colonial rule to independence. However, after independence, this principle has not proved beneficial to most African Countries, rather, it has compounded their problems. Thus for the African States, conflict is a double-edged sword; a means to independence but at post independence particularly after the Cold War, conflict escalated into civil wars with devastating effect on many African Countries. This view was captured succinctly by Maj Gen Chris Garuba when he said:

> Following the end of the Cold War, there has been a clearer realisation that we on the African Continent have accounted for a disproportionately high number of post Cold War conflicts. As recently as 1998, people in about 14 of Africa's 53 countries are engaged in armed conflicts simultaneously. These violent conflicts have taken severe economic and social tolls on the continent, seriously undermining development efforts in many countries.[4]

In some other parts of the world the positive sides of conflict enabled states to maintain or extend control over territories. For instance, South Korea's independence was

achieved as a result of conflict.  Similarly the borders of the State of Israel were defined through conflict, also the borders of Iran and Iraq.  The first Gulf War of 1991 ensured the continued existence of Kuwait as an independent state.  Conflict could therefore be also productive.

David Weeks sums up the view of existence of positive and negative sides of conflict when he explained that; "Conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity and a world without conflict is not desirable because it would mean a world without diversity".[5]  Despite the existence of 2 sides of conflict, any effort at conflict prevention needs to promote the growth of the positive aspect of conflict in a society to avoid the occurrence of conflict in the first place. This is in line with the adage that says 'prevention is better than cure'. Furthermore, the negative side of conflict sometimes is capable of eroding the positive side depending on the extent and duration of such conflict.

On the causes of conflict Lewis Coser posits that "there are occasions for conflict in every group as rivalry develop over control of resources, leadership positions and the like."[6]

This is in line with conflict definition by Woodhouse and the British Maritime Doctrine. Furthermore, using data from his Minorities at Risk Project, Ted Gurr identified 3 factors that affect the proneness of communal group to rebel. These are collective incentives, capacity for joint action and external opportunities.[7] Under these general indicators are also 7 risk factors which have had significant positive connection with ethno-political rebellions. These are history of lost political autonomy, active economic and political discrimination against the group, history of state repression and strength of group identity. Others are extent of militant group mobilization, number of adjacent countries in which conflict are underway and active support from kindred groups in neighboring countries.

Dr Oche a senior research fellow at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs(NIIA), in assessing the causes of conflict in Africa argues that African conflicts arises from social, economic, political and numerous other crises that are generic to the African setting.[8] This manifests, in quest for distribution of resources, access to power and proliferation of SALW amongst others. This assessment

brings to mind the causes of conflicts in Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Rwanda, there was a clear case of ethnic rivalry domination and exploitation. In Liberia and Sierra Leone the major causes of their conflicts were similar, basically political and access to economic resources, particularly diamond.[9]    Furthermore, according to a Newswatch report, 'the fierce struggle for power between Aidid and Mahdi in Somalia has its historical antecedents in the ethnic rivalry between the Abgal Haniye clan located in Mogadishu and Habir Gidir clan whose base is in Central Somalia....'[10]

This study is of the view that the quest of interest groups for access to power and distribution of resources had largely caused conflicts in Africa. The study also believes that when individuals and groups turn to violence to solve problems conflict resolution becomes as multifaceted as conflict itself.

**2.02 Theories of Conflict Resolution.** Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved. Duffey expressed the view that this is a new theory of problem-solving in order to achieve the desired result. He maintains that the traditional settlement method merely settles conflict on the surface rather than resolve conflict as in conflict resolution.[11] The main differences between the settlement and resolution approaches to conflict are summarised in Table 2.

## 2.03 TABLE 2. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND RESOLUTION APPROACHES TO CONFLICT

| Serial | Item | Settlement (Compromise) | Resolution (Cooperation) |
|--------|------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| 1. | Focus | Objective issues; short-term | Objective issues, and subjection perception, long term. |
| 2. | Aim | Remove Conflict | Removes causes of conflict. |
| 3. | Third Party | Imposes solutions, uses power/coercion; underlying needs not important. | Does not use coercions; improves communication; obtain win-win solutions. |

**Source**: Woodhouse T Prof, et al (eds), Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution, (New York: UNITARPOCI, 2000) p.35.

Resolution of conflict addresses the deep rooted sources of conflict, changing behaviour, attitudes and structures. This will ensure that behaviours are no longer violent, attitudes are not hostile and structures are not exploitative. The process of conflict resolution includes becoming aware of a conflict, diagnosing its nature and applying appropriate methods. This is in order to discuss the negative emotional energy involved and enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their differences. Further more it is to resolve the differences to achieve solution that are not imposed, but agreed to by all the key parties, and also address the root causes of the conflict.[12]

Kevin Avruch and Peter Black brought culture question to the fore in conflict resolution. They opined that culture, as a concept, is a powerful analytical tool. Also, they argued that it is necessary to attend to the local understandings of being and action which people use in the production and interpretation of conflict behaviour.[13] They referred to this cultural knowledge as the local common-sense about conflict

which are determined by language, social, political and economic structure, religion and ethno-psychology.

Maj Gen Chris Garba explains that certain procedures have been established for resolving conflicts thus:

> *By agreement of the parties involved, by friendly intervention of a third state or of an international organisation in order to help the disputants reach an agreement, by binding and final decision of an international agency, either the UN or an international tribunal, by means of self help or self defence and finally by unlimited armed intervention or war.[14]*

The means of achieving this includes conflict settlement, conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict resolution.

**2.03 Concept of Preventive Diplomacy.** Christian Harleman writing on serving on a UN Observer Mission, states that preventive diplomacy is "actions to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur"[15] It is a measure

that seeks to anticipate and forestall conflicts and so embraces early warning, surveillance and preventive deployment of forces. Information gathering, fact finding missions and negotiations are core activities of preventive diplomacy.

Former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1995 Annual Report stated that, "it has become clear that preventive diplomacy is only one of the classes of actions that are taken to prevent disputes from turning into armed conflict."[16] The maxim 'prevention is better than cure' has always been true in classic PKO. Kofi Annan also supported this by explaining that, in this context prevention measures have traditionally relied on and exploited the consent of all parties concerned. It also relies on the existence of an established cease-fire and presence of effective political framework to compliment peacekeeping.[17]

This approach aims to transform a conflict from one of violence and destruction into a constructive force. The force produces change, progressively removing or reducing the social and structural condition from which the conflict and

violence have arisen. The peace that emerges will be deeply rooted and sustainable. Conflict transformation therefore brings a total change to the fundamental issues of conflict and forges a new relationship that is beneficial to the conflicting parties.

## 2.04 The Concept of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping involves the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance, policing, human rights and electoral monitoring, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.[18] There is the traditional and multidimensional PKOs.

The traditional UN peacekeeping was developed during the Cold War era as a means to resolve conflicts between states. This is by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, between the armed forces of the former warring parties.[19] Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers tasked the UN with bringing

closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and international peace and security.[20] Peacekeepers were deployed when a ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. UN troops observed from the ground and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict. An example of this was the UNEF operation in response to invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and UK in 1956.[21]

The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in the UN and brought about multidimensional peacekeeping. In a new spirit of cooperation, the SC established larger and more complex UN PKOs, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state conflicts. The UN DPKO was created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping.[22] Example of this was UNTAG which was the first of such missions and it was a resounding success[23]. The success was due to the full cooperation of the warring parties, the

contributory support of the UNSC and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources.[24]

Another example of multidimensional PKO was ONUMOZ. The then UNSG described the accomplishment of it's mandate as a remarkable achievement.[25] A number of factors contributed to its success, among them were the strong commitment to peace and reconciliation demonstrated by the Mozambican people and their leaders. Other factors were the clarity of the ONUMOZ mandate, the consistent support provided by the UNSC and the international community's significant political, financial and technical support for the peace process. ONUMOZ represented an example of what could be achieved through the UN when all forces joined together towards a common goal.

Maj Gen Lawrence Onoja speaking on the conduct of peacekeepers emphasizes that UN forces must above all behave in such a way as not to take part in a conflict. It must not be used either to protect certain positions or one of the parties or to oblige one part to accept a certain

political result or to influence the political balance.[26] Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the importance of UN peacekeeping thus:

> United Nations peacekeeping stands out as one of the Organisation's most original and ambitious undertakings in its effort to control conflict and promote peace. It is an inspired innovation. The Blue Helmets will continue to break new grounds as the UN is called upon not only to contain conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but also to prevent the outbreak of war among nations and to build towards enduring peace.[27]

Kofi Annan also emphasised the use of PKO for conflict prevention in Africa in his 1998 report to the UNSC thus:

> Since 1970, more then 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-state in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries in Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts accounting for more than half of all war related deaths world-wide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long term stability, prosperity and peace of its peoples…. Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting

*allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself.*[28]

This would involve sourcing of troops from TCC, according to Brig Gen SY Bello, NA's ability to promptly deploy troops for UN PKO is hampered by funding and bureaucracy.[29] The same situation applies to most armies of developing nations who incidentally are the major TCC to UN PKOs.[30] According to Col Owonubi NA troops undergo general peacekeeping courses as part of normal training. In addition those earmarked for PKOs are given specific training on the particular mission highlighting background of the conflict. They are also enlightened on the culture of the people and other vital areas.[31] On the mandate and ROE of troops deployed on UN PKO Brahimi recommended  in his panel report in 2000 that PKOs should have military capacity to accomplish assigned mandates.[32]

This study observed that during the Cold War the rivalry between the super powers was played out mainly in the Third World, where regional conflicts were fuelled by those super powers. This was in their desire to preserve or expand their sphere of influence, they were however careful

to avoid direct military confrontation. When a regional conflict threatened to escalate and draw them into such confrontation they sought to contain it, at times using the UN PKO.

However, after the Cold War the balance of nuclear terror disappeared. Thus ambitious and troublesome local leaders were no longer tightly controlled by the super powers in their respective spheres of influence. Therefore, many ancient ethnic conflicts in Africa, long contained during the Cold War, re-emerged often with brutal violence. Furthermore, this study believes the new unrest in Western Europe after the Cold War caused the industrial nations of the West to shift their attention and financial assistance from South to North.

These factors further worsened the plight of some African countries pervaded by bad governance, natural disaster, poverty and famine. This has resulted in increased conflict in Africa after the Cold War era. The evidence is the high number of UN PKOs ongoing in Africa compared to other continents of the globe. Of the 18 ongoing UN

Peacekeeping and Political Missions worldwide 8 are in Africa as shown in Figure 2, one of which is the largest and most expensive.[33] This clearly shows the increased conflict situations in Africa since after the Cold War.

## 2.05  FIGURE  2.  ONGOING  UN  PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



MISSIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Source:   http://www.un.org accessed 14 Aug 07.

On the other hand, the study also observed that the break up of former USSR an after math of the Cold War led to the situation where weapons were brought into Africa.

The weapons are then sold at cheap rates to sustain the economy of nations that emerged from the break-up. This resulted in the proliferation of SALW in Africa, consequently changing the nature of conflicts in Africa. It changed from mere conflicts using local weapons such as bows and arrows and other less sophisticated weapons. The nature of conflicts in Africa after the Cold War became brutal and violent with the use of sophisticated weapons. Furthermore many combatants in most of these conflicts in Africa are not soldiers of regular armies, but militias or groups of armed civilians, sometimes children.

Although effort is on to fine tune peacekeeping for better performance, this study seeks to join in the further search for a more effective peacekeeping strategy especially in Africa.  Special attention will be given to areas that have seemed to derail peace processes.  Using Somalia as case study, this study will identify specific areas of conflict resolution that pose challenges to UN PKOs in Africa.

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# CHAPTER THREE

## 3.00 CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Modern Ethio-Arab rivalry in the Somali peninsula dates from the mid-nineteenth century, when both states jostled with European imperial powers for control of North-East Africa. The forces of Ethiopian Emperor Menelik probed the Somali interior which is now the Ethiopian Somali region, while Egyptian forces representing the Ottoman Empire garrisoned the northern Somali coast, and Zanzibar claimed parts of the southern Somali littoral on behalf of the Sultan of Oman.[1]

## 3.01 Background and Causes of the Conflict in Somalia

During the lead-up to independence, Nasserite Egypt espoused the unification of all Somali peoples under a single flag, while Ethiopia fought successfully to retain its vast Somali territories. However, in 1960 Italian and British

colonial territories were united to become independent Somalia. This was seen as decolonization without due regard to the wishes of the Somali people who were against the union.[2]

In October 1969, the USSR trained Somalia Army, led by General Mohammed Siad Barre, seized power in Somalia.[3] Similarly in pro-western Ethiopia, Emperor Haille Salassie was deposed in a coup in 1975. The USSR then provided the new Ethiopian Government with military aid; also Cuban troops arrived for service in Ogaden in Ethiopia. The US, which had lost its base in Ethiopia, then started providing Somalia with military aid.

In the post-independence period, Arab Governments supported successive Somali Governments, while Ethiopia backed the disparate Somali rebel groups which ultimately overthrew the Siad Barre Government.[4] The over throw of President Siad Barre in January 1991 created a power vacuum in Somalia. This resulted in serious fighting for the control of Mogadishu the capital city of Somalia, in November 1991. There were 2 main factions involved, one

of them supporting Interim President Mahdi Mohammed and the other supporting General Mohammed Farah Aidid, the chairman of the USC. The fighting later spread throughout Somalia as heavily armed groups controlled different parts of the country. Somalia became ungovernable, there was wide spread destruction of lives and property. According to a Newswatch report, 'the fierce struggle for power between Aidid and Mahdi has its historical antecedents in the ethnic rivalry between the Abgal Haniye clan located in Mogadishu and Habir Gidir clan whose base is in Central Somalia....'[5]

The outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991 and collapse of government structures, combined with drought and famine created a major humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Relief convoys of various NGOs often fail to reach the victims of the crises because of obstructions and attacks by warlords and their unruly militias. Almost 4.5 million people, over half of the estimated populations of Somalia, were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases. As a result about half a million Somalis died from hunger by the end of 1991.[6] This explains the reason for UN involvement in Somalia.

## 3.02 United Nations' Intervention in Somalia

In early 1992, the then newly elected UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali obtained the agreement for a cease-fire plan from Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aidid. On 24 April 1992 the UNSC adopted Resolution 751 (1992) by which it established UNOSOM I to implement the cease-fire plan. About 50 MILOBs were deployed in June 1992 and were reinforced in August by a peacekeeping force of 500 Pakistan soldiers. General Aidid and his heavily armed militias were uncooperative and confined the troops to the Mogadishu Airport area. Therefore, the Pakistani troops, with only light defensive weapons operating under the traditional principle of consent and non-use of force except in self defence, could not carry out their mission.

Meanwhile the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. The delivery of humanitarian relief supplies was hampered by widespread looting, robberies and extortion by various militias and armed groups. Starving Somalis, especially old men, women and children were dying from

hunger and disease by their thousands daily.  This led to the introduction of the US-led multinational operation tagged Operation "RESTORE HOPE" with the aim of distribution of relief materials to the starving and dying Somali population. This was initially applauded by the Somalis, however, the size of the force coupled with their actions, which was tending towards peace enforcement heightened the suspicion of both the war lords and the Somali people who mistook the US initiative for an occupational force.

The relationship between the leadership of the US-led intervention force and the Somali war lords became estranged. US troops became objects of attack and some were killed by Gen Aidid's militias. Thus in December 1992, the UN sent in a 33,000 multinational coalition force known as UNOSOM II which took take over from the US-led force. UNOSOM II had the additional mandate of restoring peace and stability.  UNOSOM II comprised of forces from Belgium, France, Italy, South Korea, USA, others include Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan.  However, there was continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliations. Due to loss of her personnel after the ill-fated "Black Hawk

Down" episode in which 18 US Soldiers were killed after the downing of 2 American helicopters, the US pulled out her forces from UNOSOM II followed by other western nations. This undermined the achievement of UN objectives in Somalia and prevented the continuation of UNOSOM II mandate beyond 31 March 1995.[7] The UN therefore withdraw her forces from Somalia and closed the Mission.

It is generally claimed that as far as humanitarian assistance was concerned, UNOSOM II was a success; but with respect to the resolution of the conflict, it is regarded as one of the unsuccessful UN PKOs. It is one of the second generation PKOs, which presented bitter experiences and essential lessons to be learnt. Over 10 years after the pre-mature termination of UNOSOM II, Somalia is still in deep crisis without a stable government resulting in severe suffering by the populace. It is also been described as one of the most dangerous places on earth today.

The recent UNSC approved intervention by AU forces in Somalia under AMISOM via UNSCR 1725 of 6 December 2006

is a welcome development. This authorized a limited IGAD/AU deployment in and around Baidoa to protect the then hard-pressed TFG. However, hopes are not high of success because Africa lacks enough trained and equipped troops for an effective force. For instance, the AU force in Darfur-Sudan has failed to quell unrest and protect civilians there. Putting together the force in Somalia has also proved a problem, despite financial backing from the US and EU.[8] This therefore calls for re-appraisal to ensure expeditious transformation of AMISOM to a full UN run PKO with active participation by forces of developed nations. Furthermore, the re-appraisal must ensure the provision of a UN mandate for the international force to be deployed in Somalia, revision of the existing arms embargo to accommodate this force and the establishment of a timeline or set of benchmarks for its transition to the UN.

As the AU is still unable to fund its own peacekeeping operations, it is therefore imperative for the wider international community through the Contact Group to inject the requisite assistance in a timely manner. AMISOM will

require not only sufficient numbers but also adequate mobility to respond to situations. Non-African states should provide appropriate logistical support and other force multipliers. This is because it is not simply a question of raw numbers of troop but there must be a good mix of skills. Failure to grasp this opportunity would mean an all-too-familiar story line for Somalia of factional fighting and fractured government. Additionally the conditions that led to the rise of the Courts and failure of previous missions would surely repeat themselves eventually.

Any intervention in Somalia must go beyond tackling the symptoms rather than the root causes of the security challenges Somalia presents to the region. Ensuring that this opening is not wasted requires all stakeholders in the Somalia crises and the International Community, especially the US and other UNSC permanent members to confront several difficult political choices. This is because so long as peacekeeping has the political and practical support and commitment of the international community, as expressed through the main organs of the United Nations, anything is

possible. The task ahead will be demanding, but it can be done.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

## 4.00 CHALLENGES TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AND THE WAY FORWARD

Apart from few UN PKOs such as UNEF, UNAVEM I and UNIMOZ most other UN missions in Africa were failures specifically in Somalia. UNAVEM I was successful because it had a straight forward mandate and got the full cooperation of the parties. Also UNEF was successful because SG Dag Hammarskjöld and his staff worked around the clock to establish this unprecedented mission as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the international community provided firm support, and troop-contributing countries backed up their

words with rapid, effective action.[1] However, the same cannot be said of UNAVEM II and III and UNOSOM II which were faced with numerous challenges and thus failed. Some of the challenges identified are, slow rate of UN deployment, inadequate manpower and logistics as well as non cooperation of warlords. Others are non effective mandates, ineffective enforcement of arms embargo, non tackling of root cause of conflict and non participation of troops from developed nations.

These challenges that impeded the effectiveness of UN PKOs in Africa are not unique to the continent. They also affect the peacekeeping efforts of the UN in other parts of the world. The study examined these challenges and proffered remedies to them that may strengthen the capacity to manage future PKOs in Africa. Some of the strategies proffered by the study are, understanding the sensitivity of the people, commitment and cooperation of the warlords and rapid deployment capacity. Others are robust operational mandates, effective enforcement of arms embargo, acquiring troops from developed nations and adequate funding and logistics.

## 4.01 Slow Rate of UN PKO Deployment

Due to the fluid nature of conflict, it can change quite rapidly from low intensity conflict into unrestrained violence. In Somalia the civil war started in 1991 and on 24 April 1992 the UNSC established UNOSOM I to implement the ceasefire plan.[2] However, troop deployment only started in August 1992, the delay gave room for the belligerents to arm themselves effectively and prepare for the conflict. This slow deployment is one challenge identified by the study that militates against successful mission.

The causes of such delays have been identified to be procedural and excessive bureaucracy resulting in inefficiency and waste.[3] During the 1990s the US, currently the largest contributor to the UN, gave inefficiency in the UN System as a reason for withholding her dues.[4] The repayment of the dues was made conditional on a major reforms initiative. In 1994 the OIOS was established by a ruling of the GA to serve as an efficiency watchdog.[5] How

successful OIOS have been especially as it relates to mission establishment is a subject of another discussion.

Another cause of the delays is the 'CNN Factor' which is lack of adequate coverage of conflicts in Africa by major international media organisations. It is said that picture speaks a thousand words and that is quite true. The rapid deployment of thousands of reinforcements from the developed and developing world alike to the expanded and re-energized UNIFIL during the 2006 Isreal/Lebanon War was due to the extensive 24 hours live coverage by CNN and BBC World. This compared to their occasional few minutes news clip on Darfur-Sudan and Somalia crises in Africa which has remained unattended to except for Sudan is a case in point. Other causes of the delay are bureaucracy and lack of funds. The views of Brig Gen SY Bello on reasons for slow deployment by TCCs lay credence to this fact which is still a challenge for contemporary UN PKO in Africa.

The slow reaction time of the UN has had damaging consequences, for instance the current situation in Darfur-Sudan which may likely spread to Chad soon. Indeed the US

Secretary of State Ms Condoleezza Rice at a conference in Paris recently admitted the failure of the International Community in Darfur. The French President Mr Nicolas Sarcozy toed a similar line by declaring that "silence was killing" in Darfur.[6]  Many conflict situations that could have been contained effectively if peacekeeping forces were deployed earlier, often escalated into broader conflagration by the time peacekeepers arrived.  It is therefore necessary to for the UNSC to work at accelerating the UN's ability to rapidly deploy a mission when necessary.

## 4.02 Non Robust Mandate

The UNSG through the UNSC determines the mandate for a mission.  In most instances, political considerations override military operational requirements. The challenge had been the exploitation of the weakness of mandates by war lords often leading to death of UN peacekeepers.

An example of this was in UNOSOM II where UN troops were quarantined at Mogadishu Airport by militias without response by the troops due to lack of mandate to do so.

In 2005, also there was the incident in MONUC where Bangladesh Contingent lost 10 peacekeepers between March and May due to ineffective mandates.[7]

## 4.03 Ineffective Enforcement of Arms Embargo

About 50 MILOBs were deployed in Somalia by June 1992 and were reinforced in August by a peacekeeping force of 500 Pakistan Soldiers.[8] General Aidid and his heavily armed militias confined the troops to the Mogadishu Airport area. Therefore, the Pakistani troops, with only light defensive weapons operating under the traditional principle of consent and non-use of force except in self defence, could not carry out their mission.[9] This included the monitoring of arms embargo and ceasefire violations, thus these were violated with impunity by the warring factions.

The inhibition of the UN forces from performing their tasks by the warring parties in Somalia especially the USC resulted in the ineffective enforcement of arms embargo imposed on the warring factions in Somalia. One of the long term effect of this was the failure of the mission.

## 4.04 Inadequate Manpower and Logistics

The non provision of adequate manpower, equipment and other material resources is identified by this study to be another challenge leading to failure of peacekeeping efforts in Africa. The inability of UNOSOM II to deploy adequate troop strength gave room to militia groups to cheat on the mission and frustrate her efforts.

USC and other armed groups took advantage of the limitations of UNOSOM II with regard to effective monitoring of their activities throughout Somalia. For instance several relief supplies were hijacked by these groups. This coupled with other interruptions in the mission's operation by militia groups to led to its failure.

To buttress this point, talking about challenges faced by UN PKOs, Maj Gen Philip V Sibanda who commanded a peacekeeping mission in Africa explained the mission's situation when he took over thus:

*I took over as the FC ... on 1 October 1995. At that time, about 3,500 peacekeepers, military and police observes out of the 7,000 approved...had arrived in the country. One of the questions I asked my predecessor, a Nigerian Maj Gen was why the number of peacekeepers was so small considering the size of Angola.... The answer I got was that although the mission had requested close to 15,000 troops, the UNSC had declined to authorise this figure.... This situation was made worse by the provision of only a few fixed wing and rotary aircraft....This inadequate provision of resources both in terms of men and equipment, had far reaching consequences for the successful accomplishment of mandated tasks of the mission.* [10]

These facts on the mission was also stated in an earlier report dated 25 November 1992 to the UNSC, where the UNSG stated that the failure of the peace process in that country was due to the incomplete fulfillment of the key provisions of the peace accords. This included the ineffective demobilization and storage of weapons, the delay in creating the new armed forces. Others were delay in setting up a neutral police force and the failure to re-

establish central administrations in many parts of the country due to inadequate manpower and logistics.[11]

Furthermore the set backs experienced by that mission show the risk faced by the UN when its mandate and resources are inadequate in relation to the complexities of the tasks. This is especially in circumstances where the parties do not demonstrate the necessary political will or cooperation to achieve peace.

## 4.05 Non Cooperation of Warlords

Despite the fact that negotiations were long, difficult and covered a range of issues a mission could only accomplish its mandate in an atmosphere of cooperation. The lack of cooperation and full political commitment by the belligerent warlords to ceasefire agreement is a challenge drawn from the Somalia experience.

This is because the normal process of initial peace making had to be carried out with warlords, who conveniently depart from agreement at will as was the case in Somalia. It is difficult negotiating with the warlords who

were always ready to uphold only part of the agreements that favours their cause. When the relationship between the leadership of the US-led intervention force and the Somali war lords became estranged, US troops became objects of attack and were killed by Gen Aidid's militias. This eventually led to the failure of the mission with the withdrawal of peacekeepers amid the country's descent into famine and chaos.

## 4.06 Non Tackling of Root Causes of Conflicts

The neglect of the effect of religion on the Somalia conflict contributed to the failure of UNOSOM II. In addition, the historical antecedent in the ethnic rivalry between the Abgal Haniye clan highlighted by Newswatch was also neglected.

The UN made a great mistake by underestimating the religious aspect of the confrontation between General Aidid and his supporters on one-hand and UNOSOM Forces on the other. This was against the important position of culture question in conflict resolution as posited by Avruch. These

challenges hampered the success of the mission and the attainment of lasting peace in Somalia.

## 4.07 Non Participation of Troops from Developed Nations

Another major challenge to UN peacekeeping in Africa is the acquisition of troops from western developed nations. In 1991 only 2 of the top 10 TCC were developing countries, Ghana and Nepal. As at June 2006 of the top 10 contributors 9 were from developing States. Of the nearly 73,000 peacekeepers a mere few thousands are from western industrialized nations with France ranked twenty-second being the largest contributor with 588 troops[12]. As the process of peacekeeping in the post Cold War era becomes more dangerous and complex, western nations are becoming increasingly reluctant to provide troops to the UN for PKOs. This is given the fact that UN peacekeepers have

too frequently become targets of attack by belligerent forces.[13]

For instance, UNOSOM II comprised of forces from Belgium, France, Italy, South Korea, USA, others include Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan. However, due to loss of her personnel the USA pulled out her forces from UNOSOM II followed by other western nations. This undermined the UN objectives in Somalia and UNOSOM II was terminated 31 March 1995.[14] Since then the USA and some western nations shunned troop contribution to UN PKOs especially in Africa, this has had a negative impact on UN PKOs.

Over 10 years after the pre-mature termination of UNOSOM II, Somalia is still in deep crisis without a stable government resulting in severe suffering by the populace. Though the recent UNSCR 1725 authorizing regional PKO in Somalia[15] is a welcome development, however much more than that is needed to solve the Somalia equation. This study believes that except the challenges identified are addressed, most PKOs in Africa are bound to fail.

In a conflict area, constitutional order may be restored; however the overall situation might remain volatile marked by tensions among and within rival parties, a precarious socio-economic situation, deteriorating humanitarian conditions and insecurity. For fragile peace to take root, comprehensive measures are needed to address security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Hence, the way forward in overcoming the challenges as discussed below would therefore be necessary.

## 4.08 Understanding the Sensitivity of the People

The high sensitivity of Africans, to their culture and traditional as well as religious practices attracts hostile reactions if a stranger is perceived to show disrespect to these practices. The lofty positions of chiefs, clan, religious and family elders could be exploited in mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. If peacekeepers and peacemakers utilise these, the conflicts in most African states will be better managed.

TCC need to adequately train their troops earmarked for UN PKO. This could be by giving them a comprehensive study of the root causes of conflicts, ideological, ethno-cultural, religious and traditional leanings of the parties as well as gender issues. This would enhance their performance in such missions to ensure lasting peace and stability. Furthermore, Conflict Management Commissions could be set up in all regions of the world with experts who understand the problems of the region as members. The main function of such commissions would be to investigate any local dispute and sensitivities of the parties in their respective regions and make recommendations to the UNSC on ways and means of resolving such conflicts. UN Mission will subsequently use such recommendations as blue print for their operational plans.

## 4.09 Rapid Deployment Capability

Due to the fluid nature of conflict, prompt deployment of troops will be crucial in the immediate aftermath of cease-fires as it will provide security umbrellas for the safety and security of civilian populations and contribute to success of

the mission. For instance in UNEF the first units landed in Ismailia on the Suez Canal within 10 days of the General Assembly's decision, to start the first peacekeeping operation under the United Nations flag. Dag Hammarskjöld also negotiated with Egypt a SOFA, establishing the legal relationship of the Force with the host country.[16] In this way, UNEF established a useful model for future operations which unfortunately is not followed in most cases today.

It is very important to work at reducing the bureaucracy in UN troop deployment through reforms in the UN. Furthermore, developing TCCs are to be encouraged to develop contingency plans for prompt release of pledged resources and troops. They need to be assisted to overcome their challenges highlighted by Brig Gen SY Bello that could ensure their prompt troop deployment for UN PKOs. In the light of these, consideration could be given to the possibility of complementing the operational combat capacities for PKOs deployments of such armies with external support assets by developed nations. The French President Mr Nicolas Sarkozy's recent adoption of the Darfur situation as his government's Foreign Policy priority and calling for the

swift deployment of UN troops in Darfur[17] is a step in the right direction. Similar actions are needed for the Somalia situation.

## 4.10 Robust Operational Mandates

In view of the incessant attacks on UN peacekeepers, the UN needs to negotiate a robust mandate for her missions with the contending parties. The acceptance of such mandates by the warring parties would signify their level of commitment to the peace process.

In line with Brahimi's stand, in addition to being clear and precise, assigned mandates should be achievable. They are to be related to the broad spectrum of issues on the ground and matched by operational capacities informed by sufficiency of resources to deliver on the mandate. Also because the protection of civilians approximates to warlike operations, the use of force must not only be implicit, it must be explicitly stated and must be an object of such deployments. However this must be carefully balanced with the concept of non use of force except in self defence.

## 4.11 Acquiring Troops from Developed Nations

On the challenge of acquisition of troops from developed nations I wish to point to the words of President Harry S Truman of USA who once said "We live in a world in which strength on the part of peace-loving nations is still the greatest deterrent to aggression. World stability can be destroyed when nations with great responsibilities neglect to maintain the means of discharging those responsibilities"[18] President Bill Clinton also said, "Our generation, like the one before us, must choose. Without the threat of the Cold War, without the pain of economic ruin, without the fresh memory of the World War II's slaughter, it is tempting to pursue our private agendas-to simply sit back and let history unfold. We must resist the temptation"[19]

These cautions by both Presidents Truman and Clinton on the dangers of failure of the USA to act could be applied to use of her armed forces in ensuring African peace. This should not be taken lightly by her present leaders and indeed leaders of other developed world. Peace in Africa is

vital to world peace just like peace in other parts of the world such as the Middle-East and the Balkans. However, other parts are given greater attention today interms of troop commitment and other peace-building programmes.

It is pertinent to point out that, a peace mission in Africa is by far safer and cheaper than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; hence developed nations could as well deploy troops on peace mission to Africa. As President Truman said, "the responsibility of the great states is to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world."[20] He showed what can be achieved when the USA and other developed nations assume that responsibility. And still today, none of our global institutions especially the UN in her peace effort in Africa can accomplish much when the USA and other developed nations remains aloof with their troops. But when they are fully engaged by deploying their troops, the sky is the limit.

The involvement of developed nation's troops in PKO in Africa with their sophisticated equipment and expertise could enhance the effectiveness of UN PKO in the continent. This

is because a peacekeeping force today needs to be robust, mobile, well-armed and equipped, so that it can carry out the full mandate that it needs to perform and the absence of troops from developed nations may hamper such standard. Thus, the UNSC permanent members have to be urgently persuaded to contribute troops and essential resources to UN PKOs in Africa to ensure their success.

## 4.11 Effective Enforcement of Arms Embargo

There has been the problem of SALWs proliferation in the continent of Africa especially as a fall out of the end of the Cold War.  This has been one of the major factors that oil conflicts in the continent.[21] Somalia being a maritime nation bounded by the Indian Ocean is prone to illegal importation of arms through her vast and un-policed sea routes. For instance there have been reports that Eritrea has been supplying arms to Shabab militia group in Somalia.[22] There was also the report of arrest of a group of Europeans and Australians in Yemen, accused of breaking a UN arms embargo on Somalia.[23]

So long as there is inflow of arms into a conflict area, the conflict may hardly come to an end. In line with the Concept of Manoeuvrist Approach to Warfare, arms availability could be viewed as the COG of warring groups in a conflict. Its unlocking could shatter their will to fight and the DPs to unlocking this COG could be effective enforcement of arms embargo and disarmament. There is therefore, a compelling need to institute mechanisms to strengthen disarmament as well as the enforcement of arms embargo and sanctions by the UN. The participation of troops from developed nations like France, UK and USA with their expertise and better equipment could enhance the performance of this role.

These permanent members of the UNSC can effectively carry out this task through effective policing of Somalia SLOC if they are committed to peace in Africa. Furthermore, this could be tackled by imposing severe sanctions on nations identified to violate such embargoes directly or indirectly. That will go a long way to improve UN

peacekeeping efforts in Africa thus, preventing conflict spots in Africa from becoming haven for terrorist groups.

## 4.12 Commitment and Cooperation of the Warlords

To build peace systematically, UN peacekeepers have undertaken activities that address the needs of entire societies in crises.  UN operations have aided transitions to peace in various parts of the world like Cambodia, El-Salvador and other countries, largely due to co-operation of the contending parties.  Therefore African war lords need to devote sustained effort to promoting respect for signed peace agreements.  Their cooperation is essential for obtaining peace in any conflict situation.

The UN can only serve as a catalyst, framework and support mechanism for parties to seek peace and work towards it.  This is because, viable political structures or institutions cannot be imposed from the outside; ultimately, no instrument can bring about peace without the will and cooperation of the parties to the conflict to achieve peace. Thus much is also expected of Africans themselves to ensure

success of UN PKOs and allow peace to reign in the continent.

## 4.13 Adequate Funding and Logistics

Inadequate funding and logistics have inhibited the deployment of adequate troop level required for UN missions in Africa. This is been played out in DRC where MONUC strength of 17,000 is below the recommend strength of about 24,000 owing to lack of funds.[24] Thus the mission is yet to achieve its mandate within allocated time frame, it had to depend on EU standby force (EUFOR RD Congo) deployed to neighboring Gabon during the recently held election in case of any violence.[25] Therefore the UNSC needs to make deliberate efforts to adequately fund UN PKOs in Africa. This will ensure the availability of troops, equipment and logistics at the required levels, thus such missions could be successful.

This study strongly believes that if the outlined remedies are applied in UN PKOs in Africa it could lead to success of such missions. Thus a lasting peace could be

attained in most conflict situations in Africa. The application of these factors by any new mission in Somalia could ensure lasting peace is achieved in the country and contribute to international peace and security. This will go a long way to alleviate the suffering of Somalia vulnerable populations for whom the blue helmets represent the best hope.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

## 5.00 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

**5.01 Conclusion.** Conflict in Africa is becoming highly intractable, protracted and more violent. The destruction caused by these conflicts pose a great challenge to international peace and security. Therefore, the importance of a viable mechanism for securing lasting peace and security in the continent cannot be overemphasized.

From the formation of the UN in 1945, peacekeeping has been a useful tool for conflict management and

resolution. However, with the end of the Cold War peacekeeping in Africa has been faced with some peculiarities of situations which urgently require positive adjustments.

In proffering remedies to the challenges of UN PKOs in Africa, the study deeply examined the crises and UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The study brought out some challenges which have hampered the permanent resolution of conflicts in Africa. Some of such challenges include: Lack of understanding of the people's sensitivity, lack of rapid deployment capacity, ineffective enforcement of arms embargo and inadequate funding. These challenges, if properly addressed through proffered solutions in the study could result in a shorter period to end conflicts and avert their future recurrence.

The Somalia crisis which has defied many solutions till date has demonstrated that the traditional principles of PKOs needed to be adjusted for any meaningful success to be achieved. Though, the recent UN authorised intervention in Somalia to resolve the crisis is a welcome development,

however it needs a critical re-appraisal to avoid the pitfalls of the past, this will ensure it's success. The US and other developed nations equally need to be practically involved through troop deployment to save the mission from failure, as experienced in the past.

The UN also needs to delve into the root causes of conflicts, with mission specific trained troops from the TCC. In establishing a mission it is very necessary for it to be done expeditiously with robust and realisable mandates. Such mandates must equally be backed by deployment of credible force and not intermittent injection of forces in piecemeal. It is imperative for the force to be capable of effectively enforcing arms embargo and disarmament considering the danger of SALWs proliferation in crises areas. The UNSC also needs to work seriously towards reducing the time taken to establish and deploy a peacekeeping mission. A better coverage of conflicts in Africa by major World media organisations could assist in achieving this.

In view of the increasing conflicts in Africa and potential of many more especially in the areas of democratic struggles, crisis over political power and national resources sharing, UN PKOs will remain an indispensable weapon in the arsenal of the international community. This is because they provide a legitimate and impartial response to conflict; an opportunity for burden-sharing; an effective means to take tangible action; a bridge to stability and long-term peace and development. Therefore, the UNSC needs to continue working more closely with the regional and sub-regional bodies at finding peaceful solution to conflicts in Africa.

Finally, the task of preserving international peace and security is the collective responsibility of the entire mankind. The issues involved, therefore, are numerous and complex of which peacekeeping is just an aspect. A single work cannot exhaust everything hence it is suggested that further research be conducted in the following areas:

**Refugees and IDPs', Problems.** In any conflict people are bound to be displaced internally or externally and their camps could be breeding ground

for terrorists. It is therefore suggested that further works be conducted to ascertain the effects IDPs and refugees on international peace and security.

**UN OIOS Success or Failure.** Considering the negative effects of excessive bureaucracy on UN efficiency OIOS was established to tackle it. This was over a decade ago; it is therefore proposed that a study be carried out on how well it has performed so far in accomplishing its mandate especially with regards to mounting of PKO.

**5.02 Recommendations.** To ensure successful UN PKO in Africa, leading to long lasting peace, it is recommended that:

a. The UNSC should re-appraise its recently authorised intervention in Somalia.

b. The UN in conjunction with TCC should ensure proper training of all peacekeepers in mission specific PKO before their deployment to such mission areas.

c.	The US and other western nations should seriously reconsider contributing troops to UN PKOs in Africa.

d.	The UN should ensure the effective implementation of disarmament and arms embargo it imposes on warring parties.

e.	Finally, the UN should work at reducing the duration for the establishment and deployment of a peacekeeping mission.

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