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Cover photo: UN Photo #131445 by Jihad El Hassan. A United Nations armed personnel carrier "digs in" at Medak Pocket in Sector South of Croatia. 1 September 1993.

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# History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1988 to 1996

## Table of Contents

Foreword ......................................................................................................................... xii
Method of Study ................................................................................................................ xiii

**Lesson 1** The End of the Cold War and the Resurgence of UN PKOs ............................................. 14

Section 1.1 The Concept of Peacekeeping ............................................................................. 15

Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War ............................................. 16

Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the Cold War ................................... 16

Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War .................................................................................. 16

Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations ......................................................................... 17

Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) ................................................................................................................ 18

Section 1.7 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) ......................... 21

Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) ................................. 28

Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) ......................... 32
Lesson 2  The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) …… 44

Section 2.1  Background on UNTAG 45
Section 2.2  Negotiations Leading to the Establishment of UNTAG 46
Section 2.3  The Agreement for the UNTAG Operation 48
Section 2.4  The Mandate of UNTAG 48
Section 2.5  The Organization of UNTAG 49
Section 2.6  The Civilian Component of UNTAG 50
Section 2.7  Deployment of UNTAG 52
Section 2.8  Ceasefire Violation Dispute 52
Section 2.9  The Dismantling of the South African Military Presence in Namibia 54
Section 2.10  South African Allegations 56
Section 2.11  Monitoring the South West Africa Police 56
Section 2.12  Return of Refugees 57
Section 2.13  Missing Persons 58
Section 2.14  The Namibian Elections 58
Section 2.15  Importance of UNTAG 59

Lesson 3  The Gulf Crisis and the Use of Force ……………………62

Section 3.1  Background on UNIKOM 63
Section 3.2  Establishment and Mandate of UNIKOM 64
Section 3.3  The Deployment of UNIKOM 65
Section 3.4  The Expansion of UNIKOM’s Mandate 66
Section 3.5  Situation in the DMZ 67
Section 3.6  Suspension of UNIKOM and the Termination of the Mandate 67
Section 3.7  The Influence of the 1991 Gulf War on Peace Operations 68
Section 3.8 The Debate Over Sanctions (1991 Gulf War).................69
Section 3.9 The Korean Precedent.................................................69
Section 3.10 Invocation of Chapter VII.............................................70
Section 3.11 Limits on the Use of Force............................................71

Section 4.1 The Changing International Atmosphere and Rising Expectations...............................................75
Section 4.2 New Challenges..............................................................76
Section 4.3 New Peacekeeping Operations........................................76
Section 4.4 The Problems with Expansion.......................................81

Section 5.1 International Conflicts..................................................85
Section 5.2 United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)........86
Section 5.3 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).........................................................89
Section 5.4 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)........96
Section 5.5 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).........................................................102
Section 5.6 United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)..........................................................112

Section 6.1 Background to Problematic Missions................................119
Section 6.2 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).......................................................121
Section 6.3 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 124
Section 6.4 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 127
Section 6.5 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 130
Section 6.6 United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 136
Section 6.7 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) 140
Section 6.8 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) 143
Section 6.9 Background to UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia) 145
Section 6.10 The Dilemma of Non-cooperation 147
Section 6.11 Peace Enforcement 147

Lesson 7 The Second UN Operation in Somalia 150
Section 7.1 Background to UNOSOM II 151
Section 7.2 UNOSOM II Established 152
Section 7.3 The Humanitarian Conference 153
Section 7.4 National Reconciliation Conference 154
Section 7.5 Attack of 5 June 1993 155
Section 7.6 The Failure of the 3 October 1993 Assaults by UN/US Forces 155
Section 7.7 The Situation in the Last Quarter of 1993 156
Section 7.8 UNOSOM II’s Mandate Changes 157
Section 7.9 Coordinating Aid 157
Section 7.10 The Nairobi Declaration and On 157
Section 7.11 The Situation Deteriorates 158
Section 7.12 The Withdrawal of UNOSOM II 159
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 7.13</th>
<th>Impact of UNOSOM II</th>
<th>159</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 8</strong></td>
<td><strong>The UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia</strong></td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.1</td>
<td>Background to UNPROFOR-B</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.2</td>
<td>Resolution 816 (1993)</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.3</td>
<td>The Establishment of Safe Areas</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.4</td>
<td>The Protection of Safe Areas</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.5</td>
<td>Ultimatums on Sarajevo and Gorazde</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.6</td>
<td>Deadlock in the Peace Process</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.7</td>
<td>Renewed Fighting</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.8</td>
<td>NATO Air Strikes</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.9</td>
<td>The Failure of the Ceasefire</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.10</td>
<td>The Vulnerability of UNPROFOR</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.11</td>
<td>Restructuring of UNPROFOR</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.12</td>
<td>The Establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.13</td>
<td>The Bosnian Serb Offensive and the Government and Croat Counter-Offensive</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.14</td>
<td>The Dayton Peace Agreement and the Termination of UNPROFOR</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 9</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lessons from the UN Operations in Somalia and Bosnia</strong></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 9.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 9.2</td>
<td>UNOSOM II Issues</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 9.3</td>
<td>UNPROFOR Issues</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 9.4</td>
<td>Dangers of Combining Peacekeeping with Enforcement Action</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 10.11 United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) ....................................................... 211
Section 10.12 United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) ........................................... 213
Section 10.13 Credibility Issues ........................................................................................................... 216
Section 10.14 The Positive 1990s Missions ....................................................................................... 217

Lesson 11 The Situation of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Future Prospects ........................................ 220

Section 11.1 Reasons for the Retrenchment of Operations in the Mid-1990s ........................................... 221
Section 11.2 The Approach After Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia .................................................. 223
Section 11.3 Limitations of the New Approach .................................................................................... 223
Section 11.4 Prospects for the Future .................................................................................................. 224

Appendices

Appendix A: List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 228
Appendix B: An Agenda for Peace ...................................................................................................... 232
Appendix C: Past Peacekeeping Missions .......................................................................................... 233
Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions .................................................................................... 234
About the Author: Professor Sunil V. Ram ....................................................................................... 235
About the Author: Mr. F. T. Liu ....................................................................................................... 236
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination ............................................................................... 237
The end of the Cold War saw a massive increase in peacekeeping activities around the world. However, this resurgence was problematic in that peacekeeping in itself did not evolve to the changed geopolitical reality of a polar world with one superpower, namely the United States. The peace dividend led to peacekeeping missions all over the world in an effort by the UN to resolve many conflicts that had become intra-state and amongst non-state actors, rather than the traditional inter-state conflicts that involved recognised political actors.

The failure of the UN to adapt to the new political realities in the immediate post-Cold War era ultimately led to disasters in the early 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, as well as the inability to stabilise Haiti. The UN over-extended its resources and implemented over-ambitious mandates that did not reflect the reality of intra-state conflicts amongst non-state actors or failed-state scenarios. These failures resulted in a process of retrenchment during the mid-1990s, which was further exacerbated by the waning support of the United States. Over-commitment and lack of U.S. support also led to yet another major financial crisis for the UN, which further established the retrenchment course. The impact of the failures of the early 1990s saw the advent of NATO taking on a robust military role in the Balkan region and U.S.-led multinational forces intervening in Somalia and Haiti.

To fully understand these events, it is important to gain a conceptual foundation and background in the history of UN Peacekeeping Operations in the post-Cold War era by reviewing the historical, political, and diplomatic background that contributed to the evolution of peacekeeping operations in a general, chronological order. Therefore, this course package begins with a brief background on peacekeeping during the Cold War and then goes on to the early peacekeeping operations (Iran-Iraq, Central America, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Angola, and Namibia) at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. The course then moves on to the first Gulf War and the expansion of peacekeeping operations in the first half of the 1990s and their successes and failures. The missions in Somalia and Bosnia are covered in detail as they proved to be the catalysts for the retrenchment of peacekeeping in the following years. The course then reviews the smaller missions taken on during the initial phase of retrenchment and concludes with an assessment of the new approach to peacekeeping that resulted from retrenchment. Overall, the study guide will familiarise the student with the significance of individual UN Peacekeeping Missions and the overall evolution and functioning of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the post-Cold War era.

At the time of this writing, some of the missions were still ongoing. However, lessons have been written in the past tense, as mission mandates could be terminated by the time this course comes to print. I hope that the student will find this updated and enhanced course informative and interesting and that the knowledge gained will be of use in dealing with issues that face peacekeepers throughout the world.

Professor Sunil V. Ram
July 2006
Method of Study

This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:

- Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
- The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
- Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
- Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
- At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
- After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

» Access your online classroom at
<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.

- Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
- A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.

Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

- Access to all of your courses;
- A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
- Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course supplements;
- The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course; and
- Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
The United Nations developed the concept of peacekeeping at the beginning of the Cold War because the increasing mistrust among the major powers made the original UN collective security and peace enforcement system unworkable.

In this lesson »

- Section 1.1 The Concept of Peacekeeping
- Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War
- Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the Cold War
- Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War
- Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations
- Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
- Section 1.7 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
- Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)
- Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

Lesson Objectives »

- State the concept, purposes, and principles of UN peacekeeping.
- Discuss the role and performance of peacekeeping during the Cold War.
- Describe the changes in peacekeeping operations after the Cold War.
- Discuss five examples of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.
Section 1.1  The Concept of Peacekeeping

The United Nations developed the concept of peacekeeping at the beginning of the Cold War because the increasing mistrust among the major powers made the original UN collective security and peace enforcement system unworkable. The United Nations used peacekeeping operations as a practical mechanism to contain potential or actual armed conflicts, and to facilitate the settlement of these conflicts by negotiation and other peaceful means, despite the political constraints resulting from the Cold War. Unlike the enforcement actions envisioned in Chapter VII.
of the UN Charter, these operations are based on the principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. The establishment of these operations requires the consent of the parties directly concerned: UN peacekeepers must maintain complete impartiality and are not authorized to use force except in self-defence. While peacekeeping operations must be authorized by the Security Council or, exceptionally, by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General always directs their daily operations.

**Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War**

Most of the Cold War years were characterized by intense rivalry between the two superpowers tempered by the balance of nuclear terror. These two factors led to a sort of negative stability. Between the East and West blocs in Europe, there was constant tension along the Iron Curtain, but no war. The rivalry between the two superpowers was played out mainly in the Third World, where those superpowers often fuelled regional conflicts in their desire to preserve or expand their spheres of influence. Here too, however, the two superpowers were careful to avoid a direct military confrontation if their vital opposing interests were not involved. When a regional conflict threatened to escalate and draw them into such a confrontation, they sought to contain it. Since 1948, they used the UN peacekeeping mechanism for that purpose in the form of small-scale military observer missions, or, since 1956, in that of larger peacekeeping forces. Though limited in scope, peacekeeping operations had a crucial impact on the maintenance of international peace and security, and they provided an important stabilizing instrument in areas where a power vacuum might have led to explosive confrontations between the superpowers. Ralph J. Bunche, Dag Hammarskjöld, and Lester Pearson developed the concept of using military personnel on missions of conflict control under the UN flag.

**Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the Cold War**

The performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations varied with the ebb and flow of the Cold War. During the first 40 years of their history, from 1948 to 1988, only 13 such operations were formed. No peacekeeping operations were established during the last ten years of that period, which was a time of intensification of the Cold War marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration’s espousal of unilateralism in foreign policy, and the military build-up of both superpowers. This period was also a time of increasing conflict in the Third World.

This included the Iran-Iraq war, conflicts in Cambodia and in Central America, invasion and civil war in Lebanon, the crisis in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, the impasse in Cyprus, Cuban and South African interventions in Angola, and failure to move Namibia towards independence. With the Security Council deadlocked most of the time, there was little opportunity for an effective United Nations role in bringing those problems under control.

**Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War**

As the Soviet Union fought an increasingly debilitating war in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the Soviet economy also faced the escalating costs of the arms race with the United States. Under this huge economic burden, the stagnant economy faltered, and dissent began to grow within the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, the tension between Washington and Moscow began to wane largely because of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), as well as his “new thinking in foreign affairs.” The relations between the two superpowers gradually shifted from competition to cooperation, and the Cold War thawed and finally ended.
Reform attempts at home led to a weakening of control over Eastern Europe, which soon led to a breakup of the Soviet Bloc, starting with Poland. During 1989 and 1990, the Berlin Wall came down, borders opened, and free elections ousted Communist regimes everywhere in eastern Europe. In late 1991, the Soviet Union itself dissolved into its component republics. The Cold War had ended abruptly after some 45 years.

### Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations

These changes led to a resurgence of UN peacekeeping activities. Within the next two years, in 1988 and 1989, five new peacekeeping operations were formed:

- United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
- United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
- United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)
- United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
- United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

Because UNTAG was one of the major peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN, it will be dealt with in greater detail in Lesson 2. The other four operations are discussed in this lesson.

These five peacekeeping operations were all international. They were set up in pursuance of international agreements involving mainly governments and with the strong support of the two superpowers, and they were all successful.
Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)

Background to UNGOMAP

Following a coup in Afghanistan, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. This troop deployment was in response to a reported request from the Afghan Government for assistance against insurgent movements. Initially, some 30,000 Soviet troops were engaged, but this very rapidly grew to more than 100,000 troops. The Soviets soon became entangled in a guerrilla war with the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen). The mujahideen were eventually backed by the US and its proxy, Pakistan. After a pointless, protracted and bloody war, the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.

The war left more than 1 million Afghani dead and some 5 million refugees in neighbouring countries. Some 15,000 Soviets were killed and another 37,000 wounded. Most of the country had been laid waste, and approximately 5 million landmines were covering some two per cent of the country.

The Security Council failed to produce a resolution in early 1980, just after the invasion. To end the deadlock, the matter was referred to an emergency session of the General Assembly, which, by resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, strongly deplored the armed intervention and called for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan. Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative on the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, visited the region in April and August 1981. His negotiations at the time led to the Geneva Accords.

The Geneva Accords

In January 1982, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar took up the post of Secretary-General, and he designated Mr. Diego Cordovez as his Personal Representative. Beginning in June 1982 and over the next six years, Mr. Cordovez acted as an intermediary in a series of indirect negotiations between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva.

The conclusion of the Geneva Accords came about once the Soviet Government decided to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. In February 1988, the Soviet Union announced that it would start repatriating its troops in May. The last round of talks ended on 8 April 1988 when Under-Secretary-General Cordovez announced that all the instruments comprising the settlement had been finalized and were open for signature.
The Accords, known formally as the “Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan,” consisted of four instruments: 1) A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, particularly on non-interference and non-intervention.

1. Declaration on international guarantees, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

2. A bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees.

3. An agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Accords were signed by the four countries in Geneva on 14 April 1988. The Geneva Accords were also the basis for the establishment of a UN mission to Afghanistan. Organized as the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the Mission would monitor:

- Non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other’s affairs.

- The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

- The voluntary return of refugees.

UNGOMAP’s operations in the field would be directed by a senior military officer designated as Deputy to the Representative. 2) UNGOMAP would be organised into two small headquarters units in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, which would each consist of five military officers and a small civilian component. There was also provision for the deployment of up to 40 additional UN Military Observer (UNMO) officers organized into inspection teams, which would all be temporarily redeployed from existing United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Establishment of UNGOMAP

On 31 October 1988, in resolution 622, the Security Council called for the setup of UNGOMAP. 3) Mr. Cordovez remained the Representative and Finnish Major-General Rauli Helminen was appointed as Deputy to the Representative. Finnish Colonel Heikki Happonen later succeeded him in May 1989. Fifty UNMOs were temporarily assigned from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On 25 April 1988, the first part of an advance party arrived in the Mission area. The two headquarters (HQ) units in Kabul and Islamabad were operational well in advance of 15 May, when the instruments entered into force.

Monitoring the Soviet Withdrawal

UNGOMAP established three permanent outposts (each manned by two UNMOs) to monitor the Soviet withdrawal. Two posts were on the Afghan side of the Soviet-Afghan border at Hairatan and Torghundi, while the third was located at the Shindand airbase, which was used for withdrawal by air. UNGOMAP personnel also checked Soviet garrisons in Afghanistan during or immediately after the departure of Soviet forces. Where security was an issue for the UNMOs, head counts of departing Soviet troops were done at airheads at Kabul, Kunduz, and Shindand or the border-crossing points. The Soviet withdrawal occurred in three phases:

After the completion of the withdrawal, UNGOMAP closed its three outposts at Hairatan and Torghundi and the Shindand airbase.

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LESSON 1 | THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE RESURGENCE OF UN PKOS

Soviet Withdrawal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>By 15 August 1988</td>
<td>50 per cent of Soviets troops (50,183) withdrawn by land and air. Most were mobile formations, spetsnaz (special forces) troops and an airborne brigade. Also some fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were withdrawn.</td>
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<td>Second</td>
<td>To begin on 15 November 1988</td>
<td>After the August withdrawal an agreed to three-month pause occurred to facilitate the 2nd phase. This phase was suspended in early November due to the rapidly deteriorating security situation.</td>
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UNGOMAP’s Monitoring Role

During the Soviet withdrawal, UNGOMAP received numerous complaints from both Afghanistan and Pakistan of alleged first-instrument violations, on non-interference and non-intervention.

UNGOMAP made every effort to investigate the complaints. However, some difficulties hampered the effectiveness of UNGOMAP’s inspection teams. These included the rough nature of the terrain, the time which lapsed before many of the alleged incidents were reported, and the security conditions prevailing in the area of operation.  

Afghani Complaints:

- Allegations of political activities and propaganda hostile to the Government of Afghanistan taking place in Pakistan;
- Border crossings of men and materiel from Pakistan to Afghanistan;
- Cross-border firings, acts of sabotage;
- Rocket attacks on major urban centres;
- Violations of Afghan airspace by Pakistan aircraft;
- Continued presence in Pakistan of training camps and arms depots for Afghan opposition groups;
- Direct involvement by Pakistan military personnel inside Afghanistan; and
- Restrictions placed on refugees who wished to return to Afghanistan.

Pakistan Complaints:

- Allegations of political activities and propaganda hostile to the Government of Pakistan;
- Bombings and violations of its airspace by Afghan aircraft; and
- Acts of sabotage and cross-border firings, including the use of SCUD missiles against Pakistan territory.

To investigate the violation claims, UNGOMAP established two outposts (one in Peshawar and one in Quetta)

4) United Nations, UNMOGAP Background, 2002
on the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistani border in November 1988. UNGOMAP set up permanent presences at Torkham, Teri Mangal, and Chaman in April 1989, to further strengthen its presence on the Pakistan side of the border.

Termination of UNGOMAP

On January 11 1990, after consultations with the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 647, which extended the UNGOMAP mandate for two months. However, in March the Secretary-General was unable to obtain consensus for a further extension of UNGOMAP. Thus, the mission formally ended on 15 March 1990. However, due to the continued problems in Afghanistan, the Secretary-General redeployed 10 UNMOs as military advisers to his Personal Representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist in the further implementation of his responsibilities under the Assembly’s resolution.

Section 1.7 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)

Background to UNIIMOG

During the Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980-20 August 1988), the UN tried to seek an end to the war. These efforts were of limited effect, but in 1984 the first resident United Nations presence in the area was established with the deployment of inspection teams to investigate alleged attacks on civilian areas. This became known as the truce in the “war of the cities” and lasted nine months.

By the end of June 1984, two teams were installed in Baghdad and Tehran. The teams consisted of three UNMOs seconded from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and one senior official of the United Nations Secretariat. Their presence in the capitals four years later helped to expedite the establishment of UNIIMOG.

In January 1987, the Secretary-General undertook a new diplomatic initiative to settle the conflict. The readiness by the five Permanent Members to work together to seek an end to this long-standing conflict was a major factor in coming to a resolution. On 20 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 598 (1987), which included the basis for the ceasefire that came into effect one year later.

The sheer brutality of the war included the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, missile attacks on cities, and mass assaults against prepared position-tactics that harkened the trench warfare of the First World War. After the war, the UN condemned Iraq for using chemical weapons. By 1987, it had become obvious that both sides had fought to a stalemate, and both Governments were willing to negotiate peace. In September 1987, the Secretary-General began an intensive round of negotiations, which continued into the spring of 1988. The war continued unabated until 17 July 1988, when Iran accepted resolution 598 (1987); Iraq then followed suit the next day. Resolution 598 (1987) not only addressed the need for ceasefire verification and supervision, but it also addressed the need for mediation between Iraq and Iran. The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Jan Eliasson (Sweden) as his Personal Representative on Issues Pertaining to the Implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987) to meet the mediation objectives.


21
Once it was clear a ceasefire was to be implemented, the Secretary-General sent a technical mission to Iran and Iraq from 25 July to 2 August to work out the modalities for the dispatch of the United Nations observer group. Lieutenant-General Martin Vadset (Norway), Chief of Staff of UNTSO, led the mission, which included a senior political adviser, a civilian logistics expert, and four UNMOs from UNTSO. It was assisted by the small teams that had been stationed in Baghdad and Tehran since 1984.

Casualty figures are, at best, speculative, and estimates indicate at least half a million war and war-related casualties; it is possible that this number is as high as two million people. Many more were wounded, and millions were made refugees.

The Iraqi casualties (killed and wounded) are estimated at 375,000, plus some 60,000 taken as prisoners of war (POWs). Iranian casualties (killed and wounded) are at least 300,000 with another 500,000 or more wounded. Both economies were in ruins, and many cities had been destroyed.

**Mandate and Terms of Reference of UNIIMOG**

As outlined on the UN UNIIMOG database, “UNIIMOG’s mandate, in accordance with resolution 598, was “to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal.” Its terms of reference were set out in the Secretary-General’s report of 7 August, as follows:

- To establish with the parties agreed on ceasefire lines based on the localities occupied by the two sides on D-Day, but adjusting these, as may be agreed, when the positions of the two sides were judged to be dangerously close to each other.
- To monitor compliance with the ceasefire.
- To investigate any alleged violations of the ceasefire and restore the situation if a violation took place.
- To prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.
- To supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.
- To monitor the ceasefire on the internationally recognized boundaries, investigate alleged violations and prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.
To obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, could help to reduce tension and build confidence between them, such as: the establishment of areas of separation of forces on either side of the international border; limitations on the number and calibre of weapons to be deployed in areas close to the international border; and patrolling by United Nations naval personnel of certain sensitive areas in or near the Shatt al-Arab."

Four essential conditions were necessary for UNIIMOG to be effective:
2. The full cooperation of Iraq and Iran
3. The ability to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.
4. Sufficient financial arrangements to cover its costs.

**Establishment of UNIIMOG**

On 9 August 1988, the Security Council established UNIIMOG for six months with resolution 619 (1988). Major-General Slavko Jovic (Yugoslavia) served as Chief Military Observer until November 1990, when Brigadier-General S. Anam Khan (Bangladesh) took command of UNIIMOG. The peak strength of UNIIMOG was 400 all ranks and a civilian staff.

The first part of the Observer Group arrived in Iran and Iraq on 10 August 1988, consisting of 12 UNMOs, team leaders, and a civilian component. These teams liaised with Iranian and Iraqi authorities while conducting reconnaissance of the areas that UNIIMOG was to be deployed.

**Deployment of UNIIMOG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Role</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>350 UNMOs</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air unit detachment of 17 personnel</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>One Andover, two flying crews, and maintenance personnel based in Tehran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177 Military Police</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical orderlies</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>581 Signals</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>the composite 88 Signals Regt was sent pending the establishment of a civilian-operated communications system; operated in both Iran and Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 20 August 1988, the day the ceasefire came into effect, 307 UNMOs and most of the signals squadron from Canada were already in Iran and Iraq. On the first day, 51 patrols deployed to establish forward positions and resolve issues that came from breaches of the ceasefire. The two UNIIMOG headquarters were located in Baghdad and Tehran.

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8) United Nations, "Iraq-Iran UNIIMOG Background".
On the Iranian side, UNMOs were deployed in four sectors (sector headquarters at Saqqez, Bakhtaran, Dezful, and Ahwaz); on the Iraqi side, UNMOs were deployed in three sector headquarters (sector headquarters at Sulaymaniyah, Ba’qubah, and Basra). Team sites under sector control were located close to the ceasefire line to minimize additional travel time. The length of the ceasefire line monitored by UNMOs at a team site varied from 70 kilometres to 250 kilometres.

UNIIMOG used three fixed-wing aircraft for communications, observation, and transportation. UNIIMOG was anticipated to pilot a unit of United Nations helicopters for observation of the ceasefire lines and no-mans land, but as one of the countries would not agree to that plan, observers could only fly helicopters provided to the mission by the countries, and could not fly over the ceasefire line.

**UNIIMOG Operations**

As the 1,400 kilometre ceasefire lines covered a vast and diverse landscape, UNIIMOG had to adapt its patrolling methods. From boat patrols in the southern marshes to riding mule-back through the northern mountains, UNIIMOG adapted its observation methods to meet the challenges presented by the terrain. Patrols operated 24/7, with a daily average of 64 patrols.

The main objective of UNIIMOG patrols was to verify compliance with the ceasefire by observing areas near the lines and verifying complaints received by the other side. Complaints were transmitted to UNMOs on the other side of the line to negotiate an immediate settlement. UNMOs also worked in humanitarian efforts and trust-building measures between the two nations, such as the exchange of war dead found on the battlefield.

The principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations guided the agreements surrounding UNIIMOG, as did the precedent set by previous peace operations. To coordinate cooperation with the mission, both Iraq and Iran established inter-departmental groups, provided liaison officers, and offered logistic facilities.
While there were many violations at the outset of the ceasefire, the number of complaints steadily decreased as the situation stabilized. Some of the more serious complaints included exchange of fire, troop movements, reinforcement of positions by mining, wiring, or improvement of bunkers, and the establishment of new forward positions. Despite these serious complaints, most violations recorded were minor.

**Strength Reductions and Changes in UNIIMOG’s Mandate**

In August 1990, Iraq invaded and subsequently occupied Kuwait, worsening the situation in the region and complicating the tasks of UNIIMOG. Despite the upheaval, the Iran-Iraq border remained relatively calm and UNIIMOG was able to continue its mandated work. Although some forces remained on the wrong side of the borders, by the end of September 1990 the withdrawal of all forces across internationally recognized boundaries was almost complete.

To reach a complete withdrawal, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend UNIIMOG’s mandate for two months instead of six, as it had done three times previously. This smaller extension would allow UNIIMOG to verify complete troop withdrawal and evaluate the situation to determine if there was a further need for ceasefire verification and enforcement. During that period, UNIIMOG would concentrate on the
following tasks:

- Verify, confirm, and supervise the remaining stages of the withdrawal;
- Help the parties resolve any local tensions that might arise because of differences about the exact line of the border, forward moves, accidental firings, etc.; and
- Assist the parties in establishing an area of separation - an area on either side of the border into which each party would agree not to deploy military forces. It was judged that only 60 per cent of UNIIMOG’s existing strength would be required to perform these tasks.

In agreement with the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the Security Council adopted resolution 671 (1990) on 27 September 1990. This resolution extended UNOMIIG’s mandate while reducing its personnel strength to 230, including 184 UNMOs. Observers redeployed in three sectors in Iran, with headquarters at Saqqez, Bakhtaran, and Dezful, and three sectors in Iraq, with headquarters at at Sulaymaniyah, Mansuriyah, and Basra.

Violations of the ceasefire and difficulties with withdrawal continued to occur throughout October and November. Withdrawal efforts were further complicated by the presence of unmarked minefields, especially on the Iranian side of the border. The mandate was extended for two months by Security Council resolution 676 (1990) to meet the challenges posed by resistance from Iran.

UNIIMOG continued its mandated tasks of addressing issues with the border, arranging exchanges of unmarked minefield information, assisting in the negotiation and implementation of an area of separation, and arranging limitations on armaments. Further UNIIMOG force reductions resulted in further reorganization and redeployment.

### Separation Agreements

In January 1991, the two parties agreed to convene a technical meeting of military experts to discuss and resolve the questions relating to UNIIMOG’s mandate that were still outstanding. The agreement was reached bilaterally, and the meeting itself was organized outside the framework of the Mixed Military Working Group that UNIIMOG had previously been trying to establish. The Acting Chief Military Observer of UNIIMOG attended the meeting. The two sides also reached agreements on the question of disputed positions along the internationally recognized boundaries, an area of separation along those boundaries, and the exchange of information on minefields. These agreements were fully consistent with UNIIMOG’s mandate, and they provided for UNIIMOG to monitor their implementation within a specified time frame.

The disputed positions were all to be removed by 22 January 1991, and UNIIMOG was then to verify and confirm the completion of the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized border described in the 1975 Treaty concerning the state frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq. The agreements on an area of separation provided for a one-kilometre withdrawal on both sides along the entire length of the recognized borders. Its establishment was to take place between 10 and 27 January, with UNIIMOG helping in the implementation.

Due to the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf region in mid-January, however, the implementation of the agreements did not proceed fully according to the schedule. By the end of January, Iran had withdrawn 13 out of 17 disputed positions, and Iraq had withdrawn 23 out of 29 such positions. There was little progress made regarding mine clearance and an area of separation.

### Security in Iraq Worsens
UNIIMOG’s capacity to fulfill the role assigned to it was seriously affected after the adoption of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) on 29 November, authorizing the use of all necessary means by a multinational coalition if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. UNIIMOG undertook detailed planning to ensure the security of its personnel without compromising operational efficiency. With the deterioration of the situation in the second week of January 1991, it was decided to thin out both military and civilian staff in Baghdad. Following the Secretary-General’s visit to Baghdad on 12-13 January, a decision was taken to relocate UNIIMOG personnel temporarily from Baghdad to the sectors closer to the border. The command group moved to Tehran on 14 January. After the outbreak of hostilities on 16 January 1991, all remaining UNIIMOG staff in Iraq were also moved either to Cyprus or Iran.

Despite the security issues, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that the mandate of UNIIMOG, set to expire at the end of January 1991, be extended for another month so that the Group “may fulfill completely its important responsibilities.” On 31 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 685 (1991), extending the mandate to 28 February.

**Completion of UNIIMOG’s Mandate**

In the following month, because of the continuing hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, UNIIMOG continued to operate only in the Iranian part of its area but maintained regular contact with the Iraqi authorities through meeting on the border. At the beginning of February, some 20 military observers from the Iraqi side whose tours of duty were due to expire returned home. The rest of the observers from Iraq temporarily relocated to Cyprus to await a possible return to Iraq when circumstances permitted.

On 20 February 1991, the Group reported that the last of the disputed positions along the internationally recognized boundaries had been withdrawn. UNIIMOG, thus, completed verification and confirmation of the withdrawal of all forces in accordance with resolution 598 (1987).
The Secretary-General recommended replacing UNIIMOG with small civilian offices in Baghdad and Tehran. Accordingly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council take no action to extend the mandate of UNIIMOG. After the Council had informed the Secretary-General of its concurrence with the proposed arrangements, UNIIMOG completed its mandate on 28 February 1991. At the time of withdrawal, UNIIMOG was comprised of 96 military observers. The Group also included 16 military police and a small medical unit.

**Civilian Offices**

The civilian offices were established in February 1991. A few military officers attached to them allowed the UN to continue to respond promptly to requests by either Government to investigate and help resolve matters for which military expertise was required. The offices were also important in the Secretary-General’s efforts to complete the implementation of resolution 598 (1987).

In December 1991, the Secretary-General commented on the responsibility for the conflict, which was referred to in resolution 598 (1987). He added, however, that no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matter further. Rather, in the interest of peace, he suggested it would be imperative to move on with the settlement process. By the end of 1992, the offices in Baghdad and Tehran were phased out, and the Permanent Missions of Iran and Iraq became the channels of communication between those countries and the United Nations for matters related to resolution 598 (1987).

**Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)**

**Background to UNAVEM I**

At the time Angola emerged in 1975 from its status as a Portuguese colony, the guerrilla war for independence had gone on for almost 15 years. In January 1975, the Portuguese Government sought to establish a programme for transition to independence in talks at Alvor, Portugal, with three separate Angolan liberation movements: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).

The agreement forged at Alvor soon fell apart, and the three groups fought one another with support from a variety of international sources, including Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. South Africa sent troops to Angola to oppose the MPLA, which was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The MPLA emerged as the strongest of the three groups and, on 11 November 1975, established the People’s Republic of Angola. FNLA’s military importance subsequently dwindled, but UNITA continued to field troops, particularly in the countryside.

The Soviet Union and Cuba maintained their support for MPLA, while UNITA received backing from South Africa and the United States.

The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), later known as UNAVEM I, came about in a climate of declining Cold War rivalries as one aspect of intricate international negotiations on political arrangements throughout the region. With the potential withdrawal of foreign forces, the international community saw a chance to end the long-standing conflict that had been tearing Angola apart since independence. Both the UN and the US had been trying to resolve the Angolan conflict since 1987, which included a UN technical mission composed of civilian officials and three UNMOs from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
Establishment of UNAVEM

The establishment of UNAVEM I in December 1988 resulted from a complex international diplomatic process that culminated in agreements on both the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978, leading to the independence of Namibia) and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (see Lesson 2).

On 17 December, before, but contingent upon, the signature of the agreements for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, Cuba and Angola requested that the Secretary-General recommend to the Security Council the establishment of a UN military observer group. Its task would be to verify compliance with the bilateral agreement, in accordance with the arrangements which had already been made between the two countries and the Secretariat. On 20 December, the Security Council approved resolution 626 (1988) to establish UNAVEM for 31 months, one month after the planned completion of Cuban troop withdrawal on 1 July 1991. The necessary arrangements came into effect on 22 December when the tripartite and bilateral agreements between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa were signed. Shortly after, the Security Council established the UNTAG in Namibia.

On 22 December 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an agreement aimed at bringing peace to south-western Africa. The agreement provided for the implementation of a United Nations plan, which included:

- The independence of Namibia;
- The withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola; and
- The agreement that the territories would not be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence of any State of south-west Africa.

On 22 June 1989, in the presence of 18 African heads of state, the President of the MPLA, Jose Edwardo
Dos Santos, and the President of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, agreed to negotiate a peaceful solution to the 14-year Angolan civil war. The President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, mediated the agreement, known as the “Gbadolite Declaration.” The agreement called for a general ceasefire effective 24 June 1989, as well as the establishment of a commission comprised of UNITA and the MPLA, under the mediation of Zaire, for the negotiation of peace and national reconciliation in Angola. The accord failed, and the civil war continued as the Cubans began to pull out.

**Composition of UNAVEM I**

UNAVEM I became operational on 3 January 1989, when an advance party of 18 UNMOs arrived in Luanda to verify the departure on 10 January of the first 450 Cuban soldiers. After that, the strength of UNAVEM I rose to 70 UNMOs. The UNMOs came from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and Yugoslavia. The Chief Military Observer (CMO), Brazilian Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, commanded the UN Military Observers.

**Role of UNAVEM I**

UNAVEM I was mandated by the Security Council to monitor the phased withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. UNMO teams verified and recorded all movements of Cuban military personnel and equipment into and out of Angola, in particular in the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda and Namibe, and Luanda airport. A Joint Commission composed of the CMO as chairman and two senior officers from Angola and Cuba was made responsible for the coordination of UN verification process and was to address any issues that arose. UNAVEM I’s mobile teams also confirmed Cuban redeployment, in accordance with the agreed plan, northwards from all locations south of the adjusted 13th parallel. After the completion of this redeployment from the southern part of Angola, the observer strength was reduced to 60.

There was a short suspension of the withdrawal between 24 January to 25 February 1990 after two UNITA attacks killed 10 Cuban soldiers. In general, the provisions of the Angolan-Cuban agreement were scrupulously complied with, and the withdrawal proceeded at a rate slightly ahead of the projected figures. On 22 May 1991, the Secretary-General was notified of the decision taken by the Governments of Angola and Cuba to complete the withdrawal more than one month before the scheduled date. On 25 May, UNAVEM I witnessed the ceremony to mark the completion of the withdrawal from Angola of all Cuban troops and military equipment.

**Withdrawal of UNAVEM I**

*The Rio Dange Bridge Inauguration in Huambo, Angola. The bridge was constructed by a UNAVEM engineering corps from the Republic of Korea. It was one of eight such bridges renovated after civil conflict damaged them. This bridge separates roads to Uige and Luanda. 7 December 1996. UN Photo #73485 by John Charles.*
UNAVEM I withdrew on 31 May. On 6 June 1991, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNAVEM had carried out its mandate fully and effectively. He thanked the Governments of Angola and Cuba for their decision to complete the withdrawal ahead of schedule, thus allowing UNAVEM to concentrate its resources on the new tasks assigned by the Security Council in resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991. The Secretary-General observed that the “success of UNAVEM again demonstrates what can be achieved by a United Nations peacekeeping operation when it receives the full co-operation of the parties concerned.”

UNAVEM I Organization

Source: Ram Military Consulting
UNAVEM was not created to enforce the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accord, but its creation allowed for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, thus allowing for the execution of the settlement that led to Namibia’s independence.

Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

Background to ONUCA

In one of its most complex and successful interventions, the UN became directly involved in peacekeeping and peace-making efforts in Central America in 1989. The Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua requested its assistance in the implementation of their collective agreement, the “Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America,” known both as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the Guatemala Procedure. The Esquipulas II Agreement dealt with issues of:

- National reconciliation;
- An end to hostilities;
- Democratization;
- Free elections;
- Termination of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements;
- Non-use of the territory of one State to attack other States;
- Negotiations on security, verification, and the control and limitation of weapons;
- Refugees and displaced persons;
- Cooperation, democracy, and freedom for peace and development;
- International verification and follow-up; and
- A timetable for the fulfilment of commitments.

A complex and difficult process of negotiations, beginning in 1983, reversed the disrupting cycle of turmoil which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of Troops</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 1989</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Over the next 27 months, the balance of troops would be moved north-ward first to the “adjusted” 15th parallel* and then to the “adjusted” 13th parallel*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 1989</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>50 per cent withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 1990</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>66 per cent withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Oct 1990</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>76 per cent withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 1990 -</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>100 per cent withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*points measured from the actual parallel
had engulfed Central America for many years. At its various stages, the process involved countries from inside and outside the region, as well as the opposing parties within several of the Central American countries. These initiatives were actively supported and facilitated by the UN. As a result of the negotiations and the agreements reached, the UN was requested to establish mechanisms for observing and verifying commitments. These included: the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA, a Spanish acronym for Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Centroamerica); the United Nations Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN); the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV); the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL); and the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA).

Establishment of ONUCA

In a report to the Security Council dated 11 October 1989, the Secretary-General set out the guidelines for the mandate of ONUCA. With Security Council resolution 644 (1989), ONUCA was officially established on 7 November 1989 to verify compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement by the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The main goals were to halt aid to insurrectionist movements and irregular forces and to prevent the use of territories to launch attacks on other States; the latter goal included preventing the establishment or use of radio and television broadcasting stations for the purposes of advising or aiding the irregular forces or insurrectionist movements.

As the terrain in the region was not conducive to stationery outposts, ONUCA observers were organized into mobile teams of seven to ten. They would patrol using cross-country road vehicles, helicopters, patrol boats, and light speedboats. A small aircraft would transport the Chief Military Observer (CMO) and his senior staff between the countries and would also rotate the UNMOs between duty stations.

Operations

On 3 December 1989, an advance party established ONUCA headquarters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The team went on to establish liaison offices in the capitals of each of the five nations and make preparations for verification centres; however, because of the security conditions in the area, the El Salvador liaison office in San Salvador could not be established until 17 January 1990. By 5 June 1990, ONUCA reached its full strength with five liaison offices, 14 verification centres, and three operational posts. Four additional patrol boats joined the mission in June 1990 operating from a naval verification centre in San Lorenzo, Honduras.

ONUCA's operational area was mostly rugged terrain with dense forests and had limited road access. To overcome the obstacles presented by the landscape, UNMOs patrolled the area from verification centres and smaller forward observational posts. They conducted daily patrols by land, air, and river; helicopters were crucial not only in patrolling and observation efforts, but also in the transportation of observers and supplies. Observation by ONUCA teams focused on areas with reports of irregular forces and insurrection movements that violated the Esquipulas II Agreement, especially near the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border, the Honduras-Nicaragua border, the Honduras-El Salvador border, the Guatemala-El Salvador border, the north-eastern region of Nicaragua, and the south-western region of Honduras. Complaints registered with ONUCA were communicated to the government complained against, and an investigation looked into the complaint and reported its findings to both governments involved.

First Expansion of the Mandate

On 12 December 1989, the five Central American presidents requested the expansion of ONUCA's mandate in their "Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado," expressing a desire for verification and demobilization of irregular forces.

In March 1990, shortly after the elections in Nicaragua, the Secretary-General reported that the Nicaraguan government, the government-elect, and the United Nations had agreed on the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Members of the resistance in Honduras were to be demobilized at their current camps and repatriated, while those still in Nicaragua would demobilize at temporary ONUCA assembly points. ONUCA would be responsible for the weapons, military equipment, and uniforms of the former resistance. As armed personnel would be required for security, the Secretary-General requested that the Security Council expand ONUCA's mandate to include these tasks and deploy armed personnel to the mission on a contingency basis. The Security Council approved the report with Security Council resolution 650 (1990) on 27 March 1990.\(^{10}\)

On 23 April 1990, all five Central American presidents agreed with the Secretary-General that the weapons and military equipment collected during demobilization should be destroyed by ONUCA.

**Second Expansion of the Mandate**

Before the transfer of political power in Nicaragua on 25 April 1990, intensive negotiations took place between the Nicaraguan Government, representatives of the President-elect, and representatives of the Northern, Central, and Atlantic Fronts of the Nicaraguan Resistance (with the participation of the Archbishop of Managua, Cardinal Obando y Bravo). The CMO of ONUCA and Mr. Iqbal Riza, the Secretary-General’s Alternate Personal Representative for the Central American peace process, also took part.

On the night of 18-19 April, the Nicaraguan parties signed a complex of agreements relating to the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Nicaragua during the period from 25 April to 10 June 1990. A ceasefire would come into effect at noon (local time) on 19 April, and a separation of forces would

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take place because of the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government’s forces from certain "security zones," which were to be established in Nicaragua and in which the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance would concentrate for demobilization. ONUCA was asked to monitor both the ceasefire and the separation of forces.

Based on these agreements, the Secretary-General sought the Security Council’s approval of a further expansion of ONUCA’s mandate to cover these functions. That approval was granted by resolution 653 (1990) of 20 April 1990. By resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of ONUCA, as defined in resolutions 644 (1989), 650 (1990), and 653 (1990), for a further period of six months, on the understanding that the additional tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces and demobilizing the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance would lapse no later than 10 June 1990.

**Progress of Demobilization**

Five "security zones" were established on 22 April following the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government’s forces from the areas in question during the preceding three days. Within each zone, ONUCA personnel—both UNMOs and armed members of the Venezuelan battalion—were deployed in a “demobilization and logistics support area” where the hand-over of weapons and other activities connected with the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance took place. Each zone was 500-600 square kilometres in area and was surrounded by
a demilitarized zone of some 20 kilometres in width. Two additional zones were subsequently established on the Atlantic Coast for the demobilization of the members of the “Yatama” front. These zones covered a total of 2,550 square kilometres.

ONUCA had made all necessary arrangements in coordination with leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance. However, for demobilization to begin on 25 April at El Amparo in Zone 1, the members of the Resistance who had assembled there declined to lay down their weapons (after their commander told them that the minimum conditions for demobilization had not been met). In the ensuing days, only a few members of the Resistance demobilized.

On 4 May 1990, after further consultations, the Nicaraguan Government and the leadership of the Nicaraguan Resistance issued the “Managua Declaration,” in which,

the Nicaraguan Resistance declared that it would continue its voluntary demobilization and that the process would be completed in all of the “security zones” by 10 June at the latest. Demobilization began on 8 May. However, during the next two weeks, only small numbers came forward for demobilization, and it soon became clear that the pace was insufficient to ensure completion by 10 June. The leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance complained of breaches by the Nicaraguan Army of the agreements relating to the ceasefire and separation of forces. On 22-23 May 1990, the Security Council met to discuss this grave situation, and on 23 May the President of the Security Council made a statement expressing the Security Council’s concern at the slow pace of demobilization.

ONUCA, meanwhile, investigated complaints from both sides relating, on the one hand, to the presence of armed civilians and militia personnel in the “security zones” and demilitarized zones, and, on the other, to the presence outside the “security zones” of armed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (some of whom had allegedly committed various criminal acts). However, it remained the Secretary-General’s assessment that there had been no serious violations of the ceasefire. This serious situation was resolved on 30 May when a meeting between President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua, the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance, and the Archbishop of Managua resulted in an agreement entitled the “Managua Protocol.” Under its terms, the Nicaraguan Government responded to several of the Resistance’s publicly-stated concerns, notably through the establishment of “development areas” in which demobilized members of the Resistance would be resettled. The Resistance reaffirmed its commitment to demobilize by 10 June 1990 at the latest and, to this end, undertook that at least 100 combatants would be demobilized each day in each of the “security zones.”

Completion of Demobilization

After 30 May, demobilization generally proceeded rapidly. On 8 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that there had been a marked increase in the rate at which the members of the “Northern Front” and “Central Front” were demobilizing. However, demobilization of the “Atlantic Front,” which had begun on 21 May,
was proceeding at a less satisfactory pace than that of the main group, largely because of logistic difficulties in concentrating the members at demobilization areas in the large security zones concerned.

Considering the progress of the demobilization, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the relevant part of ONUCA's mandate for a brief and clearly defined period. By resolution 656 (1990) of 8 June 1990, the Council accordingly decided that ONUCA's tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces in Nicaragua and demobilizing the Resistance should be extended, on the understanding, as recommended by the Secretary-General, that these tasks would lapse with the completion of the demobilization process not later than 29 June 1990. During the following three weeks, demobilization proceeded in all zones. The process reached a peak on 10 June, when 1,886 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized. On 18 June, an eighth “security zone” became operational to facilitate the demobilization of members of the “Southern Front.”

On 29 June 1990, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that at 1900 hours (local time) on 28 June 1990, demobilization of all armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been completed at all locations, except for one in Nicaragua where a handful of members remained to be demobilized. This was soon accomplished, and the final zone was closed on 5 July 1990. By the time the process was completed, a total of 19,614 armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been demobilized in Nicaragua and 2,759 in Honduras. Weapons handed over to ONUCA by members of the Nicaraguan Resistance included 15,144 small arms (including AK-47s, other assault rifles, and light machine-guns), as well as heavy machine-guns, mortars, grenade launchers, grenades, mines, and missiles.

**Completing the Original Mandate**

The early part of the mandate period, which was dominated by ONUCA’s role in the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, was ending. The Secretary-General reported that ONUCA UNMOs in the five countries had then reverted to their original mandate, which required the patrolling of areas where violations of the Esquipulas II security undertakings seemed most likely to occur. ONUCA maintained a regular and visible presence in those areas. ONUCA’s role was verification; it did not have the authority or the capacity to prevent by physical means either the movement of armed persons or war-like material across borders or other violations of the undertakings nor was it staffed or equipped for the detection of clandestine activities.
Responding to a request from the five Central American Governments, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council on 26 October 1990 that ONUCA should continue its operations for a further period of six months, until 7 May 1991. He also recommended a reduction of ONUCA’s strength, which as of October was 254 UNMOs. Liaison offices and verification centres in each of the five capitals would be merged to form in each case an Observer Group HQ, and the number of verification centres would also be reduced. The Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s report in its resolution 675 (1990) of 5 November 1990. Security Council resolution 691 (1991) of 6 May 1991 extended ONUCA’s mandate to 7 November 1991. ONUCA’s strength in April 1991 stood at 158 UNMOs.

On 28 October 1991, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the situation in the region had continued to improve and that the five governments were making efforts to arrive at new collective security arrangements for the region. The five countries also continued their efforts to honour their commitments under the Esquipulas II Agreement. Although violations continued to occur, they were increasingly linked to criminal activity for monetary rather than political motives. At the same time, there was no evidence to indicate that the irregular armed groups that had re-emerged in Nicaragua were being helped from abroad. Regarding the conflict in El Salvador, ONUCA had confirmed that neighbouring countries had adopted measures, with varying degrees of vigour, to prevent activities from their territories that would violate the agreement. However, considering the large quantities of weapons in private hands or hidden away, considerable potential for breaches of the Agreement continued.

Due to the “fluid and dynamic situation,” the Security Council extended ONUCA’s mandate to 30 April 1992 on the recommendation of the Secretary-General in resolution 719 (1991) of 6 November 1991. At that time, the number of military observers stood at 132.

In the meantime, there were major developments relating to the settlement of the armed conflict in El Salvador, including additional verification tasks assigned to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The new Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, informed the Council of these tasks on 10 January 1992. He then stated his intention to meet as many of the personnel requirements as possible by transferring ONUCA officers to ONUSAL’s Military Division. Aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment were similarly transferred. He had informed the

United Nations soldiers are cutting up guns using an oxy-acetylene torch. The guns are being surrendered to the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) by the resistance forces as part of the overall peace process in Central America. 16 April 1990. UN Photo #85970 by Steen Johansen
Governments of the five countries where ONUCA was deployed of his intention to recommend the termination of ONUCA.

The Secretary-General proposed that the Security Council decide to terminate ONUCA’s operational mandate with effect from 17 January 1992. The Security Council, by its resolution 730 (1992) of 16 January, approved the Secretary-General’s report and decided to terminate ONUCA’s mandate.

On 24 January 1992, 131 military observers serving with ONUCA were transferred to ONUSAL. To supervise the closing of the Mission, international and local staff serving with ONUCA were retained and subsequently phased out over a period of three and a half months.

**Impact of ONUCA**

ONUCA vividly illustrated the complex demands made of the Organization’s peacemaking and peacekeeping skills and the varied role it played in advancing the peace process in Central America. Although initially established with the limited mandate of verifying only one aspect of that process, the tasks entrusted to it evolved, and it assisted the parties concerned to control and resolve the conflicts in the region. Its role in the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance marked an important step forward in the process of national reconciliation in Nicaragua. In his report recommending the termination of the Mission, the Secretary-General paid tribute to the military and civilian personnel who served in ONUCA for their great success in establishing the first large-scale peacekeeping operation of the United Nations in the Americas and for the contribution that they made to the restoration of peace and stability in Central America.

*General Augustin Quesada Gomez (Spain), Commander of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) (wearing a blue beret), inspects a weapon surrendered by the Nicaraguan resistance forces as part of the overall peace process in Central America. 18 April 1990. UN Photo #171898 by Steen Johansen.*
A Venezuelan soldier stands guard at the camp where the Nicaraguan resistance surrenders their weapons to the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) as part of the overall peace process in Central America. 18 April 1990. UN Photo #181004 by Steen Johansen.
End-of-Lesson Quiz

1. The purpose of peacekeeping operations is to ______.
   A. Supplement the peace enforcement system
   B. Contain armed conflicts and facilitate their settlement
   C. Militarily support the principle of collective security
   D. Keep the peace between the superpowers during the Cold War

2. Traditional peacekeeping operations are based on ______.
   A. Consent and impartiality
   B. Impartiality only
   C. Non-use of force and consent
   D. Consent, impartiality, and non-use of force

3. Besides the Charter, which document outlines the United Nations’ roles for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peacemaking?
   A. General guidelines for peacekeeping operations
   B. Presidential Statements
   C. An Agenda for Peace
   D. The Brahimi Report

4. On a day-to-day basis, peacekeeping operations are directed by ______.
   A. The Secretary-General
   B. The Under-Secretary-General
   C. The Security Council
   D. The General Assembly

5. During the Cold War, superpower rivalry was expressed in ______.
   A. Direct military conflict
   B. Involvement in regional conflicts in the Third World
   C. The mediation and negotiation process of the UN
   D. All of the above

6. Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations ______.
   A. Decreased in number
   B. Began to include more conflicts within “failed states”
   C. Met increasing resistance within the Security Council
   D. Were ineffective

7. What was the purpose of UNGOMAP?
   A. To monitor the withdrawal of Arab mujahideen.
   B. To monitor the disarmament of Soviet forces.
   C. To provide assistance to returning refugees.
   D. To monitor the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

8. UNIIMOG verified and supervised the ceasefire between which countries?
   A. Iran and Iraq
   B. Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq
   C. Iran and Pakistan
   D. Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran

Answer Key provided on the next page.
End-of-Lesson Quiz

9. What did UNAVEM I UNMO teams verify and record?
   A. All movements of Cuban military personnel and equipment into and out of Angola
   B. All movements of UNITA forces
   C. Disarmament of Cuban troops
   D. Refugee movements

10. On 20 April 1990, the Security Council decided to expand ONUCA’s mandate to include what additional tasks?
   A. Separating the forces and the demobilisation process
   B. Monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces
   C. Monitoring the ceasefire, separation of forces, and the demobilisation process
   D. Monitoring the ceasefire, refugee repatriation, and separation of forces

Answer Key

1. B
2. D
3. C
4. A
5. B
6. B
7. D
8. A
9. A
10. C
### Appendix A: List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>National Republican Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCFADM</td>
<td>Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Provisional Electoral Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAV</td>
<td>International Support and Verification Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAA</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMLO</td>
<td>Chief Military Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Chief Military Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPAZ</td>
<td>National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAF</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROMAC</td>
<td>Croatian Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Supervisory and Monitoring Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarised Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West Africa States</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Angolan Armed Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFT</td>
<td>Fact Finding Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Military Headquarters</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>JEOM</td>
<td>Joint Electoral Observation Mission</td>
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<td>JFFG</td>
<td>Joint Fact Finding Group</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Committees</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSAP</td>
<td>Judicial System Assessment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCTU</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Training Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICIVIH</td>
<td>International Civilian Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMWG</td>
<td>Mixed Military Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADK</td>
<td>National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMOG</td>
<td>Neutral Military Observer Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUV</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Operational Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>Auxiliary Transitory Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>National Civil Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLISARIO</td>
<td>Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro RENAMO Resistencia National Moçambicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACB</td>
<td>Somali Aid Coordination Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South Africa Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSS</td>
<td>Independent Democratic Serb Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council of Cambodia</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>State of Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SWA</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<td>SWAPOL</td>
<td>South West Africa Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West Africa Territorial Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop- Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAC</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>UN Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOHAFC</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOL</td>
<td>UN Support Office in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPA</td>
<td>UN Protected Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPF</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTO</td>
<td>United Tajik Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHS</td>
<td>Zones Humanitaires Sures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: An Agenda for Peace

A/47/277 - S/24111
17 June 1992

An Agenda for Peace
Preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking and peace-keeping

Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to the statement
adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992

Introduction

1. In its statement of 31 January 1992, adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, I was invited to prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.1/

2. The United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them. The adversarial decades of the cold war made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfil. The January 1992 Summit therefore represented an unprecedented recommitment, at the highest political level, to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

3. In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". This opportunity must not be squandered. The Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.

4. I welcome the invitation of the Security Council, early in my tenure as Secretary-General, to prepare this report. It draws upon ideas and proposals transmitted to me by Governments, regional agencies, non-governmental organizations, and institutions and individuals from many countries. I am grateful for these, even as I emphasize that the responsibility for this report is my own.

To read An Agenda for Peace, the report of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the role of the United Nations in a post-Cold War world, visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ resource page:

Appendix C: Past Peacekeeping Missions

For information about past peacekeeping missions, visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ resource page:

Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions

» Looking for statistics or other data about peacekeeping around the world today? Visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ resource page for the most up-to-date information about current peacekeeping operations and other UN missions: <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/>.
About the Author: Professor Sunil V. Ram

Originally from the UK, Professor Ram resides in Toronto, Canada. He presently teaches Military History and Land Warfare to the US Armed Forces at American Military University, in West Virginia. He is also the Contributing Editor of SITREP, the private defence journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. He has served in the Canadian Forces (CF) as both a soldier and officer between 1980 and 1999. Professor Ram is also one of Canada's acknowledged experts in the fields of peacekeeping, military affairs, and the Middle East. He has over a decade worth of experience as a military advisor with the Saudi Royal Family, including involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and the Yemeni conflict in the 1990s.

Professor Ram has won a number of awards over the years, including the UN Global Citizen Award, which was presented to him in 1995 by the UN, the UNAC, and the Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the UN for the furthering of world peace through public awareness of peacekeeping. He is an active member of a number of prestigious Canadian think tanks and organizations, the most important being The Royal Canadian Military Institute, where he sits on the Defence Studies Committee.

Professor Ram has also published and presented numerous articles and books over the years and has contributed occasional columns on military affairs for Canada's national newspaper, the Globe and Mail. Professor Ram has also dedicated his time to a number of private, non-NGO supported development projects in Africa that have directly helped local populations in numerous ways. These include work in the DRC and Somalia.
About the Author: F.T. Liu

Mr. F. T. Liu was a graduate of the Institute of Political Science of Paris and the faculty of Sciences (mathematics) of the University of Paris. He joined the United Nations Secretariat at the beginning of 1949, where he worked for 37 years until December 1986. During most of this period, he was assigned to the Office of Special Political Affairs, where he played an important role in the organization and development of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In addition to his regular assignments at United Nations Headquarters, he took part in many United Nations peacekeeping and political missions overseas, particularly in the 1960s. From 1970 to 1986, Mr. Liu worked mainly at UN Headquarters. As Director, and later Assistant Secretary-General, for Special Political Affairs, he assisted the Secretary-General in managing and supervising UN peacekeeping operations and related peacekeeping missions.

Following his retirement from the United Nations, Mr. Liu taught as a visiting professor at the University of Nice in France. Throughout the final years of his life, F.T. Liu remained active through his writing, teaching, and association with the International Peace Academy, of which he acted as Senior Advisor. In 2001, he died in New York at the age of 81.
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination

Format and Material

The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.

» Access the exam from your Online Classroom by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/courses/> and clicking the title to this course. Once you arrive at the course page, click the red "Start Exam" button.

Time Limit

There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The "Save" button is located at the bottom of the exam, next to the "Submit my answers" button. Clicking on the "Submit my answers" button will end the exam.

Passing Grade

To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade, and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be awarded a Certificate of Completion.

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• Stay connected with POTI by visiting our community page and engaging with other students through social media and sharing photos from your mission. Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/community> for more. Once you pass your exam, see your name featured on the Honour Roll as well.