Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations

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Cover Photo: UN Photo #171677 by Stuart Price. Brigadier General Bala Keita (fifth from left), military commander of the Western Sector of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), talks with the Arab nomads, following a consultation meeting. 16 March 2008.

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This course provides an overview of the theory and practice of civil-military coordination within the full spectrum of peace operations proffered in the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) and explained in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) and UN Security Council Resolution 2086 on “multidimensional peacekeeping”. As such, it reviews the dialogue and interface among the military, civilian, and police components of a peace operation with respect to political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and other dimensions of the same operation to attain larger, more strategic political goals. This may be in the conduct of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or “conflict management” conditions.

Often misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that is essentially about managing interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process. It is also about the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to civilian dominance of that process. Civil-military coordination is essential to any complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict.

UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) officers are military officers responsible for the military part of interactions among civilian, police, and military components of an integrated UN field mission in a peace operations environment. They must work effectively with UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), Civil Affairs, and Political Affairs officers, as well as many others working in the civil-military coordination context. They also need to understand the roles and functions of development and peacebuilding actors, including UN Police, in order to facilitate and coordinate support from the peacekeeping force to others in the mission, non-mission actors, and the local community, as appropriate.

This course is designed for multiple audiences. For UN-CIMIC officers, it serves as an introduction to the basics of civil-military coordination within a wider UN peace operations context and as a field reference. For UN and non-UN civilian, police, and military personnel, it provides instruction on civil-military coordination in general. This is to facilitate greater interoperability while respecting the integrity and equities among disparate multilateral, regional, national, and local organizations working for a common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations. This includes in particular primary UN mission partners such as CMCoord, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs officers, UN Police, and Military Experts on Mission, as well as those involved in security and safety; rule of law; logistics; and other mission, agency, and organizational leadership functions.

As both theory and practice, this course is laid out in two informal parts. The first part (Lessons 1-4) explains the concepts and principles of civil-military coordination mainly from a wider full-spectrum UN peace operations context, with particular attention given to military support to humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. The second part (Lessons 5-8) goes into the practical application of these strategic ideas at the operational and tactical levels. These lessons pay particular attention to
civil-military relations and transition management through civil assistance (including the protection of civilians and coordination with police) and joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and project management. The final part (Lesson 9) is a review of civil-military coordination as an exercise in adaptive leadership and communication.

This course is a natural progression from the original 2008 POTI course, *Civil-Military Coordination*, as well as the 2012 course titled *UN Civil-Military Coordination*. This edition is based on best practices obtained from various UN field missions, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Integrated Training Service, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and other sources. It was also developed with knowledge of the *Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum* by the international Civil Society Consortium and available through the Peace Portal.

A course of this nature can never cover all potential variations, especially in a fast-changing and dynamic environment. This course focuses on the broad application of concepts, principles, and policies. However, special care has been taken to provide as much practical guidance as possible for those working in the field. The course also provides examples of civil-military structures and operations from a number of UN missions. Ultimately, it is up to each civil-military practitioner to interpret and apply the general knowledge in the course to his or her own mission context.

As a minimum, we strongly suggest students new to UN peace operations to first take the POTI core courses, *Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations* and *Introduction to the UN System* in order to better understand and utilize this course. Please also consider the POTI courses and other training resources referenced at the end of each lesson for greater understanding of related subject matter.

We will add updated references and additional sources to the online classroom. We also welcome any comments, corrections, suggestions, and contributions of examples and case studies from those who have taken and applied this course. We would like to thank those who have already contributed, as well as our colleagues in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), OCHA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and many other UN agencies. We would also like to express our gratitude to those in UN and African peace operations and many organizations and individual experts, among them the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, for their assistance with evaluating and refining the original and revised UN-CIMIC courses.

Last but certainly not least, we dedicate this course to the many civilian, police, and military professionals, past and present, who have served and sacrificed in the cause of peace, in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, as stated in the preamble to the UN Charter.

-Christopher Holshek and Cedric de Coning, December 2016
Method of Study

This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:

- Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course material. Notice the lesson and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
- The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
- Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
- Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
- At the end of each lesson, take the Practice Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by re-reading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
- After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

» Access your online classroom at <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login> from virtually anywhere in the world.

- Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
- A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.

Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

- Access to all of your courses;
- A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
- Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course supplements;
- The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course; and
- Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
The need for better civil-military coordination is driven by the complexity of the peace operations environment, as well as growing demand and increasingly limited resources.

In this lesson »

Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force
Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination

Lesson Objectives »

• Understand what civil-military coordination is and what it is not.
• Explain how international laws and criteria on the use of force apply to civil-military coordination.
• Distinguish among major international civil-military approaches.
Introduction

Civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach, is essentially about managing interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process and managing the transition from conflict to peace. Civil-military coordination is often misconstrued as “public affairs”. In reality, it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform.

Civil-military coordination is the dialogue and interface among the civilian, police, and military components of a peace operation with respect to political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and other dimensions of the operation. This dialogue and interface can help attain larger, more strategic political
goals related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, as well as humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or "conflict management" conditions. As such, it is a subset and a synonym for the coordination of an integrated UN field mission.

Effective civil-military coordination contributes to the mission mandate and its “exit strategy”, primarily in the eventual departure of intervening military forces by fulfilling the mandate. In other words, it attempts to help transition the military out of the mission environment at minimal human, financial, and physical costs.

The need for better civil-military coordination is driven by the complexity of the peace operations environment, as well as growing demand and increasingly limited resources. These resources include donor funding and peacekeepers from troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs). In this regard, it is an exercise in the military principle of economy of force or effort.

Many TCC/PCCs and mission staff officers with mission coordination responsibilities are not prepared for this vital undertaking, which hampers the interoperability and integrity of different organizations working for a common purpose as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated peace operations. This course is intended to help fill that gap.

**Section 1.1  The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination**

**A Nexus of Conflict Management**

Civil-military coordination is as old as peace and war. In Julius Caesar’s *Gallic Wars*, the political and military spheres were intertwined in civil-military government, as in ancient Persia, India, and China. Many aspects of the medieval European codes of chivalry and Japanese bushido were rules on how warriors were to interact with civilians — politically and socially. Conflict, one must remember, is above all a political undertaking.

As war became deadlier on a mass scale in the mid-19th century, organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross formed to deal with wounded warriors and the impact of battle on civilian populations. The international norms for civil-military interaction, including military, government, and humanitarian responsibilities commanders had toward populations in territories they occupied, became codified in the Hague Conventions of 1908 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The First World War was the last major conflict in which the majority of casualties were military. The Second World War was the first conflict in which the majority of those who suffered were civilians. Since then, most victims of conflicts both large and small have been civilians.

After 1945 and especially after the Cold War, the United Nations, its agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increased in number and capacity. At the same time, military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination grew as military forces saw more frequent involvement in humanitarian assistance and operations between peace and war. The lines between the activities of civilian and military organizations began to blur, requiring greater coordination between them.

By the 21st century, "security" had taken on a new meaning. With violent conflict occurring more within or beyond the control of States than between them, the concept of "human security" emerged. In its 1994 *Human Development Report*, the UN Development Programme identified the security of communities and resilience of civil society as the keys to peace and stability. The democratization of
both peace and violence occurred as technology and globalization distributed power once exclusive to States into the hands of individuals and networks, licit and illicit. Unlike conventional national security’s fixation with threats, human security’s concern is with the drivers of conflict and instability — the difference between treating symptoms and curing the disease, or preventing its outbreak in the first place. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention have grown as civil-military enterprises in response to this paradigm shift. The UN’s approach to human security, being people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented, is articulated in its *Human Security Handbook*.

All this time, the impetus and demand for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches in international interventions have likewise grown. As the capacities for humanitarian response and the promotion of peace and civil society lay increasingly with civilian entities, including rule-of-law instruments such as police, civil-military coordination has equally developed as a nexus of conflict management. Many civilian and military actors are realizing it is more than incidental to operations that are increasingly integrated. In reality, this has always been the case.

Viewed strategically, two imperatives drive the need for better mission coordination and civil-military coordination in peace operations. First, the complexity of the peace operations environment requires greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities, because of their cross-cutting impacts and interdependency. Second, increasingly limited resources in the face of growing demand means that we must do more with less. We must use our available resources (including funding and peacekeepers) more judiciously, efficiently, and effectively. In other words, we must not only better manage conflict itself, but also the ways and means by which we manage peace.

**What Civil-Military Coordination Is and Is Not**

Widely misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach, is essentially about the management of the interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process, as well as the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to
civilian dominance of that process. In a peace operations context, it is the dialogue and interface among the military and civilian and police components of a peace operation. As such, it is the nexus of any complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform — and thus a subset and a synonym for the coordination of a complex, integrated UN field mission.

Civil-military coordination is an exercise in strategic management, regardless of level, whose operators must be able to “think globally and act locally” (or think strategically while acting tactically) and leverage the comparative advantages of each component or partner in order to maximize stakeholders in and minimize spoilers to the peace process in the right manner and time. Focusing on drivers of conflict and instability rather than threats is more effective. Many of these drivers are in the security sector and the civil-military relationship in societies. In this regard, as the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) noted, rather than military and technical engagements, “political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of UN peace operations.” This invokes both the democratic principle of the primacy of civil authority, as well as what some military philosophers have said about war as an extension of policy. In essence, civil-military coordination is the applied civil-military relationship in civil society — a continuous dialogue in problem-solving, innovation, and expectations management, regardless of “phase”.

One way to visualize this management process is its application in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), depicted in Figure 1. The idea is to move the military (in red) to the rear of the overall peace process, assuming an increasingly minor, less visible, and more indirect role. This is achieved by working by, with, and through external civilian (in yellow) and local (in green) partners in an enabling process of helping to build the capacity and confidence essential to self-sustainable peace.

The process of enabling external civilian and local (or internal) partners, respectively, is also known as “civilianizing” and “localizing”.¹ Civilianizing and localizing may be done simultaneously, but the most important relationship is to work by, with, and through civilian partners to improve local capacity and confidence and enable the withdrawal of the military peacekeeping force. While this general civil-military approach is ideal for transitioning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is also appropriate for supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as conflict prevention.

¹) This is explored in greater detail in Lesson 4.
More than managing the links between peace and security, drivers and threats, and strategy and tactics, this process is also a form of adaptive leadership. It is about persuasion, collaboration, and partnership as much as coercion and command-and-control. Civil-military coordination is a people-centred learning endeavour. Moreover, civil-military leadership is done mostly by example. Evoking the adage “actions speak louder than words”, the personal behaviour of peacekeepers — guided by the UN Code of Conduct — counts more than anything else. One cannot simply talk about human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, respect for others, and other such issues. One must also demonstrate commitment to these principles and values. This gives every peacekeeper from every component an inherent role in the civil-military mission, hence the learning approach to civil-military leadership and its power of example.

Given the importance and complexity of their general mandate, civil-military coordination specialists must be among the best of their kind with superior assessment, planning, and project management capabilities. Beyond thinking and acting strategically and adaptively, they must contend with numerous policy and operational frameworks and communicate and work effectively in both civilian and military worlds. They must be effective speakers and writers, and they must have a minimum set of skills in negotiation and mediation. Civil-military coordination is, ultimately, more a mind set than a skill set.

As an exercise in adaptive leadership, civil-military coordination is also fundamentally about partnership. What binds all three components — civilian, police, and military — is a sense of public service to three constituents: the international community the UN mission represents, the contributing countries, and the host nation and local community. This way of viewing the mission is important to building the capacity and confidence of local partners and instilling the same sense of unity of purpose to their three components. Put another way, it is leadership by example.

The HIPPO Report calls for a “more inclusive peace and security partnership” that “leverages comparative advantages” of all those involved. Although it focuses on the partnership between the UN and regional organizations, the principles of cooperation identified in the report could just as well be applied to civil-military coordination on a more operational level:

- Consultative decision making and common strategy;
- Division of labour based on respective comparative advantage;
- Joint analysis, planning, monitoring, and evaluation; and
- An integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention and transparency, accountability, and respect for international standards.

Because civil-military coordination is a tool for managing partnerships and transition in peace operations, “winning hearts and minds” is discouraged. In fact, a public relations approach is often counterproductive because it is short-term and limited in effect — it is more tactical than strategic, and more about external than internal actors. In addition to the significant dangers and risks it presents, especially to humanitarian partners, “winning hearts and minds” reinforces rather than reduces local dependency for services for which the military is inappropriate and cannot sustain, thus encumbering the “exit strategy”. It also risks the perception that the force is taking sides in the conflict, compromising the peacekeeping principle of impartiality, along with the mission’s credibility.
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force

In order to understand civil-military coordination in peace operations as the applied civil-military relationship in civil society, one must understand the international legal frameworks and criteria for the use of force established through civilian political decisions.

The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations

The legal authority of the UN as the international body responsible for global peace and security derives from Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that the purpose of the UN is:

...to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Article 33 states:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Although Chapter VI does not specifically refer to the deployment of troops to monitor or supervise ceasefires or peace agreements, most traditional peace operations missions were authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI and are referred to as Chapter VI missions. These missions are only authorized to use minimum force — in other words, to only use force in self-defence or defence of the mandate.

Chapter VII of the Charter, however, provides for enforcement powers, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine threats to the peace, make recommendations, or decide what measures need to be taken to restore international peace and security. Article 41 deals with enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to take any action necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Most Security Council resolutions do not refer to a specific chapter in the UN Charter when authorizing a mission, but most analysts agree that any mandate beyond self-defence (under Article 51) derives its authority from the powers included in Chapter VII. If a peace operation mission is authorized to use "all necessary means to protect civilians" (or similar wording to that effect), it is generally regarded as having some Chapter VII powers. Most recent peace operations have Chapter VII mandates. This has,
to a large degree, added to the confusion in terminology between what constitutes “peace operations” as opposed to “peace enforcement”, “stabilization”, or “conflict management”.

The UN Charter remains relevant to any discussion and analysis of peace operations and civil-military coordination in peace operations. No matter how peace operations adapt, they have to remain true to the spirit, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII, as well as to the laws of war in the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law.

**International Criteria on the Use of Force**

Another trend is the new, more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary complex UN peace operations are still grounded in and characterized by the core principles of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice have developed considerably.

In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, a policy document also known as the “Capstone Doctrine”. The document reaffirms and provides a contemporary understanding of the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.

**Consent** by the parties to the peace or ceasefire agreement is a dynamic and multilayered concept. It is essential for mission success and must be constantly managed, but it is understood that it may often be lacking at the tactical level.

**Impartiality** means that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice to the parties to the peace agreement. It should not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality, in the peacekeeping context, refers to non-interference. If the UN mission is mandated to take action — for instance, to protect civilians — it will interfere according to its mandate. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping missions are often said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the mission will not take sides, but it will act against any party that is in breach of its mandate.

The **non-use of force** implies that a UN peace operation will use the minimum force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is also now understood that UN peace operations
should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including threats against those it has been mandated to protect.

The Capstone Doctrine uses the concept of “robust peacekeeping” to recognize that the use of force at the tactical level may be necessary, when authorized to do so by the Security Council, to defend the mission and its mandate from spoilers, and to protect civilians.

In addition to the peacekeeping principles, the 2004 Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identifies five basic criteria that the Security Council should always address when authorizing the use of force:

- **Seriousness of threat**: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of force?
- **Proper purpose**: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question?
- **Last resort**: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
- **Proportional means**: Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
- **Balance of consequences**: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse than the consequences of inaction?

These criteria emphasize clear purpose and appropriate limitations on the use of force, with careful consideration of consequences. Just as in rules of engagement applying to the use of deadly force, these are the kinds of considerations that practitioners of civil-military coordination should foremost take into account.

The Capstone Doctrine also stresses three other success factors: **legitimacy**, **local ownership**, and **credibility**. The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping is derived from its unique position in international law, the UN Charter, and UN Security Council authorization. This legitimacy is rightly seen as one of the key assets — and comparative advantages — of UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations can lose legitimacy when perceived to be serving national or regional interests, and when it fails to secure local ownership.

A peace process cannot be consolidated if it is not locally owned and the host nation cannot assume responsibility for its own governance. It is difficult, however, to achieve meaningful local ownership during the period of an armed international intervention. In reality, most UN missions and other international actors often undermine local ownership during such periods by, for example, employing local professionals who should have been serving in government or in local civil society organizations. The HIPPO Report argues for a more people-centred approach to peace operations and recommends community engagement at every level, such as analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation. Community engagement can be achieved in a variety of ways, like perception surveys and regular forums for interaction and feedback from local residents. For example, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) could appoint an advisory board made up of leaders from the community, including prominent religious, academic, and other civil society personalities, and regularly consult them on the peace operation’s plans or get their feedback on ongoing or past campaigns. The point is to
judge the effectiveness of the mission on the impact it is having on ordinary people — do they feel safer, or is their trust in the justice system decreasing?

It is challenging but critical to also maintain credibility — a critical success factor — throughout the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation. Missions have lost credibility for a variety of reasons, from an inability to meet expectations of local communities, to sexual abuse and exploitation committed by some peacekeepers. For this reason, civil-military coordination, at its base level, must be leadership by example.

The Capstone Doctrine recognizes that, while UN peacekeeping operations are meant to support the peace process, they cannot deliver peace on their own. The Capstone Doctrine thus understands and accepts that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger peacebuilding process. In this larger context, the core business of UN peacekeeping is threefold. First, missions should create a secure and stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the State to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and for human rights. Second, UN peacekeeping operations should facilitate the political process by promoting and enabling dialogue on peace, security, and reconciliation, and support the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. Third, they should provide a framework for ensuring that the UN family as a whole, along with other international actors, pursues its activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

However, in the 21st century, the context for collective security and the use of force with respect to the UN Charter has changed. With the blurring of lines between State and non-State actors and combatants, the distribution of power, and the rise of human (versus State) security invoking the protection of (often traumatized) civilians as well as conflict prevention, peace operations have become more complex.

While it acknowledges that UN peace operations may find themselves, to some extent, involved in stabilization or conflict management roles — and only with respect to deterring further escalation of violence, containing the conflict, protecting civilians, and reviving the peace process, the HIPPO Report provides clear guidance on the use of force under more robust circumstances:
Peacekeeping operations are but one tool at the disposal of the Security Council and they should perform a circumscribed set of roles. In this regard, the Panel believes that UN troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations. Extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be exceptional, time-limited and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a whole. Where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations it is important for UN peacekeeping operations to maintain a clear division of labour and distinction of roles.2

With respect to the continued relevance of the peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force, the HIPPO panel

...is convinced of their importance in guiding successful UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, these principles must be interpreted progressively and with flexibility in the face of new challenges, and they should never be an excuse for failure to protect civilians or to defend the mission proactively.

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All of this has critical implications for civil-military coordination. The legitimacy and credibility of the presence and activities of peacekeeping forces are critically important to conflict transformation, particularly in the engagement of local civilian partners and populations. This is why the principles offered below — especially the primacy of civilian authority — reflect the civil-military relationship legitimized in democratic societies. This not only ensures the appropriate application of military power operationally, but also substantiates the moral and legal standing of the peace operation, and encourages partner and host nation security forces to emulate this important relationship.

**Some Operative Principles of Civil-Military Coordination**

Below are some suggested operative principles that practitioners of civil-military coordination in peace operations may consider applying, regardless of mission or circumstances. They are mindful of the integrated UN peace operations mission model and are drawn in good part from the international legal framework for peace operations and criteria for the use of force, as well as the principles of peacekeeping and the *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)* Policy of November 2010.

- **The Primacy of Civilian Authority**: Civilian authority is paramount in UN missions. The SRSG is responsible for overseeing the operations of the entire mission in support of the peace process. The Head of Military Component (HOMC), also known as the Force Commander, is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of military operations. In an integrated mission, the Force Commander functions under the authority of the SRSG.

- **The Military is Supporting and Not Supported**: The division of labour, as explained in the UN-CIMIC Policy, is as follows: Delivery of a secure environment is primarily a military function, while support to the political process and long-term social stability (including through delivery of rule of law, governance, humanitarian assistance, and development) are primarily civilian functions. The force takes the lead role in security, but plays a supporting — and never a supported — role to civilian-led or police mandated tasks. As such, it must have a solid understanding of the civilian effort, of the political and social context within which it takes place, and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution.

- **The Military as Enabler**: The essential aim of civil-military coordination is to maximize and exploit opportunities for the military to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners — especially the host nation government and local communities — to accelerate the peace process and bring about the mission end state. Beyond the primary role of delivering a secure environment, this is largely done by helping to build the capacity of and confidence in both international (or external) and local (or internal) civilian partners with respect to their organizational comparative advantages. These include planning, coordination, intelligence, logistics, training, etc. This also facilitates the eventual departure of military forces, commonly known as the “end state”. In other words, the ultimate purpose of civil-military coordination is to help work the military force out of its job.

- **Indirect versus Direct Support**: To minimize dependency on the force, and to promote locally-led and locally-owned solutions, UN-CIMIC activities should be indirect. That is, civil-military coordination should be conducted in support of and through UN and other international
or external civilian partners, serving as a “multiplier” or catalyst to civilian-led efforts to improve local capacity and confidence. Direct civil assistance should only be used in cases of dire need and as an option of last resort, i.e. when there is no police or civilian alternative available, or when the need is so urgent that immediate action is required. Military support to peace operations should focus on building local capacities and confidence, with the aim of transitioning its support to civilian partner management and local self-sustainability — otherwise known as civilianizing and localizing.

- **Managing Civil-Military Interaction and Transition**: Civil-military coordination is done along two lines. The first is to manage the operational and tactical interaction (or relationship) between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operations. The second is to maximize the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area in order to facilitate transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Civil-military coordination is, thus, a strategic leadership and management function within the context of the peace operation.

### Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination

**The United Nations: Two Complementary Concepts for Civil-Military Coordination**

Peace operations do not take place in isolation and will always require some form of coordination between the peace operation itself and other actors in the country in which the peace operation is deployed. In the past, civil-military coordination was primarily a liaison task. It has now developed into a dedicated and specialized function considered a critical factor in the success of contemporary humanitarian assistance and complex peace operations. This is the main reason why the UN has developed two recognized, complementary frameworks for civil-military coordination — Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) and UN-CIMIC.

**UN-CMCoord** is the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concept that refers to humanitarian civil-military coordination. According to the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, UN-CMCoord is "the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.”

The key coordination elements in natural disasters and complex emergencies are information sharing, task division, and planning. The scope and modus operandi of these key elements will change with the context and with the focus of the five CMCoord tasks:

1. Establish and sustain dialogue with military forces;
2. Establish a mechanism for information exchange and humanitarian action with military forces and other armed groups;
3. Assist in negotiations in critical areas of humanitarian-military interaction;

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3) CMCoord is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 3.
4. Support development and dissemination of context-specific guidance for the interaction of the humanitarian community with the military; and

5. Monitor activity of military forces and ensure positive impact on humanitarian communities.

**UN-CIMIC** is a military staff function that facilitates the interface between the military, police, and civilian components of a UN mission, as well as between the military force and all other civilians in the mission area. According to the UN-CIMIC Policy, the primary role of the military component of a UN peace operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. A secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives.

The UN-CIMIC Policy also points out that UN military forces undertake UN-CIMIC for two reasons:

- To manage the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operation; and
- To support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.
The two core tasks of UN-CIMIC are civil-military liaison and information-sharing and civil assistance. Civil-military liaison and information-sharing relates to the first management function of UN-CIMIC (civil-military interaction). Civil assistance relates to the second management function of UN-CIMIC (transition management), including mission and community support. It is important to note that the work of UN-CIMIC officers will focus primarily on liaison and information sharing.

UN-CIMIC is conducted by military staff and contingents in peace operations at operational (mission HQ or national) and tactical (sector HQ and units, or provincial and local) levels. Coordination encompasses activities undertaken and/or facilitated by military components of UN integrated missions across the full spectrum of UN peace operations, particularly as part of integrated assessments, analysis, planning, execution, and monitoring and evaluation.

National civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted by TCC/PCC contingents as long as they conform with or do not contravene the principles of peacekeeping, the laws and principles on the use of force, and UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC policies and guidelines as they apply to the mission mandate and situation at hand.

African Union Peace Operations and Civil-Military Coordination

Although the UN is ultimately responsible for international peace and security, cooperation with regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America help the UN carry out its responsibility more efficiently and effectively than it could on its own. Such cooperation also builds local capacity and ownership, helping to prevent future conflicts.

Three considerations explain the importance of regional approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding:

- Conflicts are rarely isolated within State borders;

4) This discussed is in greater detail in Lesson 6.
5) This is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 7.
6) The role and responsibilities of UN-CIMIC is articulated in the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) Policy of November 2010, which is available in full through the student classroom.
• Those who are closer to the problem are often in a better position to understand and influence it; and
• Their proximity ensures that they have a long-term interest in its outcomes.

The most important regional relationship for the UN is its relationship with the African Union (AU). African capacities are an important resource for UN peacekeeping. In 2015, African countries contributed approximately 50 per cent of all uniformed UN peacekeepers, 60 per cent of its international civilian peacekeepers, and 80 per cent of its national peacekeeping staff. UN support is also a critical enabler for AU operations, as the UN has provided some form of support to all AU peace operations to date. The UN is also an important exit strategy partner for the AU, as all AU peace operations to date have been handed over to the UN once sufficient stability has been achieved. The effectiveness of UN and AU peace operations is interdependent on several levels.

The African Standby Force (ASF) »

Launched in 2003, the ASF plans to provide for five sub-regional standby arrangements, each up to brigade size, which will supply the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15-20,000 troops. Each regional arrangement will include between 300 and 500 military observers who are trained and ready to deploy on 14 days’ notice, a police standby capacity of at least 240 individual officers and two company-strength police units (gendarmarie), and approximately 60 civilian experts. The ASF should enable the AU to deploy two complex peace operations simultaneously.

There will also be a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

The AU has the right to intervene in a Member State under certain grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and threats to legitimate order — in order to restore peace and stability.

It is highly likely one will find an AU Special Political Mission alongside any UN peacekeeping operation in Africa. Likewise, alongside any AU peace operation, one is likely to find a UN Special Political Mission. UN and AU CIMIC officers and others responsible for coordination and liaison tasks need to be familiar with each other’s organizations, as the UN and AU are likely to be in some form of strategic partnership in any operation in Africa.

As of the end of 2016, the AU had deployed five major peace operations. The first was to Burundi in 2003, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was replaced in 2004 with a United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The second was the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, which became the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. A third operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was deployed in the beginning of 2007 and is still ongoing. It is now the largest peace operation in Africa. A fourth operation, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed in January 2013, and transferred to the UN in mid-2013 to become the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The fifth operation, the African-led International Support Mission to the Central Africa
Republic (MISCA), was established in December 2013. It was handed over to the UN in September 2014 and is now the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

**AU Coordination Structures and Processes**

The AU Commission acts as the secretariat for the political structures of the African Union. The Commission is led by the Chairperson of the AU Commission (the AU counterpart of the UN Secretary-General).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the highest decision-making body in the AU and is responsible for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. The PSC has the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace operations. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is responsible for the overall planning and management of AU peace operations. The Peace Support Operations Division, situated within the Peace and Security Department, is responsible for the day-to-day management of AU peace operations.

The mission-level or operational management structure will be informed by the mandate of the mission. It typically consists of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCC, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support. The exact number of civilian personnel, their seniority, and the structure of the various civilian components necessary will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission.

The Office of the SRCC has the overall responsibility for the multidimensional coherence and coordination of the mission. It has the capacity to coordinate all elements of the mission’s mandate and is supported by a senior mission management team.

When the size of a mission’s area of responsibility (AOR) is so large that it cannot be managed efficiently with one headquarters, the mission will divide the AOR into multiple sectors and create an integrated Sector Headquarters for each. The Sector HQ will be headed by a civilian Head of Sector (HOS) who reports directly to the SRCC. The HOS facilitates coordination among the sector level components. The HOSs report to their respective chains of command for operational purposes, with due consideration to sector-level coordination.

AU peace operations, like AMISOM, have a CIMIC cell in the Force Headquarters, as well as Sector Headquarters of similar size and function at UN peace operations. The AU generally uses the same

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**African Standby Force Mission Scenarios »**

1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission;
2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission;
3. AU/regional stand-alone observer mission;
4. AU/regional traditional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions;
5. AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers, an enduring feature of many current conflicts; or
6. AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (peace enforcement).
CIMIC policy and approach followed by the UN (UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC). Again, as with all UN-mandated missions, national civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted as long as they fall within the laws, principles, and guidelines set by the UN on peace operations and the use of force, and UN-CMCoord/UN-CIMIC in particular.

**NATO and European Union Civil-Military Concepts**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition-type operations are typically deployed in a contested environment as peace enforcement operations. They are often deployed where there is still considerable hostility by factions against a peace agreement, for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan. They are also generally deployed as a military force with a separate mandate and identity from the UN or other international or regional groups that may be active in conflict-prevention, peacemaking, or peacebuilding in the same country.

Civil-military approaches in NATO and European Union (EU) doctrine are motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legally mandated entity and the civilian actors in their area of operations. Civil-military coordination in the context of UN peace operations is motivated by the need to maximize coordination between the military component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission, between the military component and the rest of the UN system, and between the military component of the UN mission and other non-UN external and internal civilian actors in the same mission area.

For NATO, a “comprehensive approach” is required to address a complex strategic environment that involves multiple ethnic, religious, ideological, and capability drivers. These drivers require sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters, or humanitarian catastrophes. These solutions are impossible to achieve by military means alone. The military must enhance the abilities of civilian agencies to fill the humanitarian gap through Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). CMI is a general term for the overarching process of military and civilian actors engaging at various levels (strategic, operational, tactical), and covering the whole spectrum of interactions in today’s challenges, complex emergencies, and operations. These are a combination of short-term crisis response and stabilization with long-term assistance and reconstruction activities under a CMI framework.

CIMIC (meaning civil-military cooperation) is the military function integral to multidimensional operations, linking all cooperating parties and facilitating mutual civil-military support in order to reach the mission end state for the best of the local population, the civil actors, and the Alliance. It enables the military end state by coordinating and synchronizing military activities with civil actors, bringing
together military operations with political objectives. In NATO terms, this enables the transition from offensive or defensive operations to security and stability operations, creating an environment where Alliance forces can leave the area much sooner.

The NATO definition of CIMIC is:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

For NATO, the core CIMIC functions are grouped into three broad areas that together comprise the total CIMIC contribution in support of the commander:

- **Civil-military liaison**, which includes establishing and maintaining liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning, and conduct of operations;
- **Support to the force**, which includes: provision of information on the civil situation, including assessment and evaluation of civil situation; the conduct of CIMIC activities, including CIMIC projects and quick and long-term impact projects with or without civilian partners; promoting force acceptance; influencing the civil society in the mission area; and facilitating access to civilian resources when needed; and
- **Support to civil actors and their environment**, encompassing all support provided by a military force to civilian authorities, organizations, and populations.

In addition to CIMIC staff officers in command groups at the joint task force, operational, and tactical levels (J9 or G9), NATO forces deploy CIMIC groups, CIMIC units, and CIMIC elements. These provide a structured organization for NATO forces to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the mission. Their size and deployment duration are determined by task and how quickly the appropriate civil actors and structures can be established. In addition to CIMIC staff performing a general CIMIC mission, NATO may also deploy CIMIC functional specialists to meet a specific requirement for expertise in a certain field to assist in the planning process or to conduct CIMIC projects. They may not necessarily be military personnel. Specific areas could include public infrastructure and facilities, rule of law, etc.

NATO also has a CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in the Netherlands that serves as the training centre for NATO CIMIC to help develop and deliver doctrine and operational guidance on, CIMIC planning, CIMIC centres, and CIMIC techniques, as well as training for NATO CIMIC officers, specialists, and units.

The EU calls the concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CMCO), and defines it as:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental [organizations] and agencies.
The major difference between the NATO and EU concepts is that the NATO concept is more operational, whereas the EU concept is more political-military guidance for the coordination of EU activities.

**United States: Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs**

United States forces define civil-military operations as:

> “...the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.”

US Civil Affairs forces and operations fall within civil-military operations.

Civil Affairs, which comprises largely US Army Reserve forces, traces its historical roots to military government operations in the North American frontier and newly obtained territories of the United States in the nineteenth century through the occupation of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. It is made up of designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations, which are defined as: “the actions planned, executed, and assessed by CA forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.” The core competencies and functions that Civil Affairs forces have to conduct civil affairs operations include:

» Civil Affairs activities (CAA)
  - Civil information management (CIM).
  - Civil-military operations centre (CMOC).
  - Civil engagement (CE).
  - CAO staff support.

» Military government operations (MGO)
  - Transitional military authority (TMA).
  - Support to civil administration (SCA).

» Civil Affairs supported activities (CASA)
• Nation assistance (NA).
• Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).
• Populace and resources control (PRC).
• Civil-military engagement (CME).

These lines of operation are conducted in coordination with US government agencies, intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, NGOs and civil society organizations, and the host nation.

There are nearly 10,000 Civil Affairs personnel in the US military. About 90 per cent of them are in the Army, and about 85 per cent are in the Reserves. They are particularly suited for this mission as they live in both civilian and military worlds and may draw upon expertise in civilian occupations such as law enforcement, engineering, medicine, law, banking, public administration, etc. As part of their changing mission template, Civil Affairs forces are increasingly seen in conflict prevention engagement missions to "build partnership capacity" in civil-military operations among troop-contributing countries, particularly in Africa. A handful have been posted to UN field missions.

Relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination

What the NATO, EU, and US approaches to civil-military cooperation have in common is that they see civil-military cooperation as a tool for command and control. It is something done in the service of the commander and the military mission. It is there to assist and serve the military commander in the execution of his or her military task and the achievement of the military objective.

The essential difference between these approaches and similar activities undertaken in the UN context is that UN peace operations have an integrated military, civilian, and police mandate and mission structure. The civil-military relationships between components of the peace operation and between the peace operation and the rest of the UN System are largely predetermined by the organizational structure of the specific UN peace operation. In the case of both UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord, the focus is thus on how best to manage the coordination of an established UN system.

CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legal entity, and external (external to NATO or EU) civilian role players in the same area of operations. To date, each NATO/EU operation has been unique, necessitating civil-military coordination mechanisms for each specific set of actors in each specific mission environment. UN peace operations are motivated by the need to maximize coordination among their own multidimensional components, and to establish cooperation between the UN peace operation and other actors in the peacekeeping mission area. As the same UN system actors deploy together into most missions, there has been more room to establish system-wide policies and mechanisms that can be used in a range of actual missions.

One of the most obvious differences between civil-military cooperation (as it is used in NATO CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (as it is used in the UN context) is the use of two different words, "cooperation" and "coordination".

In the UN context, cooperation is viewed as the strongest relationship that can exist between civilian, military, and police components. It is seen as a relationship where the component partners agree to synchronize their policies and activities to undertake joint action. Most often, however, the
institutional effort necessary to achieve full cooperation can only be achieved and maintained under special conditions, for a limited time, and for a specific purpose, for example, during an election. Under normal circumstances, a less intense relationship is preferred. This state is referred to in its minimal form as coexistence, especially in the humanitarian context. This normally implies that the parties to this relationship exchange information, come together for coordination meetings, and occasionally undertake some form of joint activity, for instance, a humanitarian convoy with a military escort. Regardless of whether there is open cooperation or only limited coexistence, some amount of coordination is required. Coordination in the UN context can therefore range on a scale from cooperation in its maximum state to coexistence in its minimum state.

Coordination

Nevertheless, there are some complementarities, if not compatibilities, among these civil-military approaches. These major international players are realizing the complex landscape that impacts their approaches to civil-military coordination; the simultaneous nature of everything from conflict prevention to conflict management to peacebuilding; and the need for comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches. The key for any civil-military practitioner in international peace operations is to become familiar enough with these various approaches to facilitate greater interoperability in general while protecting the integrity of numerous multilateral, regional, and national organizations working for a common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations.

In many ways, civil-military coordination is more a mind set than a skill set, and is the application of common-sense wisdom.

Conclusion

In this lesson, we covered:

- The nature of civil-military coordination in international peace operations — what it is and what it is not — and an understanding of how it applies in today’s peace and security landscape;
- How the nature and base principles of civil-military coordination are drawn from international laws and criteria on the use of force; and
- Comparative civil-military approaches and their relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination, including UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC.
Some Civil-Military Coordination Rules of Thumb

- Civil-military coordination is more a mindset than a skill-set.
- Build relationships and promote dialogue among unlikely partners.
- It’s not about us; it’s about them.
- Civilianize – work by, with, and through external civil partners.
- Support the establishment and expansion of “humanitarian space”, try to “do no harm”, and consider military assets as a “last resort”.
- Fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
- “Their game plan is our game plan.”
- Localize – promote local (or internal) ownership.
- Provide assistance more indirectly than directly.
- Manage your expectations, the expectations of those you work for and with, and the expectations of those you are helping.
- Perception is often reality.
- Actions (or inactions) speak louder and longer than words.
- Your measurements are part of a bigger picture.
For additional education and training

- The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) provides e-learning courses, some of which are no-fee, which may be of use to civil-military actors. Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Conflict Series 1 – What Is Conflict?; Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.
- *Civil Society-Military-Police Handbook and Curriculum on Human Security* (March 2016), a modular training handbook done by the Civil Society Consortium available through the student classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1-3 and 5 of the Handbook. See also *Local Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches* (March 2016), in particular Chapters 2, 6, and 7, as well as the Policy Brief – Local Ownership, Coordination, and Human Security (December 2015).
- NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence courses are available at: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>. Although most of the courses are in-residence requiring funding, the CCOE offers one free online course, the NATO CMI/CIMIC Awareness Course. It also maintains links to the latest developments in CIMIC, directly or indirectly related to NATO, as well as CIMIC lessons-learned, etc.

Further References

• Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Services, United Nations, 14 October 2010. Available for download through the student classroom.


