Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations

COURSE AUTHORS
Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired)
US Army Civil Affairs

Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUPI

SERIES EDITOR
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations

Cover Photo: UN Photo #171677 by Stuart Price. Brigadier General Bala Keita (fifth from left), military commander of the Western Sector of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), talks with the Arab nomads, following a consultation meeting. 16 March 2008.

Course Authors
Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired)
US Army Civil Affairs

Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUI

Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
# Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations

## Table of Contents

**Foreword** ix  
**Method of Study** xi  

**Lesson 1** What Is Civil-Military Coordination?  
Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination 14  
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force 18  
Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination 24  

**Lesson 2** Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace Operations  
Section 2.1 The Evolution of Complex, Full Spectrum Peace Operations 42  
Section 2.2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace Operations 48  
Section 2.3 Integrated Peace Operations: Civil and Military Partners 52  
Section 2.4 Snapshot of a Peacebuilding Mission: UNMIL 63  
Section 2.5 The AMISOM Mandate 66
**Lesson 3**  **Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief** ................................................................. 76

Section 3.1  UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination .......................................................... 78

Section 3.2  Military Support Roles ............................................................................................... 88

Section 3.3  Practical Discussion – The Haiti Earthquake of 2010 ................................................ 90

**Lesson 4**  **Military Support to Peacebuilding** ................................................................. 106

Section 4.1  The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Nexus ............................................................... 108

Section 4.2  Peacebuilding Frameworks ......................................................................................... 112

Section 4.3  Peacebuilding Actors ............................................................................................... 117

Section 4.4  Civilianizing and Localizing ..................................................................................... 122

Section 4.5  Peacebuilding and Conflict Management ................................................................... 127

**Lesson 5**  **UN Mission Integration and Coordination** ..................................................... 132

Section 5.1  Coordination in a Peace Operations Context .......................................................... 134

Section 5.2  UN Mission Coordination ......................................................................................... 138

Section 5.3  UN Mission Civil-Military Coordination Structures ............................................. 143

Section 5.4  Integrated Assessment and Planning ............................................................................. 145

Section 5.5  UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities ..................................................................... 148

**Lesson 6**  **Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing** ............................................... 156

Section 6.1  What is Civil-Military Liaison? .................................................................................. 158

Section 6.2  Civil-Military Assessment and Intelligence .............................................................. 163

Section 6.3  Civil-Military Information Sharing and Information Management ..................................... 166
Lesson 7  Civil Assistance ................................................................. 174
Section 7.1  Mission Support and Community Support .......................... 176
Section 7.2  Protection of Civilians .................................................. 186
Section 7.3  Support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) and Security and Defence Sector
Reform (SSR/DSR) ...................................................................... 191
Section 7.4  Military Support to Development ................................... 198

Lesson 8  Civil-Military Planning and Project
Management .................................................................................. 208
Section 8.1  UN-CIMIC Project Management .................................... 210
Section 8.2  Quick Impact Projects .................................................. 217
Section 8.3  Civil-Military Monitoring and Evaluation ......................... 220

Lesson 9  Civil-Military Communication .......................................... 230
Section 9.1  Civil-Military Coordination and Public Information .......... 232
Section 9.2  Cross-Cultural Communication ..................................... 237
Section 9.3  Working with Interpreters ............................................ 241
Section 9.4  Negotiations and Conflict Mitigation ................................ 244
Appendices

Appendix A: Glossary and list of Acronyms ................................................................. 256
Appendix B: Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer Terms of Reference ........ 275
Appendix C: Sample Civil-Military Project Management Guidelines & Project Management Outline ................................................................. 281
Appendix D: Sample UN Mission UN-CIMIC Training and Education Plan .... 286
Appendix E: Sample UN-CIMIC Directive ................................................................. 287
Appendix F: Sample UN-CIMIC Operations Briefing .............................................. 288
Appendix G: Survey of Further Civil-Military Training & Education Resources ............................................................................................................ 289
About the Authors: Col. (retired) Christopher Holshek ...................................... 291
About the Authors: Dr. Cedric de Coning .............................................................. 292
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination .................................................. 293
Foreword

This course provides an overview of the theory and practice of civil-military coordination within the full spectrum of peace operations proffered in the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) and explained in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) and UN Security Council Resolution 2086 on “multidimensional peacekeeping”. As such, it reviews the dialogue and interface among the military, civilian, and police components of a peace operation with respect to political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and other dimensions of the same operation to attain larger, more strategic political goals. This may be in the conduct of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or “conflict management” conditions.

Often misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that is essentially about managing interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process. It is also about the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to civilian dominance of that process. Civil-military coordination is essential to any complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict.

UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) officers are military officers responsible for the military part of interactions among civilian, police, and military components of an integrated UN field mission in a peace operations environment. They must work effectively with UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), Civil Affairs, and Political Affairs officers, as well as many others working in the civil-military coordination context. They also need to understand the roles and functions of development and peacebuilding actors, including UN Police, in order to facilitate and coordinate support from the peacekeeping force to others in the mission, non-mission actors, and the local community, as appropriate.

This course is designed for multiple audiences. For UN-CIMIC officers, it serves as an introduction to the basics of civil-military coordination within a wider UN peace operations context and as a field reference. For UN and non-UN civilian, police, and military personnel, it provides instruction on civil-military coordination in general. This is to facilitate greater interoperability while respecting the integrity and equities among disparate multilateral, regional, national, and local organizations working for a common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations. This includes in particular primary UN mission partners such as CMCoord, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs officers, UN Police, and Military Experts on Mission, as well as those involved in security and safety; rule of law; logistics; and other mission, agency, and organizational leadership functions.

As both theory and practice, this course is laid out in two informal parts. The first part (Lessons 1-4) explains the concepts and principles of civil-military coordination mainly from a wider full-spectrum UN peace operations context, with particular attention given to military support to humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. The second part (Lessons 5-8) goes into the practical application of these strategic ideas at the operational and tactical levels. These lessons pay particular attention to
Civil-military relations and transition management through civil assistance (including the protection of civilians and coordination with police) and joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and project management. The final part (Lesson 9) is a review of civil-military coordination as an exercise in adaptive leadership and communication.

This course is a natural progression from the original 2008 POTI course, *Civil-Military Coordination*, as well as the 2012 course titled *UN Civil-Military Coordination*. This edition is based on best practices obtained from various UN field missions, the UN Integrated Training Service, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and other sources. It was also developed with knowledge of the *Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum* by the international Civil Society Consortium and available through the Peace Portal.

A course of this nature can never cover all potential variations, especially in a fast-changing and dynamic environment. This course focuses on the broad application of concepts, principles, and policies. However, special care has been taken to provide as much practical guidance as possible for those working in the field. The course also provides examples of civil-military structures and operations from a number of UN missions. Ultimately, it is up to each civil-military practitioner to interpret and apply the general knowledge in the course to his or her own mission context.

As a minimum, we strongly suggest students new to UN peace operations to first take the POTI core courses, *Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations* and *Introduction to the UN System* in order to better understand and utilize this course. Please also consider the POTI courses and other training resources referenced at the end of each lesson for greater understanding of related subject matter.

We will add updated references and additional sources to the online classroom. We also welcome any comments, corrections, suggestions, and contributions of examples and case studies from those who have taken and applied this course. We would like to thank those who have already contributed, as well as our colleagues in the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), OCHA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and many other UN agencies. We would also like to express our gratitude to those in UN and African peace operations and many organizations and individual experts, among them the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, for their assistance with evaluating and refining the original and revised UN-CIMIC courses.

Last but certainly not least, we dedicate this course to the many civilian, police, and military professionals, past and present, who have served and sacrificed in the cause of peace, in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, as stated in the preamble to the UN Charter.

-Christopher Holshek and Cedric de Coning,
December 2016
Method of Study

This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:

• Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course material. Notice the lesson and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.

• The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.

• Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.

• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.

• At the end of each lesson, take the Practice Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by re-reading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.

• After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

  » **Access your online classroom at**
  <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
  **from virtually anywhere in the world.**

• Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.

• A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.

**Key Features of Your Online Classroom »**

• Access to all of your courses;

• A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;

• Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course supplements;

• The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course; and

• Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
In this lesson »

Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination

Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force

Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination

Lesson Objectives »

• Understand what civil-military coordination is and what it is not.

• Explain how international laws and criteria on the use of force apply to civil-military coordination.

• Distinguish among major international civil-military approaches.

The need for better civil-military coordination is driven by the complexity of the peace operations environment, as well as growing demand and increasingly limited resources.

What Is Civil-Military Coordination?

UN Photo #192474 by Logan Abassi.
Introduction

Civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach, is essentially about managing interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process and managing the transition from conflict to peace. Civil-military coordination is often misconstrued as “public affairs”. In reality, it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform.

Civil-military coordination is the dialogue and interface among the civilian, police, and military components of a peace operation with respect to political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and other dimensions of the operation. This dialogue and interface can help attain larger, more strategic political
goals related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, as well as humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or "conflict management" conditions. As such, it is a subset and a synonym for the coordination of an integrated UN field mission.

Effective civil-military coordination contributes to the mission mandate and its “exit strategy”, primarily in the eventual departure of intervening military forces by fulfilling the mandate. In other words, it attempts to help transition the military out of the mission environment at minimal human, financial, and physical costs.

The need for better civil-military coordination is driven by the complexity of the peace operations environment, as well as growing demand and increasingly limited resources. These resources include donor funding and peacekeepers from troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs). In this regard, it is an exercise in the military principle of economy of force or effort.

Many TCC/PCCs and mission staff officers with mission coordination responsibilities are not prepared for this vital undertaking, which hampers the interoperability and integrity of different organizations working for a common purpose as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated peace operations. This course is intended to help fill that gap.

Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination

A Nexus of Conflict Management

Civil-military coordination is as old as peace and war. In Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars, the political and military spheres were intertwined in civil-military government, as in ancient Persia, India, and China. Many aspects of the medieval European codes of chivalry and Japanese bushido were rules on how warriors were to interact with civilians — politically and socially. Conflict, one must remember, is above all a political undertaking.

As war became deadlier on a mass scale in the mid-19th century, organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross formed to deal with wounded warriors and the impact of battle on civilian populations. The international norms for civil-military interaction, including military, government, and humanitarian responsibilities commanders had toward populations in territories they occupied, became codified in the Hague Conventions of 1908 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The First World War was the last major conflict in which the majority of casualties were military. The Second World War was the first conflict in which the majority of those who suffered were civilians. Since then, most victims of conflicts both large and small have been civilians.

After 1945 and especially after the Cold War, the United Nations, its agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increased in number and capacity. At the same time, military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination grew as military forces saw more frequent involvement in humanitarian assistance and operations between peace and war. The lines between the activities of civilian and military organizations began to blur, requiring greater coordination between them.

By the 21st century, "security" had taken on a new meaning. With violent conflict occurring more within or beyond the control of States than between them, the concept of "human security" emerged. In its 1994 Human Development Report, the UN Development Programme identified the security of communities and resilience of civil society as the keys to peace and stability. The democratization of
both peace and violence occurred as technology and globalization distributed power once exclusive to States into the hands of individuals and networks, licit and illicit. Unlike conventional national security’s fixation with threats, human security’s concern is with the drivers of conflict and instability — the difference between treating symptoms and curing the disease, or preventing its outbreak in the first place. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention have grown as civil-military enterprises in response to this paradigm shift. The UN’s approach to human security, being people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented, is articulated in its *Human Security Handbook*.

All this time, the impetus and demand for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches in international interventions have likewise grown. As the capacities for humanitarian response and the promotion of peace and civil society lay increasingly with civilian entities, including rule-of-law instruments such as police, civil-military coordination has equally developed as a nexus of conflict management. Many civilian and military actors are realizing it is more than incidental to operations that are increasingly integrated. In reality, this has always been the case.

Viewed strategically, two imperatives drive the need for better mission coordination and civil-military coordination in peace operations. First, the complexity of the peace operations environment requires greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities, because of their cross-cutting impacts and interdependency. Second, increasingly limited resources in the face of growing demand means that we must do more with less. We must use our available resources (including funding and peacekeepers) more judiciously, efficiently, and effectively. In other words, we must not only better manage conflict itself, but also the ways and means by which we manage peace.

**What Civil-Military Coordination Is and Is Not**

Widely misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach, is essentially about the management of the interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process, as well as the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to
Civilian dominance of that process. In a peace operations context, it is the dialogue and interface among the military and civilian and police components of a peace operation. As such, it is the nexus of any complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform — and thus a subset and a synonym for the coordination of a complex, integrated UN field mission.

Civil-military coordination is an exercise in strategic management, regardless of level, whose operators must be able to “think globally and act locally” (or think strategically while acting tactically) and leverage the comparative advantages of each component or partner in order to maximize stakeholders in and minimize spoilers to the peace process in the right manner and time. Focusing on drivers of conflict and instability rather than threats is more effective. Many of these drivers are in the security sector and the civil-military relationship in societies. In this regard, as the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) noted, rather than military and technical engagements, “political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of UN peace operations.” This invokes both the democratic principle of the primacy of civil authority, as well as what some military philosophers have said about war as an extension of policy. In essence, civil-military coordination is the applied civil-military relationship in civil society — a continuous dialogue in problem-solving, innovation, and expectations management, regardless of “phase”.

One way to visualize this management process is its application in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), depicted in Figure 1. The idea is to move the military (in red) to the rear of the overall peace process, assuming an increasingly minor, less visible, and more indirect role. This is achieved by working by, with, and through external civilian (in yellow) and local (in green) partners in an enabling process of helping to build the capacity and confidence essential to self-sustainable peace.

The process of enabling external civilian and local (or internal) partners, respectively, is also known as “civilianizing” and “localizing”.¹ Civilianizing and localizing may be done simultaneously, but the most important relationship is to work by, with, and through civilian partners to improve local capacity and confidence and enable the withdrawal of the military peacekeeping force. While this general civil-military approach is ideal for transitioning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is also appropriate for supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as conflict prevention.

¹) This is explored in greater detail in Lesson 4.
More than managing the links between peace and security, drivers and threats, and strategy and tactics, this process is also a form of adaptive leadership. It is about persuasion, collaboration, and partnership as much as coercion and command-and-control. Civil-military coordination is a people-centred learning endeavour. Moreover, civil-military leadership is done mostly by example. Evoking the adage “actions speak louder than words”, the personal behaviour of peacekeepers — guided by the UN Code of Conduct — counts more than anything else. One cannot simply talk about human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, respect for others, and other such issues. One must also demonstrate commitment to these principles and values. This gives every peacekeeper from every component an inherent role in the civil-military mission, hence the learning approach to civil-military leadership and its power of example.

Given the importance and complexity of their general mandate, civil-military coordination specialists must be among the best of their kind with superior assessment, planning, and project management capabilities. Beyond thinking and acting strategically and adaptively, they must contend with numerous policy and operational frameworks and communicate and work effectively in both civilian and military worlds. They must be effective speakers and writers, and they must have a minimum set of skills in negotiation and mediation. Civil-military coordination is, ultimately, more a mindset than a skill set.

As an exercise in adaptive leadership, civil-military coordination is also fundamentally about partnership. What binds all three components — civilian, police, and military — is a sense of public service to three constituents: the international community the UN mission represents, the contributing countries, and the host nation and local community. This way of viewing the mission is important to building the capacity and confidence of local partners and instilling the same sense of unity of purpose to their three components. Put another way, it is leadership by example.

The HIPPO Report calls for a “more inclusive peace and security partnership” that "leverages comparative advantages" of all those involved. Although it focuses on the partnership between the UN and regional organizations, the principles of cooperation identified in the report could just as well be applied to civil-military coordination on a more operational level:

- Consultative decision making and common strategy;
- Division of labour based on respective comparative advantage;
- Joint analysis, planning, monitoring, and evaluation; and
- An integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention and transparency, accountability, and respect for international standards.

Because civil-military coordination is a tool for managing partnerships and transition in peace operations, “winning hearts and minds” is discouraged. In fact, a public relations approach is often counterproductive because it is short-term and limited in effect — it is more tactical than strategic, and more about external than internal actors. In addition to the significant dangers and risks it presents, especially to humanitarian partners, “winning hearts and minds” reinforces rather than reduces local dependency for services for which the military is inappropriate and cannot sustain, thus encumbering the “exit strategy”. It also risks the perception that the force is taking sides in the conflict, compromising the peacekeeping principle of impartiality, along with the mission’s credibility.
Section 1.2  Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force

In order to understand civil-military coordination in peace operations as the applied civil-military relationship in civil society, one must understand the international legal frameworks and criteria for the use of force established through civilian political decisions.

The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations

The legal authority of the UN as the international body responsible for global peace and security derives from Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that the purpose of the UN is:

“…to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”

Chapter VI of the UN Charter “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Article 33 states:

“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

Although Chapter VI does not specifically refer to the deployment of troops to monitor or supervise ceasefires or peace agreements, most traditional peace operations missions were authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI and are referred to as Chapter VI missions. These missions are only authorized to use minimum force — in other words, to only use force in self-defence or defence of the mandate.

Chapter VII of the Charter, however, provides for enforcement powers, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine threats to the peace, make recommendations, or decide what measures need to be taken to restore international peace and security. Article 41 deals with enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to take any action necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Most Security Council resolutions do not refer to a specific chapter in the UN Charter when authorizing a mission, but most analysts agree that any mandate beyond self-defence (under Article 51) derives its authority from the powers included in Chapter VII. If a peace operation mission is authorized to use “all necessary means to protect civilians” (or similar wording to that effect), it is generally regarded as having some Chapter VII powers. Most recent peace operations have Chapter VII mandates. This has,
to a large degree, added to the confusion in terminology between what constitutes “peace operations” as opposed to “peace enforcement”, “stabilization”, or “conflict management”.

The UN Charter remains relevant to any discussion and analysis of peace operations and civil-military coordination in peace operations. No matter how peace operations adapt, they have to remain true to the spirit, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII, as well as to the laws of war in the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law.

**International Criteria on the Use of Force**

Another trend is the new, more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary complex UN peace operations are still grounded in and characterized by the core principles of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice have developed considerably.

In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, a policy document also known as the “Capstone Doctrine”.

Consent by the parties to the peace or ceasefire agreement is a dynamic and multilayered concept. It is essential for mission success and must be constantly managed, but it is understood that it may often be lacking at the tactical level.

Impartiality means that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice to the parties to the peace agreement. It should not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality, in the peacekeeping context, refers to non-interference. If the UN mission is mandated to take action — for instance, to protect civilians — it will interfere according to its mandate. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping missions are often said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the mission will not take sides, but it will act against any party that is in breach of its mandate.

---

2) As part of organizational restructuring beginning 1 January 2019, DPKO became the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) became the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).
The non-use of force implies that a UN peace operation will use the minimum force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is also now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including threats against those it has been mandated to protect.

The Capstone Doctrine uses the concept of “robust peacekeeping” to recognize that the use of force at the tactical level may be necessary, when authorized to do so by the Security Council, to defend the mission and its mandate from spoilers, and to protect civilians.

In addition to the peacekeeping principles, the 2004 Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identifies five basic criteria that the Security Council should always address when authorizing the use of force:

- **Seriousness of threat**: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of force?
- **Proper purpose**: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question?
- **Last resort**: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
- **Proportional means**: Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
- **Balance of consequences**: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse than the consequences of inaction?

These criteria emphasize clear purpose and appropriate limitations on the use of force, with careful consideration of consequences. Just as in rules of engagement applying to the use of deadly force, these are the kinds of considerations that practitioners of civil-military coordination should foremost take into account.

The Capstone Doctrine also stresses three other success factors: legitimacy, local ownership, and credibility. The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping is derived from its unique position in international law, the UN Charter, and UN Security Council authorization. This legitimacy is rightly seen as one of the key assets — and comparative advantages — of UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations can lose legitimacy when perceived to be serving national or regional interests, and when it fails to secure local ownership.

A peace process cannot be consolidated if it is not locally owned and the host nation cannot assume responsibility for its own governance. It is difficult, however, to achieve meaningful local ownership during the period of an armed international intervention. In reality, most UN missions and other international actors often undermine local ownership during such periods by, for example, employing local professionals who should have been serving in government or in local civil society organizations. The HIPPO Report argues for a more people-centred approach to peace operations and recommends community engagement at every level, such as analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation. Community engagement can be achieved in a variety of ways, like perception surveys and regular forums for interaction and feedback from local residents. For example, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) could appoint an advisory board made up of leaders from the community,
including prominent religious, academic, and other civil society personalities, and regularly consult them on the peace operation’s plans or get their feedback on ongoing or past campaigns. The point is to judge the effectiveness of the mission on the impact it is having on ordinary people — do they feel safer, or is their trust in the justice system decreasing?

It is challenging but critical to also maintain credibility — a critical success factor — throughout the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation. Missions have lost credibility for a variety of reasons, from an inability to meet expectations of local communities, to sexual abuse and exploitation committed by some peacekeepers. For this reason, civil-military coordination, at its base level, must be leadership by example.

The Capstone Doctrine recognizes that, while UN peacekeeping operations are meant to support the peace process, they cannot deliver peace on their own. The Capstone Doctrine thus understands and accepts that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger peacebuilding process. In this larger context, the core business of UN peacekeeping is threefold. First, missions should create a secure and stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the State to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and for human rights. Second, UN peacekeeping operations should facilitate the political process by promoting and enabling dialogue on peace, security, and reconciliation, and support the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. Third, they should provide a framework for ensuring that the UN family as a whole, along with other international actors, pursues its activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

However, in the 21st century, the context for collective security and the use of force with respect to the UN Charter has changed. With the blurring of lines between State and non-State actors and combatants, the distribution of power, and the rise of human (versus State) security invoking the protection of (often traumatized) civilians as well as conflict prevention, peace operations have become more complex.

While it acknowledges that UN peace operations may find themselves, to some extent, involved in stabilization or conflict management roles — and only with respect to deterring further escalation of
violence, containing the conflict, protecting civilians, and reviving the peace process, the HIPPO Report provides clear guidance on the use of force under more robust circumstances:

"Peacekeeping operations are but one tool at the disposal of the Security Council and they should perform a circumscribed set of roles. In this regard, the Panel believes that UN troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations. Extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be exceptional, time-limited and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a whole. Where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations it is important for UN peacekeeping operations to maintain a clear division of labour and distinction of roles."

With respect to the continued relevance of the peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force, the HIPPO panel

"...is convinced of their importance in guiding successful UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, these principles must be interpreted progressively and with flexibility in the face of new challenges, and they should never be an excuse for failure to protect civilians or to defend the mission proactively."

All of this has critical implications for civil-military coordination. The legitimacy and credibility of the presence and activities of peacekeeping forces are critically important to conflict transformation, particularly in the engagement of local civilian partners and populations. This is why the principles offered below — especially the primacy of civilian authority — reflect the civil-military relationship legitimized in democratic societies. This not only ensures the appropriate application of military power operationally, but also substantiates the moral and legal standing of the peace operation, and encourages partner and host nation security forces to emulate this important relationship.

**Some Operative Principles of Civil-Military Coordination**

Below are some suggested operative principles that practitioners of civil-military coordination in peace operations may consider applying, regardless of mission or circumstances. They are mindful of the integrated UN peace operations mission model and are drawn in good part from the international legal framework for peace operations and criteria for the use of force, as well as the principles of peacekeeping and the *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) Policy* of November 2010.

- **The Primacy of Civilian Authority**: Civilian authority is paramount in UN missions. The SRSG is responsible for overseeing the operations of the entire mission in support of the peace process. The Head of Military Component (HOMC), also known as the Force Commander, is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of military operations. In an integrated mission, the Force Commander functions under the authority of the SRSG.

- **The Military is Supporting and Not Supported**: The division of labour, as explained in the UN-CIMIC Policy, is as follows: Delivery of a secure environment is primarily a military function, while support to the political process and long-term social stability (including through delivery of rule of law, governance, humanitarian assistance, and development) are primarily civilian functions. The force takes the lead role in security, but plays a supporting — and never a supported — role to civilian-led or police mandated tasks. As such, it must have a solid understanding of the civilian effort, of the political and social context within which it takes place, and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution.

- **The Military as Enabler**: The essential aim of civil-military coordination is to maximize and exploit opportunities for the military to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners — especially the host nation government and local communities — to accelerate the peace process and bring about the mission end state. Beyond the primary role of delivering a secure environment, this is largely done by helping to build the capacity of and confidence in both international (or external) and local (or internal) civilian partners with respect to their organizational comparative advantages. These include planning, coordination, intelligence, logistics, training, etc. This also facilitates the eventual departure of military forces, commonly known as the “end state”. In other words, the ultimate purpose of civil-military coordination is to help work the military force out of its job.

- **Indirect versus Direct Support**: To minimize dependency on the force, and to promote locally-led and locally-owned solutions, UN-CIMIC activities should be indirect. That is, civil-military coordination should be conducted in support of and through UN and other international
or external civilian partners, serving as a “multiplier” or catalyst to civilian-led efforts to improve local capacity and confidence. Direct civil assistance should only be used in cases of dire need and as an option of last resort, i.e. when there is no police or civilian alternative available, or when the need is so urgent that immediate action is required. Military support to peace operations should focus on building local capacities and confidence, with the aim of transitioning its support to civilian partner management and local self-sustainability — otherwise known as civilianizing and localizing.

- **Managing Civil-Military Interaction and Transition**: Civil-military coordination is done along two lines. The first is to manage the operational and tactical interaction (or relationship) between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operations. The second is to maximize the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area in order to facilitate transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Civil-military coordination is, thus, a strategic leadership and management function within the context of the peace operation.

### Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination

**The United Nations: Two Complementary Concepts for Civil-Military Coordination**

Peace operations do not take place in isolation and will always require some form of coordination between the peace operation itself and other actors in the country in which the peace operation is deployed. In the past, civil-military coordination was primarily a liaison task. It has now developed into a dedicated and specialized function considered a critical factor in the success of contemporary humanitarian assistance and complex peace operations. This is the main reason why the UN has developed two recognized, complementary frameworks for civil-military coordination — Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) and UN-CIMIC.

**UN-CMCoord** is the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concept that refers to humanitarian civil-military coordination. According to the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, UN-CMCoord is "the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals."\(^4\)

The key coordination elements in natural disasters and complex emergencies are information sharing, task division, and planning. The scope and modus operandi of these key elements will change with the context and with the focus of the five CMCoord tasks:

1. Establish and sustain dialogue with military forces;

2. Establish a mechanism for information exchange and humanitarian action with military forces and other armed groups;

3. Assist in negotiations in critical areas of humanitarian-military interaction;

---

\(^4\) CMCoord is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 3.
4. Support development and dissemination of context-specific guidance for the interaction of the humanitarian community with the military; and

5. Monitor activity of military forces and ensure positive impact on humanitarian communities.

UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that facilitates the interface between the military, police, and civilian components of a UN mission, as well as between the military force and all other civilians in the mission area. According to the UN-CIMIC Policy, the primary role of the military component of a UN peace operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. A secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives.

The UN-CIMIC Policy also points out that UN military forces undertake UN-CIMIC for two reasons:

• To manage the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operation; and

• To support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.
The two core tasks of UN-CIMIC are civil-military liaison and information-sharing and civil assistance. Civil-military liaison and information-sharing relates to the first management function of UN-CIMIC (civil-military interaction).\(^5\) Civil assistance relates to the second management function of UN-CIMIC (transition management), including mission and community support.\(^6\) It is important to note that the work of UN-CIMIC officers will focus primarily on liaison and information sharing.

UN-CIMIC is conducted by military staff and contingents in peace operations at operational (mission HQ or national) and tactical (sector HQ and units, or provincial and local) levels. Coordination encompasses activities undertaken and/or facilitated by military components of UN integrated missions across the full spectrum of UN peace operations, particularly as part of integrated assessments, analysis, planning, execution, and monitoring and evaluation.

National civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted by TCC/PCC contingents as long as they conform with or do not contravene the principles of peacekeeping, the laws and principles on the use of force, and UN-CMC and UN-CIMIC policies and guidelines as they apply to the mission mandate and situation at hand.\(^7\)

**African Union Peace Operations and Civil-Military Coordination**

Although the UN is ultimately responsible for international peace and security, cooperation with regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America help the UN carry out its responsibility more efficiently and effectively than it could on its own. Such cooperation also builds local capacity and ownership, helping to prevent future conflicts.

Three considerations explain the importance of regional approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding:

- **Conflicts are rarely isolated within State borders;**

---

\(^5\) This discussed is in greater detail in Lesson 6.

\(^6\) This is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 7.

\(^7\) The role and responsibilities of UN-CIMIC are articulated in the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) policy *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)* of November 2010, which is available in full through the student classroom. As part of organizational restructuring beginning 1 January 2019, the Department of Field Support (DFS) became the Department of Operational Support (DOS).
Those who are closer to the problem are often in a better position to understand and influence it; and

Their proximity ensures that they have a long-term interest in its outcomes.

The most important regional relationship for the UN is its relationship with the African Union (AU). African capacities are an important resource for UN peacekeeping. In 2015, African countries contributed approximately 50 per cent of all uniformed UN peacekeepers, 60 per cent of its international civilian peacekeepers, and 80 per cent of its national peacekeeping staff. UN support is also a critical enabler for AU operations, as the UN has provided some form of support to all AU peace operations to date. The UN is also an important exit strategy partner for the AU, as all AU peace operations to date have been handed over to the UN once sufficient stability has been achieved. The effectiveness of UN and AU peace operations is interdependent on several levels.

The African Standby Force (ASF)

Launched in 2003, the ASF plans to provide for five sub-regional standby arrangements, each up to brigade size, which will supply the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15-20,000 troops. Each regional arrangement will include between 300 and 500 military observers who are trained and ready to deploy on 14 days’ notice, a police standby capacity of at least 240 individual officers and two company-strength police units (gendarmerie), and approximately 60 civilian experts. The ASF should enable the AU to deploy two complex peace operations simultaneously.

There will also be a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

The AU has the right to intervene in a Member State under certain grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and threats to legitimate order — in order to restore peace and stability.

As of the end of 2016, the AU had deployed five major peace operations. The first was to Burundi in 2003, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was replaced in 2004 with a United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The second was the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, which became the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. A third operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was deployed in the beginning of 2007 and is still ongoing. It is now the largest peace operation in Africa. A fourth operation, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed in January 2013, and transferred to the UN in mid-2013 to become the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The fifth operation, the African-led International Support Mission to the Central Africa
Republic (MISCA), was established in December 2013. It was handed over to the UN in September 2014 and is now the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

AU Coordination Structures and Processes

The AU Commission acts as the secretariat for the political structures of the African Union. The Commission is led by the Chairperson of the AU Commission (the AU counterpart of the UN Secretary-General).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the highest decision-making body in the AU and is responsible for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. The PSC has the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace operations. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is responsible for the overall planning and management of AU peace operations. The Peace Support Operations Division, situated within the Peace and Security Department, is responsible for the day-to-day management of AU peace operations.

The mission-level or operational management structure will be informed by the mandate of the mission. It typically consists of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCC, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support. The exact number of civilian personnel, their seniority, and the structure of the various civilian components necessary will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission.

The Office of the SRCC has the overall responsibility for the multidimensional coherence and coordination of the mission. It has the capacity to coordinate all elements of the mission’s mandate and is supported by a senior mission management team.

When the size of a mission’s area of responsibility (AOR) is so large that it cannot be managed efficiently with one headquarters, the mission will divide the AOR into multiple sectors and create an integrated Sector Headquarters for each. The Sector HQ will be headed by a civilian Head of Sector (HOS) who reports directly to the SRCC. The HOS facilitates coordination among the sector level components. The HOSs report to their respective chains of command for operational purposes, with due consideration to sector-level coordination.

AU peace operations, like AMISOM, have a CIMIC cell in the Force Headquarters, as well as Sector Headquarters of similar size and function at UN peace operations. The AU generally uses the same

African Standby Force Mission Scenarios »

1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission;
2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission;
3. AU/regional stand-alone observer mission;
4. AU/regional traditional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions;
5. AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers, an enduring feature of many current conflicts; or
6. AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (peace enforcement).
CIMIC policy and approach followed by the UN (UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC). Again, as with all UN-mandated missions, national civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted as long as they fall within the laws, principles, and guidelines set by the UN on peace operations and the use of force, and UN-CMCoord/UN-CIMIC in particular.

**NATO and European Union Civil-Military Concepts**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition-type operations are typically deployed in a contested environment as peace enforcement operations. They are often deployed where there is still considerable hostility by factions against a peace agreement, for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan. They are also generally deployed as a military force with a separate mandate and identity from the UN or other international or regional groups that may be active in conflict-prevention, peacemaking, or peacebuilding in the same country.

Civil-military approaches in NATO and European Union (EU) doctrine are motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legally mandated entity and the civilian actors in their area of operations. Civil-military coordination in the context of UN peace operations is motivated by the need to maximize coordination between the military component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission, between the military component and the rest of the UN system, and between the military component of the UN mission and other non-UN external and internal civilian actors in the same mission area.

For NATO, a “comprehensive approach” is required to address a complex strategic environment that involves multiple ethnic, religious, ideological, and capability drivers. These drivers require sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters, or humanitarian catastrophes. These solutions are impossible to achieve by military means alone. The military must enhance the abilities of civilian agencies to fill the humanitarian gap through Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). CMI is a general term for the overarching process of military and civilian actors engaging at various levels (strategic, operational, tactical), and covering the whole spectrum of interactions in today’s challenges, complex emergencies, and operations. These are a combination of short-term crisis response and stabilization with long-term assistance and reconstruction activities under a CMI framework.

CIMIC (meaning civil-military cooperation) is the military function integral to multidimensional operations, linking all cooperating parties and facilitating mutual civil-military support in order to reach the mission end state for the best of the local population, the civil actors, and the Alliance. It enables the military end state by coordinating and synchronizing military activities with civil actors, bringing
together military operations with political objectives. In NATO terms, this enables the transition from offensive or defensive operations to security and stability operations, creating an environment where Alliance forces can leave the area much sooner.

The NATO definition of CIMIC is:

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”

For NATO, the core CIMIC functions are grouped into three broad areas that together comprise the total CIMIC contribution in support of the commander:

- **Civil-military liaison**, which includes establishing and maintaining liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning, and conduct of operations;

- **Support to the force**, which includes: provision of information on the civil situation, including assessment and evaluation of civil situation; the conduct of CIMIC activities, including CIMIC projects and quick and long-term impact projects with or without civilian partners; promoting force acceptance; influencing the civil society in the mission area; and facilitating access to civilian resources when needed; and

- **Support to civil actors and their environment**, encompassing all support provided by a military force to civilian authorities, organizations, and populations.

In addition to CIMIC staff officers in command groups at the joint task force, operational, and tactical levels (J9 or G9), NATO forces deploy CIMIC groups, CIMIC units, and CIMIC elements. These provide a structured organization for NATO forces to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the mission. Their size and deployment duration are determined by task and how quickly the appropriate civil actors and structures can be established. In addition to CIMIC staff performing a general CIMIC mission, NATO may also deploy CIMIC functional specialists to meet a specific requirement for expertise in a certain field to assist in the planning process or to conduct CIMIC projects. They may not necessarily be military personnel. Specific areas could include public infrastructure and facilities, rule of law, etc.

NATO also has a CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in the Netherlands that serves as the training centre for NATO CIMIC to help develop and deliver doctrine and operational guidance on, CIMIC planning, CIMIC centres, and CIMIC techniques, as well as training for NATO CIMIC officers, specialists, and units.

The EU calls the concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CMCO), and defines it as:

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental [organizations] and agencies.”
The major difference between the NATO and EU concepts is that the NATO concept is more operational, whereas the EU concept is more political-military guidance for the coordination of EU activities.

**United States: Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs**

United States forces define civil-military operations as:

“...the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.”

US Civil Affairs forces and operations fall within civil-military operations.

Civil Affairs, which comprises largely US Army Reserve forces, traces its historical roots to military government operations in the North American frontier and newly obtained territories of the United States in the nineteenth century through the occupation of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. It is made up of designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations, which are defined as: “the actions planned, executed, and assessed by CA forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.” The core competencies and functions that Civil Affairs forces have to conduct civil affairs operations include:

» Civil Affairs activities (CAA)
  • Civil information management (CIM).
  • Civil-military operations centre (CMOC).
  • Civil engagement (CE).
  • CAO staff support.

» Military government operations (MGO)
  • Transitional military authority (TMA).
  • Support to civil administration (SCA).
Civil Affairs supported activities (CASA)

- Nation assistance (NA).
- Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).
- Populace and resources control (PRC).
- Civil-military engagement (CME).

These lines of operation are conducted in coordination with US government agencies, intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, NGOs and civil society organizations, and the host nation.

There are nearly 10,000 Civil Affairs personnel in the US military. About 90 per cent of them are in the Army, and about 85 per cent are in the Reserves. They are particularly suited for this mission as they live in both civilian and military worlds and may draw upon expertise in civilian occupations such as law enforcement, engineering, medicine, law, banking, public administration, etc. As part of their changing mission template, Civil Affairs forces are increasingly seen in conflict prevention engagement missions to “build partnership capacity” in civil-military operations among troop-contributing countries, particularly in Africa. A handful have been posted to UN field missions.

**Relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination**

What the NATO, EU, and US approaches to civil-military cooperation have in common is that they see civil-military cooperation as a tool for command and control. It is something done in the service of the commander and the military mission. It is there to assist and serve the military commander in the execution of his or her military task and the achievement of the military objective.

The essential difference between these approaches and similar activities undertaken in the UN context is that UN peace operations have an integrated military, civilian, and police mandate and mission structure. The civil-military relationships between components of the peace operation and between the peace operation and the rest of the UN System are largely predetermined by the organizational structure of the specific UN peace operation. In the case of both UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord, the focus is thus on how best to manage the coordination of an established UN system.

CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legal entity, and external (external to NATO or EU) civilian role players in the same area of operations. To date, each NATO/EU operation has been unique, necessitating civil-military coordination mechanisms for each specific set of actors in each specific mission environment. UN peace operations are motivated by the need to maximize coordination among their own multidimensional components, and to establish cooperation between the UN peace operation and other actors in the peacekeeping mission area. As the same UN system actors deploy together into most missions, there has been more room to establish system-wide policies and mechanisms that can be used in a range of actual missions.

One of the most obvious differences between civil-military cooperation (as it is used in NATO CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (as it is used in the UN context) is the use of two different words, “cooperation” and “coordination.”
In the UN context, cooperation is viewed as the strongest relationship that can exist between civilian, military, and police components. It is seen as a relationship where the component partners agree to synchronize their policies and activities to undertake joint action. Most often, however, the institutional effort necessary to achieve full cooperation can only be achieved and maintained under special conditions, for a limited time, and for a specific purpose, for example, during an election. Under normal circumstances, a less intense relationship is preferred. This state is referred to in its minimal form as coexistence, especially in the humanitarian context. This normally implies that the parties to this relationship exchange information, come together for coordination meetings, and occasionally undertake some form of joint activity, for instance, a humanitarian convoy with a military escort. Regardless of whether there is open cooperation or only limited coexistence, some amount of coordination is required. Coordination in the UN context can therefore range on a scale from cooperation in its maximum state to coexistence in its minimum state.

Nevertheless, there are some complementarities, if not compatibilities, among these civil-military approaches. These major international players are realizing the complex landscape that impacts their approaches to civil-military coordination; the simultaneous nature of everything from conflict prevention to conflict management to peacebuilding; and the need for comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches. The key for any civil-military practitioner in international peace operations is to become familiar enough with these various approaches to facilitate greater interoperability in general while protecting the integrity of numerous multilateral, regional, and national organizations working for a common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations.

In many ways, civil-military coordination is more a mindset than a skill set, and is the application of common-sense wisdom.

Conclusion

In this lesson, we covered:

- The nature of civil-military coordination in international peace operations — what it is and what it is not — and an understanding of how it applies in today’s peace and security landscape;
- How the nature and base principles of civil-military coordination are drawn from international laws and criteria on the use of force; and
- Comparative civil-military approaches and their relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination, including UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC.
Some Civil-Military Coordination Rules of Thumb

- Civil-military coordination is more a mindset than a skill-set.
- Build relationships and promote dialogue among unlikely partners.
- It’s not about us; it’s about them.
- Civilianize – work by, with, and through external civil partners.
- Support the establishment and expansion of “humanitarian space”, try to “do no harm”, and consider military assets as a “last resort”.
- Fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
- “Their game plan is our game plan.”
- Localize – promote local (or internal) ownership.
- Provide assistance more indirectly than directly.
- Manage your expectations, the expectations of those you work for and with, and the expectations of those you are helping.
- Perception is often reality.
- Actions (or inactions) speak louder and longer than words.
- Your measurements are part of a bigger picture.

For additional education and training

- The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) provides e-learning courses, some of which are no-fee, which may be of use to civil-military actors. Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Conflict Series 1 – What Is Conflict?; Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.
- *Civil Society-Military-Police Handbook and Curriculum on Human Security* (March 2016), a modular training handbook done by the Civil Society Consortium available through the student classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1-3 and 5 of the Handbook. See also *Local Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches* (March 2016), in particular Chapters 2, 6, and 7, as well as the Policy Brief – Local Ownership, Coordination, and Human Security (December 2015).
- NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence courses are available at: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>. Although most of the courses are in-residence requiring funding, the CCOE offers one free online course, the NATO CMI/CIMIC Awareness Course. It also maintains links to the latest developments in CIMIC, directly or indirectly related to NATO, as well as CIMIC lessons-learned, etc.
Further References


- *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)*, DPKO/DFS (1 November 2010). Available for download through the student classroom.


End-of-Lesson Quiz »

1. Civil-military coordination is inherently strategic because:
   A. It is widely misconstrued at “public affairs”
   B. It covers the full spectrum of peace operations
   C. It is about managing the interaction among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process and managing the transition from conflict to peace
   D. That is how the United Nations defines it

2. Which of the following is NOT a major difference between UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord?
   A. UN-CIMIC is a military concept under the UN system while UN-CMCoord is a humanitarian concept
   B. UN-CIMIC covers the full spectrum of UN peace operations while UN-CMCoord concerns itself only with humanitarian coordination
   C. UN-CMCoord is managed by OCHA while UN-CIMIC is undertaken by the military component of a UN peacekeeping operation
   D. UN-CIMIC is inherently strategic, while UN-CMCoord is primarily about public relations

3. The operative principles of civil-military coordination in peace operations are rooted in each of the following documents or ideas EXCEPT:
   A. The UN Charter
   B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
   C. The international criteria on the use of force
   D. The principles of peacekeeping

4. The operative principles of civil-military coordination in peace operations include:
   A. The primacy of civilian authority, the military as supported and not supporting, indirect versus direct support, and civil-military liaison and information-sharing
   B. The primacy of military authority, the military as supporting and not supported, indirect versus direct support, management of civil-military interaction and transition, and civil assistance
   C. The primacy of civilian authority, the military as supporting and not supported, the military as enabler, indirect versus direct support, management of civil-military interaction and transition
   D. The primacy of military authority, the military as supporting and not supported, the military as enabler, indirect versus direct support, management of civil-military interaction and transition, and civilianizing and localizing

5. What are the two core UN-CIMIC tasks?
   A. Civil-military liaison and civil assistance
   B. Humanitarian assistance and disaster response
   C. A safe and secure environment and protection of civilians
   D. Civil-military interaction and transition management

Answer Key provided on the next page.
End-of-Lesson Quiz »

6. The primary mandate of the military component of a UN peace operation is ______.
   A. to provide armed escorts
   B. to provide humanitarian support
   C. to provide a safe and secure environment conducive to the sustainable implementation of the peace agreement
   D. to undertake community support projects

7. The international criteria on the use of force are ______.
   A. legitimacy, credibility, and local ownership
   B. consent, impartiality, and non-use of force
   C. seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences
   D. the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

8. True or false? For the foreseeable future, the AU has adopted NATO CIMIC in the absence of its own civil-military doctrine.

9. Why do we need civil-military coordination? (Choose the best two.)
   A. Because the military is increasingly dependent on civilian capacities for its “exit strategy”
   B. Because civilians are less dependent on military assets
   C. Because the complexity of the peace operations environment requires greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities that have cross-cutting impacts and are interdependent
   D. Because increasingly limited resources — including donor funding and peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries — in the face of greater demand must be more judiciously, efficiently, and effectively used
   E. Because the military and civilians have the same mandate

10. True or false? UN-CIMIC is a command-and-control function to achieve the UN military mission, whereas NATO, EU, and US approaches focus entirely on coordination as a tool to achieve NATO, EU, and US mission objectives.

Answer Key »

1. C
2. D
3. B
4. C
5. A
6. C
7. C
8. False
9. C and D
10. False
Appendix A: Glossary and list of Acronyms

The following are key terms used either in UN-CIMIC or which UN-CIMIC officers may encounter in the course of their work with their partners. Most are UN definitions, whereas others are derived from other sources cited in the course. Some are derived from non-cited sources such as the DCAF-ISSAT manual, SSR in a Nutshell (see Appendix G). In some cases, the authors have taken the liberty to modify the definitions to improve clarity of meaning for the purposes of this course.

Accountability is an obligation or willingness to take responsibility or to account for one’s actions according to principles of transparency.

Capacity is the ability of an individual/organization to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual ability), physical capacity (having the right equipment), and institutional capacity (systems and organizational structures in place).

Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF) is a key assessment tool. The CIF enables practitioners to assess institutional reform needs and to develop realistic programming options. The CIF focuses on the capacity and integrity of a public institution, both of which are central to the institution’s ability to perform its mandate. It does this at three levels: the individual, the organizational, and the external.

Capacity Building includes efforts to strengthen the aptitudes, resources, relationships, and facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively to achieve an intended purpose. Capacity building targets individuals, institutions, and their enabling environment.

Civil assistance is a support function that includes two types of related activities undertaken by the military component of a UN integrated mission:

- Support to civilian humanitarian and development actors, which is the preferred steady state of UN-CIMIC; and
- Support to the local civilian population and authorities, or community support projects. Community support projects, which are often related to physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation, are designed to help fill gaps in partner or local capacity that would otherwise risk de-stabilization of the local population or government through loss of public confidence in the peace process. UN-CIMIC ensures these supporting projects take place within joint and collaborative frameworks and processes, e.g., Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

Civil society is the political space between an individual and government. Civil society can help define a country’s security needs and policies, ensure oversight of public institutions, and at times provide security and justice services to segments of the population. It also refers to civil society organizations, non-State, and non-statutory security and justice providers.

Civil Society Organization (CSO) is a non-State organization composed of uncoerced participants with shared interests, values, and purposes, such as ethnic, cultural, political, or religious beliefs. CSOs may include non-governmental organizations, faith groups, think tanks, etc. (Also see civil society.)

Civilianizing is working by, with, and through external civilian leadership.
Civil-military operations is a US term meaning: “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.”

Community support refers to UN-CIMIC activities that help local communities to improve and normalize their lives. Community support operations are aimed at building capacity and confidence in the peace process and creating a positive relationship between the host community and especially civilian external actors and local governance. Community support projects are often related to physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation projects that could be requested by any civilian organization or entity through appropriate mission coordination structures, or proposed by the military component through the appropriate civil-military process.

Complex emergencies are humanitarian crises where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict which may require an international response beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.

Conflict prevention is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Criminal Intelligence is processed information on crimes and criminality to plan, prioritize, and allocate resources in undertaking crime reduction strategies (Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions).

Criteria on the Use of Force

- **Seriousness of threat**: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of force?
- **Proper purpose**: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question?
- **Last resort**: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
- **Proportional means**: Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
- **Balance of consequences**: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse than the consequences of inaction?

Defence Sector Reform (DSR) is a coordinated series of actions designed to improve the effectiveness and accountability of a State’s armed forces.

Development is long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving socio-economic goals or reducing poverty.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is the process during which combatants are disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated back into the community. Each country may use a slightly different version to address their specific needs. In the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the DDR process is referred to as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) to accommodate the fact that some of the combatants had to be repatriated to their country of origin, while others wished to be resettled rather than to be reintegrated back into their original communities. In Liberia, this process was known as DRRR, for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration.

Do No Harm is a humanitarian civil-military principle by which, according to the IASC Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies: “Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to ‘Do No Harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance”. It has gained wider application to civil-military coordination beyond humanitarian assistance.

Do No Harm Analysis is a key assessment tool developed by Dr. Mary B. Anderson. The Do No Harm Analysis is designed to help understand the impact that an assistance programme could have on the relationships between actors in a fragile State environment. If the analysis shows that assistance could increase tensions between local actors, alternative programming options need to be considered in order to eliminate these negative influences.

Emergency relief is action to provide immediate survival assistance and protection to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term assistance in the form of water, sanitation, food, medicines, and shelter.

External actors are the peace operation; the UNCT; international NGOs; regional and sub-regional organizations like the EU, AU, or ECOWAS; and donor agencies.

Failed State is a condition of “State collapse” which depicts a State that can no longer provide basic services (e.g., security, safety, health, education, etc.) to its population, has no effective control over its territory and borders, and cannot reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men, boys and girls of any planned action, in all areas and at all levels. The needs, concerns, and experiences of these groups are an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres, so that everyone benefits according to their needs.

Hostile intent is the threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in hostile intent is required before the use of force is authorized.
**Humanitarian action** comprises assistance, protection, and advocacy activities done on an impartial basis in response to humanitarian needs resulting from complex emergencies and/or natural disasters, or to prevent/mitigate risks and prepare for future events.

**Humanitarian actors** are designated civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, engaged in humanitarian activities.

**Humanitarian assistance** is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance. Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.

**Humanitarian crises** occurs when the lives, health, or well-being of people are in danger as a result of natural disasters, technological or man-made disasters, and violence and conflict.

**Humanitarian principles**, which define the “humanitarian space”, include:

- **Humanity**: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
- **Neutrality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in political, religious, or ideological controversies.
- **Impartiality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
- **Independence** is the autonomy of a particular actor or institution from the actions or policies of a State authority or any other institution.

**Human rights** are those rights that belong to everyone as a member of the human race, regardless of skin colour, nationality, political convictions, religious persuasion, social standing, gender, age, or any other distinction.

**Human security** is a notion of security of individuals and communities rather than States, relating to the freedom from fear and freedom from want. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential.
Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

Independence is the autonomy of a particular actor or institution from the actions or policies of a State authority or any other institution.

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the UN engagement in countries emerging from conflict. In essence, an integrated mission is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, under the leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG RC/HC.

Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), along with the Mission Concept, makes up the foundational documents for operational and resource planning by mission components, and provides the strategic outlook for the entire mission structure. The ISF comprises: main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, UN role, and comparative advantages; peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity development and institution-building; programmatic functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration; agreed results, timelines, responsibilities, and other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms; and a common monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of progress.

Intelligence is processed knowledge, information, and data acquired by various covert and overt methods, for the purpose of predicting or understanding the intentions of groups or States.

Intelligence sector reform is a reform programme concentrating on the intelligence services of a State, seeking — among other things — to ensure a balance between secrecy and transparency, to develop an adequate legal framework ensuring oversight, to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to improve accountability.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an international humanitarian coordination body established by the UN General Assembly that has the membership of nine UN Agencies, Funds, Programmes, and Offices, as well as nine Standing Invitees, including the Red Cross Movement and a number of NGOs.

Internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector, and civil society in all its different varieties.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes, in particular as a result of the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
International community is the wider global population, both State and non-State, which in some cases may denote particular groups of international actors linked by a common mission or project.

International criminal law is a body of laws, norms, and rules governing international crimes and their repression, as well as rules addressing conflict and cooperation between national criminal-law systems.

Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) coordinates the provision of logistical support, in accordance with MLT priorities.

Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) provides integrated analysis of all sources of information to assess medium- and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MLT decision-making.

Joint Operations Centre (JOC) collates situation reports and operational information from all mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. The JOC also acts as a crisis coordination hub.

Joint staff means staff elements within the integrated mission structure that are outside the reporting lines of a single (e.g. military) component. Current examples are Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), Joint Operations Centres (JOC), and Joint Logistics Operations Centres (JLOC).

Judiciary is a system of courts that interprets and applies the law in the name of the sovereign or State.

Justice Sector Reform (JSR) is the transformation or change of justice institutions to make them more independent, effective, and accountable so as to better serve the justice needs of the people.

Last Resort is a humanitarian civil-military principle on the use of MCDA as a tool to complement existing relief mechanisms in order to fulfil unique and specific requirements in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. MCDA should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of MCDA can meet a critical humanitarian need, and is unique in capability and availability. The use of civil protection assets should be needs driven, complementary to, and coherent with humanitarian aid operations, respecting the overall coordinating role of the UN.

Legitimacy is the acceptance of decisions of government leaders and officials by the (local) population based on the fact that the power is acquired and used in line with the accepted procedures and political or moral values of the society in question.

Lessons learned are generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programmes, or policies. Information gained through lessons learned can contribute to greater effectiveness and efficiency in the design and implementation of future activities.
Local ownership is an approach that recognizes that the reform of security and justice policies, institutions, and activities in a given country must be designed, managed, and implemented by national actors rather than external actors.

Localizing is promoting local (or internal) ownership of the peacebuilding process.

Mediation is the intervention into a dispute by an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power — in many respects, a facilitated negotiation.

Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) comprise relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for International Disaster Relief Assistance (IDRA). In the context of the MCDA Guidelines, international disaster relief assistance means material, personnel, and services provided by the international community to an Affected State to meet the needs of those affected by a disaster. It includes all actions necessary to grant and facilitate movement over the territory — including the territorial waters and the airspace — of a Transit State. IDRA delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles is humanitarian assistance.

Millennium Development Goals (MDG), originally pledged in 2000 by 189 nations to free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations, were eight development goals to be achieved by 2015. The eight MDG areas were:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- Achieve universal primary education;
- Promote gender equality and empower women;
- Reduce child mortality;
- Improve maternal health;
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
- Ensure environmental sustainability; and
- Develop a global partnership for development.

Mission support refers to cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the military component of a peace operation, for example, when the military component provides security, such as an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy. When mission support operations are undertaken, UN-CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating, and facilitating the actions of the military units responsible for executing the task. It is thus important for UN-CIMIC officers to understand what mission support is and where it fits into the role and function of UN-CIMIC in the context of complex peace operations.

Multi-National Force (MNF) is a reference to any grouping of countries or a coalition of the willing that come together to undertake a joint operation. An MNF is normally associated with peace enforcement operations authorized by the UN Security Council.
NATO CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations, local authorities, and national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. Because it is a NATO term, the term “CIMIC” alone is not to be used by UN missions to describe the staff function and processes that are covered by UN-CIMIC.

Natural disasters are events caused by natural hazards that seriously affect society, the economy, and/or infrastructure.

Negotiation is communication with the aim of reaching an agreement.

New security agenda is a term that recognizes the wide range of State and non-State actors that can act as security providers — or in some instances, as purveyors of insecurity. It also takes a broad view of security, understanding national security not only in military terms but also in terms of political, social, economic, and environmental security.

Non-governmental organization (NGO) is an organization that is autonomous, voluntary, and non-profit based, and which is not associated with national or local governments.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

Peacebuilding operations are deployed after a peace agreement has been entered into, and are mandated to assist the parties to the peace agreement with consolidating their peace process. They employ a broad range of capacities to assist the local government and community to address both the immediate consequences, and the root causes of the conflict, in order to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. In this sense, peacebuilding and conflict prevention are conversely related.

Peace Enforcement usually occurs in a hostile environment where consent is absent, but where the United Nations Security Council, often out of humanitarian considerations, authorizes use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally sanctioned resolutions or agreements. Peace enforcement is normally associated with Chapter VII of the UN Charter entitled, ”Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. The most important factor in both peace operations and peace enforcement is the impartiality of the peacekeepers.
Peacekeeping is designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements — military, police and civilian — working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

**Peacekeeping Principles**

- *Consent* by the parties to the peace or ceasefire agreement is a dynamic and multilayered concept. It is essential for mission success and must be constantly managed, but it is understood that it may often be lacking at the tactical level.

- *Impartiality* means that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice to the parties to the peace agreement, and should not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality, in the peacekeeping context, refers to non-interference, and if the UN mission is mandated to take action, for instance, to protect civilians, it will interfere according to its mandate. Hence, UN peacekeeping missions are often said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the mission will not take sides, but it will act against any party that is in breach of its mandate.

- *Non-use of Force* still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum amount of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is also now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including those it has been mandated to protect.

**Peacemaking** is the use of diplomatic means of persuading parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.

**Peace Operations** occur when the United Nations, or regional organizations, authorize the deployment of civilian, police, and military personnel to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement or ceasefire, or in some cases to protect civilians even if there is no ceasefire or peace agreement in place. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force.

**Peace Support Operations (PSOs)** are organized international assistance initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict.

**Private Military and Security Company (PMSC)** is a legally established national or international firm offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic manner and by military or paramilitary means.

**Protection of Civilians (POC)** refers to all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical integrity of civilian populations, particularly children, women, and other vulnerable groups, including IDPs; preventing the perpetration of war crimes and other deliberate acts of violence against civilians; securing humanitarian access; and ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with relevant national and international bodies of law, i.e. human rights law and International Humanitarian Law.
Protection missions are not deployed to monitor or implement a ceasefire or peace agreement, but to protect civilians and to create a relatively stable space within which negotiations for a peace agreement can take place. Although UN peace operations normally deploy to implement a peace agreement, i.e. after the violent conflict has come to an end, there have been situations in which a UN peace operation deployed to protect civilians without a peace agreement in place, and without the consent of all the parties engaged in the conflict. More often the case in the last few years, violence may erupt or worsen following the deployment of the established peacekeeping mission.

Programming is a general term for a set of activities designed to achieve a specific objective. In order to ensure that a programme’s results, outputs, and overall outcome are reached, activities are often framed by a strategy, key principles, and identified targets. Together, these indicate how the activities will be structured and implemented.

Programme/project cycle is the course of a programme or a project’s lifetime. This commonly includes the stages of assessment and identification, design and planning, implementation, monitoring and review, evaluation, and learning lessons.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, rapidly implementable projects of benefit to the population. These projects are funded through the mission budget and are used by the UN peacekeeping operation to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation. In most UN missions, QIPs are managed by Civil Affairs on behalf of the SRSG.

Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.

Recovery is action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development, thus ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter.

Refugee is a person who is outside his or her country of origin and has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Rehabilitation is action aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods; overlaps with emergency relief and is typically targeted for achievement within the first two years after the conflict has ended.

Results-Based Management (RBM) is a broad management strategy aimed at achieving improved performance and demonstrable results. RBM includes elements of design, monitoring, and evaluation and contributes to learning, risk management, and accountability.
Rule of law is the principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency (Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616).

Security and development nexus is an understanding that security and development are mutually reinforcing factors and the recognition that they are intrinsically linked.

Security is the absence of real or perceived threats to acquired values or to someone’s well-being.

Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are also included. The security sector also includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies, and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are all lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried by an individual combatant (SA) or a light vehicle (LW) that does not require substantial logistic and maintenance capability. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW.

Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of humanitarian agencies and organizations worldwide together around a common aim — to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors, and affected populations.

Spoiler is an individual or party who believes that the particular policy or activity could threaten their power and interests and who will therefore work to undermine it.

Stability is a situation where the political and security systems and the actors, rules, cultures, and institutions associated with them achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of order and where there is an absence of large scale violence within a country.
**Stakeholder** is a broad term used to denote all local, national, and international actors, including the State, civil societies, and business, which have an interest in the outcome of a particular activity or process.

**Stakeholder analysis** is a key assessment tool, the stakeholder analysis aims to identify potential stakeholders of security and justice reform programmes and determine their interests, influence/power, and whether that influence is positive or negative to the programme. This information can be visually mapped on a grid of low and high influence and interest.

**Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),** or Global Goals, which succeeded the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, are guiding development assistance policy and funding for the next 15 years. These goals, comprehensive of civil society, look to:

1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere;
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture;
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages;
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all;
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls;
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all;
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all;
8. Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth; full and productive employment; and decent work for all;
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation;
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries;
11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable;
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts;
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development;
15. Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems; sustainably manage forests; combat desertification; and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss;

16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; provide access to justice for all; and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels; and

17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

**SWOT Analysis** is a strategic planning method used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats involved in a policy or project.

**Terms of Reference (ToR)** is a document that describes the purpose and structure of a project as well as the parties, their roles, and responsibilities in accomplishing a shared goal. Also used as synonymous to a job or position description of responsibilities of a staff member.

**Transition** is the period following the signing of a peace agreement and the transition from an appointed interim government and before democratic elections take place.

**Transparency** is free and open access to information which enables civil society to perform its regulatory function, ensuring that stakeholders are accurately informed about the decision-making process and have the ability to influence it.

**Vetting** is a process of examination and evaluation, generally referring to performing a background check on someone before offering him or her employment, or conferring an award.

**UN Civil Affairs** is a civilian component of a UN integrated mission with a role to engage and assist local civilian authorities and communities in efforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political, legal, economic, and social infrastructures that support democratic governance and economic development. In missions that have a transitional administration mandate the Civil Affairs component can become a civil administration, responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life while simultaneously working to devolve its responsibilities to local authorities.

**UN Civil Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC)** is a military staff function in UN integrated missions that facilitates the interface between the military and civilian components of the mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission objectives.

**UN Cluster System** is the result of a UN review of the global humanitarian system in 2005 that highlighted a number of gaps in humanitarian response. Established by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the cluster system consists of groupings of UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other international organizations organized around a sector or service regularly provided during a humanitarian crisis. Each cluster is led by a designated agency. The following clusters have been
established: Protection; Camp Coordination and Management; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; Health; Emergency Shelter; Nutrition; Emergency Telecommunications; Logistics; Early Recovery; Education; and Agriculture.

**UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)** is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

### Table of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>County Development Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIU</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation [European Union term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCS</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction [NATO term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMLog</td>
<td>Civil-Military Logistics [humanitarian term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS/DMS</td>
<td>Chief/Director of Mission Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent-Owned Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPs</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACO</td>
<td>Development Assistance Coordination Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department of International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Department of Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defense Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of Security and Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERR</td>
<td>Emergency Response Roster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander (see also HOMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Agency for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMC</td>
<td>Head of Military Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoS</td>
<td>Head of Sector [African Union term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HuMOCC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Integrated Assessment and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRA</td>
<td>International Disaster Relief Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSARAG</td>
<td>International Search and Rescue Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>Individual Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Integrated Strategic Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Integrated Support Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOTC</td>
<td>Joint Operations and Tasking Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRC</td>
<td>Local Project Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief, Recovery, and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Measures and Evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEOM</td>
<td>Military Expert on Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILAD</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Mandate Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>Military Liaison Officer [humanitarian term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Project Approval Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians/Police Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Project Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council [African Union term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMT</td>
<td>QIPs Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCE</td>
<td>Support to the Civil Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission [African Union term]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STF</td>
<td>Support to the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Action Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Field Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre [humanitarian]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Empowerment of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>Violent Extremist Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer Terms of Reference

**UN-CMCoord Officers**

The following terms of reference are from the OCHA CMCoord Field Handbook of September 2015.

- **Liaise** with the headquarters of regional organizations (not covered by OCHA Liaison Offices) at the strategic and policy level, to promote adherence to existing guidelines, and contribute to building capacity for civil-military relations.
- As appropriate, participate in **military exercises** and **pre-deployment training** of national and regional military forces.
- Ensure that civil-military coordination information is included in **information products** (maps, SitReps, etc.).
- Ensure that the necessary **CMCoord human resources** are available to implement the above-mentioned tasks.
- Conduct a **CMCoord assessment** and analysis of the civil-military environment (through CMCoord focal point or with support from CMCS or OCHA’s Surge Capacity Section).
- **Connect** with senior military officers in international and national military forces, military liaison officers, relevant government institutions, and local authorities, security forces, UN agencies, civilian UN mission staff, and NGOs in the area of responsibility.
- **Sensitize** military commanders and forces on humanitarian principles and coordination mechanisms.
- Establish and maintain **dialogue with humanitarian actors and clusters** in the area of responsibility to provide information channels, and raise issues and concerns with relevant military/paramilitary organizations.
- Connect and bring together the right military and humanitarian actors and **facilitate their dialogue**.
- Establish **CMCoord mechanisms** and **tools** for information exchange as required, e.g. CMCoord cells, internet platforms, FMA request, and tracking mechanisms.
- Lead the development of **country-specific guidance** and ensure that they are properly disseminated and understood by humanitarian actors and military forces, as well as local actors.
- Identify **CMCoord training** needs of humanitarian actors and military forces, design a training strategy and materials, and organize and conduct training events.

**UN Civil Affairs Officers**

The following terms of reference are from the UN Civil Affairs Handbook of 2012.

UN Civil Affairs officers have three core roles for civil affairs in UN peacekeeping, depending on the context and mandate:
Core Role 1: Cross-mission representation, monitoring, and facilitation at the local level

Cross-mission representation, monitoring, and facilitation are performed in most missions and usually throughout the life cycle of the mission. In many situations civil affairs is the most important interface between the UN mission and the community, not just in terms of the local/regional authorities but also civil society in its broadest sense.

Core Role 2: Conflict management, confidence-building, and support to the development of political space

Conflict management, confidence-building, and supporting the development of political space are integral to UN peacekeeping and central to civil affairs work. Through this role, civil affairs actively supports the development of social and civic conditions conducive to sustainable peace, and promotes popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. While often the lead component in this area of work, civil affairs usually undertakes these activities in partnership with other mission components, as well as UN agencies and local and international partners.

Core Role 3: Support to the restoration and extension of state authority

Restoration of state authority is increasingly recognized as a key element of the stabilization of fragile States and a critical requirement for keeping and building peace.

These three core roles play out through the life cycle of a UN field mission, as follows:

During deployment and mission start-up, the civil affairs focus is typically on rapid deployment into the field, depending on the security environment, in order to perform the cross-mission, local-level representation and monitoring role. During the early stages of a mission, civil affairs may be the only civilian component, or one of a few, represented at the local level. As such, it may serve the needs of a wide variety of mission components and other stakeholders not represented. During the early phase, civil affairs components may focus on issues such as:

- Liaison with local communities and local authorities, development of cultural understanding;
- Conflict analysis, early warning, information-gathering, assessment of needs (on a variety of possible issues, ranging from protection of civilians to basic socioeconomic information);
- Identification of potential partnerships, opportunities for cooperation and coordination with other actors at the local level, such as uniformed components and the humanitarian community; and
- Early confidence-building activities, such as rapid identification of a small number of visible QIPs.

All these tasks should draw on the UNCT and capacities of other actors at the local level, and should build on the involvement, priorities, and capacities of local communities and authorities wherever possible. (Engaging longer term actors and focusing on local capacities from the outset can help to facilitate a smoother entry and exit for peacekeeping operations.)
In a formative or transitional political environment, such as a pre-election period, there is often a focus on:

- Activities related to supporting the development of political space at the local level; and
- In-depth activities related to confidence-building and conflict management.

During this phase, a larger variety of civilian components and other stakeholders may be present at the local level and the civil affairs component is likely to focus more narrowly on these specific roles.

In a maturing political environment, such as a post-election period, there is likely to be a continued focus on the activities described above. However, activities in support of the restoration of state authority, where relevant, may expand or shift in emphasis to include, for example, more hands-on support to local-level institutions and newly elected officials.

As the mission begins the process of drawdown and withdrawal, civil affairs may return to a broader function of cross-mission liaison and monitoring, as other civilian components which may have been represented at the local level begin to withdraw. As indicated, planning for this transition should, as far as possible, guide the civil affairs approach from the outset. The aim of the peacekeeping mission is to support the creation of minimum foundations and safeguards until national capacity or specialized international capacity takes over. As discussed, close partnership and planning with longer term actors, particularly UNCT actors, is crucial. Key considerations and areas of focus for civil affairs components during drawdown and withdrawal phases include:

- Monitoring of local perceptions, attitudes, and concerns regarding issues related to transition;
- Outreach to communities to manage expectations and/or address concerns and misconceptions at the local level (e.g., about what UNCT can realistically provide, or what the mission will leave behind);
- Ongoing analysis of local context and early warning systems, including in relation to the security situation as international uniformed components draw down;
- Monitoring of mission benchmarks related to withdrawal; and
- Handover of activities, including assessment of local capacities, identification of partners (national or international), analysis of potential gaps at the local level.

Suggested UN-CIMIC Staff Terms of Reference

The following terms of reference are from Annex A of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive (see Appendix E). These, in turn, are based largely on those found in the DPKO/DFS UN Standby Arrangements System Mission HQ On-Call List Job Descriptions for CIMC officers. Additional ToRs may be found at Annex 3 (Generic Terms of Reference for UN-CMCoord Officers) of the UN-CIMIC Policy (Appendix A).

Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9/U9)

(1) Under the direction of the Force Chief of Staff, serves as the UN mission principal staff proponent for civil-military coordination; advises the Force Command Group and Mission Leadership Team on UN-CIMIC with respect to the mission.
(2) Principal civil-military liaison between the FHQ and the civil component of the mission, UN agencies, host nation government, CSOs/NGOs, etc; responsible for operational- (country) level civil-military coordination — member of the UNCT.

(3) Plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of the Force UN-CIMIC strategy. Ensures civil-military common operational picture through synchronization with civilian strategies, programs, and events, including public information.

(4) Assesses the civil and civil-military situations and the conduct of UN-CIMIC; provides input to the mission analysis process through the JMAC.

(5) Provides “reach back” support for tactical UN-CIMIC — operational UN-CIMIC guidance, information, and identification of resources.

(6) Prepares and updates UN-CIMIC plans, SOPs, and directives and the coordination of these with other Force plans, SOPs, and directives.

(7) Educates military and civilian partners on UN-CIMIC; manages training for UN-CIMIC and related civilian personnel.

(8) Synchronizes UN-CIMIC with information operations; principal UN-CIMIC spokesperson.

(9) Serves as a member of the QIPs Management Team (QMT) and/or Project Review Committee.

(10) Performs other duties as assigned by Force Command Group.

**Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC (D-J9/U9)**

(1) Responsible for the management, administration, and operational rhythm of the J9/U9 UN-CIMIC staff and office operations as an operational level “UN-CIMIC centre”.

(2) Performs G5 CIMIC management of tasks, both external and internal to J9/U9 UN-CIMIC in origin; oversees plans-operations transition of J9/U9 UN-CIMIC projects.

(3) Ensures preparation and distribution of weekly, monthly and special UN-CIMIC assessments in accordance with the Force reports annex.

(4) Responsible for J9/U9 UN-CIMIC information and document management.

(5) Oversees preparation and delivery of routine Force HQ UN-CIMIC briefings.

(6) Coordinates UN-CIMIC support to appropriate security sector forces, organizations, or entities under the guidance of the J9/U9 and to host nation police forces through UNPOL.

(7) Coordinates and organizes UN-CIMIC training, to include UN-CIMIC induction, the Mission UN-CIMIC Course, and access to external training and education sources.

(8) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact.

(9) Coordinates UN-CIMIC-related logistics support with the UN-CMCoord or CMLog Officer for non-UN entities.

(10) Assessment and action officer on civil development functional area (“pillar”) as specified and directed by the J9/U9.
(11) Assumes the duties of the Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9/U9) in absence.

**Operations Officer**

(1) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, responsible for project management and coordination of all CIMIC activities under current execution as directed by the FHQ and as specified by the J9/U9. Some projects, however, are assigned through the entire life cycle, as determined by the J9/U9.

(2) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in the management, administration, and operational rhythm of the J9/U9 UN-CIMIC staff and office operations as a virtual operational-level “UN-CIMIC centre”, as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.

(3) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact with respect to current UN-CIMIC activities and projects.

(4) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, liaises and coordinates with Force HQ and Sector UN-CIMIC officers and Sector HQ staff on UN-CIMIC assessment and activities; advises the J9/U9 on the UN-CIMIC situation in those commands.

(5) Provides input to UN-CIMIC assessments and briefings as appropriate; prepares assessments and provides briefings as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.

(6) Synchronizes UN-CIMIC with information operations under the direction of the J9/U9; specifically, preparation of UN-CIMIC inputs to public information initiatives.

(7) Assumes the duties of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC and Plans Officer in absence.

**Plans Officer**

(1) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, assists the J9/U9 in the preparation and update of UN-CIMIC plans, SOPs, and directives and the coordination of these with other Force plans, SOPs, and directives.

(2) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, responsible for project management and coordination of all UN-CIMIC activities in planning phases as directed by the Force HQ and as specified by the J9/U9. Some projects, however, are assigned through the entire life cycle, as determined by the J9/U9.

(3) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact with respect to UN-CIMIC plans functions.

(4) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in J9/U9 UN-CIMIC information and document management.

(5) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in J9/U9 UN-CIMIC operational task management.

(6) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in UN-CIMIC training and education management.

(7) Provides input to UN-CIMIC assessments and briefings as appropriate; prepares assessments and provides briefings as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.

(8) Assumes the duties of the Operations Officer in absence.
**Sector and Unit UN-CIMIC Officers**

1. Chief command adviser and staff proponent for Sector/Unit UN-CIMIC.

2. Under the direction of the sector/unit commander or chief of staff, liaises and coordinates with Heads of Field Offices and UN CMCoord, Civil Affairs, and other civilian actors, as appropriate, as well as unit UN-CIMIC officers and staff, MEOMs, and UNPOL.

3. Oversees conduct of civil reconnaissance in sector in coordination with MEOMs and other information providers in order to provide the commander situational understanding of the civil and civil-military situation in the Sector/Unit AoR and recommend UN-CIMIC and related courses of action.

4. Provides weekly UN-CIMIC assessments in accordance with the Force reports annex.

5. Responsible for sector or unit UN-CIMIC information and document management; promotes information-sharing per the UN-CIMIC SOP or Base Directive.

6. Plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of UN-CIMIC projects in-sector per the Base Directive and project management annex; conducts sector or unit UN-CIMIC task management; serves as chief Sector/Unit QIPs officer and is a member of the Local Projects Review Committee (LPRC).

7. Synchronizes sector/unit UN-CIMIC and Sector/Unit AoR information operations; principal Sector/Unit spokesperson on UN-CIMIC.

8. Manages and provides training and education for sector or unit UN-CIMIC officers and related civilian personnel, as appropriate; educates partners on UN-CIMIC role.

9. Performs other duties as assigned by the sector or unit commander or chief of staff, as appropriate.

**UN-CIMIC Sergeant**

1. Under the direction of the assigned UN-CIMIC officer, executes UN-CIMIC internal administrative management and information management functions as specified.

2. Perform physical or virtual UN-CIMIC centre operations sergeant tasks, as appropriate.

3. Assists UN-CIMIC information and document management, as well as distribution of UN-CIMIC products; maintains UN-CIMIC contact lists.

4. Provides research and other input, as directed or appropriate, for UN-CIMIC assessments.

5. Provides administrative assistance to UN-CIMIC task management and scheduling.

6. Provides administrative assistance to training and education management.

7. Prepares briefings and documents as directed.

8. Maintains accountability of personnel and property as well as equipment readiness; performs section supply and logistics functions.


10. Performs other duties as assigned by the appropriate UN-CIMIC officer.
Appendix C: Sample Civil-Military Project Management Guidelines & Project Management Outline

The following SOP is from Annex C of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive 15 June 2009.

CIMIC Project Management in UNMIL – General Guidelines

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure effective and efficient management of any CIMIC project undertaken by the UNMIL military in order to:
   a. Generate desired effects of improved capacity and confidence at local level.
   b. Narrow essential public service gaps that may result in civil instability.
   c. Transition ownership of public service responsibilities to the Government of Liberia (GoL) in a sustainable manner.

2. **Project Assessment.** Every CIMIC project should be based on an in-depth assessment (see Annex B) in accordance with the CIMIC lines of coordination and support in the Base Directive should be conducted. Of paramount importance is to have the project come at the request of the appropriate GoL structure — which should have the project lead and comprise the “storefront” operation, be joint and collaborative, and feature military assets in a supporting role. The assessment should identify a key opportunity or challenge with respect to fulfilment of the GoL Poverty Reduction Strategy/County Development Agendas (PRS/CDAs) and UNDAF. PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives should be specifically referenced in the CIMIC proposal. Involving the GoL from the very start maximizes ownership of the project and provides an opportunity to assist the beneficiary GoL office with its own project management skills development, thus multiplying the capacity-building effect. The project should be focused on answering the question: “What are the desired effects or outcomes and can they be made sustainable”? Risks and opportunities of conducting and not conducting the project should be carefully evaluated against intended effects. Additionally, assessment should also consider that the intended project does not favour one religious, ethnic or political group of people and that does not have adverse effects on the cultural or power balance in the area. However, in order to make a comprehensive assessment, consultation with the local county officials, county support team, concerned UNMOs, UN agencies, NGOs, and other beneficiaries/stakeholders should be carried out along with ground reconnaissance and survey.

3. **Project Planning and Coordination.** Based on the assessment, CIMIC officers should embark on meticulous planning and designing of the intended project under following guidance:
   a. At the onset, the project proposal should address the main opportunity or challenge identified in the assessment, using the “5WH” [who, what, when, where, why, and how] method per Annex B.
   b. An appropriate project title should be selected. The title should mainly enhance GoL/community lead and “storefront” — therefore, let them name the project. Reference should be made to specific PRS/CDA objectives, as appropriate.
   c. Projects will be joint — at Sector/unit level through the Sector/unit CIMIC-Head of Field Office/County Support Team line of coordination.
d. Projects will also be collaborative — i.e., include participation of UN agency and international or local national NGOs.

e. Project planning and design should also involve county/district level officials as appropriate (see paragraph 2 above).

f. For project funds/resources, coordinate with civil partners under joint and collaborative effort. When military resources are used, these should never be at the expense of Force core missions or the welfare of Force personnel.

g. Project design should identify and articulate the tasks of three distinct phases: planning and coordination phase; implementation phase; and sustainment phase. Responsibilities of all partners/stakeholders and lines of coordination in every phase should also be spelled out. To ensure commitment and smooth compliance, agreement from the civil partners/stakeholders should be solicited in the first phase.

h. Project design should include a time frame that will show when each task will start and end. One way of doing this is to list the tasks in different phases and indicate the start and end dates against each. A planning matrix identifying desired outcomes (per PRS/CDA and UNDAF) and respective stakeholder responsibilities is a very effective tool to build consensus and insure coverage of tasks.

j. Project design should involve a sustainment strategy; namely, discussing by what ways and means the beneficiary/stakeholders will maintain the project following military withdrawal.

4. **Project Implementation.**

a. As required, UNMIL CIMIC concludes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other appropriate contractual agreement between the Force and all other partners. This could also be in the form of the planning matrix.

b. Coordinate with the partners/stakeholders according to the CIMIC lines of coordination and support in the [UNMIL CIMIC] Base Directive and within the agreed time frame.

c. Involve at least a minimum participation of appropriate county or district-level officials and push them out in front of the project lead.

d. Engage local and UNMIL public information assets to advertise the GoL as in the lead. This event should be coordinated through local Civil Affairs and PIO, as appropriate.

e. Monitor progress using GoL/civilian organization measures of effectiveness or success indicators. Ensure all information is formatted to support information-sharing and capacity-building of GoL knowledge/data systems.

f. Use local labour or contractors in the project works when feasible. Provide on-the-job skills training when feasible in order to build skilled labor base.

g. Periodically help conduct joint, collaborative in-progress reviews to evaluate the progress and take corrective action when necessary.
5. **Project Sustainment.**

   a. Before disengagement, ensure its sustainability with respect to capacity and confidence effects or desired outcomes identified in the planning phase.

   b. Upon completion or military withdrawal, UNMIL CIMIC, though Civil Affairs, helps the beneficiary (GoL) conduct an after-action or in-progress review involving of all partners/stakeholders to identify best practices to sustain and areas to improve the next time, ensure knowledge and information sharing, and identify a follow-on project.

6. **Managing Challenges.** Sound management of any project is key to overcoming challenges of joint, collaborative project management. Specifically:

   a. Care must be taken while making the assessment. Special attention should be paid in understanding desired effects/outcomes, context, contacts, timeframe, etc.

   b. If certain outcomes/objectives are to be reached by a specified time, plan backwards with plenty of “cushion” time to account for problems that may be reached in mobilizing stakeholders and/or resources, obtaining decisions, etc.

   c. While planning and designing the project, likely risk factors should be calculated, and possible mitigation strategy/alternatives identified accordingly.

   d. To ensure realistic evaluation and monitoring of the progress, goals, and objectives against each task/event should be made quantifiable/measurable as far as possible, using the beneficiaries’ benchmark system.

   e. In UNMIL CIMIC projects where various civil-military actors, stakeholders and beneficiaries from different organizations/communities are involved, resource mobilization and coordination is very challenging. Forging relationships and robust coordination and liaison mechanism among partners is the most reliable safeguard.

   f. Sustainability is more challenging than completing a project. Hence, “front-loading” ownership in the project management cycle as well as know-how transfer, both technical and administrative, to the appropriate stakeholders/local officials and long term monitoring mechanism should be ensured before disengagement.

7. **Project Management Format.** Care should be taken to use the beneficiary’s or a major partner’s project management format. The military should provide a format as a last resort. Consultation to include important components of project planning, implementation, and sustainment as discussed above may be appropriate. In the absence of any civilian project management formats, the format below may be considered as a basis for consensus.
UNMIL CIMIC Project Management Outline

1. **Assessment** – opportunities or challenges identified; should relate to capacity and confidence at local level.

2. **Description of Project** ("5WH") and specific PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives/outcomes.

3. **Intended Effects/Outcomes**
   a. First Order (beneficiary – specific primary GoL physical or organizational capacity targeted for development; note applicable PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives)
   b. Second Order (additional capacities enhanced, e.g., other beneficiary capacities, skill development, beneficiary project management, etc.)
   c. Third Order (potential public confidence effects through capacities improved)

4. **Stakeholders/Contributors**
   a. GoL – name of project and project leader
   b. UN agency – name of project officer(s)
   c. NGO – name of project officer(s)
   d. UNMIL Civil Component (HoFO/CST) – name of project officer(s)
   e. UNMIL Force – name of project officer(s)

5. **Resources** (material, financial, services, personnel, etc.)
   a. GoL
   b. UN Agency
   c. NGO
   d. UN Civil Component
   e. UNMIL Force
6. **Implementation Plan** (attach planning matrix as appropriate — the planning matrix may list all stakeholders on one side, project objectives/outcomes on the other, and a listing in each box area of what tasks and/or resources by whom are to be used to help reach this objective/outcome; the matrix may also be a timeline that shows who does what, when, and where in order to reach objectives).

   a. Responsibilities
   
   b. Coordination scheme (attach coordination matrix as appropriate)
   
   c. Monitoring/measurements
   
   d. Risk management — identify possible risks and means to mitigate them
   
   e. Evaluation criteria/scheme
   
   f. Public information and community sensitization plan (per Annex D)

7. **Sustainability Plan**

   a. Explain how beneficiary will sustain the project following military withdrawal, with what resources, by whom, etc.
   
   b. Force capabilities not to be required in future as a result
   
   c. Possible follow-on/related projects to exploit effects reached by this project.
Appendix D: Sample UN Mission UN-CIMIC Training and Education Plan

To view this entire document, visit the student classroom.

The following SOP is from Annex E of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive (see Appendix F).

UNMIL CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC) EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1. General. For especially the drawdown phase, a critical CIMIC vulnerability is the relatively low understanding of CIMIC in the Mission and among the Force and the shortage of trained CIMIC military officers. To mitigate this, the G5 CIMIC has instituted a multi-sourced education and training strategy to improve overall understanding of CIMIC, build CIMIC capability, and thus enhance Mission coordination.

2. CIMIC Education. UNMIL CIMIC education is intended to improve overall understanding of UNMIL CIMIC among Mission civilian and military staff, as well as civilian partners among agencies, NGOs, and the GoL in order to advance civil-military coordination and further CIMIC goals. Major activities include:
   a. CIMIC concept briefings delivered to civilian and military executive leadership, staff, etc. and professional development venues, meetings, etc.
   b. CIMIC induction briefing.
   c. Sharing of background papers and this Directive with select offices and organizations.
   d. Sharing of CIMIC assessments with select offices and organizations.

3. CIMIC Training. UNMIL CIMIC training is primarily aimed at enhancing CIMIC and related personnel knowledge, skills and abilities with respect to the conduct of the UNMIL CIMIC mission. Major activities include:
   a. As directed by the Force Commander, the G5 organizes and executes an UNMIL CIMIC course every two to three months. Training audiences, in order of priority, are UNMIL CIMIC personnel, UNMOs, related military staff, UNCA, related UNMIL civilian staff, and UN agency and NGO personnel. This course is designed to provide a general understanding of CIMIC as applied in UNMIL, explain how CIMIC works with related military and civilian activities, and introduce basic CIMIC skills in assessment and project management. An example of the course program of instruction is below.
   b. United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute CIMIC course. This course is among a menu of online courses on peacekeeping and is free for most peacekeepers. For others, it is at very low cost. The course provides a general introduction of comparative CIMIC and a discussion of applied CIMIC from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) perspective. It is highly recommended as enhancement training following the UNMIL CIMIC course. The G5 CIMIC provides copies of the program of instruction for this online course. For further information and to enroll, go to: http://www.peaceopstraining.org
   c. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination course. This course focuses on the OCHA concept of CIMIC (“CMCoord”), which concentrates on humanitarian coordination. UNMIL leadership
Appendix E: Sample UN-CIMIC Directive

To view this entire document, visit the student classroom.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL)

FORCE HEADQUARTERS (FHQ)

CIVIL-Military Coordination (CIMIC)

FORCE DIRECTIVE

FOR THE CONDUCT OF CIMIC BY THE UNMIL FORCE

FOR THE DRAWDOWN PHASE

Version 2 to be effective 1502359ZJUN09
Appendix F: Sample UN-CIMIC Operations Briefing

To view this entire document, visit the student classroom.
Appendix G: Survey of Further Civil-Military Training & Education Resources

The following constitute additional resources worldwide for UN-CIMIC officers to enhance their own professional development, either in a deployment or home-stationed status.

1. Additional POTI Courses. The following POTI course are recommended as enhancements to this course:

   - Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations
   - International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
   - Ethics in Peacekeeping
   - Human Rights
   - Human Rights and Peacekeeping
   - Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
   - Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission
   - Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
   - United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities
   - Protection of Civilians
   - The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations: Principles of Intervention and Management
   - Gender Perspectives in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
   - Preventing Violence Against Women and Gender Inequality in Peacekeeping
   - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and Management in Peacekeeping Operations
   - Security for Peace Operations Personnel
   - Methods and Techniques for Serving on a Peacekeeping Mission as a UN Military Observer
   - Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction

2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination course. This course focuses on the OCHA concept of CIMIC (“CMCoord”), which concentrates on humanitarian coordination. Personnel who are unable to attend the course may nonetheless take the CMCoord IMPACT course online. For more information, go to: <https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-civil-military-coordination>.
3. *Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations*, ACCORD, 2007, Durban. UN and African CIMIC Officers who have not had an opportunity to attend a CIMIC course prior to deployment will find this handbook particularly useful as a self-study guide. It will also be of interest to those interested in learning more about civil-military coordination in UN and African peace operations. For more information, go to: <http://www.accord.org.za/publication/conflict-management-for-peacekeepers-and-peacebuilders/>.

4. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence CIMIC Courses. The CCOE Training & Education (T&E) Branch provides support, creates products, offers specialized education and training in order to enhance the general knowledge about CIMIC and to enable military and civil operators to conduct CIMIC-related tasks in different missions and scenarios, while simultaneously contributing to the lessons learned process. For more information, go to: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>.

About the Authors: Col. Christopher Holshek (retired)

Christopher Holshek, Colonel, US Army Civil Affairs (retired) is an international peace and security consultant focused on civil-military relations and operations and peace and stability operations education and training.

Chris Holshek has over three decades of civil-military experience at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in joint, inter-agency, and multinational settings across the full range of operations. This includes command of the first US Army Civil Affairs battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of Army, Marine, and British forces, as the KFOR Civil-Military Liaison Officer to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and in the planning and deployment of CA forces to the Balkans in the mid-1990s.

He has served with the UN in military and civilian capacities — as a civilian Logistics Officer with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia from 1996-98, and with UNMIK as the Political Reporting Officer from 2000-01, then as Chief of CIMIC at the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2008-09.

Over the years, he has also had significant input to the development of policy and doctrine for NATO CIMIC, US Army Civil Affairs, and US Joint civil-military operations, as well as the UN-CIMIC Policy. In addition to this course, he contributed to the development of a DPKO Integrated Training Service program on UN-CIMIC, the Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes revision of the Civil-Military Coordination in UN and Africa Peace Operations handbook, and to the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict’s Civil Society and Security Sector Engagement for Human Security training and education project as the Senior Military Adviser.

He is currently a member of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) international advisory group for the new Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards to be published in 2017. He is also a senior civil-military adviser at the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area, and as a Director in the Civil Affairs Association, including co-editor of its annual Civil Affairs Issue Papers on subjects of future force development.

He has written extensively on national security and strategic issues, civil-military relations in policy and practice, and stability and peace operations in numerous publications worldwide.
About the Authors: Dr. Cedric de Coning

Dr. Cedric de Coning is a senior researcher with the Peace and Conflict Research Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a senior adviser on peacekeeping and peacebuilding for the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

Dr. Cedric de Coning is an adviser to the High Representative of the African Union Peace Fund, and previously was an adviser to the head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union. He has served on African Union panels to review the African Standby Force (ASF) and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). He was a member of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group, and he worked with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York and with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination

Format and Material

The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.

» Access the exam from your Online Classroom by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/courses/> and clicking the title of this course. Once you arrive at the course page, click the red "Start Exam” button.

Time Limit

There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The “Save” button is located at the bottom of the exam, next to the “Submit my answers” button. Clicking on the “Submit my answers” button will end the exam.

Passing Grade

To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade, and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be awarded a Certificate of Completion.

Continue your POTI training experience »

- Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.
- If a particular category of study interests you, such as Human Rights, Logistics, or Military Studies, consider the POST Certificate programme available in six areas of specialization. See the requirements at <www.peaceopstraining.org/specialized-training-certificates/>.
- Stay connected with POTI by visiting our community page and engaging with other students through social media and sharing photos from your mission. Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/community> for more. Once you pass your exam, see your name featured on the Honour Roll as well.